Two men could scarcely have offered a greater contrast in training, in methods, and in ideals than the two thus thrown into prominence6. Sam Randall was the older and by far the more experienced in national affairs. For several years he had been the leader of his party. He had accomplished7 this mainly by the coolness and the skill with which he led a weak minority so that it frequently was able to frustrate8 the plans of a big majority. To play the parliamentarian game successfully against such odds10 as Randall faced had aroused enthusiasm and devotion and given him supreme11 power. The first serious shock to Randall’s leadership came in the early ’80’s. Then the issue of tariff-for-revenue only became acute with his party and he could not follow, for Randall was a protectionist 134of the Kelley brand. In youth he had been a Whig, but in 1856 he and his family went over to Buchanan, largely on the ground of personal liking12, it seems. In Congress he had always supported the high tariff arguments and bills, without ever bringing much light to the question, for he was not at all well equipped for tariff discussion. Indeed, as late as the bill of 1883 he went about the House studying a little handbook on the tariff—for the first time posting himself on the vocabulary and the schedules. As it became more evident that the Democratic issue was to be tariff revision, Randall’s place became more difficult, for it was a Republican district which was sending him to Congress and it was no secret that they sent him on condition that he support protection. To an outsider it seems now as if the natural thing would have been for Randall to have gone over to the Republicans at this juncture13, but he believed, honestly enough no doubt, that he could force the Democrats back from the position they had taken, that he could in fact protectionize the Democratic Party.
But Randall was dealing14 with a bigger force and a bigger man in 1883 than he realized. John G. Carlisle, his opponent, was probably the nearest approach to a statesman then in the United States Congress. Born on a Kentucky farm, he had spent the days of his early youth at farm work, the nights over books. He had become a school teacher and in his leisure had read law. Admitted to the bar, he had continued to study until he was called the ablest lawyer in the state. Admitted to the state legislature, he had become a leader of his party by force of knowledge and intellectual vigor15. Carlisle had first entered the House in 1877, fourteen years after Randall, and he immediately made a deep impression on the country by his thorough mastery of subjects, his clearness of statement, his gravity and candor17 in argument, 135and his freedom from the trickery and deceits of partisan18 politics. In the spring of 1882 he made a speech against a Tariff Commission which, as an argument for thorough tariff reform, was one of the ablest of the period. It really framed a strong logical position for the Democrats. His speech in 1883 when the Kelley Bill was under consideration gave his position in the tariff:
“In the broad and sweeping19 sense which the term usually implies I am not a free-trader,” he said. “I will add that in my judgment20 it will be years yet before anything in the nature of free trade would be wise or practicable in the United States. When we speak of this subject we refer to approximate free trade which has no idea of cutting the growth of home industries, but simply of scaling down the inequalities of the tariff schedules where they are utterly21 out of proportion to the demands of that growth. After we have calmly stood up and allowed monopolists to grow fat we should not be asked to make them bloated. Our enormous surplus revenues are illogical and oppressive. It is entirely22 undemocratic to continue these burdens on the people for years and years after the requirements of protection have been met and the representatives of these industries have become incrusted with wealth.”
That is, Carlisle saw clearly that certain evils inherent in high protection, evils against which Garfield and all the Republican tariff reformers had so often warned, were becoming realities. The word monopoly was already in everybody’s mouth, for at this time the impossibility of preventing the over-production and consequent depressions which are the logical results of an artificial stimulus23 like a high tariff, except by some artificial check like a combination to limit output and hold up prices, had been completely demonstrated.
Mr. Randall, however, saw no danger in the building up of 136monopolies and combinations to limit production which counterbalanced the advantage there was in shutting out foreign competition and keeping the home market inviolate24. The danger he claimed to see was unsettling capital. “There is nothing in life so sensitive to adverse25 criticism and which takes alarm so quickly,” he said, “as capital invested in large industrial enterprises.... Shall we unsettle business interests by constant tinkering with the tariff? Shall no law last longer than the meeting of the next Congress?”
The contest between the two men had begun in the summer and had been followed with keen interest in political circles. Early in November the candidates opened headquarters in Washington and soon the town was full of “Randall men” and “Carlisle men,” each ready to prove his candidate a sure winner! All of the big newspapers had correspondents on hand, foretelling26 confidently the success of the candidate favored by their readers. But there was little to indicate the result. It all depended, it was seen, upon how deep and how general a belief there was in the Democratic party that high tariffs27 were dangerous.
The only really significant feature of the fall contest in Washington was the activity of the protected interests in Randall’s behalf. The iron men and steel men, the wool men, the New Jersey28 potters, the Standard Oil Company, the Pennsylvania Railroad, were all said to be on hand. There were many hints of the use of money. Mr. Barnum of Connecticut, former United States Senator and now chairman of the National Democratic Committee, was said to be in town “buying mules” for Randall, as the slang of the day went. How much truth there was in the charges of bribery29 the writer does not know; but this is certain, an alliance of business interests in support of Mr. Randall was plainly evident in the fall of 1883. The protectionists were 137most active, but they had with them the railroads and the Standard Oil crowd, who at that moment were fighting hard to prevent threatened regulation of interstate commerce; that is, all of the interests which were thriving on special privileges were combined into a league for the continuation of those privileges.
Up to this time these allied30 interests had supported the Republican party. It was in power and it had granted the privileges they enjoyed, but they were quite willing to support a man of any political faith who agreed with them. Naturally their great desire was that both parties should agree to protection as the American system, that the question should practically be taken out of politics. This would result if Mr. Randall’s effort to protectionize the Democrats succeeded. Naturally, then, they were eager to do their utmost to support him in his contest with Mr. Carlisle. But to their surprise and unquestionably to the surprise of Mr. Randall, Mr. Carlisle was elected speaker by a large majority. The tariff question was to be opened again. The man whom Mr. Carlisle selected to open it was William R. Morrison of Illinois, who had worked shoulder to shoulder with him the winter before in obstructing31 the Kelley Bill.
Mr. Morrison was an experienced man at tariff reform; indeed, the first Democratic tariff bill presented after the war originated with him. That was in 1875 and 1876, when the Democrats first obtained possession of the House. The speaker, Michael C. Kerr, had asked Colonel Morrison to take the chairmanship of the Ways and Means Committee. Mr. Morrison had brought in a good and reasonable measure, one nearer in accord with sound tariff principles than those which he presented later, but even then the Randall faction32 of Protectionist-Democrats were too strong for him, and his bill had been speedily dropped. A little later 138Mr. Randall had succeeded Kerr as speaker and he had dropped Morrison from the Committee. He was not restored until 1879. But Mr. Morrison was too aggressively honest and outspoken33 ever to keep silence on a question which interested him. He had fought for reform in Congress, in caucus35, in national conventions, everywhere he could get a hearing, and now that he had a chance to make a bill he went at it with great zest36, and in March he had it ready—“a bill to reduce import duties and war-tariff taxes”—he called it. The bill was clever, for it really asked nothing more than what the Republicans themselves were already committed to. Thus he proposed a general 20 per cent reduction. The Republican Tariff Commission had advised from 20 to 25 per cent in 1882—Congress in 1883 had granted only a little over 4 per cent. So, declared Mr. Morrison, I am only asking what your own experts have advised. This 20 per cent reduction was to be applied37 horizontally to all duties on manufactured articles. Here again Mr. Morrison was following Republican precedent38: their reduction in 1872 being a 10 per cent horizontal, and their increase in 1875 a restoration of the same. In order to forestall39 the objection that this reduction might bring certain duties back to the detested40 rates of 1857, Mr. Morrison put in the proviso that no duty should be lower than that provided by the Morrill tariff of 1861. That is, he was willing to give the Republicans the protection they themselves had devised before the war and which they had increased with a distinct understanding that as soon as the war was over the old rates should be restored. Even in putting salt and coal on the free list, Mr. Morrison followed a not very old Republican precedent, Mr. Hale backed by Mr. Blaine having introduced bills to that effect into the House in 1871.
139From the day of the introduction of Mr. Morrison’s bill into the House, it was certain that Mr. Randall would oppose it. Randall indeed was working day and night to rally a strong Democratic opposition42. His success was apparent when, after three weeks of general debate, Mr. Converse43, an Ohio Democrat2, suddenly moved that the enacting44 clause of the bill be struck out and the motion was carried by a vote of 159 to 155. That is, in a House having a majority of 80 Democrats a bill which was a moderate expression of a policy to which the party had always been committed could not be passed. Forty-one Democrats voted against the bill; twelve of them from Pennsylvania, ten from Ohio, six from New York, four from California, three from New Jersey, and four from the South. It was a powerful vote, for when boiled down it represented iron and steel, wool and sugar, and the hold they had on the Democrats.
The defeat of the Morrison Bill only aggravated45 the feeling between the two factions46 and made it certain that there would be a great fight over the tariff plank47 of the platform in Chicago in July, when the National Convention met to nominate a presidential candidate, and there was—one of the most stubborn and prolonged in the history of conventions. Henry Watterson was first on the ground with the plank “tariff-for-revenue only,” which he had placed in the platforms of 1876 and of 1880, and which he was determined48 should go in again. Ben Butler, a candidate for the presidency49, followed him with a compromise plank, and after him came Abram S. Hewitt and Manton Marble, also with compromise expressions. Mr. Randall’s friends talked free whiskey and free tobacco for the plank. When the Committee on Resolutions finally was formed it included all these gentlemen. The session began with a deadlock50 over the chairman—18 being for Morrison, 18 for Converse of Ohio, Randall’s man. From 140that time until the end nothing but rumors51 of dead-locks came behind the closed door. The sub-committee to which the framing of the tariff plank was finally confided52 sat for fifty-one consecutive53 hours, and the session ended in what the disgusted Mr. Watterson called a “straddle,”—a plank calling for revision in “a spirit of fairness to all interests”—one which would “injure no domestic industry and would not deprive American labor54 of the ability to compete successfully with foreign labor.” It was an expression carefully arranged to back all shades of opinion between Mr. Carlisle and Mr. Randall—a platform which gave standing41 room to both factions, and it really compared very well with the Republican pledge to “correct the irregularities of the tariff and to reduce the surplus—so as to relieve the taxpayers55 without injuring the laborers56 or the great productive interests of the country.” If anybody was ahead in the platform contest it was Mr. Carlisle, and this from the fact that Mr. Morrison was selected to present the report to the Convention.
At the time of the National Convention it looked as if the tariff would be the chief issue of the campaign, but as it turned out the Republican candidate, Mr. Blaine, was the issue, and he had not the vitality57 for the strain. His opponent, Grover Cleveland—a man unheard of in public affairs until three years before, but whose short record as mayor of the city of Buffalo58 and governor of the State of New York had been of such courage and patriotism59 that it had made him available for the nomination60 to the presidency, was elected in November by an electoral vote of 219 to 182. The tariff issue was in Mr. Cleveland’s hands.
It has been frequently said that when Grover Cleveland became the President of the United States he knew nothing of the tariff. At least one tariff expert of that day has recorded a very different opinion. In an interesting unpublished 141manuscript of reminiscences by the late Professor Perry of Williams College there is an account of a talk the professor had with Mr. Cleveland in the fall of 1883 in Albany. Professor Perry had gone to Albany at the request of Thomas G. Shearman, of Brooklyn, to speak in behalf of free trade at a public meeting the Democratic leaders had organized, and the afternoon before the lecture he had been taken to the Capitol to meet the governor. “He and I stood in the corridor for half an hour talking on the subject which had brought me to Albany,” Professor Perry writes. “The governor, as was proper, did most of the talking, and his interlocutor was surprised and gratified at the clearness and strength of his views on the whole tariff question and began to think he had this time brought coals to New Castle, since the first official in the state apparently61 knew as much about tariffs as he did, and could express himself even better. The governor said he was glad I came to Albany, thought he had better not attend the meeting himself, but hoped everybody else would go, and on parting gave me his best wishes for the efforts made and making in behalf of the good cause, with which efforts he seemed to be familiar. He impressed me as few other men ever did on first acquaintance, as a strong man, a frank man, and a man every way to be trusted.”
But in any case Mr. Cleveland was too wise a man to take radical62 action on a subject at the outset of a first presidential term, particularly when that subject was sharply dividing his followers63. The election had by no means healed the breach64 between the Carlisle and Randall factions. If anything, indeed, it was widened, for Randall had by a clever man?uvre apparently strengthened his side from the South. He had done this by campaigning in aid of Southern Democratic candidates for Congress who favored protection. Together with his first lieutenant65, William McAdoo of New Jersey, 142Randall went in the fall of ’84 to Louisville, Kentucky, and spoke34 under the very nose of his enemy, Watterson. From Kentucky he continued his work into Tennessee and Alabama. He did not meet with a cold reception. Everywhere he had large audiences and proofs of sympathy, everywhere he found newspapers to support him. To those on the inside it was apparent that Pennsylvania had been busy in the Southern manufacturing centres, and that its money and influence accounted largely for the candidates and the interest. But it was not a sign to be lightly regarded, and Mr. Randall took care that its full strength be known to Mr. Cleveland.
But however cautious Mr. Cleveland meant to be, his first message showed that he stood with Mr. Carlisle and not with Mr. Randall. He was for revision at once. “The fact that our revenues are in excess of the actual needs of an economical administration of the government justifies66 a reduction in the amount exacted from the people for its support,” he wrote. “The proposition with which we have to deal is the reduction of the revenue received by the government and indirectly67 paid by the people from the customs duties. The amount of such reduction having been determined, the inquiry68 follows, where can it best be remitted69 and what articles can best be released from duty in the interests of our citizens? I think the reduction should be made in the revenue derived70 from a tax upon the imported necessaries of life.” “The question of free trade,” Mr. Cleveland said, “is not involved, nor is there any occasion for the general discussion of the wisdom or experience of a protective system.” He also interpolated a paragraph assuring the protected industries and their working-men that there was no intention in his mind of any ruthless changes which would hurt their interests.
As was to be expected, Mr. Carlisle and Mr. Morrison returned to the charge as soon as Congress opened. Four 143months were spent in preparing a new bill and on it the very best brains of the party were engaged. Abram Hewitt, who had in the previous session presented a bill embodying71 his ideas, now went to work with Morrison. David Wells and J. S. Moore, the “Parsee Merchant,” came to Washington to give their help. The greatest care was taken to meet the just objections to the previous measure, and when the bill was reported in April, 1886, it was found to be more moderate than its predecessor72. The objectionable horizontal levelling had been given up. Duties had been studied in relation to labor cost. The free list was larger, including coal, salt, and iron, copper73 and lead ores. It was a bill for which both Republicans and Democrats might have voted without violating party platforms, but there was no hope for it. The Randall faction again joined the Republicans when Mr. Morrison asked the House to go into a Committee of the Whole to consider his bill, and voted him down by a vote of 157 to 140. Four Republicans voted with Morrison, 35 Democrats against him.
Mr. Morrison might be defeated, but tariff revision could not be. Indeed, the situation was becoming more complicated every day. For four years a serious business depression had harassed74 the country. Mr. Carroll D. Wright, who, as commissioner75 of labor, investigated the condition and reported a little later, found that in the year ending July, 1885, there had been fully9 1,000,000 persons out of employment. He estimated that year of idleness meant a loss of $300,000,000 to the country. Strikes were incessant76, and in 1884 and 1885 over 20,000 failures had occurred, many of them being in highly protected industries. Indeed, some of the chief advocates of the system had gone down in the general distress77, among them John Roach, whose panegyric78 on protection as the source of prosperity was one of the 144choice pieces collected by the Tariff Commission of 1882, and Henry Oliver, the representative on the Commission of the iron and steel industries. The piling up of the surplus, too, was causing more and more uneasiness. In the year ending just after Mr. Morrison’s second bill was denied consideration, the surplus was found to be nearly ninety-four million dollars, with no profitable provision for spending. Even Mr. Randall was willing to admit that this was serious, and to remedy it he now prepared a bill. The gist79 of it was the reduction of the surplus by increasing the duties; that is, making them prohibitory. If nothing was imported, nothing would be collected. Of course, there was no hope for Mr. Randall’s proposition, though the Ways and Means Committee gave prominence to it by an adverse report and it was discussed fully in the public press, particularly in the New York Times, where the “Parsee Merchant” dissected80 it mercilessly.
This, in substance, was the condition of things when it came time for Mr. Cleveland to send in his second message. His first year in office had certainly given him large opportunity to study the tariff question. It had not been wasted. His notions had evidently been enlarged and intensified81 and in his message he urged at length upon Congress the “pressing importance” of revision. He made a strong argument against the system which had produced the surplus he was laboring82 with and at the same time caused “abnormal and exceptional business profits,” “without corresponding benefit to the people at large,” and it ended with a plain warning to Congress that nothing could be accomplished “unless the subject was approached in a patriotic83 spirit of devotion to the interests of the entire country and with a willingness to yield something to the public good.” This message is particularly interesting in comparison with the famous one of a year later. Indeed, it contains 145nearly all the points elaborated there. But it fell on deaf ears. Mr. Morrison proved this when, a few days later, he tried again to get his second bill reported, and was defeated. Not only did Congress refuse to consider Mr. Morrison’s bill, it adjourned84 in March, 1887, without any action of any kind in regard to revenue.
And while the members of Congress sullenly85 refused to consider the needs of the country lest in so doing they might sacrifice party advantage, Mr. Cleveland and his cabinet were spending anxious days trying to find means to unclog the treasury86 and avert87 panic. In the first six months after the message of December, 1886, nearly $80,000,000 were applied to taking up 3 per cent bonds. Financial uneasiness continuing, some eighteen to nineteen millions more were spent on the same bonds, and twenty-seven and one-half millions in taking up bonds not yet due and in anticipating interest. Even after this Mr. Cleveland and Mr. Fairchild, his Secretary of the Treasury, did not feel at all certain that trouble would not return, and as the hot weather came on and the cabinet members prepared to leave for their summer homes, the President arranged that they keep him informed of all their movements. He wanted to be able to reach them, he told them, for he had made up his mind that if there was a recurrence88 of trouble he would call an extra session of Congress and lay matters before the members in such a way that they would be forced to act.
But the summer passed and business grew better rather than worse. In September Mr. Cleveland went to Philadelphia to the centenary of the Constitution and there he met Mr. Fairchild. The two talked matters over and agreed that no extra session would be needed. “I was almost sorry,” Mr. Cleveland once told the writer “—not sorry that the trouble was over, but that my opportunity was lost.” But 146the cause of the trouble remained and continued to worry the President. It continued, too, to worry the country. Ugly evidences of this were continually coming from press and people. Mr. Cleveland was accused of not realizing the situation, of fearing the Randall faction of his party, of doing nothing because he was playing for a second term,—the old-time charges against the man who in a difficult situation with a divided party behind him, studies his case and waits for a favorable moment to act. Later in September, something happened which set everybody agog89. Secretary Fairchild and Speaker Carlisle were reported to be at Oak View in consultation90 with the President and Mr. Randall was not present. It was taken as a sign that the President had concluded to ignore the Randall faction. But Mr. Cleveland did nothing more at the September council than to get the opinion of his colleagues on the situation; he did not reveal his plan of campaign, though at that moment he had it in mind, indeed had practically decided91 upon it, and a bold, original plan it was.
Mr. Cleveland had come to the conclusion that the country must be forced to think about the tariff and its relation to the business disorders92, and that the only way open to him to force this attention was to devote his entire forthcoming message to Congress to that subject. No such thing had ever been done by a President of the United States. But there was no constitutional objection to the idea. Nothing but precedent was against it and Mr. Cleveland concluded that here was a case where the breaking of a precedent was more useful than the observance. For weeks he turned the matter over in his mind, taking nobody into his confidence, until finally early in November he told his cabinet what he had determined upon. He regretted, he said, not to use their several reports as was the custom, particularly when everybody 147had made so good a showing, but in his judgment the situation justified93 the action. There was not an objector to the suggestion; on the contrary, there was hearty94 and unanimous approval. Every member of the cabinet seems to have realized that the President had hit on a move of undoubted wisdom.
The writing of the message was a serious task for Mr. Cleveland. He realized that its effect depended upon the completeness of his argument and his making himself clear and convincing to plain people. It was really a literary task, and Mr. Cleveland was not a literary man. He was a lawyer, accustomed to presenting what he had to say in the forcible and exact but more or less technical and ponderous95 terms of the law. He had a taste, too, for sonorous96 and unusual words and phrases, but now he wanted to be simple,—as simple as he could be, and still be dignified97. For weeks he kept his message within reach in the drawer of his White House work-table, whenever he had a moment, taking it out to add to and to correct. Finally he had the structure worked out to his satisfaction. He would begin at the end of the story with what the high tariff had done, the dangers and hardships it had brought on the country, and he would tell Congress plainly, this is your work and you alone can remedy it. With dignity and clearness he worked out the situation:
“You are confronted at the threshold of your legislative98 duties,” he wrote Congress, “with a condition of the national finances which imperatively99 demands immediate16 and careful consideration. The amount of money annually100 exacted through the operation of present laws, from the industries and necessities of the people, largely exceeds the sum necessary to meet the expenses of the Government.... This condition of our Treasury is not altogether new; and it has more than once of late been submitted to the people’s representatives 148in the Congress, who alone can apply a remedy. And yet the situation still continues with aggravated incidents, more than ever presaging101 financial convulsion and widespread disaster.... If disaster results from the continued inaction of Congress, the responsibility must rest where it belongs.”
He set down the income, the expenses, the unusual efforts made to dispose of the surplus, and after all was done, he told them another June would probably see $140,000,000 more in the Treasury than was needed, “with no clear and undoubted executive power of relief.” All of the suggestions before him for getting rid of the surplus: that is, purchasing at a premium102 bonds not yet due; refunding103 the public debt; depositing the money in banks throughout the country for use, he believed to be unwise and extravagant104. What was needed was something deeper than expedients105 for spending money, it was stopping the inflow by removing the cause. What was the cause? Why, unnecessary taxation106, of course. “Our scheme of taxation by means of which this needless surplus is taken from the people and put into the public treasury,” Mr. Cleveland wrote, “consists of a tariff or duty levied107 upon importations from abroad, and internal-revenue taxes levied upon the consumption of tobacco and spirituous and malt liquors. It must be conceded that none of the things subjected to internal-revenue taxation are, strictly108 speaking, necessaries. There appears to be no just complaint of this taxation by the consumers of these articles, and there seems to be nothing so well able to bear the burden without hardship to any portion of the people. But our present tariff laws, the vicious, inequitable, and illogical source of unnecessary taxation ought to be at once revised and amended109.”
And Mr. Cleveland set out to explain clearly to the people why, in his opinion, the adjectives he applied to the tariff were not too strong. The argument is important. It was the 149reason of an honest and candid4 man for the faith within him and it was destined110 to convince masses of people and to be the accepted argument of a majority of his party in years of future struggling on the question. The gist of it was that the tariff is really a tax,—that is, the price of the imported article one buys is higher by the amount of the duty, and this duty makes it possible for people who are manufacturers of the same kind of articles as those imported to sell them for a price approximately equal to that demanded for the imported goods. In the first case the tax or duty goes to the government, in the other case to the domestic manufacturer. “It is said that the increase in the price of domestic manufactures resulting from the present tariff is necessary in order that higher wages may be paid to our working-men employed in manufactories, than are paid for what is called the pauper111 labor of Europe.” Now out of a population of 50,155,783, 2,623,089 persons are employed in such manufacturing industries as are claimed to be benefited by a high tariff. “To these the appeal is made to save their employment and maintain their wages by resisting a change.... Yet with slight reflection they will not overlook the fact that they are consumers with the rest.... Nor can the worker in manufactures fail to understand that while a high tariff is claimed to be necessary to allow the payment of remunerative112 wages it certainly results in a very large increase in the price of nearly all sorts of manufactures, which in almost countless113 forms he needs for the use of himself and his family. He receives at the desk of his employer his wages, and perhaps before he reaches his home is obliged, in a purchase for family use of an article which embraces his own labor, to return in the payment of the increase in price which the tariff permits, the hard-earned compensation of many days of toil114.”
Mr. Cleveland felt strongly that it was to the 7,670,493 150farmers in the country that the tariff worked particular injustice115. Seeking an illustration of his idea he went back to his boyhood in New York State, when every farmer he knew had a few sheep; when he himself wore a suit of homespun wool—the very odor of which he said he remembered! What good were these farmers getting from the wool tariff?
“I think it may be fairly assumed,” he wrote, “that a large proportion of the sheep owned by the farmers throughout the country are found in small flocks numbering from twenty-five to fifty. The duty on the grade of imported wool which these sheep yield is ten cents each pound if of the value of thirty cents or less, and twelve cents if of the value of more than thirty cents. If the liberal estimate of six pounds be allowed for each fleece, the duty thereon would be sixty or seventy-two cents, and this may be taken as the utmost enhancement of its price to the farmer by reason of this duty. Eighteen dollars would thus represent the increased price of the wool from twenty-five sheep, and thirty-six dollars that from the wool of fifty sheep; and at present values this addition would amount to about one-third of its price. If upon its sale the farmer receives this or a less tariff profit, the wool leaves his hands charged with precisely116 that sum, which in all its changes will adhere to it, until it reaches the consumer. When manufactured into cloth and other goods and material for use, its cost is not only increased to the extent of the farmer’s tariff profit, but a further sum has been added for the benefit of the manufacturer under the operation of other tariff laws. In the meantime the day arrives when the farmer finds it necessary to purchase woollen goods and material to clothe himself and family for the winter. When he faces the tradesman for that purpose he discovers that he is obliged not only to return, in the way of increased prices, his tariff profit on the wool he sold, and which then perhaps lies before him in manufactured form, but that he must add a considerable sum thereto to meet a further increase in cost caused by a tariff duty on the manufacture. Thus in the end he is roused to the fact that he has paid upon a moderate purchase, as a result of the tariff scheme 151which when he sold his wool seemed so profitable, an increase in price more than sufficient to sweep away all the tariff profit he received upon the wool he produced and sold.
“When the number of farmers engaged in wool-raising is compared with all the farmers in the country, and the small proportion they bear to our population is considered; when it is made apparent that, in the case of a large part of those who own sheep, the benefit of the present tariff on wool is illusory; and, above all, when it must be conceded that the increase of the cost of living caused by such tariff becomes a burden upon those with moderate means and the poor, the employed and unemployed117, the sick and well, and the young and old, and that it constitutes a tax which, with relentless118 grasp, is fastened upon the clothing of every man, woman, and child in the land, reasons are suggested why the removal or reduction of this duty should be included in a revision of our tariff laws.”
One of the most significant parts of Mr. Cleveland’s message from the point of view of present-day developments is that in which he pointed119 out the relation of the tariff to the trusts. By this time (1887) the movement to prevent any lowering of domestic prices of the protected articles by natural-competition was already strong and alarming. The sugar trust, the National Lead Trust Company, the National Linseed Oil Trust, the Copper Syndicate, the association of steel men, the combinations in wax, rubber goods, oil cloth, and dozens of other highly protected articles, were worrying the whole country. “It is notorious,” Mr. Cleveland wrote, “that competition is too often strangled by combinations quite prevalent at this time, and frequently called trusts, which have for their object the regulation of the supply and price of commodities made and sold by members of the combination. The people can hardly hope for any consideration in the operation of these selfish schemes.... The necessity of combination 152to maintain the price of any commodity to the tariff point, furnishes proof that some one is willing to accept lower prices for such commodity, and that such prices are remunerative.”
Mr. Cleveland did not neglect either to touch upon another feature of the protective trust which was causing uneasiness and of which he was soon to learn much more than he knew then, that was, the measures being taken to prevent any revision at all. “So stubbornly have all efforts to reform the present condition been resisted by those of our fellow-citizens thus engaged (in protected industries) that they can hardly complain of the suspicion entertained to a certain extent that there exists an organized combination all along the line to maintain their advantage.”
Little by little with care and pains the message was beaten out. The greatest caution was taken to have it exact. For example, after the illustration on the farmer and his wool was written, Mr. Cleveland became concerned for his figures. He knew twenty-five to fifty was the right average for a farmer’s sheep in New York State, but how about Ohio? He called in a member of the bureau of statistics, and was told the average Ohio flock was between twenty and forty. And as he verified figures he qualified120 statements, reiterating121 his assurance that no revision which would destroy any business was contemplated—none which would throw labor out of work or lower its wages, that no doctrinal discussion was sought. “It is a condition which confronts us—not a theory,” was his famous phrase. And most solemnly did he beg Congress to approach the question “in a spirit higher than partisanship122, to consider it in the light of that regard for patriotic duty which should characterize the action of those intrusted with the weal of a confiding123 people.”
153Throughout the whole period of composition of the message Mr. Cleveland took no one into his confidence. Finally, one day after it was complete, Mr. Carlisle called on some business. When he had finished Mr. Cleveland said: “Carlisle, I want to read you something.” It was his message. He had decided to present it practically as it was, he said, but he was afraid he had made it too simple. He wanted it perfectly124 dignified. Would Mr. Carlisle listen to it and make any suggestions he might have? Walking up and down, Mr. Carlisle listened attentively125. Once or twice he broke in, correcting what he believed to be a too general statement. Thus Mr. Cleveland had written, “The majority of our citizens who buy domestic articles of the same class (as imported articles) pay a sum equal to the duty to the home manufacturer.” Mr. Carlisle did not think they paid the full amount of the duty. He believed usually it was a little less. Mr. Cleveland had better say “substantially equal.” Mr. Cleveland wrote finally, “at least approximately equal.” Beyond a few suggestions of this kind Mr. Carlisle had nothing but hearty approval for the message.
On the 6th of December it went to Congress. The effect was instantaneous. All over the country thinking people cried out that not since the Emancipation126 Proclamation had a President of the United States shown equal courage and wisdom. The patience with which Mr. Cleveland had waited for Congress to take the action needed and to which he had in both his previous messages urged it, the deliberation and caution with which he had worked out his duty when Congress failed to do its duty; the courage with which he acted when he felt the time had come for his interference, the high patriotism with which he had swept away all thought of the result to himself and the party for what he believed to be the general good—all these features appealed to the 154thoughtful and led many to draw a parallel between Abraham Lincoln in 1862 and Grover Cleveland in 1887.
The immediate important political result of the message was that it crystallized tariff sentiment in both parties. The Democrats who had been trying to mix enough protection with their “ultimate free-trade” or “tariff-for-revenue only” principles to ease the fears of protected industries, and win over Mr. Randall, turned exclusive attention to revision without compromise. As for Mr. Randall, it was plain his day was over—if his fight was not.
At first the message caused something like a panic among Republicans. The Tribune appealed to Mr. Blaine for help and he sent from Paris a famous interview. If anything was needed to emphasize the worth of Mr. Cleveland’s message, it was supplied by Mr. Blaine’s interview. The combination of the two documents caused something like a split in Republican ranks. The Chicago Tribune and a number of other Western papers came out with as strong a commendation of Mr. Cleveland as the New York Nation, and in Minnesota, Nebraska, and Iowa particularly, many leading Republicans publicly approved it. Nevertheless, the final effect on the party was to solidify127 the varying degrees of protectionists into one body. Cost what it might the Democrats must not be allowed to reform the tariff. Nothing was better campaign capital for Republicans than the charge of “free-trade.” If Mr. Cleveland’s will prevailed, the value of the epithet128 might be materially lessened129. Protection must be preserved. If its operations were to be corrected, this must be done by its friends, not its enemies. Whatever their differences about the degree and extent of duties, all good Republicans must now stand together.
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1
conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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2
democrat
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| n.民主主义者，民主人士；民主党党员 | |
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democrats
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| n.民主主义者，民主人士( democrat的名词复数 ) | |
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candid
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| adj.公正的，正直的；坦率的 | |
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tariff
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| n.关税，税率；(旅馆、饭店等)价目表，收费表 | |
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6
prominence
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| n.突出；显著；杰出；重要 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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frustrate
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| v.使失望；使沮丧；使厌烦 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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10
odds
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| n.让步，机率，可能性，比率；胜败优劣之别 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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12
liking
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| n.爱好；嗜好；喜欢 | |
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juncture
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| n.时刻，关键时刻，紧要关头 | |
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14
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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15
vigor
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| n.活力，精力，元气 | |
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16
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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17
candor
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| n.坦白，率真 | |
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18
partisan
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| adj.党派性的；游击队的；n.游击队员；党徒 | |
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19
sweeping
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| adj.范围广大的，一扫无遗的 | |
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20
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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21
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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23
stimulus
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| n.刺激，刺激物，促进因素，引起兴奋的事物 | |
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24
inviolate
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| adj.未亵渎的，未受侵犯的 | |
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25
adverse
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| adj.不利的；有害的；敌对的，不友好的 | |
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26
foretelling
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| v.预言，预示( foretell的现在分词 ) | |
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27
tariffs
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| 关税制度； 关税( tariff的名词复数 )； 关税表； （旅馆或饭店等的）收费表； 量刑标准 | |
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28
jersey
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| n.运动衫 | |
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29
bribery
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| n.贿络行为，行贿，受贿 | |
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30
allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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31
obstructing
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| 阻塞( obstruct的现在分词 )； 堵塞； 阻碍； 阻止 | |
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32
faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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33
outspoken
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| adj.直言无讳的，坦率的，坦白无隐的 | |
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34
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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35
caucus
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| n.秘密会议；干部会议；v.（参加）干部开会议 | |
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36
zest
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| n.乐趣；滋味，风味；兴趣 | |
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37
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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38
precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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39
forestall
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| vt.抢在…之前采取行动；预先阻止 | |
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40
detested
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| v.憎恶，嫌恶，痛恨( detest的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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41
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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42
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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43
converse
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| vi.谈话，谈天，闲聊；adv.相反的，相反 | |
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44
enacting
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| 制定（法律），通过（法案）( enact的现在分词 ) | |
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45
aggravated
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| 使恶化( aggravate的过去式和过去分词 )； 使更严重； 激怒； 使恼火 | |
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46
factions
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| 组织中的小派别，派系( faction的名词复数 ) | |
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47
plank
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| n.板条，木板，政策要点，政纲条目 | |
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48
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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49
presidency
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| n.总统(校长，总经理)的职位(任期) | |
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50
deadlock
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| n.僵局，僵持 | |
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51
rumors
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| n.传闻( rumor的名词复数 )；[古]名誉；咕哝；[古]喧嚷v.传闻( rumor的第三人称单数 )；[古]名誉；咕哝；[古]喧嚷 | |
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52
confided
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| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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53
consecutive
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| adj.连续的，联贯的，始终一贯的 | |
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54
labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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55
taxpayers
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| 纳税人，纳税的机构( taxpayer的名词复数 ) | |
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56
laborers
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| n.体力劳动者，工人( laborer的名词复数 )；（熟练工人的）辅助工 | |
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57
vitality
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| n.活力，生命力，效力 | |
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58
buffalo
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| n.(北美)野牛；(亚洲)水牛 | |
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59
patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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60
nomination
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| n.提名，任命，提名权 | |
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61
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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62
radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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63
followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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64
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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65
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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66
justifies
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| 证明…有理( justify的第三人称单数 )； 为…辩护； 对…作出解释； 为…辩解（或辩护） | |
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67
indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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68
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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69
remitted
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| v.免除（债务），宽恕( remit的过去式和过去分词 )；使某事缓和；寄回，传送 | |
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70
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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71
embodying
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| v.表现( embody的现在分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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72
predecessor
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| n.前辈，前任 | |
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73
copper
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| n.铜；铜币；铜器；adj.铜(制)的；(紫)铜色的 | |
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74
harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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75
commissioner
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| n.（政府厅、局、处等部门）专员，长官，委员 | |
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76
incessant
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| adj.不停的，连续的 | |
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77
distress
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| n.苦恼，痛苦，不舒适；不幸；vt.使悲痛 | |
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78
panegyric
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| n.颂词，颂扬 | |
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79
gist
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| n.要旨；梗概 | |
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80
dissected
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| adj.切开的，分割的，（叶子）多裂的v.解剖（动物等）( dissect的过去式和过去分词 )；仔细分析或研究 | |
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81
intensified
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| v.（使）增强， （使）加剧( intensify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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82
laboring
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| n.劳动，操劳v.努力争取(for)( labor的现在分词 )；苦干；详细分析；（指引擎）缓慢而困难地运转 | |
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patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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84
adjourned
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| （使）休会， （使）休庭( adjourn的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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85
sullenly
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| 不高兴地，绷着脸，忧郁地 | |
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86
treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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87
avert
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| v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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recurrence
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| n.复发，反复，重现 | |
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89
agog
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| adj.兴奋的，有强烈兴趣的； adv.渴望地 | |
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90
consultation
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| n.咨询；商量；商议；会议 | |
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91
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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disorders
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| n.混乱( disorder的名词复数 )；凌乱；骚乱；（身心、机能）失调 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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hearty
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| adj.热情友好的；衷心的；尽情的，纵情的 | |
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ponderous
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| adj.沉重的，笨重的，(文章)冗长的 | |
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sonorous
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| adj.响亮的，回响的；adv.圆润低沉地；感人地；n.感人，堂皇 | |
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dignified
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| a.可敬的，高贵的 | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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imperatively
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| adv.命令式地 | |
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annually
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| adv.一年一次，每年 | |
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presaging
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| v.预示，预兆( presage的现在分词 ) | |
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102
premium
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| n.加付款；赠品；adj.高级的；售价高的 | |
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103
refunding
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| n.借新债还旧债；再融资；债务延展；发行新债券取代旧债券v.归还，退还( refund的现在分词 ) | |
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104
extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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105
expedients
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| n.应急有效的，权宜之计的( expedient的名词复数 ) | |
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106
taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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107
levied
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| 征（兵）( levy的过去式和过去分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税 | |
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108
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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Amended
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| adj. 修正的 动词amend的过去式和过去分词 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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111
pauper
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| n.贫民，被救济者，穷人 | |
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remunerative
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| adj.有报酬的 | |
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113
countless
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| adj.无数的，多得不计其数的 | |
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114
toil
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| vi.辛劳工作，艰难地行动；n.苦工，难事 | |
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115
injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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116
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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117
unemployed
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| adj.失业的，没有工作的；未动用的，闲置的 | |
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118
relentless
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| adj.残酷的，不留情的，无怜悯心的 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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121
reiterating
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| 反复地说，重申( reiterate的现在分词 ) | |
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122
Partisanship
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| n. 党派性, 党派偏见 | |
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123
confiding
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| adj.相信人的，易于相信的v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的现在分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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124
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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125
attentively
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| adv.聚精会神地；周到地；谛；凝神 | |
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126
emancipation
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| n.（从束缚、支配下）解放 | |
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127
solidify
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| v.(使)凝固，(使)固化，(使)团结 | |
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128
epithet
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| n.（用于褒贬人物等的）表述形容词，修饰语 | |
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129
lessened
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| 减少的，减弱的 | |
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