J.S. Mill
To have reached, in the study of observed phenomena3, the point of perception indicated in this motto, and to feel the full force of the remark, is to have imbibed4 the spirit of science—-whose traits are dear distinctions, accurate classification, and strict reference to primitive data. The bases of all science are methodical facts. The first step to the perfection and enlargement of a science is the resolution of its propositions into axioms, and into propositions which are to be proved. Dr. Reid observes—'This has been done in mathematics from the beginning, and has tended greatly to the emolument5 of that science. It has lately been done in natural philosophy, and by this means that science has advanced more in 160 years than it had done before in 2,000. Every science is in an unformed state until its first principles are ascertained6; after this it advances regularly, and secures the ground it has gained.'
Classification is one of the first steps to Science. The maxim7 in government, divide and conquer, retains, when applied8 to science, all its wisdom without its machiavelialism. The young grammarian reduces the mass of words, that so threaten to confound his powers, to a few natural classes, and he conquers them separately with ease.
'The single power by which we discover resemblance or relation in general, is a sufficient aid to us in the perplexity and confusion of our first attempts at arrangement. It begins by converting thousands, and more than thousands, into one; and, reducing in the same manner the numbers tiros formed, it arrives at last at the few distinctive10 characters of those great comprehensive tribes, on which it ceases to operate, 'because there is nothing left to oppress the memory or the understanding.'*
* Brown's Moral Philosophy, Lect, xvi.
Merell has spoken more comprehensively on this subject—'That human knowledge dees not consist in the bare collection and enumeration11 of facts; this alone would be of little service were we net to attempt the classification of them, and to educe9 from such classification general laws and principles. The knowledge, which consists in individual truths, could never be either extensive ear definite—for the multiplicity of objects which then must crowd in upon the mind only tends to confound and perplex it, while the memory, overburdened with particulars, is not able to retain a hundredth part of the materials which are collected. To prevent this, the power el generalisation comes to our aid, by which the individual facts are so classified under their proper conceptions, that they may at the same time be more easily retained, and their several relations to all other branches of knowledge accurately13 defined. The colligation and classification of facts, then, we may regard as the two first steps, which are to be taken in the attainment14 of truth.'*
Aristotle, says Morell, classified the matter, Kant the forms. Aristotle was the first man who undertook the gigantic task of reducing the multiplicity of all the objects of human knowledge to a few general heads—-1. Substance. 2. Quality. 3. Quantity. 4. Relation. Action. 6. Passion. 7. Place. 8. Time. 9. Posture15. 10. Habit. Aristotle's philosophy was objective, Kant's subjective16. Kant's categories were twelve. 1. Unity17. 2. Plurality. 3. Totality. 4. Affirmation. Negation18. 6. limitation. 7. Substance. 8. Casualty. 9. Reciprocity. 10. Possibility. 11. Actuality. 12. Necessity.
'It is a fundamental principle in logic19, that the power of framing classes is unlimited20 as long as there is any (even the smallest) difference to found a distinction upon.**
What Geoffroy Saint Hilaire has said of natural history is applicable to all science:—'The first problem to be solved by him who wishes to penetrate21 deeply into this; study, consists evidently in the formation of clear and precise distinctions between the various brings. This is the most elementary problem, in so-far as it precedes all the others; but it is in reality, in most cases, complicated and full of difficulties. Its accurate solution requires—first, Observation, which makes known the facts; next, Description, which fixes them permanently22; then Characterisation, which selects and displays prominently the most important of them—and lastly, Classification, which arranges them in systematic23 order.'***
Of the value of classification, Lamartine has given a fine illustration:——'Montesquieu had sounded the institutions and analysed the laws of all people. By classing governments he had compared them, by comparing them he passed judgment24 on them; and this judgment brought out, in its bold relief and contrast, on every page, right and force, privilege and equality, tyranny and liberty.'****
* Morell's Hist. of Speculative25 Phil., p. 34, vol. 1.
** Mill, p. 165, vol. 1.
*** T. W. Thornton: Reasoner No. 72, p. 664.
**** Lamartine's Hist. Girondists, pp. 14-15, vol. 1.
Familiarity with the characteristics of science imparts considerable power for the detection of fallacy. A logician26 is imperfect without scientific tastes and habits. The man of science has all his knowledge systematised and arranged. What other people have in confusion, he has in order. The elements of knowledge are, more or less, as has been observed, known to all men—but in their perfect, communicable, and usable state, they are-known only to the educated and scientific man. What training is to the soldier, science is to the thinker. It enables him to control all his resources and employ his natural powers to the best advantage. It is this which constitutes the superiority of the educated over the ignorant. Astronomy, navigation, architecture, geometry, political economy, morals, all rest, or should rest, and do rest, if they have-attained to the perfection of science, on primary facts and first principles. Every step can be measured by an axiom—every result can be traced to a first principle.* To detect error, then, in any province of investigation27, or any domain28 of argument, the logician first looks to the primary principles on which it is based, and thus tests the legitimacy29 of its conclusions.
As respects those who deal in things professedly above reason, It was well said by an anonymous30 writer of the old school of sturdy thinkers,—'Of such men as these I usually demand, whether their own assent31 to things they would have us believe, be grounded upon some rational argument. If they say 'tis not, they are fools to believe it themselves; and I should add to the number of fools, if, after this acknowledgment, I should believe them: but if they say it is, I desire them to produce their argument; for since 'tis framed by a human understanding, the force of it may also be comprehended and judged of by a human understanding: and tis to no purpose to say that the subject surpasses human reason: for if it do so indeed, it will surpass theirs as well as mine, and so leave us both upon even terms. And let the thing assented32 to be what it will, the assent itself must be founded upon a sufficient reason, and consequently upon one that is intelligible33 to the human intellect that is wrought34 on by it.'**
* See Beauties and Uses of Euclid, chap. vi., Logic of
Euclid.
"What is it?—" "'Tis impossible the same thing should be, and not be at the same time," are maxims36 of such universal usefulness, that without them we could neither judge, discourse, nor act. These principles may not always make their appearance in formal propositions, but still they guide all our thoughts in the same manner as when a musician plays a careless voluntary upon a harpsichord—he is guided by rules of music he long since became familiar with, though now scarcely sensible of them.
'A butcher loses his knife, and looks all about for it, and remarks as the motive37 of his search, "I am sure it must be somewhere or other." By which rude saying it is evident he is guided by the axiom last mentioned. Had he not the knowledge of this axiom beforehand, did he think it possible that his knife could be no where or in no place he would never take pains to look for it. We may observe many such axioms as this guiding the actions of the vulgar, and it is no unworthy speculation38 to observe their behaviour and words, which proceed from uncorrupted nature, and retrieve39 the axioms from which their conduct proceeds.'*
* Solid Philosophy, asserted against the Fancies of the
Idealists. (Locke's Understanding is the work controverted40.)
By J. S.. London, 1679.
The outlines of the science of morality are thus comprehensively sketched41 by Sir James Mackintosh: the origin, value, and application of first principles are indicated with his usual felicity. 'The usages and laws of nations, the events of history, the opinions of philosophers, the sentiments of orators42 and poets, as well as the observations of common life, are in truth, the materials out of which the science of morality to formed; and those who neglect them are justly chargeable with a vain attempt to philosophise without regard to fact and experienee—the sole foundation of all true philosophy.
The natural order undoubtedly43 dictates44 that we should first search for the original principles of the science in human nature; then apply them to the regulation of the conduct of individuals, and lastly employ them for the decision of those difficult and complicated questions that arise with respect to the intercourse45 of nations.'
To search for ultimate principles is to discover at a glance the whole bearings of a great question. Through what clouds of politics had the historian of Rome penetrated46 when he announced that the principles of a free constitution are irrecoverably lost when the legislative47 power is nominated by the executive.
This habit—it cannot be too often insisted on aids not only the acquisition of knowledge, but also its retention48. Around these first principles, as around a standard, the thoughts naturally associate. Touch but a remote chord of any question, and it will vibrate to the central principle to which it has once been well attached. Every relative impression owns a kindred connection, and the moment one is attacked, it, like a faithful sentinel, arouses a whole troop, which, marshalled and disciplined, bear down and challenge the enemy.'*
* Beauties and Uses of Euclid, pp. 47-9.
What Rogers has so exquisitely49 sung of the associations of childhood, is true of the associations of science.
Childhood's loved group revisit! every scene,—
Mute is the bell which rang at peep of dawn,
Unheard the shout that rent the noontide air,
When the slow dial gave a pause to care.
Up springs at every step, to claim a tear,
Some little friendship formed and cherished here?
With golden visions and romantic dreams.
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1 primitive | |
adj.原始的;简单的;n.原(始)人,原始事物 | |
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2 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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3 phenomena | |
n.现象 | |
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4 imbibed | |
v.吸收( imbibe的过去式和过去分词 );喝;吸取;吸气 | |
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5 emolument | |
n.报酬,薪水 | |
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6 ascertained | |
v.弄清,确定,查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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7 maxim | |
n.格言,箴言 | |
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8 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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9 educe | |
v.引出;演绎 | |
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10 distinctive | |
adj.特别的,有特色的,与众不同的 | |
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11 enumeration | |
n.计数,列举;细目;详表;点查 | |
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12 lone | |
adj.孤寂的,单独的;唯一的 | |
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13 accurately | |
adv.准确地,精确地 | |
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14 attainment | |
n.达到,到达;[常pl.]成就,造诣 | |
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15 posture | |
n.姿势,姿态,心态,态度;v.作出某种姿势 | |
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16 subjective | |
a.主观(上)的,个人的 | |
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17 unity | |
n.团结,联合,统一;和睦,协调 | |
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18 negation | |
n.否定;否认 | |
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19 logic | |
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
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20 unlimited | |
adj.无限的,不受控制的,无条件的 | |
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21 penetrate | |
v.透(渗)入;刺入,刺穿;洞察,了解 | |
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22 permanently | |
adv.永恒地,永久地,固定不变地 | |
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23 systematic | |
adj.有系统的,有计划的,有方法的 | |
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24 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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25 speculative | |
adj.思索性的,暝想性的,推理的 | |
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26 logician | |
n.逻辑学家 | |
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27 investigation | |
n.调查,调查研究 | |
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28 domain | |
n.(活动等)领域,范围;领地,势力范围 | |
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29 legitimacy | |
n.合法,正当 | |
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30 anonymous | |
adj.无名的;匿名的;无特色的 | |
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31 assent | |
v.批准,认可;n.批准,认可 | |
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32 assented | |
同意,赞成( assent的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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33 intelligible | |
adj.可理解的,明白易懂的,清楚的 | |
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34 wrought | |
v.引起;以…原料制作;运转;adj.制造的 | |
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35 discourse | |
n.论文,演说;谈话;话语;vi.讲述,著述 | |
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36 maxims | |
n.格言,座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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37 motive | |
n.动机,目的;adv.发动的,运动的 | |
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38 speculation | |
n.思索,沉思;猜测;投机 | |
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39 retrieve | |
vt.重新得到,收回;挽回,补救;检索 | |
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40 controverted | |
v.争论,反驳,否定( controvert的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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41 sketched | |
v.草拟(sketch的过去式与过去分词形式) | |
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42 orators | |
n.演说者,演讲家( orator的名词复数 ) | |
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43 undoubtedly | |
adv.确实地,无疑地 | |
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44 dictates | |
n.命令,规定,要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 );口授;支配;摆布 | |
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45 intercourse | |
n.性交;交流,交往,交际 | |
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46 penetrated | |
adj. 击穿的,鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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47 legislative | |
n.立法机构,立法权;adj.立法的,有立法权的 | |
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48 retention | |
n.保留,保持,保持力,记忆力 | |
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49 exquisitely | |
adv.精致地;强烈地;剧烈地;异常地 | |
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50 tangled | |
adj. 纠缠的,紊乱的 动词tangle的过去式和过去分词 | |
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51 mosses | |
n. 藓类, 苔藓植物 名词moss的复数形式 | |
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52 pensive | |
a.沉思的,哀思的,忧沉的 | |
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53 truant | |
n.懒惰鬼,旷课者;adj.偷懒的,旷课的,游荡的;v.偷懒,旷课 | |
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v.充满( teem的第三人称单数 );到处都是;(指水、雨等)暴降;倾注 | |
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