Every legal statute6, says Dr. Johnson, is founded on induction. 'Law is the science in which the greatest powers of understanding are applied8 to the greatest number of facts.' The basis of all science is such an extensive induction of particulars as leads to general definitions and fundamental axioms, and furnishes the premises9 from which inferences may be deduced.
Inductive observation is the great instrument of discovering important truths. 'What are called the principles of human nature are learned from individual instances. It is the only possible way of learning them. * * When we reason from a general law or principle, we are in truth reasoning from a number of instances represented by It.'*
* Rationale of Political Representation, p. 34.
A general election is an induction of the intelligence of the country represented by the members of Parliament. The difference between democracy and monarchy11 is in one sense an affair of logic12. Where electors are limited in franchise13, and candidates restricted by property qualification, the induction is partial, but where all can vote and many can be chosen from, the premises are more capacious and the inference sounder.
Dr. Whately says, that 'in Natural Philosophy a single instance is often accounted a sufficient induction; e.g., having once ascertained15 that an individual magnet will attract iron, we are authorised to conclude that this property is universal.'
'The Edinburgh Reviewer of Whewell's "History of the Inductive Sciences," observes that, "by the accidental placing of a rhomb of calcareous spar, upon a book or line, Bartholinus discovered the property of the double refraction of light. By accidentally combining two rhombs in different positions, Huygens discovered the polarisation of light. By accidentally looking through a prism of the same substance, and turning it round, Mains discovered the polarisation of light by reflection; and by placing thin chrystalline films between two similar prisms or rhombs, M. Arago discovered the phenomena of polarised tints16."
'To this Mr. Whewell, in his "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences," makes the following reply:—"But Bartholinus could have seen no such consequence in the accident, if he had not previously17 had a clear conception of single refraction. A lady, in describing an optical experiment which had been shown her, said of her teacher, 'he told me to increase and diminish the angle of refraction: and, at last, I found that he only meant me to move my head up and down.' At any rate, till the lady had acquired a knowledge of the meaning which the technical terms convey, she could not have made Bartholinus's discovery by means of this accident. Suppose that Huygens made the experiment alluded18 to, without design, what he really observed was that the images appeared and disappeared alternately as he turned the rhomb round. His success depended on his clearness of thought, which enabled him to perform the intellectual analysis which would never have occurred to most men, however often they had combined two rhombs in different positions. Malus saw that in some positions the light reflected from the windows of the Louvre became dim. Another person would have attributed this to accident; he, however, considered the position of the prism, and the window; repeated the experiment often; and by virtue19 of the eminently20 distinct conceptions of space which he possessed21, resolved the phenomenon into its geometrical conditions."* "If it were true, that the fall of an apple was the occasion of Newton's pursuing that train of thought which led to the doctrine22 of universal gravitation, the habits and constitution of Newton's intellect were the real source of this great event in the progress of knowledge."** "In whatever manner facts may be presented to the notice of a discoverer, they can never become the materials of exact knowledge, except they find his mind already provided with precise and suitable conceptions, by which they may be analysed and connected."'***
* Whewell: Phil. Induct. Sciences, vol. 2. pp. 199-1.
** Ibid, vol. 2, p. 189.
*** See J. N. Bailey's Essays pp. 87-8-9.
These admissions seem to me to prove that whenever a casual fact proves to us a new truth, it does so by its coincidence with previously known facts, and that the novelty of the occasion attracts all credit to itself, and we lose sight of the generalisation below—the fruitful soil of experience on which the new fact, like a seed, falls. We only recognise difference by comparison, and the comparison is an induction, however slender.
Monsieur de Montmorine was recaptured and brought to the scaffold, through the trifling24 circumstance of some chicken bones being found near the door of his landlady—a woman too poor to indulge in such dainties.* The discovery of de Montmorine was not, as at first sight appears, an inference from a single fact, but from an adjacent induction. It was a general truth, (known to the party who observed the bones) a truth inducted from a number of facts that poor people could not afford to luxuriate on chickens. It was, therefore, from this induction, inferred that some one of superior fortune must be living in that particular place.
No. 61: the Story of Lavaiette, p. 27
The judicious26 care which the great fathers of science have exhibited in making their inferences, incontestably establishes their conviction of the danger of any other reasoning than that from inductions27. Lord Brougham informs us, that what Newton's Principia is to science, Locke's essay to metaphysics, Demosthenes in oratory28, and Homer in poetry, Cuvier's researches to our fossil osteology. But Cuvier never attempted to draw any inferences until he had examined the whole osteology of the living species.
Lord Brougham remarks, that 'from examining a single fragment of bone we infer that, in the wilds where we found it, there lived and ranged, some thousands of years ago, an animal of a peculiar29 kind.' This is a case in which the inference spoken of is arrived at in a way different from that apparently30 stated. We recognise in the 'fragment of bone' a link in a chain of facts constituting the basis of a well-known induction, which comparative anatomy31 has many times verified. It is important to distinguish well the grounds from which accurate inferences, such as these in the cases before us, have really been adduced, in order to ascertain14 the grounds from which we should reason generally. It will be found that solid reasoning can only proceed from general rules—i.e., inductions from facts. It will be found that the prime source of fallacy lies in reasoning from isolated32 facts. It is not to be denied that such reasoning is sometimes right, but it is to be remembered that it is right by accident, not by design. There is no science or certainty in it. It is hazard, not logic.
This habit however, is very common. Mr. Mill says, that 'Not only may we reason from particulars to particulars, without passing through generals, but we perpetually do so reason. All our earliest inferences are of this nature. From the first dawn of intelligence we draw inferences, but years elapse before we learn the use of general language. The child, who, having burnt his fingers, avoids to thrust them again into the fire, has reasoned or inferred, though he has never thought of the general maxim—fire burns. He knows from memory that he has been burnt, and on this evidence believes, when he sees a candle, that if he puts his fingers into the flame of it, he will be burnt again. He believes this in every case which happens to arise; but without looking, in each instance, beyond the present case. He is not generalising; he is inferring a particular from particulars. In the same way, also, brutes33 reason. There is little or no ground, for attributing to any of the lower animals the use of conventional signs, without which general propositions are impossible. But those animals profit by experience, and avoid what they have found to cause them pain, in the same manner, though not always with the same skill, as a human creature. Not only the burnt child, but the burnt dog, dreads35 the fire.
'I believe that, in point of fact, when drawing inferences from our personal experience, and not from maxims36 handed down to us by books or tradition, we much oftener conclude from particulars to particulars directly, than through the intermediate agency of any general proposition. We are constantly reasoning from ourselves to other people, or from one person to another, without giving ourselves the trouble to erect38 our observations into general maxims of human or external nature. When we conclude that some person will, on some given occasion, feel or act so and so, we sometimes judge from an enlarged consideration of the manner in which men in general, or men of some particular character, are accustomed to feel and act; but much oftener from having known the feelings and conduct of the same man in some previous instance, or from considering how we should feel or act ourselves. It is not only the village matron who, when called to a consultation39 upon the case of a neighbour's child, pronounces on the evil and its remedy simply on the recollection and authority of what she accounts the similar case of her Lucy. We all, where we have no definite maxims to steer40 by, guide ourselves in the same way; and if we have an extensive experience, and retain its impressions strongly, we may acquire, in this manner, a very considerable power of accurate judgment41, which we may be utterly42 incapable43 of justifying44 or of communicating to others. Among the higher order of practical intellects, there have been many of whom it was remarked how admirably they suited their means to their ends, without being able to give any sufficient reasons for what they did and applied, or seemed to apply, recondite46 principles which they were wholly unable to state. This is a natural consequence of having a mind stored with appropriate particulars, and having been long accustomed to reason at once from these to fresh particulars, without practising the habit of stating to oneself or to others the corresponding general propositions. An old warrior47, on a rapid glance at the outlines of the ground, is able at once to give the necessary orders for a skilful48 arrangement of his troops; though if he has received little theoretical instruction, and has seldom been called upon to answer to other people for his conduct, he may never have had in his mind a single general theorem respecting the relation between ground and array. But his experience of encampments, under circumstances more or less similar, has left a number of vivid, unexpressed, ungeneralised analogies in his mind, the most appropriate of which, instantly suggesting itself, determines him to a judicious arrangement.
'The skill of an uneducated person in the use of weapons, or of tools, is of a precisely49 similar nature. The savage50 who executes unerringly the exact throw which brings down his game, or his enemy, in the manner most suited to his purpose, under the operation of all the conditions necessarily involved, the weight and form of the weapon, the direction and distance of the object, the action of the wind, &c., owes this power to a long series of previous experiments, the results of which he certainly never framed into any verbal theorems or rules. It is the same in all extraordinary manual dexterity51. Not long ago a Scotch52 manufacturer procured54 from England, at a high rate of wages, a working dyer, famous for producing very fine colours, with a view of teaching to his other workmen the same skill. The workman came; but his mode of proportioning the ingredients, in which lay the secret of the effects he produced, was by taking them up in handfuls while the common method was to weigh them. The manufacturer sought to make him turn his handling system into an equivalent weighing system, that the general principle of his peculiar mode of proceeding55 might be ascertained. This, however, the man found himself quite unable to do, and therefore could impart his skill to nobody. He had, from the individual cases of his own experience, established a connection in his mind between fine effects of colour, and tactual perceptions in handling his dyeing materials; and from these perceptions he could, in any particular cases, infer the means to be employed, and the effect which would be produced, but could not put others in possession of the grounds on which he proceeded, from having never generalised them in his own mind, or expressed them in language.
'Almost every one knows Lord Mansfield's advice to a man of practical good sense, who, being appointed governor of a colony, had to preside in its court of justice, without previous judicial57 practice or legal education. The advice was to give his decision boldly, for it would probably be right; but never to venture on assigning reasons, for they would almost infallibly be wrong. In cases like this, which are of no uncommon58 occurrence, it would be absurd to suppose that the bad reason was the source of the good decision. Lord Mansfield knew that if any reason were assigned it would be necessarily an afterthought, the judge being in fact guided by impressions from past experience, without the circuitous59 process of framing general principles from them, and that if he attempted to frame any such he would assuredly fail. Lord Mansfield, however, would not have doubted that a man of equal experience, who had also a mind stored with general propositions derived61 by legitimate62 induction from that experience, would have been greatly preferable as a judge, to one, however sagacious, who could not be trusted with the explanation and justification63 of his own judgments64. The cases of able men performing wonderful things they know not how, are examples of the less civilised and most spontaneous form of the operations of superior minds It is a defect in them, and often a source of errors, not to have generalised as they went on; but generalisation is a help, the most important indeed of all helps, yet not an essential.'*
* Mill's Logic, pp. 251-5.
In illustration of generalising from single instances, Miss Martineau gives this example:—'A raw Chinese traveller in England was landed by a Thames waterman who had a wooden leg. The stranger saw that the wooden leg was used to stand in the water with, while the other was high and dry. The apparent economy of the fact struck the Chinese; he saw in it strong evidence of design, and wrote home that in England one-legged men are kept for watermen, to the saving of all injury to health, shoe, and stocking, from standing7 in the river.'*
Reasoning on insufficient65 data—
Wanting its proper base to stand upon.
Samuel Bailey has furnished, in one passage, both a clear illustration of the process, and the validity of an induction:—'Whoever had witnessed the acts of a landlord to his tenants68, of a schoolmaster to his pupils, of artizans towards their apprentices69, of husbands towards their wives, on points where the power of the superior could not be contested, and where his personal gratification was incompatible70 with just conduct to the subordinate, would necessarily have formed in his own mind a species of general rule; and from this rule he might safely draw an inference as to what would be the conduct of a despot, seated on a throne, in the possession of unchecked authority; assisted too, as the inquirer would be, by that indispensable and inestimable guide to the knowledge of mankind, an appeal to his own feelings, in a variety of analogous71 instances.
'We conclude, that a ruler with uncontrolled power will act the tyrant72, not merely from the fact that Caligula, or Nero, or Bonaparte did, but from a thousand facts attesting74 that men, in, every situation, use uncontrolled power in this way—just as we infer that all bodies tend to the centre of the earth, not merely from the circumstance of an apple dropping from a tree, but from seeing the tendency in stones, water, animals, and all things within our observation. The use of uncontrolled power, for the gratification of the possessor, without an equitable75 respect to others, is no more peculiar to monarchs76, than a tendency to the earth is peculiar to apples. It may be useful to know that monarchs act in this way, as it may be useful to know that apples drop to the ground; but it is much more useful to know that men act in this manner. An inference is safer when gathered from the widest induction.'
* How to Observe, p. 6.
** Rationale of Political Representation. Introduction, pp.
85-6. The last sentence of this extract is abridged—but, as
the reader will find upon reference, the sense of the author
is faithfully rendered.
It may be useful to observe that, though a few instances are insufficient to establish a theory, one may be sufficient to overturn a theory, fancifully or hypothetically supported, Gibbon overturns the entertaining theory of Rudbeck, an antiquarian of Upsal, of profound learning and easy faith, who, by the dim light of legends and traditions, of conjectures78 and etymologies80, sought to establish the antiquity81 of Sweden over half the earth. Gibbon annihilated82 this well laboured system of German antiquities83, by a single fact too well attested84 to admit of any doubt, and of too decisive a nature to leave room for any reply—the fact that the Germans, of the age of Tacitus, were unacquainted with the use of letters. A circumstance fatal to their literary claims, urged by Olaus Rudbeck.
In the chapter on 'Facts' I have cautioned the reader against unquestioned data. This seems the place to remark that the unsuspected sources of error and unfriendliness have their rise in the criminal implicitness85 with which we listen to reports, and infer from rumours86 as from facts. These are the very little handles which move men and women to strange performances.'* All the plots of dramas and romances are founded on misunderstandings, which a little sagacity of action (such as a wise resolution not to be imposed upon would lead to) would commonly suffice to arrest the error at its birth. With regard to character we constantly infer from data, partial, limited, and doubtful. If most quarrelers were called into a court of Inquiry87 to confess the real grounds from which they have arrived at certain conclusions with regard to their neighbours, and often with regard to their friends, they would be at once overwhelmed with a conviction of the weakness of which they have been guilty. Upon analysing the miserable88 sources of opinions of which scandal and calumny89 are born, I have found it impossible to restrain astonishment90 at the imbecility of logical power men will sometimes be content to exhibit, where meanness prevails, malice91 incites92, and passion governs. Well might Bacon exclaim—'Doth any man doubt, that if there were taken out of men's minds, vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations, and the like, but it would leave the minds of a number of men poor shrunken things?'** The wise rule is, never judge from appearances when facts can be had—never receive a report without challenging its foundation, nor adopt it without permission to give the authority.
** Essay on Truth.
In all cases, in which you must judge from appearances and reason from conjectures, adopt the fairest interpretation94 possible. On this principle, credit will sometimes be given where none is due—but in nine cases out of ten, justice will be done, for I am satisfied that there is more worth among men than wisdom, and that we do well much oftener than we reason well. We seldom need judge charitably, did we always endeavour to judge justly. But we make a virtue of our own errors, and we often affect to condescend95 to pronounce an opinion, which it would be criminal to withhold96. If ever I go to the Herald's, office, the motto I will have emblazoned shall be this—Justice is sufficient. Could we only get justice in the world, we could afford to excuse it all its 'charity' of judgment, and its benevolence97 even of act.
Where should a man's reputation be safe from suspicion if not in the hands of his friend? It ought to be a principle of action with all men, never to judge a friend except out of his own mouth. 'There was a generous friend of mine once, who never would have judged me or any other man unheard.'* With the sublime98 intensity99 of one who felt the infinite value of private justice, has Schiller delineated this spirit in the interview between Octavio and his son Max Piccolomini. After a violent and visible struggle with his feelings—wrought upon by his father's endeavours to sow suspicions in his mind, and detach him from the service of his friend, Wallenstein—Max exclaims:—
* Edward to Mr. Peerybing.
Octavio. Where now?
Max. (To the Duke.)
If thou hast believed that I shall act
A part in this thy play——
Thou hast miscalculated on me grievously.
My way must be straight on.
True with the tongue,
False with the heart—I may not, cannot be:
Nor can I suffer that a man should trust me—
With such low pleas as these:—"I ask him not—
He did it all at his own hazard—and
My mouth has never lied to him."—No, no
What a friend takes me for, that I must be.
—I'll to the Duke; ere yet this day is ended
Will I demand of him that he do save
His good name from the world, and with one stride
He can, he will!—I still am his believer.
Yet I'll not pledge myself, but that those letters
May furnish you, perchance, with proofs against him.
How far may not this Tertsky have proceeded—
What may not he himself too have permitted
The laws of war excusing? Nothing, save
His own mouth shall convict him—nothing less!
And face to face will I go question him.
Ay—this state-policy? O how I curse it!
You will some time, with your state-policy,
Compel him to the measure; it may happen
Because ye are determined102 that he is guilty,
Guilty ye'll make him. All retreat cut off,
Narrower and narrower, till at length ye force him—
Yes, ye,—ye force him in his desperation,
To set fire to his prison. Father! father!
That never can end well—it cannot—will not!
That I must bear me on in my own way.
All must remain pure betwixt him and me;
And, ere the day-light dawns, it must be known
Which I must lose—my father, or my friend.*
* Shiller's Piccolomini, act 3, scene 9.
Had Othello been thus honourable105 to Desdemona, he would never have murdered her. Incalculable is the evil we bring on ourselves and society, by supposing and surmising106 facts we ought resolutely107 to question. The motto of the garter—
Evil be to him who evil thinks,
ought to be,
Evil is to him who evil thinks.
Every man will be his own Lawyer and his own Doctor, and such is the perversity108 of human nature, he will also be his own Iago, and feed himself with suspicions. Nearly all tragedies hinge on this error.
To avoid being the cause of misunderstanding to others, it is a good rule never to speak critically of others, except in their presence, or in print. When I am obliged to do this in conversation, with persons of unknown or doubtful exactitude, I take care to keep much below the truth in matters of censure109, as anything of that kind may gain ten or twenty per cent, in carriage. When with men of just habits of interpretation, I pay them the highest compliment of friendship, and speak to them of others, without reserve.
Notorious are the contumelies put upon the cases of grievance110 presented from the people in the House of Commons. Nor is it altogether causeless. So prone111 are the ignorant to mistake their prejudices for facts, and ascribe to others as crimes what exists only in their own surmises113, that most popular cases may be stripped of half their pretensions114 without injuring their truth. Exaggeration is the vice56 of ignorance. Half the speeches addressed to 'King Mob' are hyperbolic. The sentiments of public meetings minister too often to the prevalent inflation. The people will be powerful when they learn to be exact—and not till then.
The only mode of correcting this evil is to instil115 into the people the wise rule of Burlamiqui. To reason, (that is, inductively) says this writer, is to calculate, and as it were draw up an account, after balancing all arguments, in order to see on which side the advantage lies. Burlamiqui had law chiefly in view in his remark, but the rule is of immense application. A logician116 is a secretary or banker's clerk, who keeps an account between truth and error. When a lady once consulted Dr. Johnson on the degree of turpitude117 to be attached to her son's robbing an orchard—'Madam,' said Johnson, 'it all depends upon the weight of the boy. I remember my schoolfellow, Davy Garrick, who was always a little fellow, robbing a dozen orchards118 with impunity119, but the very first time I climbed up an apple tree, for I was always a heavy boy, the bough120 broke with me, and it was called a judgment. I suppose that is why Justice is represented with a pair of scales.' This may not be the precise reason why Justice has a pair of scales, but the point goes to the root of the matter. Without weighing there can be neither justice nor fair induction.
In illustration of these views Mr. Mill has some able remarks:—'In proportion to any person's deficiency of knowledge and mental cultivation121, is generally his inability to discriminate122 between his inferences and the perceptions on which they were grounded.
Many a marvellous tale many a scandalous anecdote123, owes its origin to this incapacity. The narrater relates, not what he saw or heard, but the impression which he derived from what he saw or heard, and of which perhaps the greater part consisted of inference, though the whole is related not as inference but as matter-of-fact. The difficulty of inducing witnesses to restrain, within any moderate limits, the intermixture of their inferences with the narrative124 of their perceptions, is well known to experienced cross-examiners; and still more is this the case when ignorant persons attempt to describe any natural phenomenon. "The simplest narrative," says Dugald Stewart, "of the most illiterate125 observer involves more or less of hypothesis nay126, in general, it will be found that, in proportion to his ignorance, the greater is the number of conjectural127 principle involved in his statements. A village apothecary128 (and, if possible, in a still greater degree, an experienced nurse) is seldom able to describe; the plainest case, without employing a phraseology of which every word is a theory; whereas a simple and genuine specification129 of the phenomena which mark a particular disease—a specification unsophisticated by fancy, or by preconceived opinions, may be regarded as unequivocal evidence of a mind trained by long and successful study to the most difficult of all arts, that of the faithful interpretation of nature."'*
* Logic, pp. 408-9, vol. 2.
It is in judgments formed, in reprehensible130 indifference131 to the actual facts of the case, that party rancour and the proverbial injustice132 of popular political opinion take their rise. A useful caution on this head is pronounced by Lord Brougham in his sketch133 of the life of Lord Wellesley:—'How often do we see,' observes his lordship, 'vehement134: and unceasing; attacks made upon a minister or a statesman, perhaps not in the public service, for something which he does not choose to defend or explain, resting his claims to the confidence of his countrymen upon his past exertions135 and his known character. Yet these assaults are unremittingly made upon him, and the people believe that so much noise could not be stirred up without something to authorise it. Sometimes the objects of the calumny are silent from disdain136; sometimes from knowing that the base propagators of it will only return to their slander137 the more eagerly alter their conviction of falsehood; but sometimes, also, the silencer may be owing to official reserve, of which we see a most remarkable138 instance in the ease of Lord Wellesly.'
Not only are enemies of the people afforded a justification for their opposition139 by wrongful judgment pronounced upon them, but the friends of the people often pass over to the other side through the same cause. When a leader of the people first comes in personal contact with the opposite party, and becomes acquainted with merits of feeling and judgment which he had as it were pledged himself to deny, and indeed achieved himself a position by disbelieving in, he becomes ashamed of the injustice exacted from him by his inexorable adherents140, and forsakes142 his party when he should only forsake141 its errors. The case of Barnave, in the first French Revolution, is a memorable143 instance of this. On lesser144 theatres I have seen many instances of this kind of conversion145; Such changes have always been ascribed to venality146, yet they are men of generous instincts who are thus overcome—but they want logical strength, and cannot correct themselves without falling.
It is a wise rule in conversation, never to guess at meanings. When, an observation is made, capable of affording two inferences, at once put the question which shall elicit147 the meaning intended. Conversation is held to no purpose unless explicitness148 comes out of it. Innumerable are the errors that arise through letting remarks pass, of which we only suppose we know the purport149. This is a fruitful source of misunderstanding. When in Scotland I was much instructed by the intellectual characteristics of the people. The Scotch are essentially150 a reflective people. The English conceive doubts, but the Scotch put them into queries151. Before I had been in the country many hours I was struck by the inductive habits of the people. A very old and illiterate woman, to whom I put an indefinite question, eyed me deliberately152 from head to foot before she gave me an answer. Not in rudeness did she gaze, so much as in inquiry as to what could be my object. I spent more than a week in inquiring at places, where apartments were to be let, by which I acquired profitable acquaintance with the people. Upon asking the terms of apartments, I was met, in all cases, by several preliminary questions, as for whom were they? what number of persons? what station, habits, and probable stay? Then I received the precise answer required. It did not seem to me that they were answering one question by asking another, as is sometimes said of the Scotch—but by a happy and wise presence of mind they asked, as all should do, at many questions as were required to complete the data of the specific answer they were called upon to give.
A wise practice is followed in courts of law. No judge pronounces an opinion on a hypothetical case. What he would do? or what would be the judgment of the law, suppose a certain case should arise?—are questions he never condescends153 to answer. 'Bring the plaintiff into court, let the evidence be taken, and then we will decide. We sit here to judge actual, not suppositious cases.' Such would be the reply. People out of court might profit by the example.
I remember one striking instance of the pernicious effects of surmise112. Some years ago I took part in a Fraternal Demonstration154 at Highbury Barn. The assembly was numerous, and composed of persons of all nations and all parties. The celebration was avowedly155 one of fraternity. The tone of the meeting reflected its object. Pacific words were on every tongue, and harmony reigned156 up till eleven o'clock. At that hour Monsieur Chillman asked me if some steps could not be taken to annualize the meeting, and he requested me to prepare and propose a resolution to that effect. Monsieur Chillman, thinking the resolution ought to come from an Englishman, strongly urged me to move it. I, thinking it too important to emanate157 from a young man, looked about for a person of experience and known discretion158 to introduce it. After several had declined, Mr. Hetherington undertook it. The English politicians were composed of two parties, the friends of Mr. O'Connor, and the members of the National Hall. At that time they were pleased to be the antipodes of each other. No sooner had Mr. Hetherington spoken, he being the friend of Mr. Lovett, than his motion was supposed to come from Mr. Lovett's party, though they were utterly ignorant of its origination. Clamour's hundred tongues were loosened. Slumbering159 differences were awakened160. Suspicion spread like an infection. Fraternity perished of the contagion161. Twenty amendments162 were proposed, and it was not till midnight, and then in a storm indescribably contradictory163 of the meeting's whole purport, that a common understanding was come to. Had the least inquiry been made by the objecting party, previously to dissenting164, they would have found that the suspicious proposition originated with one of themselves. But assuming premises, they inferred from conjecture79 instead of fact, and raised disastrous165 doubts as to the ability of that assembly for domestic or international fraternisation.
The use and abuse of authority Is a subject worthy166 of the young logician's serious attention. Many great writers like Bacon, through policy—Burke through position, or Shakspere through versatility167 of genius, have written on both sides of important questions. Such men, taken piece-meal, may be quoted by the most opposite parties in favour of the most opposite opinions. Unless there is time to make a broad induction from their writings, showing, by weighty, quantitive evidence, the side to which they leaned, better not quote them as authorities at all, but give what expresses your own views on your own responsibility—indeed, in all cases, the quoter ought to stand prepared, if possible, to justify45 all he cites from another in argument. 'There is perhaps something weak and servile in our wishing to rely on, or draw assistance from, ancient opinions. Reason ought not, like vanity, to adorn168 herself with old parchments, and the display of a genealogical tree; more dignified169 in her proceedings170, she ought to derive60 everything from herself; she should disregard past times, and be, if I may use the phrase, the contemporary of all ages.'* Quote others as Grotius did: not as judges from whose decision there is no appeal, but as witnesses whose conspiring171 testimony172 confirms the view taken.
* Necker.
Analogy has frequently been confounded with induction. Analogy signifies reasoning from resemblances subsisting173 between phenomena—induction, reasoning from the sameness of phenomena.
The phenomena affording an induction of a law of nature must be obvious, uniform, and universal.
The rules to be observed in deducing general principles are, that the case be true and the facts universal.
On this subject, as exhibiting the clearest results arrived at, I transcribe174 a passage from Mill: 'There is no word which is used more loosely, or in a greater variety of senses, than analogy. It sometimes stands for arguments which may be examples of the most rigid175 induction. Archbishop Whately, for instance, following Ferguson and other writers, defines analogy conformably to its primitive176 acceptation, that which was given to it by mathematicians177, resemblance of relations. In this sense, when a country which has sent out colonies is termed the mother country, the expression is analogical, signifying that the colonies of a country stand in the same relation to her in which children stand to their parents. And if any inference be drawn178 from this resemblance of relations, as, for instance, that the same obedience179 or affection is due from colonies to the mother country which is due from children to a parent, this is called reasoning by analogy. Or if it be argued that a nation is most beneficially governed by an assembly elected by the people, from the admitted fact that other associations for a common purpose, such as joint180 stock companies, are best managed by a committee chosen by the parties interested; this, too, is an argument from analogy in the preceding sense, because its foundation is, not that a nation is like a joint stock company, or Parliament like a board of directors, but that Parliament stands in the same relation to the nation in which a board of directors stands to a joint stock company. Now, in an argument of this nature, there is no inherent inferiority of conclusiveness181 like other arguments from resemblance, it may amount to nothing, or it may be a perfect and conclusive182 induction. The circumstance in which the two cases resemble, may be capable of: being shown to be the matereal circumstance; to be that on which all the consequences, necessary to be taken into account in the particular discussion, depend. In the case in question, the resemblance is one of relation; the fundamentum relationis being the management, by a few persons, of affairs in which a much greater number are interested along with them. Now, some may contend that this circumstance which is common to the two cases, and the various consequences which follow from it, have the chief share in determining all those effects which make up what we term good or bad administration. If they can establish this, their argument has the force of a rigid induction: if they cannot, they are said to have failed in proving the analogy between the two cases, a mode of speech which implies that when the analogy can be proved, the argument founded upon it cannot be resisted.'*
* Logic, pp. 97-8, vol. 2.
'Many of the most splendid and important discoveries in this science were the result of analogical reasonings. It was from this source that Dr. Priestley proved the compound nature of atmospheric183 air; and it is related that it was in consequence of hints which he had given, when on a visit to Paris, to Lavoisier, founded entirely184 upon analogical conjectures, that the latter philosopher was induced to commence experiments, with the view of proving the compound nature of water, and of reducing it to its constituent185 elements. Indeed the whole history of this very important and useful department of human knowledge exhibits very striking and incontestable proofs how much of the art owed its existence to mere73 hints and conjectures, founded, in many cases, upon very slight resemblances or analogies.*. The chief province of analogy is confined to that of suggestion. Analogies are the great hinters of experiments. They illustrate3 an argument, but do not establish it. They are probabilities, not proofs. Hence Lord Brougham in one place exclaims:—'I have a dread34, at least a suspicion, of all analogies, and never more than when on the slippery heights of an obscure subject; when we are, as it were, inter37 apices of a metaphysical argument, and feeling, perhaps groping, our way in the dark, or among the clouds. I then regard analogy as a dangerous light, a treacherous186 ignii fatuus.'**
A striking instance of the fallacy of analogy is afforded in the experiments of Professor Matteuoci, which seem to prove that though the analogies between electricity and nervous substance are nearly perfect, yet they are two distinct agencies.***
* Blakey's Logic, pp. 97-7.
*** See Zoist No. 20, p. 363.
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1
induction
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| n.感应，感应现象 | |
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2
syllogism
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| n.演绎法，三段论法 | |
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3
illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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4
illustrated
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| adj. 有插图的，列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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6
statute
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| n.成文法，法令，法规；章程，规则，条例 | |
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7
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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8
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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premises
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| n.建筑物，房屋 | |
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10
hem
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| n.贴边，镶边；vt.缝贴边；(in)包围，限制 | |
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monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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12
logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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franchise
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| n.特许，特权，专营权，特许权 | |
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14
ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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15
ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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16
tints
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| 色彩( tint的名词复数 )； 带白的颜色； （淡色）染发剂； 痕迹 | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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18
alluded
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| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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19
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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20
eminently
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| adv.突出地；显著地；不寻常地 | |
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21
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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22
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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23
tracts
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| 大片土地( tract的名词复数 )； 地带； （体内的）道； （尤指宣扬宗教、伦理或政治的）短文 | |
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24
trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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25
chambers
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| n.房间( chamber的名词复数 )；（议会的）议院；卧室；会议厅 | |
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26
judicious
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| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
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inductions
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| 归纳（法）( induction的名词复数 )； （电或磁的）感应； 就职； 吸入 | |
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28
oratory
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| n.演讲术；词藻华丽的言辞 | |
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29
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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30
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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31
anatomy
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| n.解剖学，解剖；功能，结构，组织 | |
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isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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33
brutes
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| 兽( brute的名词复数 )； 畜生； 残酷无情的人； 兽性 | |
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34
dread
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| vt.担忧，忧虑；惧怕，不敢；n.担忧，畏惧 | |
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35
dreads
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| n.恐惧，畏惧( dread的名词复数 )；令人恐惧的事物v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的第三人称单数 ) | |
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36
maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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inter
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| v.埋葬 | |
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38
erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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consultation
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| n.咨询；商量；商议；会议 | |
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40
steer
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| vt.驾驶，为…操舵；引导；vi.驾驶 | |
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41
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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42
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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43
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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44
justifying
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| 证明…有理( justify的现在分词 )； 为…辩护； 对…作出解释； 为…辩解（或辩护） | |
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45
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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46
recondite
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| adj.深奥的，难解的 | |
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47
warrior
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| n.勇士，武士，斗士 | |
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48
skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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49
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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50
savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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51
dexterity
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| n.(手的)灵巧，灵活 | |
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52
scotch
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| n.伤口，刻痕；苏格兰威士忌酒；v.粉碎，消灭，阻止；adj.苏格兰(人)的 | |
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53
procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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54
procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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55
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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56
vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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57
judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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58
uncommon
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| adj.罕见的，非凡的，不平常的 | |
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59
circuitous
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| adj.迂回的路的，迂曲的，绕行的 | |
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60
derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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61
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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62
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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64
judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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65
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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66
inverted
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| adj.反向的，倒转的v.使倒置，使反转( invert的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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67
cone
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| n.圆锥体，圆锥形东西，球果 | |
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68
tenants
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| n.房客( tenant的名词复数 )；佃户；占用者；占有者 | |
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apprentices
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| 学徒，徒弟( apprentice的名词复数 ) | |
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70
incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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72
tyrant
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| n.暴君，专制的君主，残暴的人 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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attesting
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| v.证明( attest的现在分词 )；证实；声称…属实；使宣誓 | |
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equitable
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| adj.公平的；公正的 | |
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monarchs
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| 君主，帝王( monarch的名词复数 ) | |
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77
rend
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| vt.把…撕开，割裂；把…揪下来，强行夺取 | |
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conjectures
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| 推测，猜想( conjecture的名词复数 ) | |
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conjecture
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| n./v.推测，猜测 | |
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80
etymologies
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| n.词源学，词源说明( etymology的名词复数 ) | |
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81
antiquity
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| n.古老；高龄；古物，古迹 | |
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82
annihilated
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| v.（彻底）消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 )；使无效；废止；彻底击溃 | |
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83
antiquities
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| n.古老( antiquity的名词复数 )；古迹；古人们；古代的风俗习惯 | |
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84
attested
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| adj.经检验证明无病的，经检验证明无菌的v.证明( attest的过去式和过去分词 )；证实；声称…属实；使宣誓 | |
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85
implicitness
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| adj.含蓄的, 绝对的, 无疑问的,固有的,无保留的,暗示的 | |
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rumours
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| n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 )；风闻；谣言；谣传 | |
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87
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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88
miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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calumny
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| n.诽谤，污蔑，中伤 | |
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astonishment
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| n.惊奇，惊异 | |
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91
malice
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| n.恶意，怨恨，蓄意；[律]预谋 | |
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92
incites
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| 刺激，激励，煽动( incite的第三人称单数 ) | |
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hearth
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| n.壁炉炉床，壁炉地面 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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95
condescend
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| v.俯就，屈尊；堕落，丢丑 | |
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withhold
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| v.拒绝，不给；使停止，阻挡 | |
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benevolence
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| n.慈悲，捐助 | |
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98
sublime
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| adj.崇高的，伟大的；极度的，不顾后果的 | |
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intensity
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| n.强烈，剧烈；强度；烈度 | |
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100
lull
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| v.使安静，使入睡，缓和，哄骗；n.暂停，间歇 | |
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101
snare
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| n.陷阱，诱惑，圈套；（去除息肉或者肿瘤的）勒除器；响弦，小军鼓；vt.以陷阱捕获，诱惑 | |
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102
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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103
outlet
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| n.出口/路；销路；批发商店；通风口；发泄 | |
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104
wilt
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| v.(使)植物凋谢或枯萎；(指人)疲倦，衰弱 | |
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105
honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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106
surmising
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| v.臆测，推断( surmise的现在分词 )；揣测；猜想 | |
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resolutely
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| adj.坚决地，果断地 | |
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perversity
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| n.任性；刚愎自用 | |
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109
censure
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| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
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110
grievance
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| n.怨愤，气恼，委屈 | |
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prone
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| adj.(to)易于…的，很可能…的；俯卧的 | |
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surmise
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| v./n.猜想，推测 | |
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113
surmises
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| v.臆测，推断( surmise的第三人称单数 )；揣测；猜想 | |
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114
pretensions
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| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
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115
instil
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| v.逐渐灌输 | |
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116
logician
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| n.逻辑学家 | |
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117
turpitude
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| n.可耻；邪恶 | |
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118
orchards
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| （通常指围起来的）果园( orchard的名词复数 ) | |
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119
impunity
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| n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
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120
bough
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| n.大树枝，主枝 | |
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121
cultivation
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| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
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122
discriminate
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| v.区别，辨别，区分；有区别地对待 | |
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123
anecdote
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| n.轶事，趣闻，短故事 | |
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124
narrative
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| n.叙述，故事；adj.叙事的，故事体的 | |
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125
illiterate
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| adj.文盲的；无知的；n.文盲 | |
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126
nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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127
conjectural
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| adj.推测的 | |
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128
apothecary
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| n.药剂师 | |
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129
specification
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| n.详述；[常pl.]规格，说明书，规范 | |
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130
reprehensible
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| adj.该受责备的 | |
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131
indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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132
injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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133
sketch
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| n.草图；梗概；素描；v.素描；概述 | |
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134
vehement
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| adj.感情强烈的；热烈的；(人)有强烈感情的 | |
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135
exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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136
disdain
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| n.鄙视，轻视；v.轻视，鄙视，不屑 | |
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137
slander
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| n./v.诽谤，污蔑 | |
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138
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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139
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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140
adherents
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| n.支持者，拥护者( adherent的名词复数 )；党羽；徒子徒孙 | |
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141
forsake
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| vt.遗弃，抛弃；舍弃，放弃 | |
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142
forsakes
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| 放弃( forsake的第三人称单数 )； 弃绝； 抛弃； 摒弃 | |
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143
memorable
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| adj.值得回忆的，难忘的，特别的，显著的 | |
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144
lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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145
conversion
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| n.转化，转换，转变 | |
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146
venality
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| n.贪赃枉法，腐败 | |
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147
elicit
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| v.引出,抽出,引起 | |
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148
explicitness
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149
purport
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| n.意义，要旨，大要；v.意味著，做为...要旨，要领是... | |
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150
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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151
queries
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| n.问题( query的名词复数 )；疑问；询问；问号v.质疑，对…表示疑问( query的第三人称单数 )；询问 | |
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152
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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153
condescends
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| 屈尊，俯就( condescend的第三人称单数 )； 故意表示和蔼可亲 | |
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154
demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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155
avowedly
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| adv.公然地 | |
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156
reigned
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| vi.当政，统治（reign的过去式形式） | |
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157
emanate
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| v.发自，来自，出自 | |
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158
discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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159
slumbering
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| 微睡，睡眠（slumber的现在分词形式） | |
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160
awakened
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| v.（使）醒( awaken的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到 | |
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161
contagion
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| n.(通过接触的疾病)传染；蔓延 | |
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162
amendments
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| （法律、文件的）改动( amendment的名词复数 )； 修正案； 修改； （美国宪法的）修正案 | |
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163
contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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164
dissenting
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| adj.不同意的 | |
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165
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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166
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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167
versatility
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| n.多才多艺，多样性，多功能 | |
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168
adorn
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| vt.使美化，装饰 | |
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169
dignified
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| a.可敬的，高贵的 | |
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170
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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171
conspiring
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| 密谋( conspire的现在分词 )； 搞阴谋； （事件等）巧合； 共同导致 | |
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172
testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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173
subsisting
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| v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的现在分词 ) | |
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174
transcribe
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| v.抄写，誉写；改编(乐曲)；复制，转录 | |
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175
rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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176
primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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177
mathematicians
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| 数学家( mathematician的名词复数 ) | |
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178
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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179
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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180
joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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181
conclusiveness
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| n.最后； 释疑； 确定性； 结论性 | |
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182
conclusive
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| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
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183
atmospheric
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| adj.大气的，空气的；大气层的；大气所引起的 | |
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184
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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185
constituent
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| n.选民；成分，组分；adj.组成的，构成的 | |
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186
treacherous
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| adj.不可靠的，有暗藏的危险的；adj.背叛的，背信弃义的 | |
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187
pal
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| n.朋友，伙伴，同志；vi.结为友 | |
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