This was plain to everybody, but it was equally plain to those who studied the balance sheet of the treasury9 that many things could be done to equalize and reduce the taxation. The debt itself could be readjusted to be much less burdensome. As it stood it was made up of some twenty different kinds of paper;—bonds, treasury notes, certificates of indebtedness of all kinds due at nearly twenty different dates, and drawing almost as many different rates of interest. The paper currency which kept the money market in a constant state of unrest could be redeemed10. Great economies could be made in the administration of the government. These things done and a careful estimate of essential expenses computed12, nobody had any doubt but that the people would 29consent to the taxation required with as little grumbling13 as human nature usually meets taxes.
That the revision of the revenue was work for experts, not for politicians, had been realized before Mr. Lincoln’s death, and in March, 1865, a commission had been appointed to look into the whole subject and report. The head of this commission was a man who was to wield15 a big influence in the country in the next few years, and one to whom we owe more credit than he has ever received, David A. Wells. Mr. Wells was a New England man, who had first attracted attention by planning and constructing in the printing office of the Springfield Republican, where he wrote editorials, the first machine ever made for folding newspapers. He made money from his invention, and used some of it in giving himself a scientific training at Harvard as a special pupil of Louis Agassiz. In 1864 Mr. Wells, who had become interested in economic problems, wrote a pamphlet, called “Our Burden and Our Strength,” which attracted general attention, both here and abroad, and led naturally enough to his choice as one of the revenue commission referred to above. There were two other members on the commission, but from the beginning Mr. Wells dominated it, and his first report, made January 1, 1866, showed in a very clear way what was before the country.
By his calculations the taxes and tariffs then in force ought to yield in the year ending June 30, 1867, $435,000,000. Now the Secretary of the Treasury had estimated that we could get along that year on $284,000,000. Let us say three hundred millions, proposed Mr. Wells, and then let us set aside fifty millions a year for reducing the debt—that still leaves $85,000,000 to be taken off the taxes. Where should it be applied16? To the internal taxes or to the custom duties? Mr. Wells knew the feeling of the people. They hated direct taxation, they preferred duties on imports, and he worked 30out a plan for taking the $85,000,000 off the former, but at the same time he called attention to various inequalities in the tariff5 which should be corrected. They came mainly from the lack of equalization between the two systems of taxation. The duties on imports were supposed to be arranged so as to compensate17 for the internal taxation; not infrequently, however, the tariffs were placed without proper consideration, and grave inequalities had resulted. These were of two kinds: either the tariff was less than the taxes, so that the manufacturer could not compete with foreign goods imported, or it was considerably18 higher than the taxes, so that he could put up his prices until they practically prohibited importation, thus cutting off revenue and heavily burdening the consumer. Certain cases of the first kind became familiar at the time from the fact that they touched everybody, and were explained clearly and in detail in Mr. Wells’s report. There was the matter of book-making. Everything which went to make a book was separately taxed,—paper, cloth, boards, glue, thread, gold-leaf, leather, and type,—and when the book was complete it was taxed 5 per cent on the selling price. It cost 59? cents to make a book requiring a pound of paper. The same book could be made in England and delivered in New York, including duty (the duty on books was 25% on the value) for 26? cents. Little wonder that American book publishers sent their work abroad to be done or that the boys and girls of the time were using Webster’s Spelling Books made in England. The umbrella was another common article over which there was much trouble. Each item which went into the making of the umbrella—sticks, rods, handles, tips, bands, tassels19, buttons, cover—was produced by a different establishment, and each paid its own tax. The cover usually was imported, and silk paid a duty of 60 per cent. The finished parasol 31paid a 6 per cent tax. Now the duty on an imported umbrella was 35 per cent on its value. Naturally umbrellas were imported in quantities and sold at a price lower than they could be made for at home.
But while there were cases where the tariff did not compensate for the tax there were more where it had been forced far beyond it. If these tariffs had increased the revenue, they might, under the circumstances, have been justified20, but they did not do that. They limited importation and enabled the home manufacturer to put up his prices, and it was he, not the government, who got the extra money. At the same time it cost the government a great deal to collect the small sums realized on these over-protected articles, often more than the sum itself.
If the government could get on with $85,000,000 less than it could collect, it seemed obvious that it ought to begin cutting down those internal taxes which were so much too high for the tariffs. It seemed obvious, too, that unremunerative tariffs ought to be cut off. But no sooner did the talk of reducing tariffs on any article begin than there came a loud outburst from many manufacturing centres against any reduction. The internal taxes must come off at once—that they demanded, but no tariffs should be lowered. The cry to preserve the tariffs soon turned in many mouths to one to raise them. Copper21 (in blocks), which under the bill of 1864 had had a duty of 2? cents a pound, now asked for double that. Iron rails which already were carrying a duty of 70 cents a hundred pounds and selling in New York for over $80 a ton, while they cost only about $32 in Wales, asked a higher duty. The salt miners of Michigan and New York, whose profits at the moment were enormous, demanded still greater protection. As soon as the House Committee of Ways and Means got to work on a tariff bill, which was early 32in 1866, an army of determined22 tariff lobbyists poured into Washington, declaring they must have more protection or they would perish.
That there were grave embarrassments23 in the business of the country could not be denied. Five hundred thousand men, young men at that, had been taken permanently24 from the ranks of breadwinners by the war—and those dependent upon them were now the country’s wards25. Immigration to which the government had looked for re?nforcements for labor26 was falling off. The tremendous demand which a great army makes upon manufactures of all kinds was at an end. Particularly did the iron mills, the woollen factories, the railroads, the produce merchants, feel this sudden cessation of trade. Prices were probably 90 per cent higher than before the war, although wages were not over 60 per cent higher. But these embarrassments were the inevitable27 results of war—as logical as the debt or the disabled soldier. Somehow the transition from the abnormal condition of war to the normal one of peace had to be made; somehow for the artificial demand and cost the natural must be substituted. It meant economy, curtailment28, lower prices, lessened29 output; hard times, in short, for a period. There was no class in the country from whom patient endurance of the difficulties of the situation could be more fairly asked than the manufacturers. They had for the most part enjoyed four as fat years as ever fell to the lot of man. It is doubtful indeed if any industry at any period of the world’s history had reaped so great rewards in so short a time as that of iron in the Civil War.
The difficulty now was that these manufacturers were not willing to pay their share of the cost of the war. They demanded higher protection that they might make their prices higher, and thus ease as much as possible the necessarily 33hard transition state. Congress was to do for them what economy and patience should have done.
As it happened the demands for a higher protection were made on a Congress under the dictatorship of a man for whom no tariff could ever be too high—that was Thaddeus Stevens. When the first tariff bill was presented to the House in June, 1866, by Mr. Morrill, everybody knew Stevens was near his end, but emaciated30, white, and suffering as he was, his nerve was still superb. Too weak to walk up the Capitol steps, two stalwart negroes carried him. “Who will carry me when you are dead, boys?” he said to them one day with a chuckle31. The fight between Congress and President Johnson over Reconstruction32 had developed, and Johnson had already singled out Stevens as his chief enemy. He was soon to begin to ask as he “swung around the circle,” “Why not hang Thad Stevens?” Johnson was not mistaken in placing the responsibility. Stevens had always disliked him. “Can’t you find a candidate for vice-president of the United States without going down to one of those damned rebel provinces to pick up one?” he had asked Colonel McClure in 1864. His dislike had grown to open opposition34, and he was now leading the Congressional fight with spirit, ability, and bitterness. Yet weak as he was, and absorbed as he was in the undoing35 of the sullen36 suffering man at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, no measure escaped his dictation, least of all a measure which touched a doctrine37 so dear to his heart as the protection of American industry.
The bill was not in before it was evident Stevens was dissatisfied with it. It was, he declared vehemently38, a free-trade measure. As a matter of fact no bill the United States Congress had seen up to this date had less consolation39 for the free-trader in it than the one Mr. Morrill now introduced. Although just before the bill was reported 34$75,000,000 had been taken from the internal revenue taxes, no compensating40 reduction had been made in the tariff. Not only did it preserve the average of 47 per cent, which the bill of 1864 imposed, but it increased many duties, notably41 those on copper, iron, steel rails, wool and woollen goods, salt, all articles which touched the mass of consumers. Many purely42 protective duties which could yield no revenue were added—such were the duties proposed on grindstones and on nickel. So inconsistent was the bill with the former professions of the party, so evident was it that it was going to make the price of many essential articles higher, that Mr. Morrill, candid33 gentleman that he was, apologized rather pathetically for it. He had hoped, he said in course of debate, that at the close of the war the tariff had reached its maximum, and that the earliest business of Congress after taking off internal taxes on manufactures would be to reduce duties by the full compensating amount. That this could not be done with safety was due in his mind entirely43 to the failure of Congress to redeem11 the currency. As long as there was $917,000,000 of paper money in circulation Mr. Morrill thought the tariff could not be lowered, but ought rather to be raised. His argument was not particularly clear or convincing, but it was obvious that he believed what he said, and that he was greatly worried over the situation.
Mr. Morrill’s doleful apology for raising duties was entirely misplaced as far as the dominant44 factor in Congress was concerned. It was not the higher duties which stirred that body to protest against the bill, it was the lower; it was not the extravagant45 increases, it was the moderate ones; it was not the articles added, it was those omitted. Thus, among other items in the schedule was one making the duty on Nova Scotia coal 50 cents a ton, although the duty on coal from other points was $1.25 a ton. This discrimination 35was, of course, for the sake of New England manufacturers, who were cut off from using native coal by the freight charges of the long haul. Again, scrap46 iron was not protected at all and shoddy had a duty only four times what it had been formerly47! These and other similar changes in the bill were not fairly before the House when Stevens broke out in anger at the moderation of the measure. “I look upon this bill as a free trade bill from beginning to end,” he stormed. Nova Scotia coal should pay the full tariff of $1.25, and that was not enough. There was not a word about scrap iron in the bill, shoddy should pay more. “It is a most extraordinary imposition upon the protective tariff of the country.” But Stevens was physically48 too weak to do justice to his indignation—more than once when he tried to address the House he sank back into his seat, exclaiming, “I am too exhausted,” but if he could not defend his doctrine, he had a Pennsylvania colleague who could, and far more cunningly, with far more knowledge and fairness than Stevens. This was William D. Kelley of Philadelphia. Kelley at once took hold of the debate on the bill, his whole weight being thrown in favor of the highest protection of any article which could be made or grown in the United States. His knowledge of the articles on which he spoke49, and his eloquence50, clearness, and conviction in presentation, were such as to mark him at once as the probable future leader of the high protectionists.
But bold, able, and determined as the protectionist sentiment in the House showed itself, it was not to go unchallenged. A species of three-cornered fight developed within the party. There was Mr. Morrill defending while deploring51 the bill, on the ground that paper currency made it necessary,—there were the high protectionists led by Mr. Stevens in spirit and Mr. Kelley in speech, and there was a most interesting body of moderate protectionists, led by three representatives from 36Iowa, John A. Kasson, James F. Wilson, and William B. Allison. These men were ably seconded by Frederick A. Pike of Maine (“tax-fight-emancipate Pike”) and Henry Raymond of New York. Ridicule52, protest, argument, were in turn tried by this group. “It is well understood that there are many very worthy53 manufacturers of coffee in this country,” Mr. Pike said in disgust one day; “they make it of chicory, beans, peas, rye, wheat, dandelion root, and many other things. So there is reason for retaining a small duty on coffee in order to protect that worthy class of our manufacturers.”
Mr. Raymond, who was indignant over the increased duty on railroad iron—a duty which he declared would increase the annual expenses of the two roads in his state, the Erie and the Central, at least $2,000,000—exclaimed: “If the bill of 1865 is not sufficient protection, what in Heaven’s name will be? We were told at the beginning if we protected this infant industry it would soon stand alone. We have been doing it for thirty or forty years, and yet every session of Congress witnesses new demands for increased protection.”
It was Mr. Kasson who did perhaps the most effective service against the measure. He wished simply “to foster the incipient54 industries of America until they were able to take care of themselves without help, in fair competition with the industries of foreign countries.” To make the duties so high that foreign competition was removed, was, in Mr. Kasson’s judgment55, to encourage monopoly. This was a bill “to prevent the diffused56 blessings57 of Providence58 from being enjoyed by the people of the United States,” he declared. Who were the handful of wool-growers in the country that 34,000,000 consumers should be taxed to support them? Mr. Kasson was especially bitter against the higher prices the bill would undoubtedly59 make for farmers. “What does this bill do?” he asked. “It raises the tariff on lumber60, which 37is so necessary to the Western prairie farmer; on nails, without which he cannot drive his boards on his house or build his fence; on salt, without which he cannot preserve his beef and pork. There is hardly a thing he consumes which this bill forgets to raise the duty upon. Every prominent necessity of life, food, fuel, shelter, and clothing, is embraced and made more expensive to the consumer throughout the country. Even on boys’ pocket-knives the duty is increased about three times—600 per cent—one member of the committee tells me. And yet it is said this is a tariff for mere61 protection. Why, sir, you are protecting the American people until they will not be able to buy one solitary62 thing that is protected if this goes on.” It was unjust to the consumers, and, said Mr. Kasson, “Consumption represents millions, capital only thousands.”
The majority of the Western representatives were with him in the feeling that the bill was unjust to the farmer. “Long John” Wentworth of Illinois, a Republican of Democratic antecedents, did some sensible, pointed14 arguing against the higher duties on the ground that they were against the very men (the farmers) “who do most of the tax-paying in peace and most of the fighting in war.” He warned emphatically that not only was the bill a discrimination, but that it was certain to encourage interstate combinations—a warning which was repeatedly dropped during the debate, and to which the tendency to combination in the salt, iron, and copper industries gave particular force.
When Wentworth and the Westerners found that there was little chance of defeating the bill they declared that it must be made just all around—there must be protection for the farmer and they asked for 30 per cent on cattle, 50 per cent on fruit, more on grain, duties which raised strong protests from Pennsylvania and other manufacturing centres. This 38would take the necessaries of life from the reach of “their poor toiling63 millions.” Yes, said the Westerners, but you are taking the necessaries of labor from our “poor toiling millions.”
That members of the Republican party should dare in his presence to talk such doctrine was gall64 and wormwood to Mr. Stevens, and he flung at them, and at Mr. Kasson particularly, an epithet65 which in his mouth was only one degree less opprobrious66 than that of “slave-holder” and “rebel”—“free trader,” and he could prove it, for here was Mr. Kasson’s name on one of the circulars of the Free Trade League. Mr. Kasson did not deny the charge: “I have the distinguished67 honor,” he replied, “of being a councillor-elect to it, and I am giving my counsel to it (the League), and to all the people of the United States.”
The bill passed the House by a large majority—the high duties on farm products which the Westerners asked tacked68 to it. It was evident that Congress, as a whole, had broken with the avowed69 tariff policy of the past 20 years.
It was the middle of July, 1866, when the bill reached the Senate—too hot for tariffs, the Senators decided70. It was several months indeed before it came before them. Along with it came a bill prepared by Mr. Wells, who had been greatly disturbed by the outbreak of high protectionism. A moderate protectionist himself—he appreciated the injustice71 and the dangers in recklessly and generally increasing duties. He had carefully studied the schedules, and he knew how inevitably73 disaster must follow to some interests from the sweeping changes proposed. He accordingly prepared a bill much more moderate in its duties, which he claimed would give the necessary revenue and at the same time protect as far as was just. It met the hearty74 approval of the Senate, where there had been much sarcasm75 spent on the House 39bill, principally by the Republicans themselves. “The idea has seemed to prevail of late,” said Mr. Fessenden, “that if anybody choose to start a new manufacture by way of experiment, thinking he can succeed in it, the duty of this country, whatever the effect on commerce, or whatever the taxation on individuals, is to place duties which will prevent the importation of that article if it interferes76 with the manufacture started.... Is it worth while,” he asked, “to prohibit the importation of all articles and end our relations with foreign countries?”
Mr. Wells’s bill was made an amendment78 to the revised House bill, and sent back. Mr. Morrill advised its acceptance, and promptly79. The time had come when, in his opinion, it was “reasonable to have an unreasonable80 tariff.” But there were few of the members, particularly of the Western members, who agreed with Mr. Morrill. The bitter feeling that the East was legislating81 for itself to the injury of the farmer broke out hotly. A genuine struggle of sections followed, to the disgust and alarm of Stevens, who knew that if the Westerners could not or would not accept the “home market” argument, high protection was a lost cause. That his own side should imperil the bill was particularly trying to him. “If the gentlemen who are in favor of a tariff bill hold their tongues and vote,” he snarled82, “letting the other side do the talking, they may get a tariff, but they never will if they keep up their debate.” But they would not hold their tongues, and they did not get the bill. In the general dissatisfaction it failed. But high protection did not end with it. The failure to pass the bill was the signal for a move of far-reaching consequences.
The morning after the House dropped the bill Mr. John Sherman asked the Senate to consider a measure for raising revenue by putting up the duties on wool and woollen goods. 40There was a general outcry. Where did such a bill come from—who had ever heard of it—how could Mr. Sherman expect a measure plainly in the interest of a single industry to be properly considered, when Congress was to expire “day after to-morrow,” and more and more of the same kind, including some caustic84 remarks about the influence a private industry must have to force such a measure before the Senate at such a time.
As a matter of fact the bill now so suddenly sprung on the Senate had been lying in wait for some seven months for just such a contingency85 as the failure of the tariff bill—a fine example of business foresight86! This was its history: In July, 1866, when the Senate postponed87 taking up the tariff Judge Bingham of Ohio had brought into the House a bill providing for higher duties on wool and woollens. It was evidently framed to take care of the wool-growers of his state. Certain woollen manufacturers, who had known nothing of his intention, saw the danger of the bill antagonizing both Congress and those manufacturers who were advocating free wool, and persuaded Judge Bingham to allow it to be sidetracked until the fate of the general tariff was decided. This was done, the bill being quietly passed on to the Senate, where nobody but Mr. Sherman seems to have known or remembered anything about it. When the tariff bill dropped, the wool interests immediately asked that their special measure be presented, and Mr. Sherman agreed. Part of the dismay that the Senate showed at the presentation of the measure was no doubt due to its familiarity with the solid organization and effective lobbying of the wool manufacturing interests of that day as well as with their reputation for unsavory lobbying in the past. It was not yet forgotten how in the forties and fifties the wool interests had combined with the Pennsylvania iron men to force Western representatives, who 41at that time were all working for land grants for railroads, to vote for their tariffs. The scandal of 1857 in the fight for free raw wool was not yet forgotten. The charge of corruption89 at that time had even forced a Congressional investigation91 in which it was shown that one Boston wool firm had spent some $87,000 of its own money besides some thousands of other people’s. These sums they charged frankly92 on their books “to expenses in securing the passage of the tariff of 1857.” The investigation showed that the agent of the manufacturers confiscated93 most of the money intrusted to him; that none of it, as far as shown, ever reached a Congressman94, though a considerable sum did go to editors and “influential persons”—such was $5000 to Mr. Thurlow Weed, for collecting statistics and using arguments!
The insistent95 demands of the wool men, for years, had been such, that even good Mr. Morrill had grown tired of them. “Their evils somehow never disappear,” he said, querulously, when he presented his bill in ’66, and he went on then to say that never since he had been in Congress had so large a number of petitions for help been received as had been coming from the wool interests East and West. The wool men, as a matter of fact, were organized then as probably no interest in the country had ever been before. The chief organization was the National Association of Wool Manufacturers, having at its head as able a lobbyist and promoter as the country has ever produced—this was John L. Hayes—a New Englander—a graduate of Dartmouth and of the Harvard Law School, a man of wide and varied96 experience. He had been counsel for Canada when the reciprocity treaty of 1854 was framed. He had founded iron works in Maine and promoted a railroad in Mexico. He had been in politics. He had held office in Washington. He was a natural scientist of no mean order—a man versatile97, knowing, engaging, and 42energetic. Mr. Hayes took charge of the interests of the wool manufactures in 1865, and he carried on a splendid campaign for higher tariffs. The only hitch98 in it had been the necessity of combining with the wool-growers. The decline in the price of wool after the war had lead the latter to conceive the idea that if all foreign wool could be shut out of the country, the domestic grower would be able to monopolize99 the market—at his own price. To accomplish this they had organized to fight for a duty which they meant should be prohibitive. The disadvantage at which the manufacturer would find himself, should such a measure pass, was obvious, but to fight for free wool was to antagonize a group of unusual political power. Ohio was the chief centre of this group, but it could count on the support of New York, Pennsylvania, and Michigan. Mr. Hayes realized that if the wool manufacturers should succeed in keeping their raw material free, the wool-growers in retaliation100 might force low duties on woollens. It seemed to him and to the association he directed better policy to work with rather than against their opponents, and largely through his influence the two conflicting interests were brought together at a convention held in Syracuse, New York, early in 1866. There was an attempt to convince the sheep men that free raw wool would benefit them more than any tariff, but they refused the argument. They must have real protection. The two interests succeeded finally in working out an agreement which satisfied each. The basis of this agreement was, as afterwards stated by Commissioner101 Wells, “that the duty on raw or unwashed wools and hair, other than wools adapted for carpets, should be fixed102 at rates varying from ten to twelve cents per pound, and from ten to eleven per cent ad valorem. In order, then, to compensate the manufacturer for such a prospective103 enhancement of the price of his raw material, it was agreed that, in consideration 43of the fact that four pounds of the cheapest imported wool (mestiza), paying an aggregate104 duty of forty-six cents, were sometimes employed in the fabrication of a pound of finished cloth, the duty on cloth should be fifty cents per pound, and on other fabrics105 of wool of varying weight a duty in like proportion. In order, next, to give the manufacturer protection against his foreign competitors, 25 per cent ad valorem was added; and in order to further compensate for the payment of an internal revenue tax of 6 per cent, which tax was repealed106 in the succeeding year, 10 per cent more was added, thus making the aggregate duty on shawls, cloths, and woollen goods generally, fifty cents per pound and thirty-five per cent ad valorem. It will thus be seen that if the manufacturers, as is often alleged107, did not enter into the arrangement for an increase in duty through their own seeking, they nevertheless managed to secure full compensation for all that was granted to the wool-growers; and in addition to that, through force of subsequent circumstances, an additional protection in excess of what, according to their showing, they considered necessary.”
This was the basis of the wool schedule which had been embodied108 in Mr. Morrill’s bill and also of the bill which Mr. Sherman had sprung on the Senate. That the Senate did not like the wool bill was evident. On all sides there was strenuous109 opposition to protecting one industry and not another, and yet the bill went through. It is worth nothing in view of the support of the scandalous wool schedule of 1909 by both the Senators from Massachusetts, that both Senators Summer and Wilson of Massachusetts voted against the wool bill of 1867 and that Senators Morrill and Fessenden absented themselves. A few hours before the end of the session the wool bill was received by the House and passed. But its fate was by no means decided. It still 44must have the President’s signature, and the President was Andrew Johnson. Johnson was in poor temper to favor any measure sanctioned by “Thad Stevens and his gang.” He had just vetoed one of Stevens’s pet measures, and it was very likely he would veto any bill favoring a special interest, for his traditions and sympathies were all with a liberal commercial policy. Mr. Hayes knew this, and he and his friends collected outside the door of the Capitol chamber110, where, as the custom is, the President signs bills on the last night of a session. Late in the evening it was rumored111 that the bill would be vetoed. Hayes hurriedly summoned aid,—Bingham of Ohio, the framer of the bill, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney-General. What pressure this force brought to bear on Mr. Johnson is unknown, but at a minute before twelve, according to Mr. Hayes’s story, the President put his name to the wool bill. It was a great triumph for Mr. Hayes. “The wool bill of 1867 and its enactment112 into law,” says one of the protectionist organs, “were chiefly due to his personal influence with leading members of both branches of Congress.”
The passage of the wool bill proved that an industry, if strongly enough organized and headed by a sufficiently113 able and respectable lobbyist, could secure from the Congress of the United States protective favors which could not be secured for the whole mass of industries. The lesson had immediate88 effect. The next year (1868) Congress was asked to pass a similar bill, favoring the Lake Superior copper industry. The rich mines in that section had been in operation for several years, and in the last two or three years their output had been increasing rapidly. As was natural, there had been a great amount of speculation114 in copper mining stocks. The public had subscribed115 almost as much to wildcat and bogus copper schemes in this period as to the same kind of oil 45schemes. Probably something like $20,000,000 had been actually invested in the region, there were forty or fifty thousand persons settled in the district, and there was a considerable fleet on the Lakes in the copper-carrying trade. It was the beginning of a great industry. Now for many years there had been in Maryland, Connecticut, and Massachusetts copper-smelting116 works which used ores from Chile and Cuba mixed with ores from the Eastern states. Since 1864 the Eastern concerns had paid a duty of 5 per cent on foreign copper ore. The Lake Superior interests had been suffering for several months from decreased prices, due largely to a great increase in the world’s copper output. They had asked relief in 1866, and a higher duty had been accorded them in the bill that failed. They now concluded, as the wool men had, that if they could not get what they wanted in one way they would in another, and in July, 1868, brought in a bill asking for a duty equal to about 25 per cent on copper ore. It was a rate which, if granted, was bound to put the New England and Baltimore works out of commission, put an end to the carrying trade with Chile and Cuba, raise the price of copper so that American-built ships could not get their copper bottoms in our ports, and drive many industries then using copper to cheaper substitutes, like galvanized iron, sheet tin, zinc117, or lead, and put still others to an expense which, as they would have no compensating tariffs to protect them, would greatly cripple them. Excited debate followed the bill everywhere, especially in the Senate, where Zach Chandler fought for it. The time had come, he declared, when the manufacturers were not going to have all the protection; miners and farmers were going to have it now. There was not an article made in Connecticut, which was opposing this bill, which was not protected, “not an article from a wooden button to a brass118 clock or from carpetings to Jew’s 46harps.” If you don’t give protection to us this way (through special bills), we’ll take a horizontal tariff for our copper and lumber and wheat and wool, and then if “your clocks will not run, let them stop.” His picture of the suffering of the miners following the closing of the mines no doubt won many to the measure. It was because of that, said Mr. Morrill, that he should vote for it, though he believed it would help speculation in copper stocks more than the suffering miners of Michigan, and that it was a blow to ship-building and commerce. Would it not be better, suggested Mr. Grimes of Iowa, to organize a branch of the Freedman’s Bureau and send it to Michigan to take care of the miners?
The bill finally passed and by large majorities, and in February, 1869, went to President Johnson. Whatever the influences which had induced Johnson to sign a bill which must have been so repugnant to him as the wool bill, there was little chance that they would have any effect upon him now. His term was almost over. In a few days he was to yield the White House to “that little fellow Grant,” as he called him, and go back to his Tennessee home to hoe potatoes and discuss politics with his neighbors in his son-in-law’s village store.
He was going out in a sense victorious119, for he had not been convicted, and his arch-enemy Stevens was dead, and yet it is doubtful if the end of his terrific fight with Congress gave him much happiness, if indeed anything could give him real happiness. Certainly Johnson suffered throughout his four years as President as few people at the time realized. One of his secretaries once said that in the two years he was with him in the White House he never saw him smile but once. Ill himself, his beloved wife a bed-ridden invalid120, unfitted for companionship, suspicious of his associates, narrow in mind, bitter and resentful in heart, there was little reason indeed why 47Andrew Johnson should smile. Yet unquestionably he got a grim pleasure from his vetoes, even out of his impeachment121 trial. He believed he would be convicted, and his secretary tells of the satisfaction he got from the idea that his persecutors would all come to bad ends. He learned Addison’s Cato by heart, and went about the White House rooms delivering it. He studied the trial of Charles I of England, and ordered the names of those who signed the death warrant and the terrible ends to which they all came tabulated122. His secretary says he believes Johnson was not a little disappointed when he was acquitted123. It took from him the bitterest of the many bitter cuds he incessantly124 chewed.
Throughout his administration Johnson had fought with little effect the horde125 of lobbyists, speculators, land grant agents, and other suppliants126 for government aid, whom the war had brought together and Congress had rather encouraged than discouraged. The bills granting tariffs to special interests belonged to this category unquestionably, however respectable their supporters, and it was to be expected that Johnson would veto the copper bill, and he did, sending with his veto the following message—not his own, however. The letter was written by Mr. Wells.
Feb. 23, 1869.
To the House of Representatives: The accompanying bill, entitled “An Act regulating the duties on imported copper and copper ores,” is, for the following reasons, returned, without my approval, to the House of Representatives, in which branch of Congress it originated.
Its immediate effect will be to diminish the public receipts, for the object of the bill cannot be accomplished127 without seriously affecting the importation of copper and copper ores, from which a considerable revenue is at present derived128. 48While thus impairing129 the resources of the government, it imposes an additional tax upon an already overburdened people, who should not be further impoverished130 that monopolies may be fostered and corporations enriched.
It is represented, and the declaration seems to be sustained by evidence, that the duties for which this bill provides are nearly or quite sufficient to prohibit the importation of certain foreign ores of copper. Its enactments131, therefore, will prove detrimental132 to the shipping133 interests of the nation, and at the same time destroy the business, for many years successively established, of smelting home ores in connection with a smaller amount of the imported articles. This business, it is credibly134 asserted, has heretofore yielded the larger share of the copper production of the country, and thus the industry which this legislation is designed to encourage is actually less than that which will be destroyed by the passage of the bill.
It seems also to be evident that the effect of this measure will be to enhance by 70 per cent the cost of blue vitriol—an article extensively used in dyeing and in the manufacture of printed and colored cloths. To produce such an augmentation in the price of this commodity will be to discriminate135 against other great branches of domestic industry, and by increasing their cost expose them most unfairly to the effects of foreign competition. Legislation can be neither wise nor just which seeks the welfare of a single interest at the expense and to the injury of many and varied interests at least equally important and equally deserving the consideration of Congress.
The enactment of such a law is urged as necessary for the relief of certain mining interests upon Lake Superior, which, it is alleged, are in a greatly depressed136 condition, and can only be sustained by an enhancement of the price of copper. If this result should follow the passage of the bill, a tax for the 49exclusive benefit of a single class would be imposed upon the consumers of copper throughout the entire country not warranted by any need of the government, and the avails of which would not in any degree find their way into the treasury of the nation. If the miners of Lake Superior are in a condition of want, it cannot be justly affirmed that the government should extend charity to them in preference to those of its citizens who in other portions of the country suffer in like manner from destitution137. Least of all should endeavor to aid them be based upon a method so uncertain and indirect as that contemplated138 by the bill, and which, moreover, proposes to continue the exercise of its benefactions through an indefinite period of years. It is, besides, reasonable to hope that positive suffering from want, if it really exists, will prove but temporary in a region where agricultural labor is so much in demand and so well compensated139. A careful examination of the subject appears to show that the present low price of copper, which alone has induced any depression the mining interests of Lake Superior may have recently experienced, is due to causes which it is wholly unpolitic, if not impracticable, to contravene140 by legislation. These causes are in the main an increase in the general supply of copper, owing to the discovery and working of remarkably141 productive mines and to a coincident restriction142 in the consumption and use of copper by the substitution of other and cheaper metals for industrial purposes.
Although providing for an increase of duties, the proposed law does not even come within the range of protection in the fair acceptance of the term. It does not look to the fostering of a young and feeble interest, with a view to the ultimate attainment143 of strength and the capacity of self-support. It appears to assume that the present inability for successful production is inherent and permanent, and is more likely to 50increase than to be gradually overcome; yet in spite of this it proposes by the exercise of the law-making power to sustain that interest and to impose it in hopeless perpetuity as a tax upon the competent and beneficent industries of the country.
The true method for the mining interests of Lake Superior to obtain relief, if relief is needed, is to endeavor to make their great natural resources fully72 available by reducing the cost of production. Special or class legislation cannot remedy the evils which this bill is designed to meet. They can only be overcome by laws which will effect a wise, honest, and economical administration of the government, a reestablishment of the special standard of values and an early adjustment of our system of state, municipal, and national taxation (especially the latter) upon the fundamental principle that all taxes, whether collected under the internal revenue or under a tariff, shall interfere77 as little as possible with the productive energies of the people.
The bill is therefore returned, in the belief that the true interest of the government and of the people require it should not become a law.
Andrew Johnson.
Of course Congress passed the bill over Johnson’s veto. Mr. Pike of Maine, who regarded the bill as “class legislation of the worst kind,” and knew the feeling that one of the President’s vetoes inspired, begged his colleagues “to vote on the measure and not on Andrew Johnson,” but no remonstrance144 or argument had any effect. The bill was passed over the veto by a large majority.
It was again demonstrated that any private interest which could secure the backing of a powerful Senator or Representative like Sherman of Ohio, Chandler of Michigan, Kelley of Pennsylvania, could obtain what it wanted from the Congress 51of the United States, though that favor might raise prices to consumers without giving them compensation in other directions, might destroy established industries, and injure an established commerce.
The demonstration145 was not lost. By 1870 the tariff was a conglomeration146 of special favors. The duties were not for revenue—many of them, like copper, cut down the revenue. They had no relation any longer to the excise147, for while that had been steadily148 decreased the promise to decrease the tariff at the same time had been broken. The duties had no relation to each other; that is, the cost of manufacturing an article might be materially increased by the duty on copper or iron or soda149 ash, but it received no compensating help—not until it had organized a lobby and laid siege to Congress.
These unjust and unscientific duties had not been laid without protest. Men like Morrill, Garfield, Fessenden, Allison, Kasson, Raymond, and Sumner had warned against the outbreak. “It smells of monopoly,” they said again and again, and yet most of them when it came to the test voted with their party. Many of the ablest Republican newspapers, especially those in the West, harangued150 incessantly against the unfairness of the legislation. But remonstrance, even an attempt at discussion, only aroused the angry cry of “free-trader” from the dominant faction83 in Congress. “It has become impossible,” said Mr. Wells, in his report of December, 1869, for one “to suggest any reduction or modification151 whatever looking to the abatement152 of prices artificially maintained in the interest of special industries without being immoderately assailed153 with accusations154 of corrupt90 and unpatriotic motives155.”
The tariff legislation was but a part of the deplorable and general attempt which followed the war to make Congress do for the individual what it was his business to do for himself. 52Men seemed to believe that their futures156 depended on legislation—to have forgotten or never realized that legislation can do nothing more than distribute wealth—it cannot produce it, and that the only way you can get money to legislate157 into the pocket of one individual is by taking it out of the pocket of another. Washington had come to be filled with as fine a band of plunderers as ever besieged158 a National Congress: tax swindlers, smugglers, speculators in land grants, railroad lobbyists, agents of ship companies, mingled159 with the representatives of industries seeking protection, until it seemed as if Congress was little more than a Relief Bureau. At one time in 1869 there were 41 railroads or would-be railroads seeking aid in the House, and 37 in the Senate. What was to be the effect of this outbreak of protectionism? Many sober people asked themselves the question in dismay. But at the moment everybody was looking to Grant. The new President would certainly help the situation—bring back Congress and the party to candid discussion, institute economies, clear Washington of the self-seekers.
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1
wrought
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| v.引起；以…原料制作；运转；adj.制造的 | |
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dire
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| adj.可怕的，悲惨的，阴惨的，极端的 | |
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abhorrent
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| adj.可恶的，可恨的，讨厌的 | |
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repudiated
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| v.（正式地）否认( repudiate的过去式和过去分词 )；拒绝接受；拒绝与…往来；拒不履行（法律义务） | |
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tariff
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| n.关税，税率；(旅馆、饭店等)价目表，收费表 | |
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tariffs
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| 关税制度； 关税( tariff的名词复数 )； 关税表； （旅馆或饭店等的）收费表； 量刑标准 | |
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7
sweeping
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| adj.范围广大的，一扫无遗的 | |
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taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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10
redeemed
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| adj. 可赎回的，可救赎的 动词redeem的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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redeem
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| v.买回，赎回，挽回，恢复，履行（诺言等） | |
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computed
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| adj.[医]计算的，使用计算机的v.计算，估算( compute的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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13
grumbling
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| adj. 喃喃鸣不平的, 出怨言的 | |
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14
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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15
wield
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| vt.行使，运用，支配；挥，使用(武器等) | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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compensate
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| vt.补偿，赔偿；酬报 vi.弥补；补偿；抵消 | |
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18
considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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19
tassels
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| n.穗( tassel的名词复数 )；流苏状物；（植物的）穗；玉蜀黍的穗状雄花v.抽穗， （玉米）长穗须( tassel的第三人称单数 )；使抽穗， （为了使作物茁壮生长）摘去穗状雄花；用流苏装饰 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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copper
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| n.铜；铜币；铜器；adj.铜(制)的；(紫)铜色的 | |
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22
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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23
embarrassments
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| n.尴尬( embarrassment的名词复数 )；难堪；局促不安；令人难堪或耻辱的事 | |
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24
permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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25
wards
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| 区( ward的名词复数 )； 病房； 受监护的未成年者； 被人照顾或控制的状态 | |
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26
labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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27
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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28
curtailment
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| n.缩减，缩短 | |
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29
lessened
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| 减少的，减弱的 | |
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30
emaciated
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| adj.衰弱的，消瘦的 | |
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chuckle
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| vi.／n.轻声笑，咯咯笑 | |
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32
reconstruction
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| n.重建，再现，复原 | |
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33
candid
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| adj.公正的，正直的；坦率的 | |
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34
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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35
undoing
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| n.毁灭的原因，祸根；破坏，毁灭 | |
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36
sullen
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| adj.愠怒的，闷闷不乐的，(天气等)阴沉的 | |
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37
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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38
vehemently
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| adv. 热烈地 | |
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39
consolation
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| n.安慰，慰问 | |
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40
compensating
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| 补偿，补助，修正 | |
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41
notably
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| adv.值得注意地，显著地，尤其地，特别地 | |
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42
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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43
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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44
dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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45
extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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46
scrap
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| n.碎片；废料；v.废弃，报废 | |
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47
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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48
physically
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| adj.物质上，体格上，身体上，按自然规律 | |
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49
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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50
eloquence
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| n.雄辩；口才，修辞 | |
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51
deploring
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| v.悲叹，痛惜，强烈反对( deplore的现在分词 ) | |
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52
ridicule
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| v.讥讽，挖苦；n.嘲弄 | |
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53
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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54
incipient
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| adj.起初的，发端的，初期的 | |
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55
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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56
diffused
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| 散布的，普及的，扩散的 | |
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57
blessings
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| n.（上帝的）祝福( blessing的名词复数 )；好事；福分；因祸得福 | |
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58
providence
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| n.深谋远虑，天道，天意；远见；节约；上帝 | |
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59
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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60
lumber
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| n.木材，木料；v.以破旧东西堆满；伐木；笨重移动 | |
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61
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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62
solitary
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| adj.孤独的，独立的，荒凉的；n.隐士 | |
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63
toiling
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| 长时间或辛苦地工作( toil的现在分词 )； 艰难缓慢地移动，跋涉 | |
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64
gall
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| v.使烦恼，使焦躁，难堪；n.磨难 | |
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65
epithet
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| n.（用于褒贬人物等的）表述形容词，修饰语 | |
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66
opprobrious
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| adj.可耻的，辱骂的 | |
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67
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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68
tacked
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| 用平头钉钉( tack的过去式和过去分词 )； 附加，增补； 帆船抢风行驶，用粗线脚缝 | |
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69
avowed
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| adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
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70
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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71
injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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72
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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73
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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74
hearty
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| adj.热情友好的；衷心的；尽情的，纵情的 | |
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75
sarcasm
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| n.讥讽，讽刺，嘲弄，反话 （adj.sarcastic） | |
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76
interferes
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| vi. 妨碍，冲突，干涉 | |
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77
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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78
amendment
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| n.改正，修正，改善，修正案 | |
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79
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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80
unreasonable
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| adj.不讲道理的，不合情理的，过度的 | |
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81
legislating
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| v.立法，制定法律( legislate的现在分词 ) | |
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82
snarled
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| v.（指狗）吠，嗥叫， （人）咆哮( snarl的过去式和过去分词 )；咆哮着说，厉声地说 | |
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83
faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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84
caustic
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| adj.刻薄的，腐蚀性的 | |
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85
contingency
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| n.意外事件，可能性 | |
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86
foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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87
postponed
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| vt.& vi.延期，缓办，（使）延迟vt.把…放在次要地位；[语]把…放在后面（或句尾）vi.（疟疾等）延缓发作（或复发） | |
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88
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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92
frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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confiscated
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| 没收，充公( confiscate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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Congressman
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| n.（美）国会议员 | |
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insistent
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| adj.迫切的，坚持的 | |
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varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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versatile
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| adj.通用的，万用的；多才多艺的，多方面的 | |
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hitch
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| v.免费搭(车旅行)；系住；急提；n.故障；急拉 | |
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monopolize
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| v.垄断，独占，专营 | |
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retaliation
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| n.报复，反击 | |
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101
commissioner
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| n.（政府厅、局、处等部门）专员，长官，委员 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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103
prospective
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| adj.预期的，未来的，前瞻性的 | |
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104
aggregate
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| adj.总计的，集合的；n.总数；v.合计；集合 | |
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105
fabrics
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| 织物( fabric的名词复数 )； 布； 构造； （建筑物的）结构（如墙、地面、屋顶）：质地 | |
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106
repealed
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| 撤销，废除( repeal的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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107
alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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108
embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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109
strenuous
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| adj.奋发的，使劲的；紧张的；热烈的，狂热的 | |
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chamber
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| n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所 | |
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111
rumored
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| adj.传说的，谣传的v.传闻( rumor的过去式和过去分词 )；[古]名誉；咕哝；[古]喧嚷 | |
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112
enactment
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| n.演出，担任…角色；制订，通过 | |
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113
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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115
subscribed
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| v.捐助( subscribe的过去式和过去分词 )；签署，题词；订阅；同意 | |
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116
smelting
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| n.熔炼v.熔炼，提炼（矿石）( smelt的现在分词 ) | |
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117
zinc
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| n.锌；vt.在...上镀锌 | |
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118
brass
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| n.黄铜；黄铜器，铜管乐器 | |
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119
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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invalid
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| n.病人，伤残人；adj.有病的，伤残的；无效的 | |
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impeachment
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| n.弹劾；控告；怀疑 | |
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tabulated
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| 把（数字、事实）列成表( tabulate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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123
acquitted
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| 宣判…无罪( acquit的过去式和过去分词 )； 使（自己）作出某种表现 | |
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incessantly
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| ad.不停地 | |
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horde
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| n.群众，一大群 | |
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126
suppliants
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| n.恳求者，哀求者( suppliant的名词复数 ) | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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129
impairing
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| v.损害，削弱( impair的现在分词 ) | |
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impoverished
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| adj.穷困的，无力的，用尽了的v.使（某人）贫穷( impoverish的过去式和过去分词 )；使（某物）贫瘠或恶化 | |
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131
enactments
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| n.演出( enactment的名词复数 )；展现；规定；通过 | |
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detrimental
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| adj.损害的，造成伤害的 | |
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133
shipping
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| n.船运（发货，运输，乘船） | |
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credibly
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| ad.可信地；可靠地 | |
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135
discriminate
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| v.区别，辨别，区分；有区别地对待 | |
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depressed
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| adj.沮丧的，抑郁的，不景气的，萧条的 | |
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destitution
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| n.穷困，缺乏，贫穷 | |
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138
contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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139
compensated
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| 补偿，报酬( compensate的过去式和过去分词 )； 给（某人）赔偿（或赔款） | |
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140
contravene
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| v.违反，违背，反驳，反对 | |
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remarkably
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| ad.不同寻常地，相当地 | |
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142
restriction
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| n.限制，约束 | |
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143
attainment
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| n.达到，到达；［常pl.］成就，造诣 | |
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remonstrance
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| n抗议，抱怨 | |
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demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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146
conglomeration
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| n.团块，聚集，混合物 | |
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147
excise
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| n.(国产)货物税；vt.切除，删去 | |
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148
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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149
soda
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| n.苏打水；汽水 | |
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150
harangued
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| v.高谈阔论( harangue的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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151
modification
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| n.修改，改进，缓和，减轻 | |
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152
abatement
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| n.减(免)税，打折扣，冲销 | |
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153
assailed
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| v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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154
accusations
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| n.指责( accusation的名词复数 )；指控；控告；（被告发、控告的）罪名 | |
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155
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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156
futures
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| n.期货，期货交易 | |
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157
legislate
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| vt.制定法律；n.法规，律例；立法 | |
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158
besieged
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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159
mingled
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| 混合，混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 )； 混进，与…交往[联系] | |
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