without meaning.—Lord Kames.
As every proposition consists of two names, and as every proposition affirms or denies one of these names of the other, the value of definition, which fixes the import of names, is apparent.
'A name is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark, which may raise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and which being pronounced to others, may be to them a sign of what thought the speaker had before in his mind [Hobbes]. This simple definition of a name, as a word (or set of words) serving the double purpose of a mark to recall to ourselves the likeness1 of a former thought, and a sign to make it known to others, appears unexceptionable.'*
Definition originates in accurate and comprehensive observation. 'There cannot be,' says Mill, 'agreement about the definition of a thing, until there is agreement about the thing itself. To define a thing is to select from among the whole of its properties those which shall be understood to be designated and declared by its name; and the properties must be very well known to us before we can be competent to determine which of them are fittest to be chosen for this purpose.'**
'The simplest and most correct notion of a definition is, a proposition declaratory of the meaning of a word; namely, either the meaning which it bears in common acceptation, or that which the speaker or writer, for the particular purposes of his discourse2, intends to annex3 to it.'***
I. p. 27.
** Introduction to Logic, p. 1.
*** Mill's Logic, p. 183, vol. 1.
But with most persons the object of a definition is merely to guide them to the correct use of a term as a protection against applying it in a manner inconsistent with custom and convention. Anything, therefore, is to them a sufficient definition of a term which will serve as a correct index to what the term denotes; although not embracing the whole, and sometimes perhaps not even any part of what it connotes.
Definitions are sometimes explained as being of two kinds—of things and words.
The definition of words is the explanation of the sense in which they are used.
The definition of things is an explanation of the specific properties by which they differ from all other things.
To define a thing, says Dr. Watts5, we must ascertain6 with what it agrees, then note the most remarkable7 attribute of difference, and join the two together.
Justice—the disposition to maintain the rights of mankind.
Benevolence—the disposition to improve the rights of mankind.
Malevolence—hatred of the rights of mankind.
In defining a word we seek some class to which to refer it, that we may identify it, and fix attention upon that peculiarity13 by which we can distinguish it from all other things. 'Probity and 'justice' are referred to 'disposition,' with reference to the 'rights of mankind' as their sphere of existence: and acknowledgment, and maintenance, are mentioned as the distinguishing features.
Distinctions must not be made without differences. The definition should be plainer than the thing defined. Aristotle's definition of motion is considered defective14 in this respect:—'Motion—an act of a being in power, so far forth15 as it is in power.' Tautological16 definitions cause more to be supposed than is true—the too terse17 explanation leaves some necessary thing unmentioned. A perfect definition requires the union of the concise18, the clear, and the adequate. Some persons are so unskilful in the analysis of terms as to occasion the advice Nil19 explicare—never explain yourself if you wish to be understood.
Double meanings should be avoided. The writer may himself alternate in their use, and the reader may take the word in the unintended meaning. All men have not the strong sense of Johnson. When Caleb Whiteford inquired seriously of the Doctor, whether he really considered that a man ought to be transported, like Barrington, the pickpocket20, for being guilty of a double meaning. 'Sir,' said Johnson, 'if a man means well, the more he means the better'—which, whether real or fictitious21, is one of the happiest answers that ever crushed a quibble.*
* Hood's Own.
I have frequently put the question—What is consciousness? to persons who have been conscious for twenty or thirty years, but who were yet unable to reply. Had any one deprived these persons of consciousness, a judge would have hanged him for the offence; yet, could they themselves have been interrogated22 as to what harm they had suffered, they could not have told what they had lost. And upon the principle, that he not knowing what he has lost, is no loser, these persons, though murdered, had suffered no harm.
The various definitions of the same subject which prevail, originate in the caprice, or partial, or profound knowledge the definer may have of his subject. It seems to be admitted by logicians, that an author has a right to give whatever provisional definition he pleases of his terms. But having once given them, perspicuity24 requires that he should adhere to them. Any new sense in which a term is employed should be specially25 defined. In discoursing26 on an ordinary subject, as the right of public assembly,—such words as perception, conception, apprehension27, might be used reciprocally, but in a dissertation28 on metaphysics each requires restriction29 in use and precision in purport30.
Often genius strikes out new relations of words. In recent political debates, Mr. Cobden resorted with new force and point to a charge of rashness against ministers: he showed that rashness consisted more frequently in inaction than action. He is rash who stands surrounded by the elements of danger without taking; any precaution against the contingencies31 of peril32; he is rash who does not take advantage of the calm, to repair his shattered rigging; he is rash who looks not out for a proper supply of water until the conflagration33 is raging around him; and more rash than all is he who exercises no provident34 care for supplying a nation with food, but waits for the pressure of famine and the perils35 of starvation.
At the last soiree of the Leeds Mechanics' Institution, Mr. Dickens referred to ignorance, commonly considered as a passive negation36, and placed it in the light of a power. 'Look where we will, do we not find ignorance powerful for every kind of wrong and evil? Powerful to take its enemies to its heart and strike its best friends down—powerful to fill the prisons, the hospitals, and the graves—powerful for blind violence, prejudice, and error in all their destructive shapes.'
The variations which not only common but technical terms undergo, is a considerable source of perplexity in reasoning. Mr. Mill cites the instance of the term felony. No lawyer will undertake to tell what a felony is otherwise than by enumerating37 the various kinds of offences which are so called. Originally, felony denoted all offences, the penalty of which included forfeiture38 of goods; but, subsequent Acts of Parliament have declared various offences to be felonies without enjoining39 that penalty, and have taken away the penalty from others which continue still to be called felonies, insomuch that the acts so called have now no property whatever in common, save that of being unlawful and punishable. This inattention to precision in terms has arisen not among the vulgar, but among educated English lawyers.
'Language,' says Mr. Mill, borrowing a political simile40 from Sir James Mackintosh, '"is not made, but grows." A name not unfrequently passes by successive links of resemblance from one object to another, until it becomes applied41 to things having nothing in common with the first things to which the name was given; which, however, do not, for that reason, drop the name; so that it at last denotes a confused huddle42 of objects, having nothing whatever in common; and connotes nothing, not even a vague and general resemblance. When a name has fallen into this state, in which by predicating it of any object we assert literally43 nothing about the object, it has become unfit for the purposes either of thought or of the communication of thought; and can only be made serviceable by stripping it of some part of its multifarious denotation44, and confining it to objects possessed45 of some attributes in common, which it may be made to connote. Such are the inconveniences of a language which "is not made, but grows." like a road which is not made, but has made itself, it requires continual mending in order to be passable.'*
* Logic, p. 207.
It is well observed, that the spontaneous growth of language is of the utmost importance to the thinker. There seems to be so palpable a substratum of right sense, in the rude classifications of the multitude, that the logician23 has little else to do, in many cases, than to retouch them and give them precision. Guizot observes, there is frequently more truth in common acceptations of general terms than in the more precise definitions of science. Common sense gives to words their ordinary signification. The leading terms of philosophy are clothed in innumerable shades of meaning acquired in their transitional use, and immense is the knowledge of thing: requisite46 to enable a man to affirm that any given argument turns wholly on words. The study of terms, for which logicians have provided multiplied means, is one of the most interesting and profitable upon which men can enter. If it be worth while to speak at all, it is worth while to know certainly what we speak about.
Philanthropic genius has pointed47 out a perversion48 of power, arising through definitional incapacity, which makes it a moral duty to study analysis of terms, and exactitude of expression.
'All battle,' says Carlyle, 'is misunderstanding—did the parties know one another, the battle would cease. No man at bottom means injustice; he contends for some distorted image of right. Clear, undeniable right—clear, undeniable might—either of these, once ascertained49, puts an end to battle. Battle is a confused experiment to ascertain these.'
Of the power of names to impose on the multitude, history furnishes too many examples. Strength to forefend us against they delusion50 ability to see that the meaning governs the term, and not the term the meaning—are species of intellectual self-defence.
'Augustus,' says Gibbon, 'was sensible that mankind is governed by names; nor was he deceived in his expectation that the senate and people would submit to slavery provided that they were respectably assured that they still enjoyed their ancient freedom.'
'Never,' adjures51 W. J. Fox, 'be deceived by words. Always try to penetrate52 to realities. Have your wits sharpened, your senses exercised to discern good and evil. Be not imposed upon by pompous53 manners. Many a solemnly-uttered sentence is often a sheer inanity54, which will not bear the scrutiny55 of an observant intellect. Be not frightened by denunciations; by being told that you are not a good subject or a good Christian56, if you do not believe, or say that you believe this or that. Be not led astray by iteration—mistake not the familiar for the intelligible57. Ascertain what words are meant to convey, and what they actually do convey. Go to the substance and soul of whatever is propounded58. Be on your guard against bold assumptions, nor let them bear you away against the dictates59 of your own understanding.
Look at phrases as counters, or paper money, that may pass for much or little according to circumstances. Endeavour to arrive at truth, and make that your treasure. Be ever wide awake to see through any veil of sophistry60 and cant61; nor by the agency of words be made the dupe of critic or lawyer, of priest of politician.'*
* Lectures to the Working Classes, p. 70, vol. 2.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
likeness
|
|
| n.相像，相似（之处） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
discourse
|
|
| n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
annex
|
|
| vt.兼并，吞并；n.附属建筑物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
logic
|
|
| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
watts
|
|
| （电力计量单位）瓦，瓦特( watt的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
ascertain
|
|
| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
remarkable
|
|
| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
probity
|
|
| n.刚直；廉洁，正直 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
disposition
|
|
| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
concealed
|
|
| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
violation
|
|
| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
injustice
|
|
| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
peculiarity
|
|
| n.独特性，特色；特殊的东西；怪癖 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
defective
|
|
| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
forth
|
|
| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
tautological
|
|
| adj.重复的；累赘的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
terse
|
|
| adj.(说话，文笔)精炼的，简明的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
concise
|
|
| adj.简洁的，简明的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
nil
|
|
| n.无，全无，零 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
pickpocket
|
|
| n.扒手；v.扒窃 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
fictitious
|
|
| adj.虚构的，假设的；空头的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
interrogated
|
|
| v.询问( interrogate的过去式和过去分词 )；审问；（在计算机或其他机器上）查询 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
logician
|
|
| n.逻辑学家 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
perspicuity
|
|
| n.（文体的）明晰 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
specially
|
|
| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
discoursing
|
|
| 演说（discourse的现在分词形式） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
apprehension
|
|
| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
dissertation
|
|
| n.（博士学位）论文，学术演讲，专题论文 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
restriction
|
|
| n.限制，约束 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
purport
|
|
| n.意义，要旨，大要；v.意味著，做为...要旨，要领是... | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
contingencies
|
|
| n.偶然发生的事故，意外事故( contingency的名词复数 )；以备万一 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
peril
|
|
| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
conflagration
|
|
| n.建筑物或森林大火 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
provident
|
|
| adj.为将来做准备的，有先见之明的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
perils
|
|
| 极大危险( peril的名词复数 )； 危险的事（或环境） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
negation
|
|
| n.否定；否认 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
enumerating
|
|
| v.列举，枚举，数( enumerate的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
forfeiture
|
|
| n.（名誉等）丧失 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
enjoining
|
|
| v.命令( enjoin的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
simile
|
|
| n.直喻，明喻 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
applied
|
|
| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
huddle
|
|
| vi.挤作一团；蜷缩；vt.聚集；n.挤在一起的人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
literally
|
|
| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
denotation
|
|
| n.（明示的）意义；指示 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
possessed
|
|
| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
requisite
|
|
| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
pointed
|
|
| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
perversion
|
|
| n.曲解；堕落；反常 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
ascertained
|
|
| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
delusion
|
|
| n.谬见，欺骗，幻觉，迷惑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
adjures
|
|
| vt.（以起誓或诅咒等形式）命令要求（adjure的第三人称单数形式） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
52
penetrate
|
|
| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
pompous
|
|
| adj.傲慢的，自大的；夸大的；豪华的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
inanity
|
|
| n.无意义，无聊 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
scrutiny
|
|
| n.详细检查，仔细观察 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
Christian
|
|
| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
intelligible
|
|
| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
propounded
|
|
| v.提出（问题、计划等）供考虑[讨论]，提议( propound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
dictates
|
|
| n.命令，规定，要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
sophistry
|
|
| n.诡辩 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
cant
|
|
| n.斜穿，黑话，猛扔 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |