Sir James Mackintosh has remarked that 'Popular reason can alone correct popular sophistry'—and it is in vain that we expect amendment4 in the reasoning of the multitude, unless we make reasoning intelligible5 to the multitude. As to my object, could I, like Gridiron-Cobbett, adopt a symbol of it, I would have engraved6 ?sop's 'Old Man and his Ass,' who, in a vain attempt to please everybody, failed (like his disciples—for even he has disciples) to please anybody. The folly7 of that superfluously8 philanthropic old gentleman should teach us proportion of purpose. To be of real service; to some is in the compass of individual capacity, and consequently, the true way of serving, if not of pleasing all. The republic of literature, like society, has its aristocratic, its middle, and its lower classes. No one has combined, in one performance, the refinement9 applauded in the universities, with the practical purpose, popular among those who toil11 to live, and live to toil. The populace are my choice—of them I am one, and, like a recent premier12, Earl Grey, am disposed 'to stand by my order.' I write for this class both from affection and taste. If I can benefit any, I can them. I know their difficulties, for I have encountered them—their wants, for they have been mine. This will account for the liberties taken with the subjects upon which I treat. There is more than one kind of hunger that will break through barriers, and I have taken with an unlicensed hand, wherever it was to be found, what I wanted for myself, and what I know to be wanted by those who stand at the anvil13 and the loom14, and who never had the benefits of scholastic15 education, and who never will.
Many of the arts and sciences, which formerly16 resided exclusively in the colleges, and ministered only to the sons of opulence17 and leisure, have escaped from their retreat, and have become the hand-maids of the populace. But as respects logic, there still remains18 between the learned and the illiterate19 an impassable gulf20. The uninformed look on the recondite21 structure of logic, and they are repelled22 by the difficulty of comprehending it, and wrap themselves up in absolute and obstinate23 ignorance, which they believe to be their destiny. The populace, in our manufactories, have to choose between subsistence and intelligence. For study, after protracted24 toil, they have not the strength—and to abridge25 their labour is to abridge their subsistence, and this they cannot afford. But because they are precluded26 by the destiny of civilisation27 from knowing much, they need not remain utterly28 unskilled in reasoning. Their natural good sense may be systematized, their natural logic may be reduced to some rule and order—though it may not be refined it may be practical, it may give power, and develop capacity now dormant29.
The hints, general rules, and elementary remarks dispersed30 throughout this work, will probably be of service to the uninitiated, perhaps put them on the road to higher acquirements, give them a confidence in their own powers, perhaps inspire them with a love of these essential studies, and impart a taste for the refinements31 which lie beyond. My hope is that many will be induced to consult scholastic treatises32, and acquire that accurate knowledge which makes the society of educated people so interesting. Impulse has been given to knowledge, and the populace have begun to think, and both to speak and write their thinkings—and why should they not be enabled to do it free from obvious mistakes, and with a broad propriety34 commensurate with the native capacity they possess? Why should they, like a certain learned politician on a public occasion, propose, as a sentiment, 'The three R's, Reading, 'Riting, and 'Rithmetic?'* Why, in writing, should they not express themselves with strong grammatical coherence35, and a certain bold perspicuity36, if not able to reach refinement and elegance37? Why, in pronunciation, should they not speak with a certain manly38 openness of vowel39 sound and a distinct articulation40, if not with all elocutionary modulation41? Why should not their discourse42 be expressed in brief, clear sentences? If their punctuation43 went no farther than placing capital letters at the commencement of sentences and of proper names, and periods at the conclusion of sentences, it would render their writings more intelligible than are half the communications they now send to the press. If they mastered only brevity and abrupt44 directness, and learned to omit tedious prolixity45, they would command a hearing in many cases where now they are denied one. If in logic they made a shrewd mastery of plain facts—being as sure as they could, when once set on surety, eschewing46 conjecture47 and pernicious supposition—if they followed the methods of nature and good sense, where the elaborate methods of art are hidden from them, who will not admit that they would be more intelligible than now, exercise a power they never yet possessed48, and extort49 the attention and esteem50 of the public where now they excite only its pity, or contempt, or outrage51 what just taste it has? The people would be enabled to do these things, but that so many who prepare treatises for their guidance alarm them by the display of abstruse52 dissertation53 above their powers, their means, their time, and their wants. That a little learning is a dangerous thing is not a maxim54 alone believed in by the race of country squires55 steeped in port and prejudice, but by schoolmen who cannot bring themselves to give a little proportion of sound knowledge, but must give all, the reconite as well. The statesman decries56 the ignorance and want of wisdom displayed by embryo57 politicians who will accept no instalment of liberty, but insist on the concession58 of all their claims—but the scholar does the same thing when he will impart none but the completest information to the people.
* This case is cited by S. G. Goodrich, the original Peter
Parley, in his preface to 'Fireside Education.' Sir William
Curtis, to whom, probably, Mr. Goodrich refers, gave also
'the three K's—King, Church, and Constitution.'
In quoting, I have been a borrower, but not a plagiarist59. In no case am I conscious of having taken from others without at the same time making the fairest acknowledgment in my power.
If the references to the highest authorities are sometimes through others, it is because the highest authorities have not always been accessible. Those who have had ordinary experience estimate highly the value of minute integrity in this respect. Fruitless hours are spent in tracing false and careless references, and to one whose time is his means, no little injury is done when it is thus wasted.
Unbounded gratitude60 is due to those authors, old and new, who, with learning and grace, with care and patience, have put the world in possession of thoughts which are real additions to its knowledge—and corresponding should be the contempt of those whose high-sounding and pretending books seduce61 readers to wade62 through them only to find in them the millioneth echo of some commonplace idea.
The 'Spectator' was pleased to say that I wrote 'Practical Grammar' in the spirit of an 'ultra-radical, setting the world to rights.' Yet I have always declared, with Butler—
Reforming schemes are none of mine,
To mend the world's a vast design;
Like those who toil in little boat
To drag to them the ship afloat.
Utopianism is not my idiosyncracy. But I have confidence in endeavour. Continuity of ameliorative effort is the sole enthusiasm that can serve the cause of improvement. It is useful to do what seems to be useful, whether little or much—a moderate rule, but one that will take those who carry it out, a long way.
My illustrations, I need scarcely say, are neutral in politics and theology. In the grammar of J. A. D. D'Orsey, published in 'Chambers63' Educational Course,' there are disputations, Biblicisms, and bits of intense theology. Professor John Radford Young, in his treatise33 on Algebra64, has introduced a reply to Hume's controverted65 theory of miracles—and Dr. Whately makes his 'Logic' an avowedly66 theological auxiliary67, showing that much passes for good taste in this country which is only an irrelevant68 propitiation of powerful opinion. I have not, however, been seduced69 by this species of example. There are distinct provinces in intellect as well as in industry—and what political economy justifies70 in one case, good sense dictates71 in the other. No man has a right to intrude72 theology into every question, and agitate73 points of faith when he pretends to instruct the understanding.
There is less occasion to speak of the utility of logic, than to show it to be easy of acquisition. Mr. Stuart Mill, in confirmation74 of this view, observes: We need not seek far for a solution of the question so often agitated75, respecting the utility of Logic. If a science of logic exists, or is capable of existing, it must be useful. If there be rules to which every mind conforms, in every instance in which it judges rightly, there seems little necessity for discussing whether a person is more likely to observe those rules when he knows the rules, than when he is unacquainted with them.* Certainly people are not so much prejudiced against logic on account of its supposed uselessness as on account of its supposed difficulties. Deserved or not, logic has always had a good reputation. Well or ill founded, the popular impression has uniformly been in its favour. It has been valued like the diamond—but considered, like that precious stone, of very uncertain access.
*'System of Logic,' p. 12. Second Edition.
The high popularity of common sense—'the exercise of the judgment76 unaided by rule'—has been interpreted into a virtual rejection77 of logic by the multitude. But it ought not to be overlooked, that the credit in which mere78 common sense is held, is a matter of necessity as well as choice. It being the best sense the untutored have, they wisely use it, and no wonder that they are inclined to laud10 what they are constrained79 to employ. Doubtless they always perceived that common sense would be the better for being made orderly, as a spirited horse is the fitter for use after being 'broken.' Logical sense, among the masses, is secretly supposed to be disciplined sense, and to have all the advantage of the trained soldier over the raw recruit.
It is quite true, as Abram Tucker puts it, that 'The science of abstruse learning, when completely attained80, is like Achilles' spear, that healed the wounds it had made before; so this knowledge serves to repair the damage itself had occasioned, it casts no additional light upon the paths of life.' But few persons sensible of the value of exact knowledge will complain of the necessary elaboration to which it sometimes leads. Nor will those who have felt the thrill of pleasure which complete analysis imparts, regret the patience which put them in possession of a secret of science, or made them master of a new field of knowledge.
Common sense is the substratum of all logic. Common sense is the natural sense of mankind. It is founded on common observation and experience. It is modest and plain and unsophisticated. It sees with everybody's eyes and hears with everybody's ears. It has no capricious distinctions, no partialities, and no mysteries. It never equivocates81 and never trifles. Its language is always the same, and is always intelligible. It is known by its perspicuity of speech and singleness of purpose. The most prudent82 of all the children of fact, it never forsakes83 nature or reason. Some outline laws for its employment, if they can be indicated, must be better than its popular aimless and desultory84 use.
点击收听单词发音
1 logic | |
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
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2 premises | |
n.建筑物,房屋 | |
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3 lesser | |
adj.次要的,较小的;adv.较小地,较少地 | |
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4 amendment | |
n.改正,修正,改善,修正案 | |
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5 intelligible | |
adj.可理解的,明白易懂的,清楚的 | |
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6 engraved | |
v.在(硬物)上雕刻(字,画等)( engrave的过去式和过去分词 );将某事物深深印在(记忆或头脑中) | |
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7 folly | |
n.愚笨,愚蠢,蠢事,蠢行,傻话 | |
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8 superfluously | |
过分地; 过剩地 | |
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9 refinement | |
n.文雅;高尚;精美;精制;精炼 | |
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10 laud | |
n.颂歌;v.赞美 | |
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11 toil | |
vi.辛劳工作,艰难地行动;n.苦工,难事 | |
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12 premier | |
adj.首要的;n.总理,首相 | |
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13 anvil | |
n.铁钻 | |
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14 loom | |
n.织布机,织机;v.隐现,(危险、忧虑等)迫近 | |
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15 scholastic | |
adj.学校的,学院的,学术上的 | |
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16 formerly | |
adv.从前,以前 | |
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17 opulence | |
n.财富,富裕 | |
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18 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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19 illiterate | |
adj.文盲的;无知的;n.文盲 | |
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20 gulf | |
n.海湾;深渊,鸿沟;分歧,隔阂 | |
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21 recondite | |
adj.深奥的,难解的 | |
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22 repelled | |
v.击退( repel的过去式和过去分词 );使厌恶;排斥;推开 | |
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23 obstinate | |
adj.顽固的,倔强的,不易屈服的,较难治愈的 | |
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24 protracted | |
adj.拖延的;延长的v.拖延“protract”的过去式和过去分词 | |
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25 abridge | |
v.删减,删节,节略,缩短 | |
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26 precluded | |
v.阻止( preclude的过去式和过去分词 );排除;妨碍;使…行不通 | |
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27 civilisation | |
n.文明,文化,开化,教化 | |
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28 utterly | |
adv.完全地,绝对地 | |
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29 dormant | |
adj.暂停活动的;休眠的;潜伏的 | |
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30 dispersed | |
adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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31 refinements | |
n.(生活)风雅;精炼( refinement的名词复数 );改良品;细微的改良;优雅或高贵的动作 | |
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32 treatises | |
n.专题著作,专题论文,专著( treatise的名词复数 ) | |
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33 treatise | |
n.专著;(专题)论文 | |
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34 propriety | |
n.正当行为;正当;适当 | |
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35 coherence | |
n.紧凑;连贯;一致性 | |
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36 perspicuity | |
n.(文体的)明晰 | |
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37 elegance | |
n.优雅;优美,雅致;精致,巧妙 | |
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38 manly | |
adj.有男子气概的;adv.男子般地,果断地 | |
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39 vowel | |
n.元音;元音字母 | |
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40 articulation | |
n.(清楚的)发音;清晰度,咬合 | |
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41 modulation | |
n.调制 | |
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42 discourse | |
n.论文,演说;谈话;话语;vi.讲述,著述 | |
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43 punctuation | |
n.标点符号,标点法 | |
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44 abrupt | |
adj.突然的,意外的;唐突的,鲁莽的 | |
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45 prolixity | |
n.冗长,罗嗦 | |
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46 eschewing | |
v.(尤指为道德或实际理由而)习惯性避开,回避( eschew的现在分词 ) | |
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47 conjecture | |
n./v.推测,猜测 | |
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48 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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49 extort | |
v.勒索,敲诈,强要 | |
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50 esteem | |
n.尊敬,尊重;vt.尊重,敬重;把…看作 | |
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51 outrage | |
n.暴行,侮辱,愤怒;vt.凌辱,激怒 | |
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52 abstruse | |
adj.深奥的,难解的 | |
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53 dissertation | |
n.(博士学位)论文,学术演讲,专题论文 | |
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54 maxim | |
n.格言,箴言 | |
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55 squires | |
n.地主,乡绅( squire的名词复数 ) | |
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56 decries | |
v.公开反对,谴责( decry的第三人称单数 ) | |
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57 embryo | |
n.胚胎,萌芽的事物 | |
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58 concession | |
n.让步,妥协;特许(权) | |
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59 plagiarist | |
n.剽窃者,文抄公 | |
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60 gratitude | |
adj.感激,感谢 | |
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61 seduce | |
vt.勾引,诱奸,诱惑,引诱 | |
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62 wade | |
v.跋涉,涉水;n.跋涉 | |
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63 chambers | |
n.房间( chamber的名词复数 );(议会的)议院;卧室;会议厅 | |
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64 algebra | |
n.代数学 | |
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65 controverted | |
v.争论,反驳,否定( controvert的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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66 avowedly | |
adv.公然地 | |
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67 auxiliary | |
adj.辅助的,备用的 | |
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68 irrelevant | |
adj.不恰当的,无关系的,不相干的 | |
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69 seduced | |
诱奸( seduce的过去式和过去分词 ); 勾引; 诱使堕落; 使入迷 | |
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70 justifies | |
证明…有理( justify的第三人称单数 ); 为…辩护; 对…作出解释; 为…辩解(或辩护) | |
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71 dictates | |
n.命令,规定,要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 );口授;支配;摆布 | |
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72 intrude | |
vi.闯入;侵入;打扰,侵扰 | |
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73 agitate | |
vi.(for,against)煽动,鼓动;vt.搅动 | |
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74 confirmation | |
n.证实,确认,批准 | |
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75 agitated | |
adj.被鼓动的,不安的 | |
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76 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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77 rejection | |
n.拒绝,被拒,抛弃,被弃 | |
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78 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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79 constrained | |
adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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80 attained | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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81 equivocates | |
n.使用模棱两可的话隐瞒真相( equivocate的名词复数 )v.使用模棱两可的话隐瞒真相( equivocate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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82 prudent | |
adj.谨慎的,有远见的,精打细算的 | |
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83 forsakes | |
放弃( forsake的第三人称单数 ); 弃绝; 抛弃; 摒弃 | |
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84 desultory | |
adj.散漫的,无方法的 | |
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