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REAR-ADMIRAL GRIGOROVITCH.
The day before the fleet's departure Rear-Admiral Grigorovitch proposed to Admiral Witgeft, at first verbally, and afterwards on paper, that to force its way successfully to Vladivostock the fleet ought to be composed only of the fastest ships, and the slow ones—the Poltava and the Sevastopol—should be left in Arthur to strengthen the shore defences. Rear-Admiral Loschinsky supported this proposal; but he developed the idea by suggesting that when the squadron moved out of Arthur towards Shantung he, with the two battleships, four gunboats, and ten destroyers, should make a demonstration towards Dalny. If the larger part of the Japanese force followed the departing squadron, then his force would be able to bombard Dalny, the naval and principal supply base of the Japanese army. If by some mistake, or owing to other circumstances, the enemy's main force attacked him, then, taking advantage of the mine defences and supported by the coast batteries, he would be able to engage the enemy's force, although superior both in numbers and strength, for a considerable time. Unfortunately, Witgeft did not agree.
'My orders are to go to Vladivostock with the whole squadron, and this I shall do.'
If he had agreed to Grigorovitch's proposal, Togo would not have had a balance of advantage, and his force, being split up by reason of the demonstration at Dalny, would have been weaker than ours. Our squadron would have successfully broken through to Vladivostock without serious injury, and Dalny would have been destroyed by Admiral Loschinsky. If only we had not let slip the excellent opportunities we had had for sinking the enemy's ships,[Pg 152] their force would have been considerably6 weaker than ours.
As the time approached for the squadron's departure, the Admiral and most of the officers were depressed7, for the approaching voyage promised little good. They all realized that the squadron was going to sea short of guns (most of those put ashore8 were left there), and of very much else; they knew that our shells did little destruction, sometimes not even bursting, whilst those, even the 4·7-inch shells, of the enemy caused great havoc9, and that, having superior speed, the enemy would have the initiative.
The Admiral was wounded by a splinter of shell bursting on the Cesarevitch the day before the sortie, and, as if foreseeing his near end, his last words to those on shore were: 'Gentlemen, we shall meet in the next world.'
At daybreak on the 10th the fleet steamed out into the outer Roads, and, forming into single-column line ahead, steered10 for Liao-tieh-shan. The hospital ship Mongolia left exactly at eight o'clock, and overtook the fleet at 8.30. Some Japanese destroyers showing themselves in the direction of Dalny, the Novik was sent towards them, and having rapidly driven them away, the whole fleet started at nearly full speed—a formidable array of yellow-brown vessels11, brought up in rear by the Mongolia, glistening12 white, with the red cross on her funnels13.
As the Commandant, from the top of Electric Cliff, watched it steam out, he said:
'May God grant it luck! If only it can vanquish14 the foe15 and gain possession of the sea, the Fortress16 will be saved. But evil will be the day if it is defeated and does not return. How many men, guns and shells has it not taken with it, all of which we badly want!'
Port Arthur's weary day of strained suspense17 came to an end; the night passed and morning dawned. The[Pg 153] signal station at Liao-tieh-shan reported that our squadron was approaching. It did return; but heavens! in what a plight18! By the afternoon it was drawn19 up in the inner roads, less four ships, the Cesarevitch, Askold, Novik, and Diana, which had not returned, and about whose fate no one knew. Admiral Witgeft had been killed. What had happened at sea has been described by others, and I will spare the reader the details of this sad engagement.
Thus weakened by the loss of one of our best battleships and three of our fastest cruisers, the r?le of the fleet might be said to have come to an end, for the sea was held by an enemy powerful in numbers as well as quality, and till the coming of the Baltic fleet our squadron would not be able to engage them in battle. All it could now do was to give us men, guns and ammunition20 for the land defence. Why the Pacific Ocean fleet, consisting of the best ships in the navy, had done nothing during a seven months' campaign, and why in the end it had been forced to abandon all idea of an active r?le and its chief raison d'être—to get command of the sea and interrupt the Japanese sea communications—are questions which demand an answer.
'Who was to blame?' There is but one answer.
The very essential and fundamental reforms in the navy, which had been pointed21 out as necessary years ago by the better and more enlightened officers, should have been introduced, and the prehistoric22 naval customs of the time of Peter the Great should have been consigned23 to oblivion. To blame the individual for this is impossible: it was the system that was at fault, as well as that official class which, like a thousand-headed hydra24, sucks and nibbles25 at the really healthy organism of Russia. British and German officers will not believe my assertion that everything on Russian ships was neglected save the personnel, which was fairly well looked after materially[Pg 154] and moderately well trained. The education of the higher ranks in staff duties, as well as their training in shooting, torpedo26 and other work, was so neglected that the majority of officers had but the vaguest notion of the practical application of theory. In most cases, owing to their constant transfer from one to another, they did not know even their ships. For three-quarters of the year these were in harbour and hardly any cruising was done, while the officers were made to work so little that at the commencement of the war they did not even know the shores of the Kwantun Peninsula.
The return of the squadron with its mutilated hulls27, battered28 funnels and masts, had a bad effect, and on all sides was heard, 'The end will now soon come!'
点击收听单词发音
1 thoroughly | |
adv.完全地,彻底地,十足地 | |
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2 demonstration | |
n.表明,示范,论证,示威 | |
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3 naval | |
adj.海军的,军舰的,船的 | |
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4 opportune | |
adj.合适的,适当的 | |
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5 garrison | |
n.卫戍部队;驻地,卫戍区;vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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6 considerably | |
adv.极大地;相当大地;在很大程度上 | |
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7 depressed | |
adj.沮丧的,抑郁的,不景气的,萧条的 | |
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8 ashore | |
adv.在(向)岸上,上岸 | |
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9 havoc | |
n.大破坏,浩劫,大混乱,大杂乱 | |
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10 steered | |
v.驾驶( steer的过去式和过去分词 );操纵;控制;引导 | |
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11 vessels | |
n.血管( vessel的名词复数 );船;容器;(具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的)人 | |
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12 glistening | |
adj.闪耀的,反光的v.湿物闪耀,闪亮( glisten的现在分词 ) | |
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13 funnels | |
漏斗( funnel的名词复数 ); (轮船,火车等的)烟囱 | |
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14 vanquish | |
v.征服,战胜;克服;抑制 | |
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15 foe | |
n.敌人,仇敌 | |
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16 fortress | |
n.堡垒,防御工事 | |
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17 suspense | |
n.(对可能发生的事)紧张感,担心,挂虑 | |
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18 plight | |
n.困境,境况,誓约,艰难;vt.宣誓,保证,约定 | |
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19 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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20 ammunition | |
n.军火,弹药 | |
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21 pointed | |
adj.尖的,直截了当的 | |
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22 prehistoric | |
adj.(有记载的)历史以前的,史前的,古老的 | |
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23 consigned | |
v.把…置于(令人不快的境地)( consign的过去式和过去分词 );把…托付给;把…托人代售;丟弃 | |
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24 hydra | |
n.水螅;难于根除的祸患 | |
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25 nibbles | |
vt.& vi.啃,一点一点地咬(nibble的第三人称单数形式) | |
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26 torpedo | |
n.水雷,地雷;v.用鱼雷破坏 | |
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27 hulls | |
船体( hull的名词复数 ); 船身; 外壳; 豆荚 | |
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28 battered | |
adj.磨损的;v.连续猛击;磨损 | |
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