Why there should be so many bulls and so few bears can only be explained on the ground that optimism is the basis of speculation6, and hope the73 essence of it. Yet the market can only go two ways: it is quite as likely to go down as up. Since sentiment should have no place in speculation one would think there should be as many bears as bulls, more of them, in fact, because the market almost always goes down faster than it goes up, and because nine out of ten of the unforeseen things that occur result in lower prices.
Accidents like diplomatic entanglements7, rumors8 of war, earthquakes, and drought are constantly occurring to upset the plans of bulls and bring fat profits to bears in a hurry, while matters that bring about higher markets are generally things long anticipated, in which the profits that accrue9 to the bulls come about slowly and laboriously10, and always with the attendant risk that a disturbance12 in any corner of the globe may bring on a sudden smash that will undo13 the upbuilding of months. In theory, therefore, there should be at least as many bears as bulls in all active markets, but in practice the large majority are always bulls, to whose sanguine14 and credulous15 natures the bear is a thing apart—a gloomy and misanthropic16 person hovering17 about like a vulture awaiting the carrion18 of a misfortune in the hope of a profit. Naturally the layman cannot understand him, and would like to suppress him.
Despite the fact that the odds19 seem to favor74 the bears, there is an old and true saying that no Ursa Major ever retired20 with a fortune. Wall Street has seen many of them, and with perhaps one exception the records agree that the chronic21 pessimists22 have not succeeded. Fortune seems to have smiled on them at intervals23; in the country’s early days of construction and development mistakes were made that brought about disaster, but in the long run such tremendous progress has resulted in America as to defeat the aspirations24 of any man or group of men who stood in its way. The big bears, as a rule, have “over-stayed the market.” Imbued25 with the hope that worse things were in store, they have been swept away by the forces they sought to oppose. One of them, a power in his day, was so obsessed26 with the notion that all prices were inflated27, that he has been known to sell stocks short “for investment.” One night when a lady at his side remarked on the beauty of the moon, he is said to have replied with that absent-minded mechanical skepticim inherent in the bear, “yes, but it’s too high; it must come down.”
One would think the ideal temperament28 for a speculator would be absolute impartiality29, with an open mind uninfluenced by sentiment, ever ready to take advantage of all fluctuations30 as they occur. The ups and downs of a stock market75 always show, on average long periods, a practically equivalent swing each way, so it would seem that the speculator most likely to profit by these fluctuations would be one without preconceived prejudices, ready at all times to turn bull or bear as the occasion required. As a matter of fact, this type is the rarest of all, being confined, generally speaking, to the professional “traders” on the large exchanges, necessarily a very small minority of the speculative group, yet withal perhaps the most uniformly successful. These men, it must be understood, are not speculators, but traders, a nice distinction involving “catching a turn,” as opposed to the speculative habit of “taking a position.”
In active times I have known one of them to operate simultaneously31 in the New York Stock market, in the cotton market, and in the wheat market, trading at the same time in London and Paris, “shifting his position,” or “switching” from the bull to the bear side twice in a single day, and closing all his trades at three o’clock with a total net profit of less than a thousand dollars on a turnover32 of 30,000 shares, to say nothing of the transactions in cotton and grain. It goes without saying that to do all these things in one day requires a curiously33 mercurial34 temperament, and calls for nerve and celerity76 altogether foreign to the average speculator. Such a man, moreover, contributes but little to the making of prices and values, which is the function of large markets; his chief economic usefulness lies rather in the enormous revenues he pays to the State. The man whose operations I have just described contributed in a single year $75,000 to the State Government in stock-transfer taxes.
The scientific way to measure the value of speculators in wide markets is to consider the bull as one whose purchases in times of falling prices serve to minimize the decline, and the bear as one who serves a doubly useful purpose in minimizing the advance by his short sales and in checking the decline by covering those sales. All these operations serve useful economic purposes, since the more buyers and sellers there are, the greater the stability of prices and the nearer the approach of prices to values.
This, as I have said, is the scientific way to look at it, and the correct way, but the popular way is something quite different. From this point of view the man who sells property he does not immediately possess is thought to be a menace, who depresses prices artificially and works a disadvantage to the investor35 or, in the produce markets, to the producer. Nothing could be more fallacious than this, because of the fact that just as77 every routine sale of actual stock requires a buyer, so every short sale by a bear requires a purchase by him of equal magnitude. And it is precisely36 these repurchasing or “covering” operations of the bears that do the utmost good in the way of checking declines in times of panic or distress37.
When there are no bears, or when their position is so slight as to be inconsequential, declines are apt to run to extreme lengths and play havoc38 with bulls. One often hears among acute and clever speculators the expression “the bears are the market’s best friends,” and, though this may seem incongruous, it is quite true. In the month in which these lines are written there has occurred, for example, a really severe break in prices on the Stock Exchanges at London, Paris, and Berlin, arising from the periodic Balkan crisis. This decline ran to disproportionate extremes, and, in fact, approached such demoralization that more than 300,000 shares of American securities held abroad were thrown on the New York market for what they would bring. The reason for the severity of this decline was easily explained. The outstanding speculative account at all European centres, while not actually unwieldy, was almost entirely39 in the nature of commitments for the rise. There was no bear account. Therefore all Stock Exchanges were supersensitive since they78 lacked the steadying influence which covering by the bears invariably brings about. The bears are then, in truth the market’s best friends, and the more there are of them, the better for all concerned when trouble comes.
Throughout all the political agitation40 in Germany which culminated41 in that disastrous42 failure, the Bourse Law of 1896, there appears to have been very little opposition43 to the bear and the practice of short selling; nevertheless in that section of the law which prohibited dealings for future delivery the bears found their activities restricted. The law has now been amended45, having proved a wretched fiasco, but in the decade which attended its enforcement it was curious to note the unanimous cry that went up in Germany for the restoration of the bear. His usefulness in the stock market no less than in the commodity market was recognized; his suppression was deplored46. It was found that just as his activities were restricted so the tendency toward inflated advance and ultimate collapse47 was increased. The market became one-sided, and hence lop-sided; quotations48 thus established were unreal and fictitious. Moreover there was an incentive49 to dishonesty, for unscrupulous persons could open a short account in one office and a long account in another, and if the bear side79 lost they could refuse to settle on the ground customarily resorted to by welchers.
“The prices of all industrial securities have fallen,” said the Deutsche Bank in 1900, “and this decline has been felt all the more because by reason of the ill-conceived Bourse Law, it struck the public with full force without being softened50 through covering purchases”—i. e., by the bears. Again, four years later, when the law was still in force, the same authority states “a serious political surprise would cause the worst panic, because there are no longer any dealers52 (shorts) to take up the securities which at such times are thrown on the market.” The Dresdner Bank in 1899 reported that the dangers arising from this prohibition53 cannot be overestimated54 “if with a change of economic conditions the unavoidable selling force cannot be met by dealers willing and able to buy.”
“Short sellers do not determine prices,” says Professor Huebner. “By selling they simply express judgment55 as to what prices will be in the future. If their judgment is wrong they will suffer the penalty of being obliged to go into the market and buy the securities at higher prices. Nine tenths of the people are by nature ‘bulls,’ and the higher prices go, the more optimistic and elated they become. If it were not for a group of80 ‘short sellers,’ who resist an excessive inflation, it would be much easier than now to raise prices through the roof; and then, when the inflation became apparent to all, the descent would be abrupt57 and likely unchecked until the basement was reached. The operations of the ‘bear,’ however, make excessive inflation extremely expensive, and similarly tend to prevent a violent smash because the ‘bear,’ to realize his profits, must become a buyer. The writer has been told by several members of the New York Stock Exchange that they have seen days of panic when practically the only buyers, who were taking the vast volume of securities dumped on the exchange, were those who had sold ‘short,’ and who now turned buyers as the only way of closing their transactions. They were curious to know what would have happened in those panic days, when everybody wished to sell and few cared to invest, if the buying power had depended solely58 upon the real investment demand of the outside public.
“In reply also to the prevalent opinion that ‘short selling’ unduly59 depresses security values, it should be stated that ‘short sellers’ are frequently the most powerful support which the market possesses. It is an ordinary affair to read in the press that the market is sustained or ‘put up’ at the expense of the ‘shorts’ who, having contracted81 to deliver at a certain price can frequently easily be driven to ‘cover.’ Short selling is thus a beneficial factor in steadying prices and obviating60 extreme fluctuations. Largely through its action, the discounting of serious depressions does not take the form of a sudden shock or convulsion, but instead is spread out over a period of time, giving the actual holder61 of securities ample time to observe the situation and limit his loss before ruin results. In fact, there could be no organized market for securities worthy62 of the name, if there did not exist two sides, the ‘bull’ and the ‘bear.’ The constant contest between their judgments63 is sure to give a much saner64 and truer level of prices than could otherwise exist. ‘No other means,’ reports the Hughes Committee, ‘of restraining unwarranted marking up and down of prices has been suggested to us.’”31
So much for the functions of the bear in markets that deal in invested capital. In the commodity markets he becomes of even greater value, indeed, he is well-nigh indispensable. Mr. Horace White, who was the Chairman of the Hughes Investigating Committee, cites this instance: “A manufacturer of cotton goods, in order to keep his mill running all the year round, must82 make contracts ahead for his material, before the crop of any particular year is picked. The cotton must be of a particular grade. He wishes to be insured against fluctuations in both price and quality; for such insurance he can afford to pay. In fact he cannot afford to be without it. There are also men in the cotton trade, of large capital and experience, who keep themselves informed of all the facts touching65 the crops and the demand and supply of cotton in the world, and who find their profit in making contracts for its future delivery. They do not possess the article when they sell it. To them the contract is a matter of speculation and short selling, but it is a perfectly66 legitimate67 transaction.
“To the manufacturer it is virtually a policy of insurance. It enables him to keep his mills running and his hands employed, regardless of bad weather or insect pests or other uncertainties68. The same principles apply to the miller69 who wants wheat, to the distiller, the cattle-feeder, and the starch-maker who wants corn, to the brewer70 who wants hops71 and barley72, to the brass73 founder74 who wants copper75, and so on indefinitely. Insurance is one of two redeeming76 features of such speculation; and the other, which is even more important, is the steadying effect which it has on market prices. If no speculative buying83 of produce ever took place, it would be impossible for a grower of wheat or cotton to realize a fair price at once on his crop. He would have to deal it out little by little to merchants who, in turn, would pass it on, in the same piecemeal77 way, to consumers. It is speculative buying which not only enables farmers to realize on their entire crops as soon as they are harvested, but enables them to do so with no disastrous sacrifice of price. When buyers who have future sales in view compete actively78 with each other, farmers get fair prices for their produce.”32
And, it may be added, the same satisfactory result is attained79 when bears who have sold the farmer’s crop short come to cover their short sales by buying in the open market; their buying steadies the market if there is a tendency to decline; if the market is strong, their buying helps make it stronger. In either case they are the farmer’s best friends, because the farmer profits as prices advance.
Speaking of farmers, it is well known that much of the opposition to short selling and dealing44 in futures80 in the large markets finds its chief advocates among the Western and Southern politicians whose constituents81 are the agricultural classes. These gentlemen fulminate strongly against the84 New York Stock Exchange and the grain and cotton exchanges, and in currying82 favor with their bucolic83 supporters they do not hesitate to condemn84 margin85 trading, short selling and every other phase of speculative markets. Yet it does not occur to them, or, if it does, they dare not refer to it, that in forming pools and combinations to hold back their wheat and cotton their constituents are doing the very thing which they so strongly condemn in speculative centres. The farmer is, of course, richer than he ever was before, but nevertheless he grows his wheat to sell, and only a few can carry it for any length of time without borrowing from the banks. The farmer who goes into one of these pools with wheat valued at $10,000 and who borrows $8000 on it from his local bank, is nothing more nor less than a speculator in wheat on a 20 per cent. margin, and the same horrid86 appellation87 describes the cotton-planter who resorts to similar practices.33
Now, of course, there is no moral reason why a farmer should not speculate if he chooses, but what touches us on the raw is his Phariseeism in doing for himself what he professes88 to abhor89 and condemn in others. One is tempted90 to say unkind things to the farmer at such times, to remind him, for example, that he is to-day the most backward85 and unprogressive factor in American business life. Despite the fact that the Department of Agriculture has spent $100,000,000 on his education in the last twenty years, he has not yet begun to learn what the German, Dutch, and French farmers learned years ago in intensive farming, nor has he mastered the art of cattle-raising in anything like the degree it is understood in the Argentine. Nature has smiled on him; he waxes fat with her bounty91, but he does not keep pace with the growth of the country. Although enhancing prices are paid him for his product, he is unable to raise a crop proportionate in any degree to the facilities put at his disposal in the way of fertilizers and machinery92. One would like to “rub it in” on the farmer, but one doesn’t, “because” as a recent writer puts it, “the farmer is a farmer, and therefore not a person to be lectured like a mere93 banker or broker94 in Wall Street.”
To the farmer, the politician, and the layman generally, short sales of cotton or grain are understood, approved, in fact, if the grower happens to be the one who profits by them. But substitute stocks and shares for wheat and cotton, and talk of “operations for a fall,” and the layman thinks he smells a rat. He sees the bale of cotton or the carload of wheat actually moving; it is a concrete thing; it appeals to his senses, it is comprehensible.86 But talk to him of bits of paper called stock certificates, and by a curious process he concludes that a short sale has no basis of reality and is therefore menacing and improper95. He persuades himself that short selling ought to be prohibited by law, and, since Wall Street harbors the chief offenders96, he finds in the nearest politician a handy ally to assist him. These gentlemen, who obstinately97 refuse every other medicament, could be cured of their ailment98 by a strong diet of economics. They become subjects of medical, rather than financial, interest. They should dip themselves into Conant and Leroy-Beaulieu; they should cool off in the pages of Bagehot and Emery; and, by the time they have got into the soothing99 columns of the Hughes Commission’s report, they will be ready for new points of view.
As a preparatory lesson: suppose a speculator buys from a commission merchant a carload of coal of a specified100 grade. The coal is not in the possession of the commission merchant, but he knows where he can get it, and he knows that he can deliver it on the date agreed upon. Accordingly he sells it short, and enters into a binding101 contract which, happily, the courts construe102 to be perfectly legal. Now suppose the same purchaser wishes to buy 100 shares of Pennsylvania Railroad87 stock. All Pennsylvania stock is the same, that is to say any 100 shares of it is just as good as any other 100 shares of the same property—the number on the certificate is of no importance whatever.
The dealer51 to whom he applies does not happen to have 100 Pennsylvania on hand, but he knows where he can get it, and he knows that he can deliver it to the purchaser on the following day. So he sells it short, and all that remains103 to complete his part of the contract is the actual delivery. He is then a bear on Pennsylvania stock. He may, if he chooses, go into the open market and buy the stock at once, so that he will be able to deliver it in the easiest and most direct way. Or he may feel that by waiting he may be able to buy at a lower price than that at which he has sold it, hence, in order to make the delivery promptly104, he borrows the hundred shares from one of his colleagues, to whom he pays the market price as security for the temporary loan of the certificate.34 In a day or two the price of the88 stock may have declined, whereupon the bear goes into the market and buys the 100 shares of Pennsylvania at a price, say, 1 per cent. lower than that at which he sold it.
When this certificate is delivered to him next day, he delivers it in turn to the man from whom he borrowed the original 100 shares; his security money is then returned to him, and the transaction is closed. It is just as real a transaction as any other, and just as legal. Moreover, since it is always possible to buy, but not always possible to sell, the active presence in the market of large numbers of bears who must buy, whether they want to or not, is the very best policy of insurance that a holder of securities could have.
Many years ago there was a law on the French Statute105 books, subsequently repealed107, prohibiting short sales. M. Boscary de Villeplaine, a deputy chairman of the association of stockbrokers108, was conversing109 with Napoleon regarding a pending110 discussion in the Council of State looking to the repeal106 of the law. “Your Majesty111,” said de89 Villeplaine, “when my water carrier is at the door, would he be guilty of selling property he did not own if he sold me two casks of water instead of only one, which he has?” “Certainly not,” replied Napoleon, “because he is always sure of finding in the river what he lacks.” “Well, your Majesty, there is on the Bourse a river of Rentes.”35
Napoleon felt, no doubt, that there was something inherently wrong in selling short; even as these lines are written, counsel for a Congressional committee is attempting to make witnesses admit that the practice is “immoral112.” But why, where, how is it immoral? It pervades113 all business; no question of morals or ethics114 enters into it at all. The man who sells you a motor-car has not got it; he accepts your money and enters into an agreement to deliver the car next spring because he knows or believes that he can make it and have it ready for delivery at that time. Meanwhile he has sold short. A gentleman of my acquaintance has sold thousands of storage-batteries on the same basis, although plans for them have not yet been designed to meet the specifications115. At Cape116 Cod117 the cranberry-growers sell their crop before it has begun to mature; all over the land contractors118 and builders are “going90 short” of the labor11 and materials which, at some time in the future, they hope to obtain to fulfil the terms of their agreements. Are all these worthy people “immoral”?
If it is immoral to sell for a purpose, it is equally immoral to buy for a purpose; in each case the purpose is the hope of a profit. Buying for a profit is approved by every one; why not selling? In both instances you have bought or sold for a difference in price; the sequence of the events in no way involves a question of morals, since there is no ethical119 difference and no economic difference between buying first and selling last, and selling first and buying last. Moreover, in selling short you do no injury, since you sell to a buyer, at his price, only what he wants and is willing to pay for.36
All suggestions of impropriety in short selling91 are grotesque120 in their absurdity121. But suppose, for purposes of argument, that economic errors of some sort were actually involved in this practice. How could it be regulated or controlled? As the governors of the Stock Exchange stated to the Hughes Commission in 1909, short selling is of different descriptions. There is the short sale where the security is held in another country and sold to arrive pending transportation. There is the short sale where an individual sells against securities which he expects to have later, but which are not in deliverable form; and in this connection I call your attention to the recent sale of $50,000,000 of Corporate122 Stock of the City of New York where deliveries were not made for a period of about three months, and which stock was dealt in enormously, long before it was issued.
“If a market had not been provided for it under those conditions,” said the governors, “the loan could not have been placed. Then, again, there is the short selling of stock against which different and new securities are to be issued; the vendor123 knowing that he is to receive certain securities at a distant date, but desiring to realize upon them at this time. Beyond this, there is the regular selling of short stock, either by parties who do so to hedge a dangerous position upon the long side of the market, or the sale purely124 and simply with the92 intention of rebuying at a profit, should circumstances favor it.”
Finally, there is the investor with stock in his strong-box actually paid for and owned outright125. He may wish to sell in a strong market with the hope of repurchasing at lower prices, but for reasons of his own he may borrow the stock for delivery rather than deliver the securities bearing his own name. Technically126 he is short; he is a bear. But in his case, as in that of the others here cited, how can this perfectly proper method of doing business be “regulated” or interfered127 with in any way? I do not think it necessary to pursue so palpable an absurdity.
It has been said that the bears often resort to unfair methods to bring about declines in prices, circulating rumors designed to alarm timid owners of securities and thus frighten them into selling. That this is done every now and then is undeniable, but the opportunity of the bear in these matters is very limited, and may be easily and speedily investigated, whereas similar practices, by the bulls in inflating128 values by all sorts of grotesque assertions and promises are by no means so easily run to earth, and do incalculably more harm.
The bear who drags a red-herring across the trail now and then interrupts the chase, but he cannot stop it; the genial129 optimist56 who has a doubtful93 concern on his hands, with a pack of enthusiastic buyers in full cry at his heels, is a much more serious matter. Good times and bull markets engender130 many questionable131 practices of this sort. “All people are most credulous when they are most happy,” says Walter Bagehot; “and when much money has just been made, when some people are really making it, when most people think they are making it, there is a happy opportunity for ingenious mendacity. Almost everything will be believed for a little while, and long before discovery the worst and most adroit132 deceivers are geographically133 or legally beyond the reach of punishment. But the harm they have done diffuses134 harm, for it weakens credit still further.”37
If this book were written for people instructed in economic matters there would be no occasion to dilate135 upon the usefulness of bears and the value of short selling, but since we are addressing laymen136 who do not understand how the bear can be a useful factor, we may venture to say once more that insurance is the chief advantage in his operations. Ex-Governor White’s contribution to the subject, which I have quoted in this chapter, is strongly supported by Mr. Conant, who shows that valuable progress in opening new countries and developing new industries is often made possible94 by “bearish” operations designed to “hedge” or insure the new undertaking137 against loss.
“The broker who has a new security which he desires to place from time to time in the future, making possible, for instance, the opening of a new country to railway traffic, protects himself against loss resulting from future changes in market conditions by selling other securities for future delivery at current prices. These securities will realize a profit when the date arrives for delivery if the market has in the meantime become unfavorable, and will offset138 the loss upon his new securities. They will have to be bought at a loss if the movement of prices has been upward, but the upward movement will afford a profit upon the new securities which he is seeking to place upon the market. Thus, to quote Georges-Levy, ‘there is a genuine insurance, which the broker will have himself organized and on which he will willingly pay the premium139 for protection against any accident.’”38
An instance such as this serves to show the difference between gambling140 and speculating, terms that are often misapplied by critics of stock markets. A gambler seeks and makes risks which95 it is not necessary to assume, and which, in their assumption, contribute nothing to the general uplift. But the speculator—in the instance just cited, a bear who sells short—volunteers to assume those risks of business which must inevitably141 fall somewhere, and without which the mine, or the factory, or the railroad could not be undertaken. His profession, and the daily risks he assumes, call for special knowledge and superior foresight142, so that the probability of loss is less than it would be to others. If he did not do it—if there were no bear speculators—the same risks would have to be borne by others less fitted to assume them or the useful projects in question would not be undertaken at all.
So general is the employment of these hedging or insurance operations that in the case of cotton—to cite but one instance—the business is regarded by practically all cotton merchants as an absolute necessity under modern methods of conducting business. “An idea of the value of the hedging function may be obtained,” says Herbert Knox Smith, Commissioner143 of Corporations, “when it is stated that in Great Britain banks very generally refuse to loan money on cotton that is not hedged. Moreover, it is almost universally conceded that, since the introduction of hedging, failures in the cotton trade, which had96 previously144 been frequent, have been materially reduced as a direct result of the greater stability with which transactions in spot cotton can be conducted.”39
In conclusion it may be noted145 that as early as 1732 an attempt was made in England to prevent short sales by law, that the law was recognized a mistake and subsequently repealed. To-day there is no law on the English Statute books restricting speculation in any form. In America the New York State Legislature enacted146 a law in 1812 and the Federal Government in 1864, both designed to prevent short selling. These laws have also been repealed and they will not be revived. The bear has come to stay. As a spectre to frighten amateurs, he may continue for a time to stalk abroad o’ nights; as a necessary and useful part of all business he is a substantial reality. And he is not “immoral.”
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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riddles
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| n.谜（语）( riddle的名词复数 )；猜不透的难题，难解之谜 | |
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layman
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| n.俗人，门外汉，凡人 | |
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enigma
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| n.谜，谜一样的人或事 | |
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fictitious
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| adj.虚构的，假设的；空头的 | |
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speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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entanglements
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| n.瓜葛( entanglement的名词复数 )；牵连；纠缠；缠住 | |
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rumors
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| n.传闻( rumor的名词复数 )；[古]名誉；咕哝；[古]喧嚷v.传闻( rumor的第三人称单数 )；[古]名誉；咕哝；[古]喧嚷 | |
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accrue
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| v.(利息等)增大，增多 | |
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laboriously
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| adv.艰苦地；费力地；辛勤地；（文体等）佶屈聱牙地 | |
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labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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undo
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| vt.解开，松开；取消，撤销 | |
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sanguine
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| adj.充满希望的，乐观的，血红色的 | |
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credulous
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| adj.轻信的，易信的 | |
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misanthropic
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| adj.厌恶人类的，憎恶（或蔑视）世人的；愤世嫉俗 | |
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hovering
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| 鸟( hover的现在分词 )； 靠近（某事物）； （人）徘徊； 犹豫 | |
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carrion
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| n.腐肉 | |
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odds
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| n.让步，机率，可能性，比率；胜败优劣之别 | |
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retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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chronic
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| adj.(疾病)长期未愈的，慢性的；极坏的 | |
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pessimists
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| n.悲观主义者( pessimist的名词复数 ) | |
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intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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aspirations
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| 强烈的愿望( aspiration的名词复数 )； 志向； 发送气音； 发 h 音 | |
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imbued
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| v.使（某人/某事）充满或激起（感情等）( imbue的过去式和过去分词 )；使充满；灌输；激发（强烈感情或品质等） | |
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obsessed
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| adj.心神不宁的,鬼迷心窍的,沉迷的 | |
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inflated
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| adj.（价格）飞涨的；（通货）膨胀的；言过其实的；充了气的v.使充气（于轮胎、气球等）( inflate的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）膨胀；（使）通货膨胀；物价上涨 | |
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temperament
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| n.气质，性格，性情 | |
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29
impartiality
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| n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
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30
fluctuations
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| 波动，涨落，起伏( fluctuation的名词复数 ) | |
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31
simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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32
turnover
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| n.人员流动率，人事变动率；营业额，成交量 | |
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33
curiously
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| adv.有求知欲地；好问地；奇特地 | |
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34
mercurial
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| adj.善变的，活泼的 | |
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35
investor
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| n.投资者，投资人 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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37
distress
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| n.苦恼，痛苦，不舒适；不幸；vt.使悲痛 | |
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38
havoc
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| n.大破坏，浩劫，大混乱，大杂乱 | |
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39
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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40
agitation
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| n.搅动；搅拌；鼓动，煽动 | |
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41
culminated
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| v.达到极点( culminate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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42
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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43
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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44
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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45
Amended
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| adj. 修正的 动词amend的过去式和过去分词 | |
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deplored
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| v.悲叹，痛惜，强烈反对( deplore的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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47
collapse
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| vi.累倒；昏倒；倒塌；塌陷 | |
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48
quotations
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| n.引用( quotation的名词复数 )；[商业]行情（报告）；（货物或股票的）市价；时价 | |
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49
incentive
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| n.刺激；动力；鼓励；诱因；动机 | |
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softened
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| （使）变软( soften的过去式和过去分词 )； 缓解打击； 缓和； 安慰 | |
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51
dealer
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| n.商人，贩子 | |
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52
dealers
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| n.商人( dealer的名词复数 )；贩毒者；毒品贩子；发牌者 | |
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53
prohibition
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| n.禁止；禁令，禁律 | |
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54
overestimated
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| 对（数量）估计过高，对…作过高的评价( overestimate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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55
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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56
optimist
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| n.乐观的人，乐观主义者 | |
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57
abrupt
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| adj.突然的，意外的；唐突的，鲁莽的 | |
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58
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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59
unduly
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| adv.过度地，不适当地 | |
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60
obviating
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| v.避免，消除（贫困、不方便等）( obviate的现在分词 ) | |
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61
holder
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| n.持有者，占有者；(台，架等)支持物 | |
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62
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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63
judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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64
saner
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| adj.心智健全的( sane的比较级 )；神志正常的；明智的；稳健的 | |
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65
touching
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| adj.动人的，使人感伤的 | |
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66
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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67
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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68
uncertainties
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| 无把握( uncertainty的名词复数 )； 不确定； 变化不定； 无把握、不确定的事物 | |
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69
miller
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| n.磨坊主 | |
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70
brewer
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| n. 啤酒制造者 | |
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71
hops
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| 跳上[下]( hop的第三人称单数 )； 单足蹦跳； 齐足（或双足）跳行； 摘葎草花 | |
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72
barley
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| n.大麦，大麦粒 | |
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73
brass
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| n.黄铜；黄铜器，铜管乐器 | |
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74
Founder
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| n.创始者，缔造者 | |
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75
copper
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| n.铜；铜币；铜器；adj.铜(制)的；(紫)铜色的 | |
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76
redeeming
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| 补偿的，弥补的 | |
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77
piecemeal
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| adj.零碎的；n.片，块；adv.逐渐地；v.弄成碎块 | |
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78
actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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79
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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80
futures
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| n.期货，期货交易 | |
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81
constituents
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| n.选民( constituent的名词复数 )；成分；构成部分；要素 | |
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82
currying
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| 加脂操作 | |
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83
bucolic
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| adj.乡村的；牧羊的 | |
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84
condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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85
margin
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| n.页边空白；差额；余地，余裕；边，边缘 | |
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86
horrid
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| adj.可怕的；令人惊恐的；恐怖的；极讨厌的 | |
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87
appellation
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| n.名称，称呼 | |
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88
professes
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| 声称( profess的第三人称单数 )； 宣称； 公开表明； 信奉 | |
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89
abhor
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| v.憎恶；痛恨 | |
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90
tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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91
bounty
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| n.慷慨的赠予物，奖金；慷慨，大方；施与 | |
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92
machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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93
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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94
broker
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| n.中间人，经纪人；v.作为中间人来安排 | |
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95
improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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96
offenders
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| n.冒犯者( offender的名词复数 )；犯规者；罪犯；妨害…的人（或事物） | |
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97
obstinately
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| ad.固执地，顽固地 | |
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98
ailment
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| n.疾病，小病 | |
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99
soothing
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| adj.慰藉的；使人宽心的；镇静的 | |
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100
specified
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| adj.特定的 | |
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101
binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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102
construe
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| v.翻译，解释 | |
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103
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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104
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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105
statute
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| n.成文法，法令，法规；章程，规则，条例 | |
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106
repeal
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| n.废止，撤消；v.废止，撤消 | |
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107
repealed
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| 撤销，废除( repeal的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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108
stockbrokers
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| n.股票经纪人( stockbroker的名词复数 ) | |
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109
conversing
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| v.交谈，谈话( converse的现在分词 ) | |
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110
pending
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| prep.直到，等待…期间；adj.待定的；迫近的 | |
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111
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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112
immoral
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| adj.不道德的，淫荡的，荒淫的，有伤风化的 | |
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113
pervades
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| v.遍及，弥漫( pervade的第三人称单数 ) | |
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114
ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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115
specifications
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| n.规格；载明；详述；（产品等的）说明书；说明书( specification的名词复数 )；详细的计划书；载明；详述 | |
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116
cape
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| n.海角，岬；披肩，短披风 | |
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117
cod
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| n.鳕鱼；v.愚弄；哄骗 | |
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118
contractors
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| n.（建筑、监造中的）承包人( contractor的名词复数 ) | |
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119
ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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120
grotesque
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| adj.怪诞的，丑陋的；n.怪诞的图案，怪人（物） | |
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121
absurdity
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| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
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122
corporate
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| adj.共同的，全体的；公司的，企业的 | |
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123
vendor
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| n.卖主；小贩 | |
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124
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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125
outright
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| adv.坦率地；彻底地；立即；adj.无疑的；彻底的 | |
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126
technically
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| adv.专门地，技术上地 | |
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127
interfered
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| v.干预( interfere的过去式和过去分词 )；调停；妨碍；干涉 | |
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128
inflating
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| v.使充气（于轮胎、气球等）( inflate的现在分词 )；（使）膨胀；（使）通货膨胀；物价上涨 | |
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129
genial
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| adj.亲切的，和蔼的，愉快的，脾气好的 | |
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130
engender
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| v.产生，引起 | |
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131
questionable
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| adj.可疑的，有问题的 | |
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132
adroit
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| adj.熟练的，灵巧的 | |
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133
geographically
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| adv.地理学上，在地理上，地理方面 | |
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134
diffuses
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| （使光）模糊，漫射，漫散( diffuse的第三人称单数 )； （使）扩散； （使）弥漫； （使）传播 | |
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135
dilate
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| vt.使膨胀，使扩大 | |
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136
laymen
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| 门外汉，外行人( layman的名词复数 )； 普通教徒（有别于神职人员） | |
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137
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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138
offset
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| n.分支，补偿；v.抵消，补偿 | |
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139
premium
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| n.加付款；赠品；adj.高级的；售价高的 | |
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140
gambling
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| n.赌博；投机 | |
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141
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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142
foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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143
commissioner
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| n.（政府厅、局、处等部门）专员，长官，委员 | |
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144
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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145
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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146
enacted
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| 制定（法律），通过（法案）( enact的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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