We have seen whence the ideal of a spiritual universe arises. It is unnecessary to prove that the universe is moral. What it is necessary to verify is that a universe exists; for “universe” is an ethical1 ideal, it is the ethical manifold, or, if we distinguish ethical as concerning relations between man and man, then we may use the term “spiritual” to designate that infinite system of interdependence in which men as ethical units have their place. We begin with the affirmation—Man is an end per se. This wonderful affirmation, which the democracies are darkly and confusedly trying to express in political and social arrangements, constitutes the problem of all problems. It is the great datum2 of ethics3, of which ethical theory must give an account. All other data or problems that have been thrust into the foreground—freedom of the will, responsibility, altruistic4 self-sacrifice—are secondary, in the sense that they depend for their solution on a right conception of man as end per se. As possessing worth on his own account he is an ethical unit. Only as a member of the infinite spiritual universe does he possess the two-fold attributes implied in worth—inviolability with respect to outsiders and indefeasible, intrinsic preciousness. Therefore I say that around the126 individual, the ethical unit, we build up as a necessary postulate5 the spiritual universe. Man ethically6 considered carries with him this infinite environment.
Does this universe exist or is it a mere7 figment? It is the product of the reality-producing functions in their ideal completion. It is the necessary postulate required if the idea of right is to have validity, and the idea of right is required by man in so far as he is an agent and not merely a spectator of life. The ethical manifold, the spiritual universe, exists in so far as there is a right.
Have we then reinstated the idea of God as existent? Not the idea of God as an individual. We have on the contrary set aside that idea by affirming that manifoldness cannot be derived9 from unity11, that the positing12 of plurality is just as much a primary function of the mind as the positing of unity. We have discarded the God-idea as the locus13 of unity, since the unity subsists14 in the relation of the units. Strictly15 speaking, we have replaced the God-idea by that of a universe of spiritual beings interacting in infinite harmony.
But at this point I must go back for a moment to Kant, using his ideas once more as a foil to make my own more explicit16. Wilhelm von Humboldt said of Kant that some of the things he had destroyed would never be rebuilt, and that some of the things he had built would never be destroyed.
For more than a hundred years the impression has prevailed that among the things forever destroyed by Kant are the proofs of the existence of God. He is represented as an intellectual giant whose blows have forever shattered the proofs on which the existence of a127 supersensible reality rested. Kant’s mind was pre?minently scientific. He was the philosopher who made explicit the principles underlying17 Newtonian science as Aristotle had made explicit the logic18 underlying the Greek science. His philosophy is essentially19 agnostic. The use that he continues to make of the God-idea can be dissociated from his system with advantage to the latter.34
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But did Kant indeed destroy the idea of a supersensible reality as existent, or are we warranted in undertaking20 to build anew the supersensible world.35 “Du hast sie zerst?rrt, die sch?ne Welt, In deinem Busen baue sie wieder”—not indeed in the realm of mere feelings, but in the sphere of will. The spell of Kant’s shattering attack still rests upon the intellectual world today. The notion of a supersensible reality, if held at all, is held timidly, apologetically and is apt to be based on subjective21 emotional need. The wish is more or less admitted to be father to the faith—the will to believe is defiantly22 asserted in despair of sound foundations. A scientist like Dubois-Reymond enumerates23 seven world riddles24, or mysteries that cannot be explained, and after saying that they cannot be explained, he seems to see that no alternative remains26 but to take refuge in resignation: “Ignoramus, ignorabimus!”
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That “explanation” is not the only avenue to truth, that the referring of effects to their causes is not the highest operation of the reality-producing functions, I have pointed27 out in a previous chapter. But Kant, as has been said, is supposed to have utterly28 annihilated29 the arguments intended to demonstrate the existence of God, and it will clear up the matter at issue if we consider wherein he actually succeeded and wherein he quite failed. As he himself declares, his method is regressive; he does not attempt the progressive method path. He seeks to ascertain31 whether by going backward along the chain of effects and causes, or of conditions, he can somewhere find God as first cause or as unconditioned. He does not look forward looking to the ideals of the will. He does not enter into the realm of ends, where the necessity of determining action in obedience32 to some universal plan or scheme of relations might have forced itself on his attention. His approach, like his habit of mind, is scientific. He is not primarily an ethicist33. Proceeding34 in this manner he shows that the notion of a first cause is untenable, and he attacks in particular the ontological argument by which every other argument supplements itself at the point where it breaks down.
Did Kant, however, annihilate30 the Ontological Argument? Yes, in the scholastic35 form in which it was held. No, in a form, based on the idea of the ethical manifold, in which it can be restated. In the scholastic form it runs:130 “There is such a thing as the idea of a perfect being. Existence is an element of perfection. If the perfect being did not exist it would be less than perfect. But the ens realissimum, the perfect being, is present as an idea in the mind. Therefore it exists.” The disproof of this amounts to the curt36 statement that what exists in the mind does not necessarily exist outside of it, or, as Kant put it: “The idea of 100 thalers in the head of a man is one thing, lacking no element of conceptual integrity; while the existence of the 100 thalers in the man’s purse is an entirely37 different matter.” The evidence of existence, in other words, depends on the synthesis of the data of sense as arranged in the space and time manifold in accordance with the categories of the understanding. Existence is temporal and spatial38. To prove that God exists we should have to prove that he exists in the world of the senses. Of any other kind of existence we are agnostic. Kant’s disproof of the Ontological Argument thus depends on his agnosticism.
But suppose that on ethical grounds we find ourselves compelled to affirm that there is an object which has worth, and that to account for the inviolableness, indispensableness and preciousness of this object we are compelled to give free rein8 to the reality-producing functions, and to place this object having worth as a member in a manifold not spatial and temporal but infinite: and suppose we say that the existence of this worth-endowed object, of this ethical unit with its compeers, is as certain as the notion of rightness is certain, have we not then without blame widened the conception of existence, and placed the Ontological Argu131ment where Kant’s disproof does not even touch it?36
One more important remark is here in place, suggested by Kant’s designation of God as the ideal of reason, and by his designation of our highest nature as the rational nature.
Is “rational” equivalent to intellectual? If it be so, then feeling must be classed as irrational39, and impulse likewise, since neither feeling nor impulse is subject to logical rules. And then the war will be on between the intellectualists or rationalists and the champions of irrational conceptions of life, since feeling and impulse actually make up the major part of life, and can neither be left out of account nor compressed into intellectualist formulas.37
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Plainly, there is a deep misunderstanding between the two parties. An error is involved somewhere. It appears to consist in assuming that objectivity can be supplied only by the intellect, in overlooking the fact that the feelings and still more the volition40 possess intrinsic controls and norms of their own, that Science, the work of the intellect, and art and ethics, spring from a common root, namely, the reality-producing functions. The manifolds with which each of the three respectively deals are different, the methods of synthesis are different, but the root principle, synthesis of the manifold, is identical in all.
To describe our highest nature, therefore, as the rational nature is perilous41, since the word rational suggests intellectual. Either we must strain the signification of reason to include feeling and will, which is contrary to common usage, or we should select some other term, such as spiritual, to designate that nature within us which operates in science and art and achieves its highest manifestation42 in producing the ethical ideal.
Finally, if what has been said regarding the ethical manifold holds good, then a genuine philosophy of life can only be reached by the ethical approach to the problems of life. This has never yet been consistently attempted. The approach has been made from the scientific or the logical side, or as in the case of Plato from the ?sthetic, or as in modern times from the biological. Yet the ethical approach is full of promise. A philosophy of physical nature may be feasible without it, a philosophy of art may be possible without it, but not so a philosophy of life. It has not been tried because ethics has lain in the lap of theology, which was itself corrupted43 by the attempt to apply to ethical problems the inadequate44 principle of causality in the form of creation theories, while again in recent times, by way133 of reaction against theology, the solution of ethical questions is sought for in the empirical disciplines where a measure at least of objective certainty has rewarded the investigators45. Even Kant, who asserted the independence of ethics, actually made it dependent on Newtonian science. The great task now is, strictly to carry out the idea of the independence of ethics, not indeed as if its principles were unrelated to those of science and art, but in the sense of independently investigating the problems peculiar46 to ethical consciousness. I am well aware that the attempt made in this volume to take the ethical line of approach to a general philosophy of life, is tentative and defective47 in a hundred ways, nevertheless it is an attempt in a new direction.
In the next book I shall take up the practical consequences that follow from the theory here advanced. Having delineated the ethical ideal, and discovered the invaluable48 fact that there is a structural49 plan contained in it, we shall see that our actual human duties may be derived by applying this ideal scheme to the quasi-organic groups already existing in human society. There are provocative50 correspondences to the ethical ideal in the social life of men; otherwise it would be impossible to apply it. There are human groups in which a quasi-correlative membership in a common life already exists. In the case of each of these groups we find some sort of empirical multiplicity which must be studied scientifically, and also an empirical motive51 which may be utilized52 in the interest of developing the ethical relation. The family is the first of these groups which offers a footing in the world of experience for the ideal. In the134 family natural affection is the motive; in the vocational group, the desire to express a talent or special gift; in the state, patriotism54; in the church, the need felt to integrate all human ideals.
Thus the things of earth are to be used as instrumentalities by which we are to become aware of the spiritual reality. Only that the disparateness of the physical world and the ethical universe should ever be kept in the foreground. Every effort to solve the riddle25 by somehow identifying the two has failed. To account for the existence of a finite world of indefinite extensibility side by side with a universe ex hypothesi infinite is impossible. Instead of seeking to explain let effort go toward utilizing55. Let the world be used instrumentally for the purpose of verifying the existence of universe.
For the average man, and indeed for all men, the test of the truth of a theory is in the practice to which it leads. Abstract metaphysical arguments appeal only to a few, and even for them the formula in its abstract guise56 is unconvincing. Look at the mathematical figure, and see whether the axioms hold good. Look at the sequent phenomena57 and see whether the so-called law of nature is exemplified. And so with respect to conduct: look at the ways of human behavior traced out in accordance with the plan of the ethical manifold, and see whether such behavior wins the approval of the spiritual nature implicit58 within you.38
NOTE I
There are various points at which the system sketched59 in the text deviates60 from current opinion, but in regard to the underlying proposition the reader’s particular attention is called to the remarks on the “prejudice of causality” and to the statement that verification is exemplification.
How can ethical truth be verified? How can we be sure that ethical ideals are more than fine wishes, expressing subjective aspiration61, but having no counterpart in the ultimate constitution of things? This is the dark doubt that haunts the minds of ethical writers, as well as of the average man. We ask to have the things we believe in, the objects of our supreme62 aspiration, verified. How can they be verified?
I think that we shall see light in this matter once we have grasped the thought that verification, both in science and in ethics, is nothing more than exemplification. In the case of causality, in science, verification does not consist in mere recurrence63. For if we find, even by a single carefully guarded experiment, that a given phenomenon A is the true antecedent of B, then we take leave to predict that B will always follow A, without regard to the repetition of the sequence in our 136experience.39 Indeed, no amount of repetition would justify64 prediction. The problem in the case of causality is to determine the true antecedent and the true consequent. For at any moment there are innumerable phenomena that might possibly be antecedents of B. How obtain certainty that A is the causal antecedent? By the synthetic65 process. We assume a unity, say energy. We assume that there are differenti?, say a certain mathematically determined66 quantum of mechanical energy in A, and a determined quantum of thermal67 energy in B. No sooner have these differenti? been mathematically determined, than in virtue68 of the assumed unity of energy underlying the differences, we pronounce the nexus69 to be necessary. We predict that B will always follow A.
Causality, therefore, is an example of a synthesis which over-arches sequences. The fact that the phenomena are sequent does not affect the principle involved. Whenever we contemplate70 an example of synthesis, that is, defined differenti? of some sort, and a defined underlying unity of some sort, the mind affirms that reality exists. There are degrees of reality. The degree of completeness with which the synthetic function is carried out in any instance determines the degree.
Ethical verification is likewise exemplification, though in another sense. When the ideal plan of ethical relations is presented, the ideal plan being a synthesis not of sequences but of all co-existent entities71 whatsoever72, the mind assents73 to this ideal plan as representing the complete synthesis or the complete reality. The more explicitly74 and definitely the relation between137 the ethical units is conceived, the greater the conviction of reality resulting. Now frustration75 after partial achievement has the effect of making more explicit the idea of the plan of relations as it ought to be carried out in human life. And in this sense I would have the reader understand the main practical argument of the book—that frustration is the condition of our intensified76 conviction as to the reality of the supersensible universe.
In virtue of the constitution of our minds we cannot help acknowledging as real that which is synthesized. Synthesized and real are synonymous terms. Hence the idea of the completed synthesis necessarily is the idea of the ultimate reality.
NOTE II
The three principal respects wherein Kant has failed to justify his affirmation that every human being is to be regarded as an end per se, and not to be used as a tool, are:
1. Out of the bare experience of oughtness, absolute constraint77, he seeks to derive10 personality. Out of the empty categorical imperative78 he seeks to draw a substantive79 entity80—a being possessed81 of worth.
2. The society of ends per se described by him is not a true society, but a collection of atomic individuals juxtaposed. The capital flaw in his ethics is here. He begins by detaching the individual. He studies the individual, and discovers, or believes himself to have discovered, that something happens in him (the consciousness of absolute constraint) which entitles him to be considered worth while on his own account.
Next, since the formula of university proposes imitability by others as the test of a moral act, all others are called in as concomitants of the detached atom first considered. Each of the concomitants in turn is an atomic entity. It is in this mechanical way that the conception of a kingdom of ends, or a holy community, is supposed to be validated82. Kant’s mistake is to assume that an individual regarded as an isolated83 being can138 be worth while, can be an end per se. The notion of end involves relation to others, not mechanical juxtaposition84, but intrinsic connection. No one is worth while by himself. He has worth only as an organic member of a spiritual whole. The unique quality which lends him incomparable distinction is the creative life which emanates85 from him and quickens cognate86 but diversely modified life in his associates.
3. Kant’s version of the ethical rule is strong on the side of interdiction87, but quite inadequate on the positive side. He tells us that we are to look on others not merely as means to our own ends, but also ends per se. The vagueness is in the formula “not merely ... but also.” Where the dividing line is to be drawn88 he does not tell. I am at liberty to use the services of others in the prosecution89 of my own interests, as they may use mine, since we are social beings and dependent on one another. But how far may I go in this direction? On this point we are left wholly in the dark. Kant admits into his system the so-called natural ends,40 such as wealth, culture and the like, gives them leave to abound90, only with the proviso that they may not overpass91 a certain limit,—the limit beyond which they would interfere92 with the rights of fellowmen. An instrumental view of wealth, science, culture, as positively93 promoting the ethical end of man, he does not and cannot establish.41 But the instrumental view is precisely94 that in which modern society has most at stake, on the working out of which the solution of our most pressing problems,—such as the labor95 problem, the problem of the family, the problem of patriotism and international relations—is entirely dependent. If Kant has failed at this point, as I believe he has, his usefulness as a guide in the reconstruction96 of modern life is seriously diminished. What he had set out to demonstrate, the inalienable worth of man, remains; but foundations other than his must139 be found. For the formula “not merely as a means but also as an end” I would substitute: Treat every man as a spiritual means to thine own spiritual end and conversely ... treat the extent and the manner in which we are to use one another as means being determined by the criterion that our exchange of services shall conduce to the attainment97 of each other’s ends as ethical beings conjointly.
NOTE III
I would also ask the reader to consider well the effect upon the philosophy of life of the position taken throughout this volume that there is no intellectual bridge between the finite order and the infinite order. This involves dropping creation at the beginning and immortality98 in its usual sense at the end. Creation is an attempt to show how the world, including man, proceeded out of the infinite. Immortality is an attempt to express how man returns to the infinite. In this volume man’s dealings with the finite order are represented as having for their purpose the achievement of the conviction that there verily is an infinite life, a supersensible universe. Creation systems, pantheistic systems, certain evolutionary99 systems, also the Hegelian system, are futile100 attempts to explain the How. But explanation is impossible; for to explain means to understand, and to understand means to trace an effect to its cause. And causality is not the kind of synthesis applicable to a co-existent totality.
Among practical consequences note the difference between the theistic attitude in fatal sickness and the spiritual attitude.42 The theist presupposes that there is a God to whose will he must patiently submit. But theism is a principle of explanation, the God-idea being employed to account for the finite order. God is thus made responsible for the suffering of the sick as well as for all other evils in the world. Hence the very idea which is presupposed in order to produce patience140 raises up doubts and perplexities, which imperil patience. If God made the world why does he permit pain and evil? The spiritual attitude, on the contrary, ethically interpreted, does not presuppose the idea of a divine order as a dogma, but offers it as the product of the experience of suffering itself. The conviction that there is in man an essential spiritual self, a holy thing, and a spiritual universe, a holy community, are not gifts to which we fall heir at birth, or by some sort of revelation borrow from the experience of ancient teachers; they are a supreme good to be arduously101 worked out by ourselves. And the interpretation102 given to the facts of suffering and frustration is that they can be used as the means of bringing to birth in us that supreme conviction.
In general it may be said that the purpose of existence, both of the individual and of the race, is so to work in the finite world as to become possessed with ever greater distinctness of the conviction of the reality of the wholly real world, the infinite supersensible universe.
The attitude of the Christian103 is other-worldly. He shuns104 intimacy105 with the finite world and turns his face toward his “true home.” The attitude herein described is that of hearty106 attack upon the business of life, and close embrace of all the partial reality which finite experience contains, with a view of thus acquiring in some measure an appreciation107 of the utter reality of which these partial realities are hints and glimmerings.
NOTE IV
In the case of any new theory, it is true that one must live with it for a considerable time before acquiring the habit of thinking in accordance with it. The older habits constantly crop up and interfere with the correct understanding of any new point of view. This is especially so of a new attitude towards reality. The world seems topsy-turvy to one who learns for the first time that grass and the leaves of trees are not really green apart from the eye that sees them, that beings with141 different organs might interpret differently that which stimulates108 the human eye to its specific color reactions. The heliocentric theory, when first announced by Copernicus, outraged109 na?ve commonsense110. It exacted a new habit of thinking in regard to the relation of the sun to the earth,—the real relation, apprehended111 by intercalated mental processes being the direct opposite of the apparent relation. The sun evidently revolves112 around the earth, nevertheless the truth is that the earth revolves around the sun.
Modern science reveals behind the palpable world around us unimaginable fluids, speeds, and physical units which are so sublimated113 in thought as to be barely distinguishable from metaphysical entities. The habit of penetrating114 with radium-like glance the concrete screen of things, and of seeing behind the screen the company of atoms, ions, etc., may be gradually acquired; but the older habit of regarding the palpable and visible as the truly real continues to assert itself in conflict with the new habit.
The ethical unit in an ethical manifold postulated115 in the text as the closest, though still symbolic116, reading of the ultimate reality, makes a similar demand upon the reader, and requires of him in like manner the formation of a new habit of thinking, against which the older habits will doubtless continue to protest.
The most obstinate117 of the older habits that stand in the way has been dealt with in the note on causality, namely,—the unscientific habit of ignoring the boundaries of science, and of taking the method employed in the physical sciences as the sole method that leads to certainty. The prejudice of causality is probably ineradicable, just as the illusion that the sun revolves about the earth persists. But we can at least reach the point of realizing that it is a prejudice, and to this extent overcome it. If it be synthesis, or the employment in inseparable conjunction of the two functions mentioned, that for the human mind spells reality, then one kind of synthesis called causality, that of sequent phenomena, does not exclude142 the ampler, though ideal synthesis, which is carried out in the mental production of the ethical manifold. So much I wish to add to the statements contained in the text in regard to the theory.
But there is also a new habit to be acquired in regard to the practical ethical consequences of the theory. The chief of these is the prizing of distinctive118 difference above uniformity or sameness. The ethical quality is that quality in which a man is intrinsically unique. The ethical act is the most completely individualized act (I ought perhaps to say personalized, but the completely individualized act is that of a unique personality). In brief, the emphasis is here put on that in which a man differs from all others, and not on the common nature which he shares with the rest; or rather, since the common nature is not denied, the stress is put on the intrinsically different mode in which the common nature is expressed in him.43
The accentuation in current ethical discussion of the common nature of man, and the fallacious assumption that the common interests are the pre-eminently moral interests, that uniformity is the test of ethical quality, is easy to understand. It is the reaction of the modern world against feudalism, a social system not yet entirely outgrown120, in which the empirical differences of rank and birth were made the basis of intolerably oppressive discriminations, and in which it was an accepted axiom that some men are baked of better clay than others. It is also a reaction against the capitalistic system that has taken the place of the feudal119, in which wealth is to a considerable extent made the standard of social appraisement121.
It is against these false discriminations that the voice of humanity is now indignantly raised, affirming the moral equality of all men. But equality is mistakenly taken to mean likeness122 in the sense of sameness, not in the sense of that fundamental like143ness on the background of which the desirable unlikenesses stand forth123. And this notion of equality as identical with sameness leads to great practical aberrations124. Thus, for instance, women are not only to be recognized as the equals of men, but are to be the same as men,—their education patterned on that of men, their specific functions, as far as possible, ignored. For unlikeness is supposed to connote inferiority, and inferiority is justly repelled125 as morally intolerable. But aside from this one example, the stressing of the common nature, or of the basis of likeness at the expense of the outstanding unlikenesses, leads to other leveling tendencies of which modern democracies furnish many unpleasing illustrations. Thus uniform popular opinion, encompassing126 the individual on every side, penetrates127 into his inmost thinking, so that he hardly ventures to hold to his own judgment128 against the judgments129 of the majority. And the impulses of the mass tend also to threaten his independence in action. There is indeed a certain intoxication130 in the very sense of being submerged in a large whole, a certain glad loss of self in great impersonal131 movements, a certain strain of democratic pantheism, as it were, that takes the place with some of mystic absorption in Deity132. But whatever the value that may attach to these upswellings of feeling, it is counterbalanced by the circumstance that in proportion as indiscriminate devotion to society as a whole becomes the paramount133 motive, the sub-organisms of society, the family, the vocation53 and the state, in which the ethical personality is ripened134, are threatened with effacement135. Instead of moral equality it were better to use the term “moral equivalence.” The differences are to be stressed; they are the coruscating136 points in the spiritual life of mankind. That every man is the equal of his fellows means that he has the same right as each of the others to become unlike the others, to acquire a distinct personality, to contribute his one peculiar ray to the white light of the spiritual life.
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ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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datum
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| n.资料；数据；已知数 | |
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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altruistic
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| adj.无私的，为他人着想的 | |
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postulate
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| n.假定，基本条件；vt.要求，假定 | |
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ethically
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| adv.在伦理上，道德上 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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rein
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| n.疆绳，统治，支配；vt.以僵绳控制，统治 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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positing
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| v.假定，设想，假设( posit的现在分词 ) | |
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locus
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| n.中心 | |
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subsists
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| v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的第三人称单数 ) | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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explicit
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| adj.详述的，明确的；坦率的；显然的 | |
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underlying
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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undertaking
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subjective
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| a.主观(上)的，个人的 | |
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defiantly
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enumerates
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riddles
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riddle
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| n.谜，谜语，粗筛；vt.解谜，给…出谜，筛，检查，鉴定，非难，充满于；vi.出谜 | |
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remains
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pointed
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utterly
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annihilated
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annihilate
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ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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32
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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33
ethicist
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| n.伦理学家，道德学家 | |
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34
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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35
scholastic
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| adj.学校的，学院的，学术上的 | |
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36
curt
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| adj.简短的，草率的 | |
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37
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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38
spatial
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| adj.空间的，占据空间的 | |
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39
irrational
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| adj.无理性的，失去理性的 | |
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40
volition
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| n.意志；决意 | |
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41
perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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42
manifestation
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| n.表现形式；表明；现象 | |
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43
corrupted
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| （使）败坏( corrupt的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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44
inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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45
investigators
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| n.调查者，审查者( investigator的名词复数 ) | |
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46
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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47
defective
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| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
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48
invaluable
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| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
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49
structural
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| adj.构造的，组织的，建筑（用）的 | |
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50
provocative
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| adj.挑衅的，煽动的，刺激的，挑逗的 | |
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51
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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52
utilized
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| v.利用，使用( utilize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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53
vocation
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| n.职业，行业 | |
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54
patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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55
utilizing
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| v.利用，使用( utilize的现在分词 ) | |
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56
guise
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| n.外表，伪装的姿态 | |
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57
phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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58
implicit
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| a.暗示的，含蓄的，不明晰的，绝对的 | |
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59
sketched
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| v.草拟（sketch的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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60
deviates
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| v.偏离，越轨( deviate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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61
aspiration
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| n.志向，志趣抱负；渴望；(语)送气音；吸出 | |
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62
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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63
recurrence
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| n.复发，反复，重现 | |
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64
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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65
synthetic
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| adj.合成的，人工的；综合的；n.人工制品 | |
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66
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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thermal
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| adj.热的，由热造成的；保暖的 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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nexus
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| n.联系；关系 | |
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contemplate
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| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
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entities
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| 实体对像； 实体，独立存在体，实际存在物( entity的名词复数 ) | |
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whatsoever
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| adv.（用于否定句中以加强语气）任何；pron.无论什么 | |
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73
assents
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| 同意，赞同( assent的名词复数 ) | |
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74
explicitly
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| ad.明确地，显然地 | |
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75
frustration
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| n.挫折，失败，失效，落空 | |
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intensified
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| v.（使）增强， （使）加剧( intensify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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constraint
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| n.(on)约束，限制；限制(或约束)性的事物 | |
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78
imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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substantive
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| adj.表示实在的；本质的、实质性的；独立的；n.实词，实名词；独立存在的实体 | |
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entity
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| n.实体，独立存在体，实际存在物 | |
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81
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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82
validated
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| v.证实( validate的过去式和过去分词 )；确证；使生效；使有法律效力 | |
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83
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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84
juxtaposition
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| n.毗邻，并置，并列 | |
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85
emanates
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| v.从…处传出，传出( emanate的第三人称单数 )；产生，表现，显示 | |
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86
cognate
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| adj.同类的，同源的，同族的；n.同家族的人，同源词 | |
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interdiction
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| n.禁止；封锁 | |
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88
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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89
prosecution
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| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
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90
abound
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| vi.大量存在；(in，with)充满，富于 | |
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91
overpass
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| n.天桥，立交桥 | |
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92
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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93
positively
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| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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95
labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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96
reconstruction
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| n.重建，再现，复原 | |
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97
attainment
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| n.达到，到达；［常pl.］成就，造诣 | |
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immortality
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| n.不死，不朽 | |
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evolutionary
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| adj.进化的；演化的，演变的；[生]进化论的 | |
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100
futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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101
arduously
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| adv.费力地，严酷地 | |
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102
interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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103
Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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104
shuns
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| v.避开，回避，避免( shun的第三人称单数 ) | |
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intimacy
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| n.熟悉，亲密，密切关系，亲昵的言行 | |
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106
hearty
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| adj.热情友好的；衷心的；尽情的，纵情的 | |
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107
appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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108
stimulates
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| v.刺激( stimulate的第三人称单数 )；激励；使兴奋；起兴奋作用，起刺激作用，起促进作用 | |
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109
outraged
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| a.震惊的，义愤填膺的 | |
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110
commonsense
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| adj.有常识的；明白事理的；注重实际的 | |
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111
apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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112
revolves
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| v.（使）旋转( revolve的第三人称单数 )；细想 | |
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113
sublimated
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| v.（使某物质）升华( sublimate的过去式和过去分词 )；使净化；纯化 | |
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114
penetrating
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| adj.（声音）响亮的，尖锐的adj.（气味）刺激的adj.（思想）敏锐的，有洞察力的 | |
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115
postulated
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| v.假定，假设( postulate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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116
symbolic
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| adj.象征性的，符号的，象征主义的 | |
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117
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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118
distinctive
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| adj.特别的，有特色的，与众不同的 | |
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119
feudal
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| adj.封建的，封地的，领地的 | |
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120
outgrown
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| 长[发展] 得超过（某物）的范围( outgrow的过去分词 )； 长[发展]得不能再要（某物）； 长得比…快； 生长速度超过 | |
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121
appraisement
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| n.评价，估价；估值 | |
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122
likeness
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| n.相像，相似（之处） | |
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123
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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124
aberrations
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| n.偏差( aberration的名词复数 )；差错；脱离常规；心理失常 | |
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125
repelled
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| v.击退( repel的过去式和过去分词 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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126
encompassing
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| v.围绕( encompass的现在分词 )；包围；包含；包括 | |
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127
penetrates
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| v.穿过( penetrate的第三人称单数 )；刺入；了解；渗透 | |
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128
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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129
judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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130
intoxication
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| n.wild excitement;drunkenness；poisoning | |
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131
impersonal
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| adj.无个人感情的，与个人无关的，非人称的 | |
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132
deity
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| n.神，神性；被奉若神明的人(或物) | |
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133
paramount
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| a.最重要的，最高权力的 | |
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134
ripened
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| v.成熟，使熟( ripen的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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135
effacement
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| n.抹消，抹杀 | |
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136
coruscating
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| v.闪光，闪烁( coruscate的现在分词 ) | |
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