In the United States of America, where similar work was done upon an enormous scale and at vast expense, under circumstances still more favourable10 to success than in this island, the American Government acted with a decision and a vigour11 that are not yet understood. Even so, the amount of mischief12 done was very great, and, for the first two years of the war at least, the German efforts were largely successful. That a duly accredited13 Ambassador to a friendly power should have been at the head of this vast conspiracy14 in America, as Count Bernstorff unquestionably was, introduces a new and most dangerous precedent15 into the comity16 of international relations. Italy, in like manner, suffered very seriously from German intrigues17. The history of the carefully organised disaster upon the Isonzo has yet to be written. That it was[258] the result of well-arranged collaboration20 between clerical organisers of treachery, inspired by Austria, German agents, with unlimited21 financial backing, who had sympathisers in high place, and honest and dishonest fanatics22 of the pacifist persuasion23, does not admit of question. Certain it is that in this one case alone German underground machinations were responsible for the crushing defeat of an army of 500,000 men, holding a position where 50,000 good troops could have held a million at bay.[C]
But if Great Britain, the United States, and Italy were thus honeycombed with secret service agents from Germany, the nation which the Kaiser, his Chief of Staff and the Junkers were most anxious to crush down beyond the possibility of recovery was still more imperilled by astute24 German infiltration25. Up to the crisis of Agadir in 1911, French finance was, to an ever increasing extent, manipulated by German Jews, who made it their special business to become more Parisian than the Parisians themselves. They were consequently regarded with favour by people whose patriotism27 was beyond question. Scarcely a great French finance institution but had close relations in some form with Germans, whose continuous attention to business and excellent general information rendered them valuable coadjutors for the French, who, as a rule, are not very exactly informed on foreign matters. Very few saw any danger in this. It seemed, indeed, a natural result of the great growth of German trade, as well as of the position which Germans had acquired as capable managers of the growing French factory industry in the North-Eastern provinces.
This latter point is of importance. So long as any industry remains28 in the old form, where individual skill, meticulous29 attention to detail, and close observance of quality are the rule, the French are second to none in their methods. But when the next stage is reached, and machine production[259] reigns30 on a very large scale, with its concomitant standardisation of output, then the French seem to fail for lack of the thorough organising faculty31 of the German or the American. Hence in many directions the highly educated, methodical, progressive foreigner from across the frontier had begun to take the place of the more conservative Frenchman. This process could be observed in the department of motor-cars, where the French, who were undoubtedly32 the pioneers, had begun to fall behind upon the world market in the time just anterior33 to the war. Not only the Americans, but the Germans, and even Italy, showed more capacity to gauge34 the necessities of the coming period than France in their output of cars.
But, in addition to this, Frenchmen, the most thrifty35 people in the world, are disinclined to use their savings36 in the development of their own country. In literature, in science, in art, they display great faculties37 of initiative. In the matter of investment they prefer to rely upon others. Even the underground railways of their metropolis38 were started by a foreigner: the French investors39 only coming in to buy the debentures40 of companies which they might just as well have started themselves. They complained that the Germans were making vast profits out of “their own” iron mines of Lorraine which had been taken from France in an undeveloped state in 1871; yet they failed to exploit the still richer deposits in Briey, of which the Germans were so envious41 that the desire to possess them was one of the minor42 causes of the war. Similar instances of neglected opportunities could be pointed43 out in many districts.
This indifference44 of the thrifty French investors to the possibility of enriching their own country by the use at home of the money capital obtained from their own savings, and the profits derived45 from visitors, astonished lookers-on. Clemenceau denounced the folly46 of financial wars of conquest in semi-civilised countries when France needed her own resources for the improvement of her own soil and what underlay47 it, as well[260] as to make adequate preparation for war. But the loans to foreign nations and foreign banks were economically as prejudicial to her real interests as the injurious colonial policy. That was proved only too clearly, even in the field of military preparation when, in August and September, 1914, tens of thousands of men, unsupplied with clothing and equipment, were to be seen in and around Paris. England had to provide them with what they required.
In such a state of affairs, where neglect of consideration as to the purposes of loans was the rule, so long as the interest seemed quite secure, German banks could and did act with great advantage. They borrowed French savings at a low rate and employed them for profitable objects, or for their own more complete war preparations on economical terms. After the shock of Agadir, when war at one period seemed certain, the French called in most of their loans and thenceforward were rather more cautious. But, in the meantime, and even afterwards, France’s savings had been used to strengthen her bitterest enemy. And this was the end the Germans kept constantly in view when they borrowed. France, in fact, built up German credit against herself, at the same time that Germany was able to estimate exactly the economic power of her destined48 victim, and to investigate, without appearing to do so, the weak points in French preparation for defence. The German banks and their French friends played together the same game, in a different way, that the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank did in London and the Banca Commerciale in Italy. The whole formed part of the vast economic octopus49 scheme, in finance and in industry, which went hand in hand with the co-ordination of military effort destined for attack.
It is easy to discern how all this peaceful financial manipulation played into the hands of the German Government and fostered German influence in Paris and in France. There was nothing which could be reasonably objected to, under the conditions of to-day, if Holland, or Belgium, had been the[261] nation concerned. But with Germany it was quite different.
Not only was French money being used on German account, but, under cover of quite legitimate50 finance and apparently51 genuine newspaper enterprise, most nefarious52 schemes were hatched in peace whose full utility to the enemy would only be disclosed in war. Taking no account even of the actual operations of bribery53, which we now know were carried on upon a very large scale, everybody who was directly or indirectly54 interested in the various forms of parasitical55 Franco-German finance had personally excellent reasons for pooh-poohing distrust of the friendly nation on the other side of the frontier. Thus the most pressing warnings addressed to the French Government might be rendered almost useless—as, in fact, they were—by influence brought to bear from quarters that were pecuniarily56 above suspicion. An atmosphere favourable to German propaganda was created which covered up and favoured the sinister plans of men and women who were actually in German pay. This went on long before the war, and was continued in still more dangerous shape after the war had begun.
Then there were the honest pacifists, who regarded all war, even defensive57 war, as disastrous58 to the workers. Whether Germany won or France won in any conflict, the capitalists and the capitalists alone were the real enemy. Two such different men as Edouard Vaillant and Gustave Hervé held this opinion; and both at great international Socialist59 congresses declared that every effort should be made to prevent France from coming to an actual struggle with Germany, no matter what the provocation60 might be. When, however, they saw what the policy of the Kaiser and his Junker militarists really meant they changed their minds. So, in the early days of the war, did the majority of French Socialists61; and several of their principal men, including Jules Guesde, the leader of the Marxists, and Albert Thomas, joined M. Briand’s Cabinet.
[262]
But there was always an active section left which in all good faith stood to their views that under the capitalist system nothing could justify62 the workers of one country in killing63 the workers of another. They had no interest in their own nation which was worth defending in the field. The past of France was for them a record of class oppression, the present of France the continuance of chattel64 slavery in disguise, the future of France no better than the permanence of penal65 servitude for life as wage-slaves to the bourgeoisie. German domination could be no worse for them than the economic tyranny of their own capitalist countrymen.
This form of social fanaticism67 now exists in every European nation. It is as bitter and, given the opportunity, as unscrupulous and cruel as any form of religious intolerance that ever exercised control. Economic theory entirely68 obscures history and facts with such men. Not even the awful horrors of the German invasion, horrors quite unprecedented69 in modern warfare70 and systematically71 practised in order to engender72 terror, and destroy the means of creating wealth, could convert Socialists of this school. As a Socialist I understand their fanaticism, though I despise their judgment73. Capitalism74 under the control of home employers and financiers is bad, but it can be controlled by educated workers. Capitalism in victorious75 alliance with foreign Junkerdom would have made France uninhabitable for Frenchmen, and would have thrown back democratic Socialism for at least two generations throughout Europe.
Nevertheless, this furious minority, in conjunction with Socialists of political intrigue18, among whom Jean Longuet (son of Charles Longuet the member of the Commune and grandson of Karl Marx) was the leader, became eventually the majority, owing to the weakness of the heads of the patriotic76 section. This success laid the French Socialist Party open to the charge of being not only anti-patriotic but definitely pro-German. It led to the retirement77 of forty-one Deputies from the “unified” combination. The violent animosity[263] of the main body to Clemenceau at the time when he was forced into office, and the refusal of Socialists to accept portfolios78 in his Cabinet, when the cause of the Allies was at its lowest point, from November, 1917, to July, 1918, looked to outsiders a miserable79 policy for the party, not to be explained by the devotion of its members to MM. Malvy and Caillaux.[D] Personal malevolence80 and political pusillanimity81 together were the imputations made against those who thus declined to serve France in her utmost need. Happily for Europe, their strength was not equal to their ill-will, and Clemenceau, after his first month of power, was able to treat them as a negligible quantity. So they remain to-day. A very great opportunity of serving the workers of their country has been missed: that the bitterest enemy of France and of freedom has not been greatly helped in her war for universal domination is no fault of theirs.
During the first three years and more of the war, however, a conspiracy was being conducted which, aided unfortunately by much of apathy82 and ineptitude83 on the part of successive French Governments, and supported unintentionally or intentionally84 by one of the leading statesmen of France, went near to wrecking85 the fortunes of the Republic. That this fateful plot failed to achieve the full success which the Germans anticipated from it is due to Clemenceau. Sordid86 monetary87 sympathy with the enemy is difficult to forgive: Socialist[264] fanaticism and Socialist intrigues which must tell to the disadvantage of the nation are hard to reconcile with common honesty; but downright infamous88 treachery, bribery, corruption89, and wholesale90 attempts to organise19 defeat put all who are guilty of them outside the law. Yet matters had come to such a pass that all these various forms of treason to France, to the Allies, and to soldiers at the front could be carried on with impunity92.
Though the guilty persons were well known and their German plots were scarcely concealed93, none of the Ministers responsible for the public safety dared arrest them. Journals that were obviously published in the interest of the enemy were allowed to spread false information as they pleased, and to attack all statesmen and politicians who were honestly trying to serve France with vitriolic94 misrepresentation. Day after day this went on. Day after day, as the situation without grew more precarious95, the chiefs of this criminal endeavour to bring France to ruin grew bolder in their well-paid treachery. The people of Paris and the soldiery in the trenches96, whose minds also German agents strove to debauch97 with plausible98 lies, were becoming hopeless of justice being done. Ministry99 succeeded Ministry and still the traitors100 were treated with consideration by the Minister of the Interior, M. Malvy, and other men in high place.
Beyond question the man officially responsible for all this shameful101 laxity, at one of the most trying crises of the whole war, was M. Malvy, who enjoyed the whole-souled support of the Socialist Party, on account of creditable behaviour towards the workers, altogether outside of questions arising from the war. But his conduct in regard to traitors and pro-Germans had become so weak as to be capable of the worst interpretation102.
On July 24th, 1917, Clemenceau declared that he utterly103 distrusted M. Malvy. It was known even thus early that this Minister had shown deplorable incapacity in his dealings with men who are known to have been actual traitors.[265] He had, in fact, decided104 not to arrest persons enumerated105 in what was called “List B,” that is to say, men and women more than suspected of criminal intrigue against France. Had not Almereyda himself assured M. Malvy, as Minister of the Interior, that he and all other Anarchists107 and anti-patriotic agitators108 would really desist from their sinister proceedings109? This was enough. Without taking any steps against them, or even obtaining any security for the fulfilment of this promise in the air, M. Malvy left these miscreants110 alone to do what they pleased. So things went on as before; though, as has since been proved, several of these active agitators for peace, disaffection and surrender were paid agents of the German Government.
When, therefore, a resolution of confidence in M. Ribot’s Administration was proposed in the Senate, Clemenceau voted for the resolution, but made special exception in the case of M. Malvy, in whom he declared he had no confidence whatever. Later, Clemenceau boldly accused M. Ribot and his whole Administration of being themselves all responsible for the existence of the treacherous111 German Bonnet112 Rouge113 and Bolo conspiracy. Most unfortunately, notwithstanding the universal distrust thus awakened114 and spreading from Paris throughout France, Republican Ministers, who ought to have been the first to move to safeguard the interests of France and her Republic, against the dangerous plots of men known to be immersed in abominable115 dealings with the enemy, failed altogether in their duty. They left it to avowed116 Royalists and reactionaries117 to lead the attack upon persons guilty of these crimes. What, consequently, ought to have been done at once, legally and thoroughly118, by men who had received political power by vote of the French people, and were trustees for the defence of the country, against the foreign enemy from without and the domestic enemy within, was left largely to be accomplished119 by M. Léon Daudet and M. Barrès.
These men made no secret of the fact that they were actuated by motives120 entirely antagonistic121 to the democratic policy of the Allies and hostile to the only form of government[266] possible in France. This did not render their indictment122 less crushing when the facts were fully disclosed, but it certainly weakened the force of the attack. What is more, it gave a large and, later, apparently the largest section of the Socialist Party the excuse, which they were eager to grasp, for supporting M. Malvy, and more particularly their friend M. Joseph Caillaux, against what they were pleased to denounce as abominable detraction123.
Newspapers to-day are credited, perhaps, with more political influence than they really possess. But it is clear that if nearly the whole of the important press of a country can be captured by a particular faction124, and only such news is allowed to be published as suits the convenience of the Government in power, the people at large have no means of correcting the false impressions of events thus thrust upon them. That is an extreme case, which has, so far, been realised, in practice, in only one country. But the German agents who were so active in Paris were fully alive to the advantages of such a policy of purchase and manipulation of the press for their own ends. They made efforts to secure a control of the majority of the shares in some of the most influential125 journals of Paris. How far this process was surreptitiously carried will never be known: not far enough, certainly, to affect the tone of the organs they were anxious to manipulate.
But enough was done to show the great danger which would have resulted to the community, had a newspaper trust been successfully created on the scale contemplated126, but fortunately never carried out, by the infamous Bolo Pasha and his associates. Their own journal, Le Bonnet Rouge, even when increased during the war from a weekly to a daily issue, was not by any means sufficient for their needs, although that traitorous127 sheet alone was able to do a great deal of mischief. But their control was extended to the Journal, a paper, prior to the war, of considerable circulation and influence. Their attempts to expand further were in full swing when, thanks to the work of MM. Léon Daudet and Barrès in the Action[267] Fran?aise, and still more to that of their bitter opponent Clemenceau in l’Homme Encha?né and in the Senate, the French Government was forced to arrest the proprietors128 of the Bonnet Rouge and put them on their trial as traitors. It was known that M. Caillaux and M. Paix-Séailles—the latter connected with M. Painlevé’s Cabinet and the repository of anti-French confidences—had contributed considerable sums to the support of the incriminated paper.
When M. Almereyda, one of the most important persons connected with the Bonnet Rouge (to whose columns a leading Socialist was a contributor) died suddenly in prison, the editor of that journal telegraphed to M. Caillaux concerning the lamentable129 departure of “our friend.” As these facts were accompanied by other revelations still more compromising, public opinion became greatly excited. There could be no doubt that the conspiracy was more than a mere106 anti-patriotic newspaper intrigue of financial origin, or an attempt of discredited130 politicians to float themselves back into office on the wave of discouragement and defeatism: it was an endeavour, supported throughout by German funds, to destroy French confidence in order to ensure French destruction. A complete exposure of the whole plot, in which M. Caillaux and Bolo Pasha were alleged131 to be the leading figures, was threatened in the course of the Bonnet Rouge trial. Eleven members of the Army Committee of the Senate were appointed to consider M. Caillaux’s connection with M. Almereyda and the Bonnet Rouge.
M. Caillaux has been by far the most formidable advocate of a German peace from the first. That an ex-Premier132 of France should take up such a position would seem almost incredible, but that Signor Giolitti in Italy and Lord Lansdowne in England have pursued the same course in a less objectionable way. The political relations between Clemenceau and M. Caillaux in the years prior to the war had not been unfriendly. M. Caillaux had been Finance Minister in Clemenceau’s Cabinet in 1907, and they had both worked together for M. Pams[268] against M. Poincaré in the contest for the Presidency133. But two more different personalities134 it would be difficult to find.
M. Caillaux is a financier of financiers. His whole career has been associated with the dexterous135 manipulation and acquisition of money in all its forms. Clemenceau never had anything to do with finance in his fife, and wealth is the last thing anybody could accuse him of possessing. Clemenceau, though no sentimentalist, makes an exception in his view of life where Frenchmen, France and Paris are concerned. With Caillaux audacious cynicism in everything is the key-note of his character all through. Moreover, the one is very simple in his habits, and the other is devoted136 to ostentation137 and display. Caillaux’s cynicism is as remarkable138 as that of Henry Labouchere, though more malignant139. When he carried the Income Tax through the Assembly and was upbraided140 for having made himself the champion of such a measure, he claimed that, though he had obtained for his measure a majority in the Assembly, he had used such arguments as would destroy it in the country.
Whatever may be the truth of that story, it is certain that the result has been as predicted. So in the course of the Agadir affair. M. Caillaux, as Prime Minister during the whole of the proceedings, was reluctant, and perhaps rightly so, to assert the claims of France with vigour. He was, in fact, quite lukewarm on behalf of his country, the representatives of other nations doing more for France, it is said, than she, or her Premier, did for herself. No sooner, however, was the business settled than M. Caillaux, the judicious141 but unavowed anti-expansionist, claimed that he had secured Morocco for France! However this may be, M. Caillaux has always favoured a close political and financial understanding with Germany, as by far the more advantageous142 policy for France, in opposition143 to a similar entente144 with England: a view which, of course, he was quite entitled to take and act upon, though its success in practice must have reduced France to the position[269] of a mere satellite of the Fatherland. Before the war it was possibly a justifiable145, though scarcely a far-seeing, policy.
The war itself rather strengthened than weakened his tendency in this direction. Having comfortably recovered from the unpleasing effect of the murder of M. Calmette of the Figaro, for which crime his wife was acquitted146, he used all his influence, in and out of France, to bring about a peace with Germany, which could with difficulty be distinguished147 from complete surrender, as soon as possible. This while the German armies were in actual occupation of more than a fifth of his devastated148 country, that fifth being the richest part of France. His interviews with Signer Giolitti, a vehement149 partisan150 of Germany, and certain strange intrigues in Rome and elsewhere, could only be regarded as the more suspicious from the fact that he travelled with a passport made out in a fictitious151 name. Altogether M. Caillaux’s proceedings at home and abroad, in Europe and in South America, gave the impression that he was pursuing a policy of his own which was diametrically opposed to the welfare of his countrymen.
Some who have watched closely M. Caillaux’s career from his youth up are of opinion that the man is mad. But there is certainly method in his madness. Whatever the defects to which the high priests of international financial brotherhood152 may plead guilty, they never admit lunatics into their Teutono-Hebraic Holy of Holies. Access to the interior of that sanctuary153 is reserved for the very elect of the artists in pecuniary154 conveyance155. But it is precisely156 within this innermost circle of glorified157 Mammon that M. Joseph Caillaux is most at home and most influential. And these people, so ensconced in their golden temple, were the ones most anxious to bring the war to an end no matter what became of France. This, as has been well said, was a civil war for Jews; but for the Jews of the great international of Mammon it was civil war and hari-kari at one and the same time. So there was weeping and wail158 in Frankfurt-am-Main, there was wringing159 of hands in Berlin on[270] the Spree, and the Parisian devotees of the golden calf160 were not less profuse161 in their lamentations.
As a matter of fact, international finance was, and is, the most pacifist of all the Internationals, and M. Joseph Caillaux as director of the Société Générale, a portion of the great Banque de Paris et Pays Bas, represented its view perfectly162. But that he is not devoid163 of political as well as financial astuteness164 is apparent from the extraordinary success he has achieved in securing close intimacy165 and friendship with the French Socialists. This has assured him the support not only of Jean Longuet and his friends, with whom he was specially bound up, but also of L’Humanité, with Renaudel, Sembat, Thomas and others connected with that useful journal. It has, indeed, been very difficult to understand the bitter hatred166 which the Socialists of France have manifested towards the thoroughgoing patriot26 Clemenceau, and their persistent167 championship of pro-Germans such as Caillaux and Malvy. But the dry-rot of pro-Germanic pacifism has infected a large proportion of the younger school of international Socialists in every country. With Socialism, as with commerce and finance, the German policy of unscrupulous penetration6 has been pursued with great success. Honest fanatics as well as self-seeking intriguers have fallen victims to their wiles168. Caillaux was equally fortunate in capturing both sections. Even the rougher type of German agents, such as Bolo and Duval, were not without their friends in the Socialist camp.
The investigation169 of his conduct before the Army Committee of the Senate was, in effect, an informal trial of M. Caillaux, M. Malvy’s case having already been remitted170 by the same body for definite adjudication by the High Court. Naturally, M. Caillaux and his friends strained every nerve, first to prevent Clemenceau from being forced into office by public opinion; and then, when his assumption of the Premiership became inevitable171, to upset his Ministry while its members were scarcely warm in their seats. The French Socialist Party, unfortunately, aided M. Caillaux and his friends in their attacks,[271] after having declined the Premier’s offer of seats in his Cabinet. Shortly afterwards Clemenceau himself was summoned to appear as a witness before the Committee of the Senate on this serious indictment. It is difficult for us to imagine the sensation which this produced. Here was M. Caillaux, who had been Prime Minister of France only a few short years before, who had previously172 been Clemenceau’s intimate colleague, openly charged with the despicable crime of trading France away to the enemy.
No wonder a great many thoroughly patriotic Frenchmen could not believe, even in the face of the evidence, that a statesman of M. Caillaux’s ability, with a great future before him after the war, could be guilty of such actions as those which were imputed173 to him. But his old colleague who had just taken office was in possession of documents which threw an ugly shadow upon all M. Caillaux’s recent proceedings. As usual Clemenceau went straight to the point. The Government had not furnished the members of the Committee with mere surmises174 or doubts cast upon the general conduct of the incriminated person. There were printed statements already at their disposal of the gravest character. With three notorious persons M. Caillaux had intimate connections. One of them, when arrested, had died suspiciously in prison: the two others were still under arrest upon most serious charges. If this were the case of a common citizen he would have been brought at once before a magistrate175. The whole country was crying out for the truth in this Caillaux case as well as in the Malvy affair.
This happened soon after Clemenceau had accepted office. A month later, M. Caillaux being in the meantime protected against arrest by his position as deputy, Clemenceau repeated that if all the probabilities accumulated against Caillaux had been formulated176 against any private person his fate would have been practically decided already. “The Government has undertaken responsibilities. The Chamber177 must likewise shoulder responsibilities. If the Chamber refuses to sanction[272] the prosecution178 of M. Caillaux, the Government will not remain in office.”
M. Caillaux’s admitted conferences with well-known defeatists in Italy were of such a nature that Baron179 Sonnino, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had himself informed the French Government that he was inclined to expel Caillaux forthwith. No doubt he would have done so, but for the fact that M. Caillaux had been, and might possibly still be again, an important personage in French and European affairs. Throughout, Clemenceau promised that the public should have the full truth. He kept his word. The delays in bringing M. Caillaux to a definite judgment have not been due to him. M. Caillaux’s immunity180 as deputy was suspended. He was arrested and imprisoned181 on January 15th, 1918. Four days later came the partial disclosure of the documents found in his private safe in Florence.
That such papers should ever have been left by a man of M. Caillaux’s intelligence where they might quite conceivably be attached, and that he should have carefully put in writing the names of men whom he hoped to use for the purpose of furthering a coup182 d’état, do unquestionably support the theory that he is subject to intermittent183 fits of madness. His extraordinary proceedings at Buenos Aires, where, according to the United States representative in the Argentine capital, he entered into a series of most compromising negotiations184 with the German von Luxburg, were no good evidence of the permanent sanity185 of this successful and experienced man of affairs. But “madness in great ones must not unwatched go.” His object was avowed in that remote city: to make peace with Germany at any price, for the purpose of reviving international finance. All these statements coming in succession, and accompanied by the formulation of the cases against M. Malvy, Bolo Pasha, with Duval and others of the Bonnet Rouge clique186, at length roused furious public indignation, which the actions of M. Humbert, the senator and owner of the Journal, the paper that Bolo had in effect bought, further[273] inflamed187. Who could be regarded as entirely free from treacherous designs, when such a crushing indictment as that officially formulated against Caillaux could be accepted as correct?—when a Minister of the Interior could be publicly charged with criminal weakness towards persons more than suspected of high treason of the most sordid type?—and when a man of Bolo Pasha’s career and associations evidently exercised great influence, not to say authority?
The revelations at the trials of the accused persons, and the ugly evidence submitted not only made matters look worse for M. Caillaux, but roused general amazement188 that such deadly intrigues should have been allowed to go so far under the very eyes of the authorities. The career of Bolo Pasha, the direct agent-in-chief of the main conspiracy, was well known. The men with whom he was on terms of close intimacy were suspected persons, long before any action was taken. The secret service department was well aware that he had huge sums of money at his disposal that were very, very far in excess of any that he could command from his private resources. The origin of his title of dishonour189 from the Khedive could not have escaped notice. Yet he, a born Frenchman, all whose begettings and belongings190 were a matter of record, pursued his shameless policy in the interest of Germany with apparent certainty of immunity from interference.
It was this very same certainty of immunity that made all but a few afraid to speak out. Bolo, in fact, was a privileged person, until there was a statesman at the head of affairs who not only did not fear to take the heavy responsibility of the arrest and imprisonment191 of M. Caillaux, but was also determined192 that the proceedings in the other cases already commenced should be pushed to their inevitable conclusion. “The unseen hand” in France, therefore, was no longer unseen. Yet so wide was the reach of the octopus tentacles193, directed by underground agency, that even to this day not a few innocent, as well as guilty, people are in mortal fear lest disclosures may be made which will in some or other[274] way implicate194 them. For the trial of M. Caillaux has yet to come.
The two really dramatic episodes in all this gradual exposure of infamy195 were the arrest and imprisonment of M. Caillaux, upon the suspension of his privileges as deputy, and the public trial of Bolo Pasha. After what had happened since August, 1914, it seemed almost impossible that any Minister, however powerful he might be, would venture to go to the full extent of what was indispensably necessary with M. Caillaux. A man who had been Prime Minister of France, who in that capacity had gathered round him groups of politicians whose members looked to him to ensure their personal success in the future, was formidably entrenched196 both in the Senate and in the Assembly. To incur197 the personal enmity of such a capable statesman and such a master of intrigue as Joseph Caillaux was more than any of the previous Ministries198 had dared to risk. There were too many political reasons against it. Even the most honest of the Socialist Ministers themselves seem to have felt that. All the time, likewise, an influential portion of the Press vigorously supported the ex-Premier. They carried the war into the enemy’s camp by denouncing his critics either as unscrupulous and lying reactionaries, who were endeavouring to ruin a really progressive statesman, as men imbued199 with such lust200 for slaughter201 and eagerness for revenge that they had lost all grip of the actual situation, or as malignant intriguers behind the scenes whose one object was to blacken the character of an opponent who stood in the way of their schemes for personal aggrandisement.
Furthermore, M. Caillaux, holding the eminent202 position already referred to in the world of finance, had the whole-souled and entire-pocket backing of the French and German-Jew international money-lords. These magnates of plutocracy203, marvellous to relate, found themselves on this issue hand in glove with the most active international French Socialists. Nobody who was in the least afraid of political cliques204, of journalistic coteries205, of financial syndicates, or of Socialist[275] rancour, could put Caillaux under lock and key. And the military outlook lent itself to the encouragement of the leading advocate of surrender and his acolytes206. The word was assiduously passed round that, now Russia was out of the fray207, a drawn208 battle was the very best that the Entente could hope for.
France was bled white, Great Britain was war-weary and her workers were discontented, Italy—think of Caporetto—while, as to the United States, America was a long way off, President Wilson was still “too proud to fight” in earnest, American troops could never be transported in sufficient numbers across the Atlantic, and, to say nothing of dangers from submarines, there was not enough shipping209 afloat to do it. All pointed, therefore, to prompt “peace by negotiation,” and what better man could there be to negotiate such a peace than M. Joseph Caillaux? It was because he was the one political personage in France who could secure fair terms for his distressful210 country, at this terrible crisis, that he was so persistently211 attacked by the Chauvinists as a pro-German and accused of the most sordid treachery by men who envied him his power at the international Council Table!
Such was the situation. So long as M. Caillaux was at large, and able to direct the whole of the forces of defeatism, no genuinely patriotic Ministry could be successfully formed, or, if formed by some fortuitous concurrence212 of circumstances, could last for three months. Treachery breeds treachery as loyalty213 engenders214 loyalty. When Clemenceau took office, therefore, everything depended upon what he did with Caillaux. Paris and all France held their breath as they awaited the event. Patriots215 were doubtful: defeatists were hopeful: soldiers were on the look-out for a man.
On January 15th, then, M. Caillaux was arrested and put in prison by Clemenceau and his Ministry. All the predictions of upheaval216 and disaster, indulged in by M. Caillaux’s friends, were falsified. The country breathed more freely. Thenceforward, France knew whom to back. But, supposing that[276] M. Caillaux had still been within the precincts of Parliament and carrying on his political plots when the terrible news came of the disasters of Cambrai and St. Quentin, and when the German armies were within cannon-shot of Paris—how then? Those who knew best how things stood believe themselves that counsels of despair and pusillanimity might have prevailed, to the ruin of the country.
No such fateful issue as that involved in Caillaux’s arrest hung upon the result of the trial of Bolo Pasha. But Bolo’s whole career was a tragical217 farce218, to which even Alphonse Daudet could scarcely have done full justice. Bolo was a Frenchman of the Midi: a Tartarin with the tendencies of a financial Vautrin: a fine specimen219 of the flamboyant220 and unscrupulous international adventurer. His first experience in the domain221 of extraction was as a dentist in the country of his birth. A handsome, blond young man of fine appearance and manners and methods of address attractive to women, he soon found that the drawing of teeth and other less skilled professions led to the receipt of no emoluments222 worthy223 of his talents. To take in a well-to-do partner and decamp with his wife and the firm’s cash-box was more in the way of business.
So satisfactory was this first adventure that he extended his field of operations, and several ladies had the advantage of paying for his attentions in the shape of all the money of which they chanced to be possessed224. Somehow or other he found himself in the Champagne225 country during the wine-growers’ riots, and continued to have a good time in the district while they were going on. But in 1905 the claret region proved more lucrative226. For in Bordeaux the charm of his disposition227 produced so great an effect upon the widow of a rich merchant of that city that she succumbed228 to his attractions and married him. This provided Bolo with the means for setting on foot all sorts of financial enterprises in Europe and America. He thus became a promoter of the open-hearted and sanguine229 type, found his way into “society” of the kind which opens its arms to such men, had sufficient[277] influence to become a chevalier of the Legion of Honour, and by 1914 had lost all his wife’s money and more into the bargain—was, in fact, in very serious financial straits from which he saw no way of extricating230 himself. Certain Egyptian friends he had made, who later obtained for him his title of Pasha from the Khedive, were not then in a position to help him.
But Bolo without money meant a German agent in search of a job. It proved easy to get it. He notified the Germans through the Egyptians that he could do good service in France if only he were provided with plenty of funds. He was so furnished with hundreds of thousands of pounds. L’Homme Libre said of him that he revelled231 in the prestige of having money, to such an extent that he believed that money was everything. Rather, perhaps, he had become so accustomed to indulge in pleasures and political and financial intrigues of every sort that he would run any risk rather than give up the game. So it was that he carried on the dangerous policy, if such it could be called, sketched232 above.
About his guilt91 there could be no doubt. That he had been closely connected with people in high places as well as in low, and possessed considerable personal magnetism233, was clear. All this came out in court, where persons of every grade, from Ministers and Senators to Levantine rogues234 and Parisian courtesans, passed in and passed out like figures on a cinema film. Bolo, of course, denied every charge, and posed as a financier of high degree, but he was condemned235 to death, and his appeal against the sentence was fruitless, though he pretended he could make harrowing disclosures. He met his death bravely on April 10th. His fate was a heavy blow to other spies and conspirators236.
There was an interpellation on the Bolo trial, a month before his execution that led to a powerful speech by Clemenceau, in which he declared that he was first for liberty, next for war, and finally for the sacrifice of everything to secure victory. He then made a vigorous appeal to the Socialists to join with the rest of the country in supporting his Govern[278]ment in a supreme237 effort to free France from the invader238. “It is a great misfortune that my administration should be denounced by Renaudel”—then editor of L’Humanité—“as a danger to the workers. My hands are to the full as hardened by toil239 as those of Renaudel and Albert Thomas, good bourgeois66 citizens as they are, like myself. I have in my pocket a paper in which Renaudel is stigmatised as Clemenceau’s orderly; nay240, adding insult to injury, he is held up to public obloquy241 as Monsieur Renaudel.” Then, addressing the Socialist group, he declared with vehemence242: “We have done you no harm, but my methods are not yours. You will not defeat Prussian Junkerdom by baa-ing around about peace.” The appeal was quite bootless. On a division confidence in the Clemenceau Government was voted by 400 to 75. The Socialists were the 75. The vote was a direct outcome of the sordid and gruesome Bolo case.
Summary of Events Relating to Treachery in Paris,
July, 1917, to July, 1918.
July, 1917.—Clemenceau attacks M. Malvy, then Minister of the Interior, for ruinous weakness towards traitors.
Assails243 the Ribot Ministry as responsible for the propaganda of the pro-German journal Le Bonnet Rouge.
It was shown later that this newspaper had received State support to the extent of ￡4,000 a year.
August, 1917.—M. Almereyda (alias Vigo), connected with Bolo Pasha, M. Caillaux and the Bonnet Rouge, arrested and dies in prison.
M. Malvy “explains” the Almereyda affair.
September, 1917.—M. Malvy resigns.
October, 1917.—Debate in Chamber upon M. Léon Daudet’s charge of treason against Malvy.
Captain Bouchardon begins investigation.
Proprietors of Bonnet Rouge arrested.279]
November, 1917.—Revelations by Clemenceau in l’Homme Enchainé, which had been going on for a twelvemonth, take effect on public.
Bonnet Rouge trial.
Revelations concerning M. Paix-Séailles’s document about French troops at Salonika to have been published in Bonnet Rouge. Paix-Séailles in M. Painlevé’s entourage.
Clemenceau exposes Caillaux’s intrigues with Almereyda, the Bonnet Rouge, the defeatists in Italy, and comments on the large subsidies244 to the Bonnet Rouge which enabled it to become a daily instead of a weekly sheet.
Clemenceau forms Ministry.
December, 1917.—Clemenceau examined before Committee of Senate on Caillaux affair.
Clemenceau declares if Parliament would not sanction prosecution of Caillaux his Ministry would resign.
Caillaux’s immunity as deputy suspended by vote.
January, 1918.—Captain Bouchardon’s report on Bolo Pasha published.
Traces Bolo’s career from 1914, his intrigues with Germany through ex-Khedive of Egypt and other Egyptians. Receipt by Bolo of ￡400,000 from Deutsche Bank.
Bolo buys shares in Journal, and tries to buy shares also in the Figaro and the Temps.
M. Caillaux arrested.
His private safe brought from Florence containing strange papers relating, among other things, to a suggested coup d’état.
United States agent at Buenos Aires reveals series of negotiations between M. Caillaux and the German representative, Count Luxburg, having for object the conclusion of a German peace.
February, 1918.—Trial of Bolo begun. Caillaux, Humbert and others incriminated.
[280]
U.S.A. secret service shows that large sums passed from Count Bernstorff, German Ambassador in Washington, to Bolo for the purposes of German propaganda.
Bolo found guilty and condemned to be shot on February 16th.
M. Malvy’s case before the High Court extended.
March, 1918.—Bolo appeals.
Bolo case discussed in Chamber. Socialists attack Clemenceau. Vote of confidence in Clemenceau’s Ministry 400 to 75.
Terrible military disasters at Cambrai and St. Quentin due to heavy German attack on positions weakened by withdrawal246 of British troops.
April, 1918.—Bolo shot.
Malvy trial continued.
May, 1918.—Caillaux “explains” his connection with Le Bonnet Rouge.
June, 1918.—Committee report on M. Malvy’s case and fix date of trial.
July, 1918.—M. Malvy found guilty of undue248 laxity towards traitors and condemned to exile from France.
French Socialists infuriated at M. Malvy’s expulsion.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
aggression
|
|
| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
permeated
|
|
| 弥漫( permeate的过去式和过去分词 )； 遍布； 渗入； 渗透 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
specially
|
|
| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
ramifications
|
|
| n.结果，后果( ramification的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
systematic
|
|
| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
penetration
|
|
| n.穿透，穿人，渗透 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
fully
|
|
| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
sinister
|
|
| adj.不吉利的，凶恶的，左边的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
abrogated
|
|
| 废除（法律等）( abrogate的过去式和过去分词 )； 取消； 去掉； 抛开 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
favourable
|
|
| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
vigour
|
|
| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
mischief
|
|
| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
accredited
|
|
| adj.可接受的；可信任的；公认的；质量合格的v.相信( accredit的过去式和过去分词 )；委托；委任；把…归结于 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
conspiracy
|
|
| n.阴谋，密谋，共谋 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
precedent
|
|
| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
comity
|
|
| n.礼让，礼仪；团结，联合 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
intrigues
|
|
| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
intrigue
|
|
| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
organise
|
|
| vt.组织，安排，筹办 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
collaboration
|
|
| n.合作，协作；勾结 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
unlimited
|
|
| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
fanatics
|
|
| 狂热者，入迷者( fanatic的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
persuasion
|
|
| n.劝说；说服；持有某种信仰的宗派 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
astute
|
|
| adj.机敏的，精明的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
infiltration
|
|
| n.渗透；下渗；渗滤；入渗 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
patriot
|
|
| n.爱国者，爱国主义者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
patriotism
|
|
| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
remains
|
|
| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
meticulous
|
|
| adj.极其仔细的，一丝不苟的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
reigns
|
|
| n.君主的统治( reign的名词复数 )；君主统治时期；任期；当政期 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
faculty
|
|
| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
undoubtedly
|
|
| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
anterior
|
|
| adj.较早的；在前的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
gauge
|
|
| v.精确计量；估计；n.标准度量；计量器 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
thrifty
|
|
| adj.节俭的；兴旺的；健壮的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
savings
|
|
| n.存款，储蓄 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
faculties
|
|
| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
metropolis
|
|
| n.首府；大城市 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
investors
|
|
| n.投资者，出资者( investor的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
debentures
|
|
| n.公司债券( debenture的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
envious
|
|
| adj.嫉妒的，羡慕的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
minor
|
|
| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
pointed
|
|
| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
indifference
|
|
| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
derived
|
|
| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
folly
|
|
| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
underlay
|
|
| v.位于或存在于（某物）之下( underlie的过去式 )；构成…的基础（或起因），引起n.衬垫物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
destined
|
|
| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
octopus
|
|
| n.章鱼 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
legitimate
|
|
| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
apparently
|
|
| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
nefarious
|
|
| adj.恶毒的，极坏的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
bribery
|
|
| n.贿络行为，行贿，受贿 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
indirectly
|
|
| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
parasitical
|
|
| adj. 寄生的(符加的) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
pecuniarily
|
|
| adv.在金钱上，在金钱方面 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
57
defensive
|
|
| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
disastrous
|
|
| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
socialist
|
|
| n.社会主义者；adj.社会主义的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
provocation
|
|
| n.激怒，刺激，挑拨，挑衅的事物，激怒的原因 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
socialists
|
|
| 社会主义者( socialist的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
justify
|
|
| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
killing
|
|
| n.巨额利润；突然赚大钱，发大财 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
chattel
|
|
| n.动产；奴隶 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
penal
|
|
| adj.刑罚的；刑法上的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
bourgeois
|
|
| adj./n.追求物质享受的(人)；中产阶级分子 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
fanaticism
|
|
| n.狂热，盲信 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
entirely
|
|
| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
unprecedented
|
|
| adj.无前例的，新奇的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
warfare
|
|
| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
systematically
|
|
| adv.有系统地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
engender
|
|
| v.产生，引起 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
judgment
|
|
| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
capitalism
|
|
| n.资本主义 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
victorious
|
|
| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
patriotic
|
|
| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
retirement
|
|
| n.退休，退职 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
portfolios
|
|
| n.投资组合( portfolio的名词复数 )；（保险）业务量；（公司或机构提供的）系列产品；纸夹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
miserable
|
|
| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
malevolence
|
|
| n.恶意，狠毒 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
pusillanimity
|
|
| n.无气力，胆怯 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
82
apathy
|
|
| n.漠不关心，无动于衷；冷淡 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
ineptitude
|
|
| n.不适当；愚笨，愚昧的言行 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
intentionally
|
|
| ad.故意地，有意地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
85
wrecking
|
|
| 破坏 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
86
sordid
|
|
| adj.肮脏的，不干净的，卑鄙的，暗淡的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
87
monetary
|
|
| adj.货币的，钱的；通货的；金融的；财政的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
88
infamous
|
|
| adj.声名狼藉的，臭名昭著的，邪恶的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
89
corruption
|
|
| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
90
wholesale
|
|
| n.批发；adv.以批发方式；vt.批发，成批出售 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
91
guilt
|
|
| n.犯罪；内疚；过失，罪责 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
92
impunity
|
|
| n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
93
concealed
|
|
| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
94
vitriolic
|
|
| adj.硫酸的，尖刻的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
95
precarious
|
|
| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
96
trenches
|
|
| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
97
debauch
|
|
| v.使堕落，放纵 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
98
plausible
|
|
| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
99
ministry
|
|
| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
100
traitors
|
|
| 卖国贼( traitor的名词复数 )； 叛徒； 背叛者； 背信弃义的人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
101
shameful
|
|
| adj.可耻的，不道德的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
102
interpretation
|
|
| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
103
utterly
|
|
| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
104
decided
|
|
| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
105
enumerated
|
|
| v.列举，枚举，数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
106
mere
|
|
| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
107
anarchists
|
|
| 无政府主义者( anarchist的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
108
agitators
|
|
| n.（尤指政治变革的）鼓动者( agitator的名词复数 )；煽动者；搅拌器；搅拌机 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
109
proceedings
|
|
| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
110
miscreants
|
|
| n.恶棍，歹徒( miscreant的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
111
treacherous
|
|
| adj.不可靠的，有暗藏的危险的；adj.背叛的，背信弃义的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
112
bonnet
|
|
| n.无边女帽；童帽 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
113
rouge
|
|
| n.胭脂，口红唇膏；v.(在…上)擦口红 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
114
awakened
|
|
| v.（使）醒( awaken的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
115
abominable
|
|
| adj.可厌的，令人憎恶的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
116
avowed
|
|
| adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
117
reactionaries
|
|
| n.反动分子，反动派( reactionary的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
118
thoroughly
|
|
| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
119
accomplished
|
|
| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
120
motives
|
|
| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
121
antagonistic
|
|
| adj.敌对的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
122
indictment
|
|
| n.起诉；诉状 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
123
detraction
|
|
| n.减损；诽谤 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
124
faction
|
|
| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
125
influential
|
|
| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
126
contemplated
|
|
| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
127
traitorous
|
|
| adj. 叛国的, 不忠的, 背信弃义的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
128
proprietors
|
|
| n.所有人，业主( proprietor的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
129
lamentable
|
|
| adj.令人惋惜的，悔恨的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
130
discredited
|
|
| 不足信的，不名誉的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
131
alleged
|
|
| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
132
premier
|
|
| adj.首要的；n.总理，首相 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
133
presidency
|
|
| n.总统(校长，总经理)的职位(任期) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
134
personalities
|
|
| n. 诽谤，（对某人容貌、性格等所进行的）人身攻击； 人身攻击；人格, 个性, 名人( personality的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
135
dexterous
|
|
| adj.灵敏的；灵巧的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
136
devoted
|
|
| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
137
ostentation
|
|
| n.夸耀，卖弄 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
138
remarkable
|
|
| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
139
malignant
|
|
| adj.恶性的，致命的；恶意的，恶毒的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
140
upbraided
|
|
| v.责备，申斥，谴责( upbraid的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
141
judicious
|
|
| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
142
advantageous
|
|
| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
143
opposition
|
|
| n.反对，敌对 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
144
entente
|
|
| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
145
justifiable
|
|
| adj.有理由的，无可非议的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
146
acquitted
|
|
| 宣判…无罪( acquit的过去式和过去分词 )； 使（自己）作出某种表现 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
147
distinguished
|
|
| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
148
devastated
|
|
| v.彻底破坏( devastate的过去式和过去分词)；摧毁；毁灭；在感情上（精神上、财务上等）压垮adj.毁坏的；极为震惊的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
149
vehement
|
|
| adj.感情强烈的；热烈的；(人)有强烈感情的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
150
partisan
|
|
| adj.党派性的；游击队的；n.游击队员；党徒 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
151
fictitious
|
|
| adj.虚构的，假设的；空头的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
152
brotherhood
|
|
| n.兄弟般的关系，手中情谊 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
153
sanctuary
|
|
| n.圣所，圣堂，寺庙；禁猎区，保护区 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
154
pecuniary
|
|
| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
155
conveyance
|
|
| n.(不动产等的)转让，让与；转让证书；传送；运送；表达；（正）运输工具 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
156
precisely
|
|
| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
157
glorified
|
|
| 美其名的，变荣耀的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
158
wail
|
|
| vt./vi.大声哀号，恸哭；呼啸，尖啸 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
159
wringing
|
|
| 淋湿的，湿透的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
160
calf
|
|
| n.小牛，犊，幼仔，小牛皮 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
161
profuse
|
|
| adj.很多的，大量的，极其丰富的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
162
perfectly
|
|
| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
163
devoid
|
|
| adj.全无的，缺乏的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
164
astuteness
|
|
| n.敏锐；精明；机敏 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
165
intimacy
|
|
| n.熟悉，亲密，密切关系，亲昵的言行 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
166
hatred
|
|
| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
167
persistent
|
|
| adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
168
wiles
|
|
| n.（旨在欺骗或吸引人的）诡计，花招；欺骗，欺诈( wile的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
169
investigation
|
|
| n.调查，调查研究 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
170
remitted
|
|
| v.免除（债务），宽恕( remit的过去式和过去分词 )；使某事缓和；寄回，传送 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
171
inevitable
|
|
| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
172
previously
|
|
| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
173
imputed
|
|
| v.把（错误等）归咎于( impute的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
174
surmises
|
|
| v.臆测，推断( surmise的第三人称单数 )；揣测；猜想 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
175
magistrate
|
|
| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
176
formulated
|
|
| v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
177
chamber
|
|
| n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
178
prosecution
|
|
| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
179
baron
|
|
| n.男爵；(商业界等)巨头，大王 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
180
immunity
|
|
| n.优惠；免除；豁免，豁免权 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
181
imprisoned
|
|
| 下狱，监禁( imprison的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
182
coup
|
|
| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
183
intermittent
|
|
| adj.间歇的，断断续续的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
184
negotiations
|
|
| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
185
sanity
|
|
| n.心智健全，神智正常，判断正确 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
186
clique
|
|
| n.朋党派系，小集团 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
187
inflamed
|
|
| adj.发炎的，红肿的v.（使）变红，发怒，过热( inflame的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
188
amazement
|
|
| n.惊奇，惊讶 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
189
dishonour
|
|
| n./vt.拒付（支票、汇票、票据等）；vt.凌辱，使丢脸；n.不名誉，耻辱，不光彩 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
190
belongings
|
|
| n.私人物品，私人财物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
191
imprisonment
|
|
| n.关押，监禁，坐牢 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
192
determined
|
|
| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
193
tentacles
|
|
| n.触手( tentacle的名词复数 )；触角；触须；触毛 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
194
implicate
|
|
| vt.使牵连其中，涉嫌 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
195
infamy
|
|
| n.声名狼藉，出丑，恶行 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
196
entrenched
|
|
| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
197
incur
|
|
| vt.招致，蒙受，遭遇 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
198
ministries
|
|
| （政府的）部( ministry的名词复数 )； 神职； 牧师职位； 神职任期 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
199
imbued
|
|
| v.使（某人/某事）充满或激起（感情等）( imbue的过去式和过去分词 )；使充满；灌输；激发（强烈感情或品质等） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
200
lust
|
|
| n.性(淫)欲；渴(欲)望；vi.对…有强烈的欲望 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
201
slaughter
|
|
| n.屠杀，屠宰；vt.屠杀，宰杀 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
202
eminent
|
|
| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
203
plutocracy
|
|
| n.富豪统治 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
204
cliques
|
|
| n.小集团，小圈子，派系( clique的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
205
coteries
|
|
| n.（有共同兴趣的）小集团( coterie的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
206
acolytes
|
|
| n.助手( acolyte的名词复数 )；随从；新手；（天主教）侍祭 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
207
fray
|
|
| v.争吵；打斗；磨损，磨破；n.吵架；打斗 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
208
drawn
|
|
| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
209
shipping
|
|
| n.船运（发货，运输，乘船） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
210
distressful
|
|
| adj.苦难重重的，不幸的，使苦恼的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
211
persistently
|
|
| ad.坚持地；固执地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
212
concurrence
|
|
| n.同意；并发 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
213
loyalty
|
|
| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
214
engenders
|
|
| v.产生（某形势或状况），造成，引起( engender的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
215
patriots
|
|
| 爱国者，爱国主义者( patriot的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
216
upheaval
|
|
| n.胀起，(地壳)的隆起；剧变，动乱 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
217
tragical
|
|
| adj. 悲剧的, 悲剧性的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
218
farce
|
|
| n.闹剧，笑剧，滑稽戏；胡闹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
219
specimen
|
|
| n.样本，标本 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
220
flamboyant
|
|
| adj.火焰般的，华丽的，炫耀的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
221
domain
|
|
| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
222
emoluments
|
|
| n.报酬，薪水( emolument的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
223
worthy
|
|
| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
224
possessed
|
|
| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
225
champagne
|
|
| n.香槟酒；微黄色 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
226
lucrative
|
|
| adj.赚钱的，可获利的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
227
disposition
|
|
| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
228
succumbed
|
|
| 不再抵抗（诱惑、疾病、攻击等）( succumb的过去式和过去分词 )； 屈从； 被压垮； 死 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
229
sanguine
|
|
| adj.充满希望的，乐观的，血红色的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
230
extricating
|
|
| v.使摆脱困难，脱身( extricate的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
231
revelled
|
|
| v.作乐( revel的过去式和过去分词 )；狂欢；着迷；陶醉 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
232
sketched
|
|
| v.草拟（sketch的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
233
magnetism
|
|
| n.磁性，吸引力，磁学 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
234
rogues
|
|
| n.流氓( rogue的名词复数 )；无赖；调皮捣蛋的人；离群的野兽 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
235
condemned
|
|
| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
236
conspirators
|
|
| n.共谋者，阴谋家( conspirator的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
237
supreme
|
|
| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
238
invader
|
|
| n.侵略者，侵犯者，入侵者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
239
toil
|
|
| vi.辛劳工作，艰难地行动；n.苦工，难事 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
240
nay
|
|
| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
241
obloquy
|
|
| n.斥责，大骂 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
242
vehemence
|
|
| n.热切；激烈；愤怒 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
243
assails
|
|
| v.攻击( assail的第三人称单数 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
244
subsidies
|
|
| n.补贴，津贴，补助金( subsidy的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
245
arraigned
|
|
| v.告发( arraign的过去式和过去分词 )；控告；传讯；指责 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
246
withdrawal
|
|
| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
247
gaol
|
|
| n.(jail)监狱；(不加冠词)监禁；vt.使…坐牢 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
248
undue
|
|
| adj.过分的；不适当的；未到期的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |