The three great final battles of Godkin’s editorship were those against the free silver craze, the Spanish War, and the retention2 of the Philippines. The first was decisively won, but the decisive loss of the other two cast a shadow over Mr. Godkin’s last days. “American ideals were the intellectual food of my youth, and to see America converted into a senseless, Old World conqueror3, embitters4 my age,” he wrote a friend in May, 1899. In all three struggles the Evening Post took the same aggressive leadership as in the Mugwump campaigns against Blaine and in Godkin’s fifteen years of war upon Tammany.
The portents5 of the free silver uprising first became alarming to the Evening Post in 1890. The Sherman Silver Purchase Act of that year it roundly attacked, and Horace White and the other editors always regarded it as the chief cause of the panic of 1893. As he pointed6 out, it added nearly $200,000,000 to the fiat7 money of the country, alarmed men at home and abroad regarding the ability of the United States to redeem8 its obligations in gold upon demand, caused the steady withdrawal9 of capital from the country, and decreased business confidence and increased money rates until failures took place on every hand. The Post’s detestation of the Sherman Act was increased by the fact that it was passed by a nefarious10 combination of silver men and supporters of the McKinley Tariff11, a measure which the Post equally abominated12. For some years in the nineties the silver danger seemed the greater because Republicans flirted13 with it as coyly as Democrats14. In 1894 both Speaker Reed and Senator Lodge16 proposed to force silver upon the world by high discriminating17 tariffs18 against nations497 which refused to adopt bimetallism. Lodge, in fact, left the Evening Post aghast by introducing a demagogic resolution in the Senate for applying this policy against England.
Late in 1894 the reception given “Coin’s Financial School” showed how irresistibly19 the free silver question was thrusting itself into the political foreground. This famous pamphlet, by W. H. Harvey, related how a “smooth little financier” of Chicago named Coin, struck by the rural distress20 and business depression, opened a school of finance in the Art Institute in May, 1894. His lectures and colloquies21 continued six days. At first only young men were present, but the audience increased until it included statesmen, professors, bank presidents, and others of note, many of them—as Lyman J. Gage22 and J. Laurence Laughlin—designated by name. When they interrupted Coin, he quickly silenced them by his incisive23 logic24 and superior knowledge. In the end, completely converted, the company tendered him a glittering reception at the Palmer House. The pamphlet was illustrated25 by coarse woodcuts. One showed silver a beautiful woman decapitated by her enemies; another depicted26 America as a cow which the farmers were laboriously28 feeding while a fat capitalist milked her; a third represented the gold standard by a man hobbling on one leg. Coin had made the utmost of his ability to ask the questions as well as answer them. As Horace White said, his discussion with Prof. Laughlin was equaled by nothing save the debate in Rabelais upon the question whether a chimera29 ruminating30 in a vacuum devoureth second intentions. The booklet was full of deceptive31 analogies. For example, when asked if Government coinage of depreciated32 silver would really make it worth a dollar in gold, Coin replied: “Certainly; if the Government bought 100,000 horses, wouldn’t the price go up?” This retort was set off with a woodcut of a horse.
No man in the country, not even Prof. W. G. Sumner, was so well equipped to answer Coin as Horace White. The “comic publication,” as the Post called it, would498 have been unworthy of attention had its influence not been tremendous. Silver miners, mortgage-ridden farmers, small shopkeepers and workmen, were everywhere soon studying it, making its specious33 arguments their own, and convincing themselves that an Eastern plutocracy34 had committed “the crime of ’73”—the demonetization of silver—in order to depress the prices of crops and labor27. By March, 1895, it was impossible to ignore the booklet. In a series of twelve articles Mr. White exposed its many misstatements and fallacies. Coin asserted that silver was “demonetized secretly” in 1873, whereas the discussion had been full and open. He said that the silver dollar was the monetary35 unit of the United States 1792–1873, when it was actually so only from 1783 to 1792. He stated that the United States was the first nation to demonetize silver, whereas Germany had closed her mints to silver except for small coins in 1871. As for the horse-buying illustration, Mr. White showed that when in 1890 the Government began buying 4,500,000 ounces of silver each month, the price actually fell because the supply increased also. He discussed in detail the greenback question, Coin’s queer delusion36 that the country had never been prosperous since 1873, and the supposed “English octopus” that had fastened gold upon the world. With some revision, his articles appeared early in 1895 as a pamphlet entitled “Coin’s Financial Fool,” and were distributed in large numbers by the Reform Club at fifteen cents a hundred.
At the beginning of 1896 the Evening Post welcomed the signs that a great national battle over free silver was coming. The result, it predicted, would be the same that had crowned the greenback contest. “A sharp division between those who want an honest dollar and those who do not is on all accounts to be desired,” it said on April 10. “A year’s discussion of the principles that enter into this question is the best possible preparation of the public mind for the presidential campaign of 1896.” It knew that the sharp division would have to be a division between the two great parties. As the isolation37 of Cleveland499 and other gold men in the Democrat15 party, and the ascendancy38 of silverites like Bland39 and Tillman, became more emphatic40, it frankly41 pinned its hopes to the Republicans.
To them it promised victory if only they refused to “straddle.” An editorial of April, 1896, called “Assurance of the Gold Standard,” told them that on a gold platform they could carry all the States north of Delaware and the Ohio River, and east of the Mississippi. This would give them 210 electoral votes, and the ten more needed could certainly be obtained from Iowa, the Dakotas, and the border States. Throughout May and June the Evening Post called upon McKinley, who was almost certain to be the nominee42, to declare himself for the gold standard. He had voted for the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, and had made alarming utterances43 in favor of silver coinage as late as the fall of 1894; hence the editors’ anxiety over his uncertain position, and their resentment44 of his talk of making the tariff the chief issue. But McKinley refused to commit himself. He was assured of a majority of the Republican Convention if he acted tactfully, and he had no intention of antagonizing the silver wing of his party before he won the prize. In his speeches both before and just after the convention he failed to allude45 to the free silver issue, while in several he emphasized the “great American doctrine46 of protection.”
McKinley’s nomination47 was therefore received by Godkin and his associates with hostility48. Not since 1860, they wrote, had the nation so needed a man of strong character and clear views; yet the Republicans had chosen a trimmer of uncertain mental operations. The gold plank49 in the platform was admirable, but it simply emphasized the fact that McKinley was, at the time he was named, a total misfit. Nevertheless, Godkin tried to be optimistic:
Nothing marks more clearly than McKinley’s nomination the mistake of turning nominating conventions into vast exciting crowds, doing their work under the eyes of a larger crowd, more excited still. There can be little doubt that the gold in the platform500 was forced on the convention by the business men, and that, had the convention been a deliberative body, McKinley’s unfitness to stand on any such platform would have been recognized. But the pledges given by the delegates before they ever met or compared notes, made it impossible to choose any other. About the platform they were free, but about the candidate they were tied up, so that they were compelled to put him astride a body of doctrine with which he had never been in thorough sympathy. But the formal recognition of the doctrine by the party at least insures discussion, and encourages us to hope that there will be no more difficulty in killing50 the silver heresy51 through the country by free debate than there has been in getting such a collection of politicians as met at St. Louis to declare for the gold standard.
If the Evening Post was frigid52 toward McKinley, it was filled with angry contempt by the nomination of Bryan. He was totally unknown to the country at large; he had not even been a regular delegate to the convention; he made a windy speech to the roaring mob of repudiators which called itself the Democratic party, and was nominated because he was of the stamp of Tillman and Altgeld, with a more attractive personality—so ran its verdict. The decadence53 of the great party of Jackson, Benton, Tilden, and Cleveland seemed to it confirmed by the platform, which Horace White pronounced “baser than anything ever avowed54 heretofore by a political party in this country outside of the slavery question.” The free coinage plank, he said, with the silver dollar really worth 52 cents, meant the repudiation55 of the half part of all the debts incurred56 since 1872, when the gold dollar had been made the unit of value.
One of the campaign achievements of the Evening Post was truly spectacular. Immediately after Bryan’s nomination its financial editor, Mr. A. D. Noyes, began publishing a series of editorials called “A Free Coinage Catechism.” This question-and-answer presentation of controversial subjects was a familiar one in the Evening Post ever since Godkin assumed control, but it was never more effectively used than in July and August, 1896. Mr.501 Noyes slashed58 directly into the errors of the Democrats, as a single brief excerpt60 will show:
Q. What is the fundamental contention61 of the free coinage advocates? A. That the amount of money in circulation has been decreasing since the demonetization of silver, and that this decrease has caused a general fall in prices.
Q. Is it true that the money supply has been decreasing? A. It is not.
Q. What are the facts? A. So far as the United States is concerned, there has been an enormous increase. In 1860 the money in circulation in this country was $442,102,477; in 1872 it was $738,309,549; by the Treasury62 bulletin, at the beginning of the present month of July, it was $1,509,725,200.
Q. What does this show? A. It shows that our money supply has increased 240 per cent. as compared with 1860, and 104 per cent. as compared with 1872.
These editorials were immediately issued by the Evening Post in a sixteen-page pamphlet, and by Sept. 4 a first edition of 1,350,000 copies had been sold. A new edition with two new chapters and other additional matter was then brought out, and by Nov. 2 the total sale had reached 1,956,000 copies. Horace White’s pamphlet, “Coin’s Financial Fool,” continued to sell, and was supplemented by the publication in leaflet form of a public address which he had made in Chicago in 1893 upon “The Gold Standard: How It Came Into the World, and Why It Will Stay.” It can safely be said that the most important campaign documents issued in behalf of sound money were these by Mr. Noyes and Mr. White.
Less spectacular, but no less effective, were Horace White’s editorials throughout the summer. As reprinted by the Nation, they reached editors and other leaders of opinion the land over, and filtered down to the public by a thousand channels. Godkin wrote upon the more general political aspects of the campaign, leaving the hard day-to-day arguing mainly to Mr. White. During the whole campaign the paper managed to attack Bryan and Democracy without open advocacy of McKinley and the Republican Party. When McKinley published his letter502 of acceptance, the Post wholeheartedly praised its financial passages, and declared that they defined the one real issue of the campaign. But its distaste for McKinley’s personality, its aversion for his high-tariff views, and the repugnant character of the dominant63 Republican leaders—Hanna, Platt, Quay64, Lodge, Frye, and others—prevented it from giving more than implied and tacit approval to his candidacy. Godkin himself voted the Gold Democratic ticket.
The New York press approached nearer to unanimity65 that summer than in any Presidential campaign since the era of good feeling. The Journal was Bryan’s one important supporter. When he was nominated, the World turned its back upon him, saying: “Lunacy having dictated66 the platform, it was perhaps natural that hysteria should evolve the candidate.” Though Dana called himself a Democrat, the Sun was more fervently68 anti-Bryan than the Tribune. Bryan called New York “the heart of what seems to be the enemy’s country.” His attempt to invade it in mid-August, when he journeyed 1,500 miles to Madison Square Garden to be notified of his nomination, was a dismal69 failure. The night was one of intense heat, the notification speech of Gov. W. J. Stone of Missouri was intolerably long, and the very character of Bryan’s address was a disappointment. He had been expected to display the eloquence70 which had so dazzled the Chicago Convention. Instead, he read from manuscript a long speech on the model of Lincoln’s Cooper union Address, dealing71 in the dry tone of a student with what he imagined to be economic facts and governmental principles. Many hearers left early. But the Post explained his failure, not by his refusal to attempt eloquence, but by the fact that his dreary72 discourse73 abounded74 in “the most grating self-contradictions, the grossest blunders in matters of fact, the emptiest platitudes75 and vaguest assertions”; and by the fact that while Lincoln had appealed to national honor, the young man from the Platte argued “the cause of private dishonesty and public disgrace.”
Some newspapers indulged in downright ferocity. The503 Journal spoke76 of the plutocrats, the monopolists, the great corporations, and their protector Hanna, in characteristic Journal fashion. The Tribune called Bryan a “wretched, addle-pated boy posing in vapid77 vanity and mouthing resounding78 rottenness”; a man “apt ... at lies and forgeries79 and blasphemies”; a “puppet in the blood-imbued hands of Altgeld, the anarchist” and of others who made up a “league of hell.” The Sun applauded the Yale students who tried to break up a New Haven80 speech by Bryan. Even the Post spoke in the harshest tones of those Western farmers the genuineness of whose hardships no one now denies, and characterizes the struggle as one between “the great civilizing81 forces of the republic” and “the still surviving barbarism bred by slavery in the South and the reckless spirit of adventure in the mining camps of the West.” Such overstatements show how intense was Eastern feeling over the election. Though the Post’s attitude toward McKinley tempered its rejoicings in the result, it nevertheless hailed it as “the most impressive vindication82 of democracy governing according to law and order that the country has ever seen.”
II
The one great doctrine that the Evening Post has maintained as insistently83 as its low-tariff stand is its opposition84 to any artificial extension of American sovereignty. From Coleman’s protests against Jackson’s high-handed invasion of the Floridas to Mr. Ogden’s protest against the purchase of the Danish West Indies, this position has been unfalteringly sustained. Bryant was among the first to oppose the annexation86 of Texas, denounced Walker’s filibusterers as “desperadoes” and “pirates,” and could not condemn87 too fiercely the Southern projects for acquiring Cuba in the fifties. When Seward purchased Alaska, he opposed that act; for, as he said, many Congressmen advocated it not because they felt they were getting anything of value, but because it was a blow at the prestige of Great Britain and a precaution against the growth of her Pacific power. The basis of the Evening Post’s scathing504 attacks on President Grant’s effort to annex85 Santo Domingo was its belief that the Anglo-Saxon rule of a Latin and negro people would be contrary to all traditions of the republic, and a complete evil for both countries.
The attitude of the paper toward conquest and military adventure was the same no matter what country was involved. Bryant could never see anything in the Crimean War but a useless and inexcusable sea of blood and misery88. When the threat of the Franco-Prussian War first appeared, the Evening Post held that if the ambition of the French to dictate67 boundaries and sovereigns to Europe was to go on retarding89 civilization till it met an effectual check, now was the time to check it. Like every other American newspaper, the Post had been embittered90 against Napoleon III by his interference in Mexico and other acts of hostility toward the United States. The receipt of the news of Sedan was the signal for an impromptu91 celebration in the editorial rooms. Nevertheless, Bryant and his sub-editors warned Germany against annexation as a “barbarous custom,” saying that she should let Napoleon III be the last European ruler who aspired92 to govern by force an unwilling93 and subjugated95 people. They also warned her against militarism, which had been the curse of France. “It is for united Germany to say that this wrong shall no longer continue; and the way to say it is to disband, as soon as peace is won, those huge armies which have done such mighty96 deeds, and thus declare to the world that Germany, like America, means peace; and has no fear, because it intends no wrong.”
But if Bryant was always vigorous in denouncing armed aggression97, Godkin was always savage98. His hatred99 of national truculence100 colored his earliest public utterances. It inspired his indignant letters to the London Daily News upon the Trent Affair in 1861, when the tone of the British press and Foreign Office seemed to him needlessly offensive. The attitude he took in the Nation toward Dominican annexation and the designs of many Americans upon Cuba in the seventies was one of trenchant101 hostility. When he became editor of the Evening Post, not a year505 passed without fresh criticism of this spirit. His attacks upon British military adventures were as freely expressed. When Gordon was killed at Khartum, he wrote with the utmost bitterness of the whole Sudan tragedy—the British Jingo demand for destruction of the Mahdi, its collision with the really admirable spirit of Arab nationalism, the waste of hundreds of millions, the death of hundreds of brave Britons and thousands of brave Arabs. “There is a powerful passage in De Maistre, apropos102 of war,” he concluded, “describing the loathing103 and disgust which would be excited in the human breast by the spectacle of tens of thousands of cats meeting in a great plain, and scratching and biting each other till half their number were dead and mangled104. To beings superior to man, conflicts like this in the Sudan must have much the same look of grotesque105 horror.”
By 1894 Mr. Godkin was convinced that the spirit of jingoism106 was growing more and more rampant107 the world over. The Continent was divided between the Dual108 and Triple Alliances. The desire to grab territory had infected even Italy. That country had emerged from the struggle for unification one of the poorest in Europe, with taxation109 at the last limit of endurance. She badly needed reforms in education, administration, and communication. Yet she hastened to establish an army of 600,000, and a navy of a dozen battleships, and to hunt up some African natives to subjugate94 like other nations. The result of her efforts to assume a protectorate over Abyssinia was a series of defeats, heavy loss in men, the overthrow110 of the Crispi Ministry111, and reduction to the verge112 of bankruptcy113. “It is no longer sufficient for a people to be happy, peaceful, industrious114, well-educated, lightly taxed,” tauntingly115 wrote Godkin. “It must have somebody afraid of it. What does a nation amount to if nobody is afraid of it? Not a fico secco, as King Humbert would say.” England was clearly headed for war in South Africa. But what grieved Mr. Godkin most was the evident desire of many Americans, the Hearsts and Lodges116 leading them, to fight somebody. In February, 1896, he wrote upon this phenomenon506 under the title “National Insanity,” comparing it to the recurrent disposition118 of some men to get drunk in spite of reason.
After the Venezuela Affair, the eagerness of these jingoes for a war turned toward Spain as an object. The Cubans had renewed their revolt in February, 1895, and fought so well that by the end of the next year they controlled three-fourths of the inland country. The cruelty of the struggle shocked Americans, while our heavy Cuban investments and trade gave us a pecuniary119 interest in the island. When it was proposed in Congress that the Cubans be recognized as belligerents121 (March, 1896), Godkin regarded this as evidence that Cleveland’s Venezuela message had turned the thoughts of Congressmen toward baiting other nations. “He suggested to a body of idle, ignorant, lazy, and not very scrupulous122 men an exciting game, which involved no labor and promised lots of fun, and would be likely to furnish them with the means of annoying and embarrassing him.” Recognition was out of the question, for the Cubans had no capital, no government, and no army but guerrilla bands. These facts A. G. Sedgwick demonstrated in “A Cuban Catechism.” However, a number of incidents showed that American feeling was really growing. Princeton students that spring hanged the boy heir to the Spanish throne in effigy123, miners in Leadville burnt a Spanish flag in the street, and Senator Morgan of Alabama tried in June to lash59 Congress into excitement over the American citizens who had been roughly treated by the Spanish authorities in Cuba.
At no time did the Evening Post conceal124 the fact that American interference might become necessary. Civil war in Cuba could not continue indefinitely; if the island were not pacified125 within a reasonable period, the United States would be justified126 in demanding a new policy on the part of Spain. Nor did it at any time conceal its indignation at Weyler’s inhumane policy of herding127 the Cuban peasantry into the Spanish lines, and at other Spanish mistakes. Late in 1897 Spain offered Cuba a form of autonomy, but on careful examination, the Post pronounced507 it a hollow cheat. The great essentials of government were kept in Spanish hands, and only a pretty plaything was extended. When Weyler was replaced by Blanco, who was sent out to pursue conciliation128, the paper predicted that he would fail as generations before Alexander of Parma had failed when sent by Philip II to replace the bloody129 Alva in the low countries. No man, it said, could rule Cuba with a sword in one hand and an olive branch in the other. On Sept. 18, 1897, our Minister at Madrid tendered the friendly offices of the United States, and hinted that if the rebellion continued, President McKinley would take serious action. The Post spoke approvingly:
This, it is important to recall, is the historic American position, and is the only rational and justifiable130 way of dealing with an affair which, in any aspect, is deplorable and thick with embarrassments131. No longer ago than President Cleveland’s message of Dec. 7, 1896, interference on the lines indicated was distinctly foreshadowed, and he was but taking his stand where President Grant had taken his in 1874 and 1875. With our foreign affairs then in the careful hands of Hamilton Fish, interference with Spain on the ground of the prolonged rebellion in Cuba was yet distinctly intimated. In his annual message of Dec. 7, 1874, Gen. Grant referred to the continuance of the “deplorable strife132 in Cuba,” then of six years’ duration, and said that “positive steps on the part of other Powers” might become “a matter of self-necessity.”
But the Evening Post believed such interference should be peaceful. As the year 1898 opened, it was confident that war could be avoided. It knew that the Cubans would keep on fighting, and that Spain, nearly bankrupt, her soldiers dispirited, could not suppress the rebellion. But it thought that patient, friendly pressure by the United States upon Spain would force her to recognize the facts and give the Cubans a government that would satisfy them. When in February the Journal published a letter by the Spanish Minister, Dupuy de Lome, calling McKinley a cheap politician and caterer133 to the rabble134, Godkin credited most Americans with taking the incident508 good-naturedly—with finding De Lome’s mortification135 and immediate57 resignation a source of amusement rather than anger. A few days later (Feb. 15) the destruction of the Maine, with the loss of 226 lives, caused a wave of horror and indignation, unparalleled since Fort Sumter, to sweep the country. Even yet, however, the Post could point with gratification to the steadiness of the general public, and its willingness to suspend judgment136 till an inquiry137 was made. The attitude of both Capt. Sigsbee of the Maine and President McKinley it pronounced admirable, as it did that of many important newspapers:
The danger was that something rash would be done in the first confused moments. When once we began to think quietly about the affair, the rest was easy. It was at once evident that the chances were enormously in favor of the theory that the blowing up of the Maine was due to accident. But suppose it were shown that she was destroyed by foul138 play ... what would that prove? That we should instantly declare war against Spain? By no means. It is simply inconceivable that the Spanish authorities in Cuba, high or low, could have countenanced139 any plot to destroy the Maine. Make them out as wicked as you please, they are not lunatics....
The first effect, then, of this shocking calamity140 upon the nation has been salutary. It has discovered in us a reserve of sanity117, of calmness, of poise141, and weight, which is worth more than all our navy. If we are able to display these qualities throughout, the world will think better of us and our self-respect will be heightened; and, despite the Jingoes, it is better to have foreign nations admire us than dread142 us, better to be conscious of strength of character than of strength of muscle.
One exception to this steadiness of opinion was furnished by a large Congressional group. When early in March Congress debated resolutions declaring Cuba a belligerent120, Mr. Godkin characterized the debate as one that Americans could not read without humiliation143. Many Republican Congressmen frankly looked to war for partisan144 advantage. Representative Grosvenor of Ohio said that it would be a Republican war, and that it offered the most brilliant opportunity that any Administration509 had seen since Lincoln “to establish itself and its party in the praise and honor and glory of a mighty people.” Senator Hale echoed him. Senator Platt said there would be one great compensation for the loss of life and treasure—“it would prevent the Democratic party from going into the next Presidential campaign with ‘Free Cuba’ and ‘Free Silver’ emblazoned on its banner.” Until war was declared on April 25, the Post consistently praised President McKinley in one column, and assailed145 Congress in the next.
But its chief indignation was reserved for the war press, and especially for the Journal and World. These newspapers presented a curious study. From the files of the Evening Post it would hardly have been gathered that the nation was laboring146 under marked excitement, but from the editorials, pictures, and lurid147 headlines of the other two it appeared that the people were at fever heat.
“The Worst Insult to the United States in Its History,” was the heading the Journal gave De Lome’s letter. For days thereafter nearly every headline contained the word “war.” “Spain Makes War on the Journal by Seizing the Yacht Buccaneer,” ran one, this being Hearst’s news-boat at Havana. “Threatening Moves by Both Spain and the United States—We Send Another War Vessel148 to Join Maine at Sea,” followed it next day. After the catastrophe149 to the Maine the Journal made the welkin ring. “The Warship150 Maine Was Split in Two by an Enemy’s Secret Infernal Machine!” it trumpeted151. “Officers and Men at Key West Describe the Mysterious Rending152 of the Vessel, and Say It Was Done by Design and Not by Accident—Captain Sigsbee Practically Declares That His Ship Was Blown Up by a Mine or Torpedo153.” These were the first page headlines on the 17th. Inside were ribbon headlines running across the next half dozen pages. “Belief in Havana That the Maine Was Anchored Over a Mine”; “Foreign Nations Shocked by the Belief in Spanish Treachery”; “War Probable if Spaniards Blew Up American Warship”; “Let the Cabinet Soon Avenge154 the Slaughtered155 Sailors.” Next day the Journal blared,510 “The Whole Country Thrills With the War Fever,” while it reported a poll of both houses showing an overwhelming sentiment in favor of immediate intervention156.
The World also knew positively157 within a few hours that the Maine was blown up by Spanish treachery. When Secretary Long pleaded for patience, it exposed him in a glaring indictment158: “Long’s Exoneration159 of Spain Nets Senatorial Clique160 $20,000,000.” That is, it accused Senators of playing the market. On the same page a news-story demanded a whole bank of headlines. “‘Send Maine Away!’ Begged a Stranger at Our Consulate—Every Day for a Week a Mysterious Elderly Spaniard Offered That Warning, But It Was Unheeded, for He Was Deemed a Crank.” It had the same iteration as the Journal. Thus on March 4 its headlines ran, “Torpedo Blew Up the Maine, High Spanish Officer Says—If His Story Is True, It Verifies the World Correspondent’s Earliest News.” On March 12 it announced: “Full and Convincing Proof That the Maine Was Destroyed Exactly as the World Exclusively and Authoritatively161 Told Three Days After the Disaster.”
The Journal and World were the two New York newspapers then pre?minent for their illustrations. The former specialized162 in pictures of “How the Maine Actually Looks, Wrecked163 by Spanish Treachery.” It had drawings of dead bodies, “vultures hovering164 over their grim feast”; piles of coffins165; divers166 among the tangled167 wreckage168; starving reconcentrados; the Vizcaya in New York harbor; Mayor Van Wyck insulting the Vizcaya’s captain at City Hall; big guns being mounted on American forts; of troops drilling; and a “frenzy on the stock exchange, realizing the imminence169 of war.” More than a month before war was declared the Journal plastered its first page with an announcement of its “War Fleet, Correspondents, and Artists,” these including Julian Hawthorne, James Creelman, Alfred Henry Lewis, and Frederic Remington. The World was notable for cartoons, the prevailing170 theme of which was Uncle Sam kicking Spain out of Cuba into the Atlantic.
511 Mr. Godkin’s opinion of the newspaper jingoes was only a little more savage than that of many other sober men. When a Journal reporter just before war began fabricated an interview with Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the latter seized the opportunity for a frank statement of his estimate of the paper. When the same sheet asked ex-President Cleveland to serve on a committee to erect171 a monument to the Maine heroes, Mr. Cleveland wired back: “I decline to allow my sorrow for those who died on the Maine to be perverted172 to an advertising173 scheme for the New York Journal.” Godkin was brutally174 frank. “A yellow journal office is probably the nearest approach, in atmosphere, to hell, existing in any Christian175 state,” he wrote. This press he deemed a totally irresponsible force, without the restraint of conscience, law, or the police. It treated war, he said, as a prize fight, and begat in hundreds of thousands of the class which enjoys prize-fights an eager desire to read about it. “These hundreds of thousands write to their Congressmen clamoring for war, as the Romans used to clamor for panem et circenses, and as the timid and quiet are generally attending only too closely to their business, the Congressman176 concludes that if he, too, does not shout for war, he will lose his seat.... Our cheap press to-day speaks in tones never before heard out of Paris. It urges upon ignorant people schemes more savage, disregard of either policy, or justice, or experience more complete, than the modern world has witnessed since the French Revolution.”
It was with reference to such journalism177 that the Times, which this year went to the one-cent basis of the World and Journal, spoke of itself as a paper which does not “soil the breakfast table.” Godkin argued that the public, by purchasing the yellow sheets, made itself the accomplice178 of their jingo editors. The Journal struck back at him and Bennett of the Herald179. It was not surprised, it said, by the abuse it received from editors who either lived in Europe, or, being native there, came to this country too late in life to absorb the spirit of American512 institutions; these men were unfitted to gauge180 the trend and force of national opinion, and were un-American in their instincts, while the Journal, with its million buyers a day, was an American paper for the American people.
Until just before the declaration of war, Godkin tried to cling to his faith in McKinley’s steadfastness181. On April 5 he wrote: “He has, with a firmness for which we confess we did not give him credit, retained the Cuban matter in his own hands, and has made no concealment182 of his belief that he could settle it, if left alone, by peaceful methods.” The editor believed that America could justly demand of Spain an immediate armistice183, relief of the reconcentrados, and an offer of genuine autonomy to the Cubans. It appeared in the early days of April that Premier184 Sagasta was willing to concede as much, and Godkin thought this offered a bridge to assured peace. Why not accept the Spanish Ministry’s concessions185, he wrote April 9 and later, and give a fair trial to their autonomy? What reason had we to make a further demand for the withdrawal of all Spanish troops? And if we did demand it, how could we expect Spain to accede186 until the Cortes met on April 25, since only the Cortes had power to surrender Spanish territory? It was true that the Cubans refused an armistice and autonomy. But, argued Godkin, they did so only because they counted on dragging us into the war upon the margin187 between autonomy and absolute independence. And what a pitiful margin that was! No one believed that the Cubans were ready for absolute independence, for like the Central American peoples, they would be turbulent and unstable188, requiring constant oversight189. Then why not leave them under the Spanish flag so long as they had the healthy substance, even though not the name, of freedom?
Mr. Godkin did not give up hope even when, on April 11, McKinley sent Congress his war message, asking that he be empowered to use the armed forces of the United States “to secure a full and final termination of hostilities190 between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba.” He took the view that this was not equivalent to513 a use of our armed forces against Spain—that it meant only that McKinley was going to insist upon a truce191. The Evening Post seized upon the fact that McKinley had advised against recognition of the Cuban Republic, and upon his hopeful words regarding Queen Isabel’s proclamation of an armistice, as proof that the door to peace was not closed. In fact, many sober men hoped for days after this message that McKinley would somehow avert192 a collision with Spain. Howells says that on one of these warm April nights he walked down the street with Godkin, the two talking gloomily of the outlook, and that as they parted, Godkin shook off his fears with a quick, “O, well, there isn’t going to be any war, after all.” But Spain at once severed193 diplomatic relations, the United States declared a blockade of Cuba, and the die was cast. A few mornings after Godkin’s talk with Howells, the jingo press gloated over the capture of a poor little Spanish schooner194, whose captain and owner wept to find his all confiscated195.
Not until later was it revealed that when he sent his war message to Congress, President McKinley failed to inform it of the full scope and definiteness of the Spanish concessions regarding Cuba. Of this failure two views may be taken. One is that he knew no reliance could be placed upon Spain’s good faith, and that she could not end the intolerable state of affairs in the island if she tried. The other is that McKinley was guilty of duplicity all along; that he had played a waiting game until preparations could be made for war and the public mind accustomed to it, and then willingly let the advocates of intervention have their way. Godkin and the Post took the second view, and in later days spoke of the President’s conduct in this crisis with scorn.
Yet the newspaper, applauded though it was in its protestant attitude by the intellectual group which Howells, Carl Schurz, Charles Eliot Norton, and Charles Francis Adams represented, rallied to support the war. Since it had come, it hoped it would be short and decisive. Before514 hostilities began, it had said much regarding the unpreparedness of the nation, and the certainty of graft196 in conducting the conflict. But now it urged the energetic prosecution197 of the contest, praised the martial198 ardor199 of American youth, and commended the military and naval200 policies of the Administration. Mr. Godkin had no petty rancor201 and no lack of patriotism202. Other journals were lavish203 of faultfinding, but no criticism found its way into the Evening Post until practically all fighting was ended.
To the series of victories which began with Dewey’s exploit at Manila, the Post rose with fitting enthusiasm. It called the Santiago campaign, when it ended on July 15, a brilliant impromptu. Who would have thought two months earlier that a triumph of such magnitude would so soon be won? Then the flower of the Spanish navy had lain in the harbor, and a Spanish force estimated at 20,000 to 35,000 held the well-fortified city; but in less than two months the fleet had been destroyed, the city taken, and the army made prisoners, all with a loss of less than 300 American lives. The Post paid a due tribute to the valor204 of American fighting men:
Lieut. Hobson deprecated the cheers that welcomed him back to the American lines. “Any of you would have done it.” Very likely. We know that practically every man on the fleet offered to go with him when volunteers were called for. Such high appeals to bravery and duty command their own response. But the men below—the engineers, exposed to death without being able to strike a blow; the stokers, whose enemy is the cruel heat in which they have to work—where does their heroism205 come in? Of course, in the same self-forgetful devotion to their duty which marks some world-resounding deed of an officer like Hobson. That was a frightful206 detail of the Spanish flight to ruin—the officers having to stand over gunners and stokers with drawn207 pistols to keep them to their task. Ships on which that was necessary were evidently beaten in advance. Contrast the state of things on the Oregon, in her long voyage against time from the Pacific. Captain Clark reported that even the stokers worked till they fainted in the fire-room, and then would fight to go back as soon as they recovered consciousness. To hurry up coaling, the officers threw off their coats and slaved like navvies. There we515 see the spirit of heroism pervading208 a ship from captain to coal-heaver; and it is that which makes the navy invincible209.
III
As summer ended, however, and the cessation of fighting gave the country an opportunity to ask itself what it should do with Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, the continuity of the Evening Post’s policy became plain. For one thing, it now felt able to state its frank opinion that the war had been criminally unnecessary. Gen. Woodford, our last Minister at Madrid, and Congressman Boutelle made speeches at a Boston dinner on Oct. 28 in which they both virtually said as much. In all its references to the conflict after midsummer the paper made clear its conviction that it was “due solely210 to the combination of a sensational211 and unscrupulous press with an equally reckless and unscrupulous majority in Congress and a weak executive in the White House.” But the chief energies of the Post were devoted212 to opposing the designs of those who wanted to annex the Philippines and Cuba, or at least the former. When the war was impending213, it had dreaded214 the loss in life and money much less than the deterioration215 which might be produced in the national fiber216, and had predicted the possible transformation217 of America into an international swaggerer. Now Godkin saw indisputable evidence that the European virus of imperialism, economic and political, was entering our veins218.
“Manifest Destiny” was the argument used against the Evening Post, Springfield Republican, Senators Hoar, Hale, and Spooner, Carl Schurz, and the other leaders in the struggle against annexations219. What would you do with the Philippines? they were asked. Since they were in our hands, could we abandon them without thought of their future? “As matters now stand,” answered the Evening Post on Oct. 1, 1898, “having possession of Manila, we should do what we could to make Spain give the Philippines a better government or hand them over to the lawful220 owners—the inhabitants.” The whole American theory of government was opposed to alien rule.516 We could never incorporate the Philippines in the union—this argument the Post had also used against annexing221 Hawaii—and it was a total reversal of national policy to acquire territory that could not be incorporated. Replying to the contention that the Filipinos might be unable to erect a good government, the Post asked if New York and Pennsylvania under Platt and Quay had one.
The chief assertions of the Evening Post, some of them since validated222 and some invalidated by time, are worth noting seriatim. It feared that the cost of subjugating223, garrisoning224 and governing the Philippines would be heavy. It pointed out that in the management of inferior peoples—the negro slaves, Indians, Chinese—had lain the source of our chief national troubles. Our Federal authorities had always shown marked incapacity for governing such wards225, as their “century of dishonor” in dealing with the Indians, and wretched treatment of the freedmen during Reconstruction226 proved. The American Government had been erected227 to provide for the welfare and liberty of the American nation alone, and if we undertook in a spirit of expansion to carry benefits to every misgoverned race with which we came in accidental contact, we would soon be in trouble in every part of the globe. The Post believed that half the talk of Duty and Destiny was raised by people on the make, who wanted their trade to follow the flag. The name of the United States, it asserted, had been great because it stood for peaceful industry, contempt for the military adventures of Europe, and the right of every separate people to liberty; its influence had furnished the chief hope for disarmament, and now was it to be thrown away for the pride of possessing “subjects”? Above all, Godkin apprehended229 the effect of expansion on our national character. The great question, as Bishop230 Potter put it, was not what we should do with the Philippines, but what the Philippines would do with us.
So intense was the Post’s feeling that it virtually opposed Theodore Roosevelt when the fall of 1898 he ran for the Governorship against the Tammany candidate Van Wyck. Ordinarily, it would have supported him enthusiastically517 in such a contest, but Roosevelt’s annexationist231 speeches led it to declare that Tammany control would be a local and temporary evil, while any encouragement to imperialism would be national and irrevocable. Early in 1899 the Post’s correspondents in Manila warned it that, as one wrote, “the United States must make up their minds either to fight for these islands or to give them up.” Just before the peace treaty, carrying annexation of the islands, was ratified232, occurred Aguinaldo’s attempt to rush the American lines at Manila. Godkin declared that we had paid $20,000,000 simply for a right to conquer, adding bitterly:
We have apparently233 rushed into this business with as little preparation or forethought as into the Cuban War. We got hold of the notion that it would be a good thing to annex 1,200 islands at the other end of the world, simply because we won a naval victory over a feeble Power in the harbor of one of them, and because people like Griggs of New Jersey234 wanted some “glory.” We then went to work to buy 1,200 islands without any knowledge of their extent, population, climate, production, or of the feelings, wishes, or capacity of the inhabitants. We did not even know their number. While in this state of ignorance, far from trying to conciliate them, assure them of our good intentions, disarm228 their suspicions of us—men of a different race, language, and religion, of whom they had only recently heard—we issued one of the most contemptuous and insulting proclamations a conqueror has ever issued, announcing to them that their most hated and secular235 enemy had sold them to us, and that if they did not submit quietly to the sale we should kill them freely.
It was now impossible to advocate immediate and complete evacuation, and during the spring of 1899 the Post suggested another solution. It proposed that instead of administering the islands as a possession, we content ourselves with setting up a protectorate, allowing the Filipino republic to function under our general oversight. The islanders were willing to accept this, for they knew they could not stand alone against the voracity236 of Europe. We could send them schoolteachers, sanitary237 experts, missionaries238, and government advisers239, but we would not have518 to crush their spirit before we began helping240 them, and would be their friends, not their conquerors241. Godkin was shocked by the lighthearted irresponsibility of the annexationists. “The one thing which will prevent expansion being a disgrace, is a permanent colonial civil service,” he wrote a friend, “but who is doing a thing or saying a word about it?”
While the controversy242 over the Philippines was at its hottest, in the spring of 1899, Mr. Godkin left for Europe, where he had spent every summer but one since 1891. In 1897 he had received his D. C. L. at Oxford243, and in 1898 an honorary degree at Cambridge, but this year the alarming state of his health was his sole reason for sailing. The warnings of the doctors in Paris and Vichy were so earnest that he resolved to give up his connection with the Evening Post. His formal withdrawal took place Jan. 1, 1900, but though he was home in New York by the beginning of the preceding October, he contributed only advice and an “occasional roar,” as Henry James put it, to the Post thereafter. It was a depressing moment for him to lay down his pen. The United States seemed to have caught the infection of the Old World fever that he feared. His native country was busy crushing the Boer republics. The political condition of the nation, the State, and the city, with Mark Hanna, Platt and Quigg, Croker and Sheehan at the height of their power, was such as to make the editor feel that the forces against which he had battled were too strong to defeat. But as Charles Eliot Norton wrote him, he had earned the right to leave the field. “When the work of this century is summed up, what you have done for the good old cause of civilization, the cause which is always defeated, but always after defeat taking more advanced position than before—what you have done for this cause will count for much.”
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1
imperialism
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| n.帝国主义，帝国主义政策 | |
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retention
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| n.保留，保持，保持力，记忆力 | |
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conqueror
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| n.征服者，胜利者 | |
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embitters
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| v.使怨恨，激怒( embitter的第三人称单数 ) | |
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portents
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| n.预兆( portent的名词复数 )；征兆；怪事；奇物 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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fiat
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| n.命令，法令，批准；vt.批准，颁布 | |
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redeem
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| v.买回，赎回，挽回，恢复，履行（诺言等） | |
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withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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nefarious
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| adj.恶毒的，极坏的 | |
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tariff
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| n.关税，税率；(旅馆、饭店等)价目表，收费表 | |
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abominated
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| v.憎恶，厌恶，不喜欢( abominate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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flirted
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| v.调情，打情骂俏( flirt的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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democrats
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| n.民主主义者，民主人士( democrat的名词复数 ) | |
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democrat
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| n.民主主义者，民主人士；民主党党员 | |
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lodge
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| v.临时住宿，寄宿，寄存，容纳；n.传达室，小旅馆 | |
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discriminating
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| a.有辨别能力的 | |
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tariffs
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| 关税制度； 关税( tariff的名词复数 )； 关税表； （旅馆或饭店等的）收费表； 量刑标准 | |
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irresistibly
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| adv.无法抵抗地，不能自持地；极为诱惑人地 | |
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distress
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| n.苦恼，痛苦，不舒适；不幸；vt.使悲痛 | |
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colloquies
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| n.谈话，对话( colloquy的名词复数 ) | |
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gage
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| n.标准尺寸，规格；量规，量表 [=gauge] | |
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incisive
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| adj.敏锐的，机敏的，锋利的，切入的 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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illustrated
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| adj. 有插图的，列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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depicted
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| 描绘，描画( depict的过去式和过去分词 )； 描述 | |
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labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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laboriously
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| adv.艰苦地；费力地；辛勤地；（文体等）佶屈聱牙地 | |
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chimera
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| n.神话怪物；梦幻 | |
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ruminating
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| v.沉思( ruminate的现在分词 )；反复考虑；反刍；倒嚼 | |
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deceptive
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| adj.骗人的，造成假象的，靠不住的 | |
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depreciated
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| v.贬值，跌价，减价( depreciate的过去式和过去分词 )；贬低，蔑视，轻视 | |
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specious
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| adj.似是而非的；adv.似是而非地 | |
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plutocracy
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| n.富豪统治 | |
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monetary
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| adj.货币的，钱的；通货的；金融的；财政的 | |
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delusion
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| n.谬见，欺骗，幻觉，迷惑 | |
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isolation
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| n.隔离，孤立，分解，分离 | |
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ascendancy
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| n.统治权，支配力量 | |
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bland
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| adj.淡而无味的，温和的，无刺激性的 | |
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emphatic
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| adj.强调的，着重的；无可置疑的，明显的 | |
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frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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nominee
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| n.被提名者；被任命者；被推荐者 | |
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utterances
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| n.发声( utterance的名词复数 )；说话方式；语调；言论 | |
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resentment
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| n.怨愤，忿恨 | |
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allude
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| v.提及，暗指 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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nomination
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| n.提名，任命，提名权 | |
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hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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plank
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| n.板条，木板，政策要点，政纲条目 | |
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killing
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| n.巨额利润；突然赚大钱，发大财 | |
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heresy
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| n.异端邪说；异教 | |
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frigid
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| adj.寒冷的，凛冽的；冷淡的；拘禁的 | |
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decadence
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| n.衰落，颓废 | |
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avowed
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| adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
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repudiation
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| n.拒绝；否认；断绝关系；抛弃 | |
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incurred
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| [医]招致的，遭受的； incur的过去式 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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slashed
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| v.挥砍( slash的过去式和过去分词 )；鞭打；割破；削减 | |
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lash
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| v.系牢；鞭打；猛烈抨击；n.鞭打；眼睫毛 | |
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excerpt
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| n.摘录，选录，节录 | |
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contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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quay
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| n.码头，靠岸处 | |
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unanimity
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| n.全体一致，一致同意 | |
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dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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fervently
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| adv.热烈地，热情地，强烈地 | |
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dismal
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| adj.阴沉的，凄凉的，令人忧郁的，差劲的 | |
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eloquence
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| n.雄辩；口才，修辞 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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dreary
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| adj.令人沮丧的，沉闷的，单调乏味的 | |
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discourse
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| n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述 | |
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abounded
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| v.大量存在，充满，富于( abound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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platitudes
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| n.平常的话，老生常谈，陈词滥调( platitude的名词复数 )；滥套子 | |
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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77
vapid
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| adj.无味的；无生气的 | |
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78
resounding
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| adj. 响亮的 | |
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79
forgeries
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| 伪造( forgery的名词复数 )； 伪造的文件、签名等 | |
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80
haven
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| n.安全的地方，避难所，庇护所 | |
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81
civilizing
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| v.使文明，使开化( civilize的现在分词 ) | |
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82
vindication
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| n.洗冤，证实 | |
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83
insistently
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| ad.坚持地 | |
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84
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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85
annex
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| vt.兼并，吞并；n.附属建筑物 | |
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86
annexation
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| n.吞并，合并 | |
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87
condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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88
misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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89
retarding
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| 使减速( retard的现在分词 )； 妨碍； 阻止； 推迟 | |
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90
embittered
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| v.使怨恨，激怒( embitter的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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91
impromptu
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| adj.即席的，即兴的；adv.即兴的(地)，无准备的(地) | |
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92
aspired
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| v.渴望，追求( aspire的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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93
unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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94
subjugate
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| v.征服；抑制 | |
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95
subjugated
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| v.征服，降伏( subjugate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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96
mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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97
aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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98
savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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99
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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100
truculence
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| n.凶猛，粗暴 | |
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101
trenchant
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| adj.尖刻的，清晰的 | |
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102
apropos
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| adv.恰好地；adj.恰当的；关于 | |
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103
loathing
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| n.厌恶，憎恨v.憎恨，厌恶( loathe的现在分词)；极不喜欢 | |
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104
mangled
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| vt.乱砍（mangle的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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105
grotesque
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| adj.怪诞的，丑陋的；n.怪诞的图案，怪人（物） | |
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106
jingoism
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| n.极端之爱国主义 | |
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107
rampant
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| adj.(植物)蔓生的；狂暴的，无约束的 | |
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108
dual
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| adj.双的；二重的，二元的 | |
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109
taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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110
overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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111
ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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112
verge
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| n.边，边缘；v.接近，濒临 | |
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113
bankruptcy
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| n.破产；无偿付能力 | |
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114
industrious
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| adj.勤劳的，刻苦的，奋发的 | |
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115
tauntingly
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| 嘲笑地，辱骂地； 嘲骂地 | |
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116
lodges
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| v.存放( lodge的第三人称单数 )；暂住；埋入；（权利、权威等）归属 | |
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117
sanity
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| n.心智健全，神智正常，判断正确 | |
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118
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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119
pecuniary
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| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
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120
belligerent
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| adj.好战的，挑起战争的；n.交战国，交战者 | |
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121
belligerents
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| n.交战的一方（指国家、集团或个人）( belligerent的名词复数 ) | |
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122
scrupulous
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| adj.审慎的，小心翼翼的，完全的，纯粹的 | |
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123
effigy
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| n.肖像 | |
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124
conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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125
pacified
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| 使（某人）安静( pacify的过去式和过去分词 )； 息怒； 抚慰； 在（有战争的地区、国家等）实现和平 | |
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126
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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127
herding
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| 中畜群 | |
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128
conciliation
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| n.调解，调停 | |
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129
bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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130
justifiable
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| adj.有理由的，无可非议的 | |
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131
embarrassments
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| n.尴尬( embarrassment的名词复数 )；难堪；局促不安；令人难堪或耻辱的事 | |
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132
strife
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| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
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133
caterer
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| n. 备办食物者，备办宴席者 | |
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134
rabble
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| n.乌合之众，暴民；下等人 | |
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135
mortification
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| n.耻辱，屈辱 | |
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136
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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137
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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138
foul
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| adj.污秽的；邪恶的；v.弄脏；妨害；犯规；n.犯规 | |
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139
countenanced
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|
| v.支持，赞同，批准( countenance的过去式 ) | |
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140
calamity
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| n.灾害，祸患，不幸事件 | |
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141
poise
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| vt./vi. 平衡，保持平衡；n.泰然自若，自信 | |
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142
dread
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| vt.担忧，忧虑；惧怕，不敢；n.担忧，畏惧 | |
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143
humiliation
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| n.羞辱 | |
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144
partisan
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| adj.党派性的；游击队的；n.游击队员；党徒 | |
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145
assailed
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| v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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146
laboring
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| n.劳动，操劳v.努力争取(for)( labor的现在分词 )；苦干；详细分析；（指引擎）缓慢而困难地运转 | |
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147
lurid
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| adj.可怕的；血红的；苍白的 | |
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148
vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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149
catastrophe
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| n.大灾难，大祸 | |
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150
warship
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| n.军舰，战舰 | |
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151
trumpeted
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| 大声说出或宣告（trumpet的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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152
rending
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| v.撕碎( rend的现在分词 )；分裂；（因愤怒、痛苦等而）揪扯（衣服或头发等）；（声音等）刺破 | |
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153
torpedo
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| n.水雷，地雷；v.用鱼雷破坏 | |
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154
avenge
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| v.为...复仇，为...报仇 | |
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155
slaughtered
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| v.屠杀，杀戮，屠宰( slaughter的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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156
intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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157
positively
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| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
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158
indictment
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| n.起诉；诉状 | |
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159
exoneration
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| n.免罪，免除 | |
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160
clique
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| n.朋党派系，小集团 | |
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161
authoritatively
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| 命令式地，有权威地，可信地 | |
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162
specialized
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| adj.专门的，专业化的 | |
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163
wrecked
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| adj.失事的，遇难的 | |
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164
hovering
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| 鸟( hover的现在分词 )； 靠近（某事物）； （人）徘徊； 犹豫 | |
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165
coffins
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| n.棺材( coffin的名词复数 )；使某人早亡[死，完蛋，垮台等]之物 | |
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166
divers
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| adj.不同的；种种的 | |
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167
tangled
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| adj. 纠缠的，紊乱的 动词tangle的过去式和过去分词 | |
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168
wreckage
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| n.（失事飞机等的）残骸，破坏，毁坏 | |
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169
imminence
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| n.急迫，危急 | |
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170
prevailing
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| adj.盛行的；占优势的；主要的 | |
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171
erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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172
perverted
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| adj.不正当的v.滥用( pervert的过去式和过去分词 )；腐蚀；败坏；使堕落 | |
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173
advertising
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| n.广告业；广告活动 a.广告的；广告业务的 | |
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174
brutally
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| adv.残忍地，野蛮地，冷酷无情地 | |
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175
Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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176
Congressman
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| n.（美）国会议员 | |
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177
journalism
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| n.新闻工作，报业 | |
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178
accomplice
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| n.从犯，帮凶，同谋 | |
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179
herald
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| vt.预示...的来临，预告，宣布，欢迎 | |
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180
gauge
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| v.精确计量；估计；n.标准度量；计量器 | |
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181
steadfastness
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| n.坚定，稳当 | |
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182
concealment
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| n.隐藏, 掩盖，隐瞒 | |
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183
armistice
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| n.休战，停战协定 | |
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184
premier
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| adj.首要的；n.总理，首相 | |
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185
concessions
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| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
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186
accede
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| v.应允，同意 | |
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187
margin
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| n.页边空白；差额；余地，余裕；边，边缘 | |
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188
unstable
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| adj.不稳定的，易变的 | |
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189
oversight
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| n.勘漏，失察，疏忽 | |
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190
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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191
truce
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| n.休战，(争执，烦恼等的)缓和；v.以停战结束 | |
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192
avert
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| v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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193
severed
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| v.切断，断绝( sever的过去式和过去分词 )；断，裂 | |
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194
schooner
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| n.纵帆船 | |
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195
confiscated
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| 没收，充公( confiscate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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196
graft
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| n.移植，嫁接，艰苦工作，贪污；v.移植，嫁接 | |
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197
prosecution
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| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
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198
martial
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| adj.战争的，军事的，尚武的，威武的 | |
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199
ardor
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| n.热情，狂热 | |
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200
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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201
rancor
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| n.深仇，积怨 | |
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202
patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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203
lavish
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| adj.无节制的；浪费的；vt.慷慨地给予，挥霍 | |
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204
valor
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| n.勇气，英勇 | |
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205
heroism
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| n.大无畏精神，英勇 | |
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206
frightful
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| adj.可怕的；讨厌的 | |
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207
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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208
pervading
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| v.遍及，弥漫( pervade的现在分词 ) | |
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invincible
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| adj.不可征服的，难以制服的 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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sensational
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| adj.使人感动的，非常好的，轰动的，耸人听闻的 | |
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devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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impending
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| a.imminent, about to come or happen | |
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dreaded
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| adj.令人畏惧的；害怕的v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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deterioration
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| n.退化；恶化；变坏 | |
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fiber
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| n.纤维，纤维质 | |
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transformation
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| n.变化；改造；转变 | |
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218
veins
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| n.纹理；矿脉( vein的名词复数 )；静脉；叶脉；纹理 | |
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219
annexations
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| n.并吞，附加，附加物( annexation的名词复数 ) | |
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lawful
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| adj.法律许可的，守法的，合法的 | |
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annexing
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| 并吞( annex的现在分词 )； 兼并； 强占； 并吞（国家、地区等） | |
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validated
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| v.证实( validate的过去式和过去分词 )；确证；使生效；使有法律效力 | |
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subjugating
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| v.征服，降伏( subjugate的现在分词 ) | |
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garrisoning
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的现在分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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wards
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| 区( ward的名词复数 )； 病房； 受监护的未成年者； 被人照顾或控制的状态 | |
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reconstruction
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| n.重建，再现，复原 | |
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227
ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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disarm
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| v.解除武装，回复平常的编制，缓和 | |
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apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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bishop
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| n.主教，（国际象棋）象 | |
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annexationist
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| 兼并[并吞]主义者 | |
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232
ratified
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| v.批准，签认（合约等）( ratify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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jersey
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| n.运动衫 | |
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secular
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| n.牧师，凡人；adj.世俗的，现世的，不朽的 | |
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voracity
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| n.贪食，贪婪 | |
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sanitary
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| adj.卫生方面的，卫生的，清洁的，卫生的 | |
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238
missionaries
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| n.传教士( missionary的名词复数 ) | |
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advisers
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| 顾问，劝告者( adviser的名词复数 )； （指导大学新生学科问题等的）指导教授 | |
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240
helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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241
conquerors
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| 征服者，占领者( conqueror的名词复数 ) | |
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242
controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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Oxford
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| n.牛津（英国城市） | |
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