In Wall Street, where men are accustomed to looking forward at all times, the question is ever in mind as to the next panic. The last one left its sting; we are interested now in knowing about184 the future. Have we learned how to avoid these difficulties? May we hope to diminish their force and mitigate8 their terrors? May we rely upon the superior organization of business and the greater quantity and quality of capital to soften10 the effect of the next shock? I think not. We may lull11 ourselves into a coma12 of fancied security as we reflect upon experience and its expensive lessons, but we deceive ourselves if we think that we shall finally arrive at a point where these convulsions shall cease.
Nothing of that sort can come about among people strong with health and vigor13, confident and full of energy, and impatient for action. With such a people life is incessantly14 mobile; a constantly increasing volume of creative activity impels15 them onward16. Panics are unknown in dead countries and in countries that have not yet heard the call of progress; in all other countries the violence of these shocks is directly proportionate to the enterprise of the people. The more civilization there is, the greater the creation of wealth; the more wealth there is, the greater the volume of speculation17 that creates wealth. In such circumstances it is idle to talk of a time when panics shall cease, because confidence and enterprise must ever push onward, speculation in material things must accompany them, supply185 must overtake demand, and human nature with its moods and caprices must finally pay toll18.
Vast industrial, commercial, and credit expansions lie somewhere ahead, and somewhere ahead excesses and indiscretions the world over must play their part and exact their penalties. We should cease to be surprised at these vicissitudes21, for, “paradoxical as it may seem, the riches of nations can be measured by the violence of the crises which they experience.”60 Moreover, panics are rarely such unmitigated calamities22 as they are pictured by those who experience them. At least they serve to place automatic checks upon extravagance and inflation, restoring prices to proper levels and chastening the spirit of over-optimism. In a world of swift changes they are soon forgotten.
We may seem to be prepared for these periodic set-backs, and there may be men amongst us of sober reflection who are really wise enough to foresee the top to a normal movement, yet the accidents that have happened will happen again,—bad harvests, war, sudden failures, earthquakes,—these are not easily discerned in advance. Sanguine23 and ardent24 merchants will make the same old mistakes; good times will engender25 the same old hallucinations; people who see, or think186 they see, wealth being created all around them, will always rush in and buy at the top; there will be too much work for the dollar to do—and after that the deluge26. Finally, in order that we may not become pessimists27, let us remember the words of the greatest of American philosophers: “The changes that break up at short intervals28 the prosperity of man are but advertisements of a nature whose law is growth.”
Another phenomenon quite as curious as that of panics, and one that is similarly psychological, is the unhesitating, slam-bang zeal29 with which we place the responsibility for these misfortunes on the shoulders of others. We, as a people, have brought the disaster upon ourselves by reason of our indiscretions. We have lost our heads and entangled30 ourselves in a mesh31 of follies32. But we do not admit such reproaches, even in our communings with self. Not at all. The fault lies elsewhere, and it is balm to our bruises33 to place it elsewhere with indignant energy. It will not do to preach at such times about currency systems, laws of supply and demand and kindred generalities, for these are abstract and vague to a mind inflamed34 by losses. What such a man wants is a head to hit; something concrete, a target for his exploding wrath35. And he never hesitates. He says Wall Street did it. His187 fathers said the same thing, and his children will follow suit.
Now here is a strange thing. After a man has said, “Wall Street did it” over and over again, he believes it, just as he believes or takes for granted a similar tedious reiteration36 by the humble37 katydid. To such a man, the thing he wants to believe, when stated over and over again, comes by repetition to fix itself in the mind as a demonstrated truth, notwithstanding an utter absence of proof or of reasoning. He says “Wall Street,” or “the Stock Exchange,” until he can think of nothing else. It is a catch-phrase, short and sweet, which he hammers home to his own ineffable38 satisfaction, and he thinks it and broods over it to his heart’s content. The politician then comes along with his cures for all the ills of society, and, finding Wall Street a convenient means of perpetuating39 his accidental notoriety, his voice joins the harmony. The indictment40 is then complete.
Take the panic of 1907 as the last and most conspicuous41 example. The financial losses involved, and the extent of the disturbance42 of the machinery43 of credit, made it the worst panic of this generation. As it burst upon the country at a period when to the outward eye prosperity reigned44 throughout the land, men were at a loss to explain it. They could not understand how188 such appalling45 conditions could occur in such apparently46 cheerful surroundings. As everybody was affected47 by it in greater or less degree the whole country was full of people with a grievance48. They were themselves directly to blame for it, but they looked elsewhere for the responsibility for their folly49.
That sinister50 influences were at work was, in the popular mind, undeniable; and by that same token we are pretty close to “Wall Street” when we talk of things sinister. At about that time a member of Congress made a speech in which he asserted, with all the art of katydid repetition so dear to the heart of the true believer, that the Stock Exchange was the cause of the panic. Rich men broke the market and “held the bag,” he said, while panic-stricken owners of property poured the invested savings51 of a lifetime into that capacious receptacle. Nothing could be simpler. Newspapers must print such things, and the public found what it wanted on the first page. Even to-day, five years after the fact, this delightful52 explanation of the 1907 panic blossoms like the rose as a political campaign progresses. The voice of the hustings53 “knows its business.”
Mr. John Burroughs warns us that it is one thing to treat your facts with imagination, but quite189 another thing to imagine your facts. Sufficient time has elapsed since 1907 to soften, somewhat, the bias54 and prejudice created by the events of that year, and perhaps there may be among us minds open to reason. The New York Stock Exchange feels, honestly, that a great injustice55 was done it by the criticism and abuse so generously poured out in the first shock of that event. Far from causing the crisis, its members assert that the institution fulfilled one of its most useful functions in giving ample warning of its approach, and that, when those warnings were disregarded, it concentrated all its machinery on the task of restoring order from chaos56. They speak feelingly when they say that never in its history has the Stock Exchange been called upon to deal with so great an emergency, and never has it demonstrated so admirably its fundamental purposes. When they make these statements they offer to prove them. Let us examine the proofs.
The panic of 1907 was not unlike many preceding financial disturbances57. The opening months of the year had witnessed a general liquidation58 on the Stock Exchange, brought about naturally, and in simple, automatic compliance59 with economic laws and precedents61. There had been over-expansion in all lines of business; careful students saw the portent62; able men of power and influence190 heeded63 its warning and set corrective forces in motion months before the shock came. Total transactions in shares sold on the Stock Exchange had risen from 187 millions in 1904 to 284 millions in 1906, while the value of the securities thus sold increased from 12,061 to 23,393 millions of dollars respectively. This was too rapid growth, and the general liquidation that had been under way for months effectually corrected it, since New York City bank loans secured by Stock Exchange collateral64 declined, as shown by the Comptroller’s report, from $385,652,014 in August, 1905, to $251,867,158 in August, 1907—a corrective force represented by $133,784,856.
The Stock Exchange has been defined as “a barometer65 of future business conditions,” and never did a barometer give clearer warning. It said in effect to all the banks of the country and to business men generally: “There has been a widespread over-expansion of credit; it must stop; we are doing our share here in New York to correct it; you must do likewise.” And, in order that there might be no failure to understand what was meant, New York City bank loans were reduced with drastic emphasis, months before the panic came, by nearly 35 per cent. “Without an exception,” writes Prof. S. S. Huebner, “every business depression in this country has been191 discounted in our security markets from six months to two years before the depression became a reality.”61 Senator Burton, another authority, emphasizes the point further: “In addition to other influences which promote an earlier rise and fall, there must be mentioned the more careful study and attention to the financial situation which is given by dealers66 in the stock markets and in great financial centres. They often forecast the grounds for a rise or fall in prices before the general public is awake to the situation.”62 This, then, was the situation in the summer of 1907. The Stock Exchange had “cleaned house,” and had liquidated67 thoroughly68, warning the country to go slow.
Why was not this warning heeded? I recall vividly69 the daily expression of surprise, on the floor of the Exchange, and throughout the financial district, in the months that elapsed between our March liquidation and the outbreak of the October panic, that the country should pay so little attention to “Wall Street’s” admonition; that it should continue its unprecedented70 boom despite the plain intimation that the funds to support it were exhausted71, and despite the general192 knowledge of every tyro72 in business that future conditions are discounted in Wall Street as freely as promissory notes.
Had the business interests of the country so much as inquired into that warning they would have found by turning to the Comptroller’s reports of the loans of national banks for the entire country that such loans had expanded from $3,726 millions in 1904 to $4,679 millions in 1907. They would have seen that whereas the New York City banks contracted their loans by nearly $134,000,000 from August, 1905, to August, 1907, loans and discounts by the banks of the whole country in that period actually expanded $700,000,000. Surely it will not be urged that Wall Street or the Stock Exchange had anything to do with bringing about this expansion. On the contrary, it shows that speculation in commercial lines, in new enterprises, in lands and in all the various forms that “out-of-town” banks are expected to finance, went on and on in vastly increasing volume long after the danger signal had been hoisted73 on the Stock Exchange, and in utter disregard of the warnings those signals conveyed.63
193 As the summer of 1907 advanced, speculation throughout the country continued in rapidly increasing volume, while on the Stock Exchange there was an almost complete cessation of activity. Business men of the West and South seemed to feel that as there had been no serious failures, and as the decline in the stock market had restored values to an attractively low basis, there would be a normal recovery similar to that which followed the panic of 1893. They felt that the trouble, whatever it was, had now been corrected, and in this fancied security they went about with further expansion of their business enterprises, confident that no serious difficulties were in store. The Stock Exchange was often cynically74 referred to in that period as “the only blue spot on the map.” Its members were cheerfully invited by a Western newspaper to “shake off their torpor75 and join the Sunshine movement.”
It is only fair to say that there was some force in the buoyant if superficial viewpoint of the country at large, for in the autumn of 1907 we were blessed with all the kindly76 fruits of the earth in abundance. The average crop of our agricultural products gathered that year was enormous, and behind it lay large reserves of wealth that had accumulated from a series of good194 crops in the years just preceding. There was, moreover, a partial failure of foreign crops that brought about heavy foreign requirements, thus assuring rich returns to American producers. Our railroads, which in the previous panic of 1893 were so affected by declining traffic and by the unproductiveness of new territory into which they had ventured that bankruptcies77 became general, were early in 1907 in better physical condition than ever before. Their gross earnings78 were at a maximum; their surpluses fat with the profits of recent years; their credit high. A long accumulation of foreign-trade balances had made the inherent strength of the nation greater than ever before. Finally there was the great essential difference between 1907 and former years in that we were now, by statute law as well as in fact, on a gold-standard basis.
And yet, without one unsound basic factor visible to superficial observers, we were suddenly plunged79 into a grave disaster—a panic which in actual money losses surpassed any of its predecessors80. It came, this cataclysm81 (as the Stock Exchange had vainly predicted six months earlier), at the worst time it could possibly come, just when the banks were called upon to furnish $200,000,000 to transport and market the crops. Small wonder that in the face of such an optimistic195 outlook men stood aghast at the violence of the panic. As they had not understood the warning, so they could not understand its swift fulfilment. In all the long processions of panic-stricken people who stood in line at the banks in those trying days, not one in a hundred could understand how an institution could be solvent82 and yet be forced to suspend. Later on, smarting from losses, this bewilderment gave way to distrust and suspicion, as is often the case, humanly speaking, when men look elsewhere than to their own folly for the sources of their misfortunes. They were in a receptive mood when the charge was made that “Wall Street and the Stock Exchange” had brought about all this misery83; they believed it to be true, and many still believe it.
The charge was so widely circulated and was fraught84 with such possibilities of mischief85 that there was danger of ill-considered legislation directed against the Stock Exchange and supported by ill-advised public opinion. Thus it happened that Governor Hughes of New York, doubtless moved to forestall86 hasty law-making, appointed a committee to investigate the Stock Exchange. In another chapter we have reviewed the work of this commission; meantime, the words of its chairman are quoted, in passing, as a sort of ex post facto reply to the outcry that “Wall Street did it.”
196 “The immediate87 cause of the panic,” he says, “was a simultaneous rush to sell securities, by holders88 who perceived that there was trouble in the money market, and who wanted cash to meet maturing obligations. These holders were not Wall Street men merely, but people in all parts of the country who had invested some of their savings in stocks and bonds. The very raison d’être of the Stock Exchange is to supply a market where invested capital can be quickly turned into cash, and vice89 versa. The remoter cause of the panic was a long course of speculation in all kinds of property, real and personal, that had pervaded91 all parts of the country, and many parts of the Old World, and had now reached its climax92.” Mr. White here adds in a footnote that it has been “shown conclusively93 that speculation on the Stock Exchange was not the chief contributor to the collapse94 of 1907, but that speculation on a much wider scale, through the length and breadth of the land, was the exciting cause.”64
I have said it was not surprising that the public failed to observe signs of disturbance in the happy conditions that seemed to prevail before the panic.197 The blindness of the mass of the people to these impending95 catastrophes96 is, indeed, a marked characteristic of all similar epochs. Let us digress for a moment and consider the history of other great disturbances. In 1825 the King’s Speech as read by the Lord Chancellor98 dwells on “that general and increasing prosperity ... which, by the blessing99 of Providence100, continues to pervade90 every part of the Kingdom.” This was in July; in December of that year the whole country was torn by a devastating101 financial crisis. The London Economist102, in 1873, dwelt at length on the “astounding” progress of the Austrian States, and said, “All over the rich countries of the Danube, capital and labor103 are vigorously at work in the discovering and turning to profit the amazing resources which have been lying unheeded for centuries.” This was written in March; the Bourse at Vienna closed its doors May 9th, and a panic of exceptional severity was followed by long and continued depression. On December 31, 1892, R. G. Dun & Company’s Weekly Review of Trade said: “The most prosperous year ever known in business closes to-day with strongly favorable indications for the future,” and yet four months later the storm burst.65
These instances go to show how the elect may198 err9 in estimating conditions, despite the fact that in two of these three memorable104 crises ample warnings of an impending catastrophe97 were proclaimed in the stock market long before these prophecies of continued expansion were printed. In each instance the portent was ignored; in each the ultimate penalty was paid. So it was in our own great crisis of 1907, and so it will always be.
There was a panic throughout the United Kingdom in April and October of 1847, yet the early response to changing conditions took place two years before, when stocks began to fail in July and August, 1845. In the year 1857 commerce and industry expanded throughout America in increasing volume up to the very eve of the August crisis, yet the stock market in the summer of the preceding year gave clear warning of what was to occur. One year before the panic of 1873 a similar “slump” foretold105 what was coming, and the same was true of the year preceding the panic of ’93.66 Previous to the last-mentioned crisis stocks began to fall, with unmistakable emphasis, early in 1892. Of seventeen of the most active, five reached their maximum price in January, 1892, three in February, four in March, two—Lake Shore and Michigan Central—in April. And as we have seen, identical preliminary warnings developed199 on the Stock Exchange from one year to six months before the last great panic of 1907.67
The panic that hit the Paris Bourse in October, 1912, causing a disturbance not equaled in violence since 1870, was brought about by sowing the wind through an immense public speculation based on two fine harvests in Russia and a feverish106 revival107 of commercial and industrial activity all over Europe. Up to this point all the indicia of the movement—such as bank loans, building operations, public and private extravagance, and200 a blind infatuation for speculation by a normally prudent108 nation that had not speculated on a large scale since the Panama débacle of 1894—corresponds exactly with conditions in America just preceding the 1907 crisis. The similarity between the two incidents goes even farther, for early in September of 1912 the French bankers and Agents de Change, recognizing the strained condition of credit, had deliberately109 put in motion corrective agencies designed to stop the rise with the least possible derangement110 of confidence.
They would have succeeded, no doubt, and the situation would have exactly paralleled our own discounting processes of March, 1907, but for the unforeseen Balkan difficulty which, coming out of a clear sky, upset the plans of the conservative financial forces and precipitated111 a panic. It came, as a French banker explained, a week too soon—by which he meant that, given a little more time, the worst phases of the disturbance would have been avoided through gradual and orderly liquidation. As it stands, the panic will no doubt go down into French financial history as “the Balkan panic,” just as our disturbance of 1907 is ascribed, faute de mieux, to Wall Street wickedness; but in reality both the French and American crises had their origin in precisely112 similar causes. The Balkan news in201 Paris only precipitated what the French Bourse had planned to accomplish in an orderly manner, just as Wall Street and the Stock Exchange had done five years earlier in a similar emergency. The essential lesson of both instances is that the same causes which generate prosperity will, if pushed far, generate an equivalent adversity.
The details of the panic of 1907 are still fresh in mind, and need be but briefly113 referred to. Banks and trust companies closed their doors and suspended payments to depositors. Cash and credit became almost unobtainable; we were face to face with demoralization. Clearing-house certificates were resorted to at practically all banking114 centres throughout the country; there was a general requirement of time notices for withdrawal115 of savings bank deposits; all normal credit instruments were impaired116. The Secretary of the Treasury117 was forced to exercise heroic discretion19 in the matter of security for government deposits and for the very necessary increase of a note circulation that was then suffering from a spasm118 of contraction119. There was an immense hoarding120 of funds and a consequent drying up of fluid capital, while from one end of the country to the other, there was liquidation, business contraction, retrenchment121, panic, and ruin. “Wall Street” and the Stock Exchange had foreseen202 that the chain was only as strong as its weakest link, and had done what it could to prepare the public for the break. To assert at this late day that it did aught but its full duty is humbug122 in excelsis.
I have already cited one instance, the country’s expanding bank loans as contrasted with “Wall Street’s” contraction, to show how plainly the warning was conveyed. As another instance, take the immobilization of capital tied up in the enormous real-estate speculation then prevalent. In New York City alone the increase in mortgages recorded jumped from 455 millions in 1904 to 755 millions in 1905, an increase over the previous years of 32.7 per cent, and 66 per cent, respectively.68 The figures showing the increase in building permits are similarly significant, revealing the fact that in 1905, 1906, and the early months of 1907, money was pouring into new construction at a rate without precedent60. In Greater New York alone, not including Queens County, building permits granted in 1904 amounted to $153,300,000, and in 1905 to $229,500,000, and in the face of disaster this rate of increase continued up to the very eve of the panic.69
203 Outside of New York the expansion in building operations was equally rapid and equally ominous123, showing an increase in twenty-five cities alone from $201,300,000 in 1903 to $234,200,000 in 1904, to $280,400,000 in 1905 and to $307,800,000 in 1906—all this but a small part of the actual funds thus locked up throughout the whole country.70 We thus find that one of the most important and inevitable124 causes of the panic was the absorption of exceptionally large amounts of capital in enterprises that required a considerable time for completion, or which, when completed, were not immediately profitable; and to them may be added factories and extensive public and private works of every kind. This form of expansion, as Senator Burton points out, when carried to extremes almost invariably brings about a disturbance.
Now let us consider. Does all this expansion of bank loans outside of New York and all this tremendous increase of building operations show that the Samsons of “Wall Street” were pulling down the temple on their own heads in order to slaughter125 the Philistines126, as alleged127, or does it show an indifference128 and lack of readjustment to the growing stringency129 of money, as revealed by204 the Stock Exchange in its liquidation of March and April? “As a rule,” said John Mill, “panics do not destroy capital; they merely reveal the extent to which it has been previously130 destroyed by its betrayal into hopelessly unproductive works.”71 There would have been no such “betrayal” had judicious131 reflection and a measurement of facts followed Wall Street’s warnings.
A shrewd man, one of the old school of New York City wholesale132 merchants, who has nothing whatever to do with Wall Street or the Stock Exchange, yet whose trade arteries133 extend to many parts of the country, has long governed his business by the published reports of Stock Exchange transactions. If he sees there revealed a wholesome134, normal, and conservative expansion in all lines of business and a money market that betrays no uneasiness as to the future, he presses on into new lines of endeavor, confident that the immediate future is serene135. If he finds an urgent liquidation on ’Change, with the coincident phenomena136 of impaired credit instruments, he draws in his lines and waits. It makes no difference to him who is rocking the boat, nor why; experience has taught him that if it rocks, the time has arrived to go ashore137. And this steady205 old merchant, I have no doubt, is but one of a numerous type.
Those who ignore the economic tides that ebb138 and flow through the medium of the Stock Exchange as they did in 1907, do so because they do not understand that these great market movements are really but expressions of natural laws. If there is a rising tide—a boom—it is attributed by thoughtless people to speculation and gambling139. If there is a bad break, it is caused by panic-stricken repentant140 sinners, or by the activities of the bears. The essential point that is missed here lies in the fact that, while bulls and bears alike may have their brief hour, sooner or later, regardless of them, the market responds to actual conditions and discounts the future of those conditions.
Booms are not made on the Stock Exchange; they are made in the country’s fields and forests and workshops. Panics are not created there; they have their origin in mistakes and excesses throughout the world, and in psychologic conditions which stock markets cannot hope to control. The pendulum141 may swing far, but it comes back. Sooner or later the movement of prices tells the exact story of future business, and of credit, and of all the economic agencies that enter into them. This was not well understood206 in 1907, and, as I said at the beginning, I doubt if it will ever be understood in the sense that it will avoid a recurrence142 of panics. All that we may hope for is that periods of depression, which are inevitable, may not be attended in future by such a loss of the reasoning faculties143 as that which brought about the affair of 1907.
Now let us consider another cause of the panic—the currency system, always bearing in mind the fact that the first and greatest cause of the panic was the over-expansion outside of New York that has just been described. The causes which we are now to consider were of minor144 importance when measured by this overshadowing matter; nevertheless they played their part and must be considered accordingly.
Not all panics, to be sure, can be prevented by a perfect currency system, yet this one could have been measurably prevented, and “Wall Street” and the Stock Exchange had labored145 for years so to prevent it. At the gatherings146 of the Chamber147 of Commerce, at the bank meetings, at all the meetings of merchants and manufacturers for years preceding 1907, the mischievous148 effects of our currency system were proclaimed and the ultimate outcome predicted. Congress was petitioned again and again to remedy those intolerable conditions, and to permit national banks to207 expand their circulation under proper safeguards, but without avail.
When the storm burst, a most impressive object lesson in practical finance resulted. What was at worst but a normal stringency of the circulating medium developed, when added to abnormal demands from the country at large, into conditions that created great alarm. There was no way by which the banks of the country could use the resources which they actually possessed149 to meet the urgent requirements of the hour. A great nation of enterprising people found itself—and still finds itself—compelled to do a banking business differing in degree, but not in kind, from the old-woman-and-her-stocking system of finance. The way our bankers got down on their knees to London and Paris in that emergency, frankly150 admitting their inability, under our old flint-lock laws, to handle a situation which foreign bankers meet without difficulty, is a subject at once painful and humiliating. Literally151 our bankers begged for help and got it. Some day we shall have to beg again.
Had the national banks of New York City enjoyed the right to expand their circulation in the manner provided by the plan of the American Bankers’ Association, at least a part of the débacle would have been avoided. “The banks208 and trust companies of this city have in their vaults152 the largest store of good credit that can be found in any city in the world,” said one of America’s foremost economists153 as the panic raged, “but much of it is utterly154 unavailable because of our currency system. One of the trust companies that closed its doors has in its possession live assets amounting to over $50,000,000. All this credit is dead. It cannot do the work of a single dollar in the paying-teller’s cage. What is wanted in a time like this is freedom to convert the credit of banks into a medium of payment that will satisfy the people.”72
True enough, and just what the whole financial community, including the Stock Exchange, had been repeating for years. Currency issues which do not provide for all situations, including not only ordinary demands, but also such exceptional cases of shrinkage as this one was, can never be called perfect, nor even safe. There is no health in them.73 The most effective and the most rapid means of regulating and protecting the general credit situation is by increasing or diminishing the volume of outstanding bank-note currency not209 covered by a reserve of gold or other lawful155 money. This method is employed successfully both in France and in Germany. The Bank of France and the Imperial Bank of Germany to some extent regulate credit conditions by acting156 as central banks of discount; but their most effective action is by increasing or diminishing the uncovered amount of their outstanding notes. When additional currency is needed as a circulating medium they supply this currency by issuing notes. When contraction of currency, or a check upon the further expansion of bank credits is desirable, they accomplish the result by diminishing the volume of their outstanding notes and by raising the discount rate. This system is as nearly perfect as any yet devised.74
Whether we shall ever succeed in adopting it, or something like it, in America, is the burning question in our banking offices to-day. Until something is done, the layman157 who distrusts the plan of a central bank and looks upon Wall Street with abhorrence158, may find satisfaction in knowing that the average New York banker is the most worried and harassed159 man in American business life. With millions of other people’s money in his possession subject to withdrawal210 by check at sight, and with millions of the best security in the world in his vaults lying absolutely idle and worthless so far as raising currency is concerned, he stands between the devil and the deep-blue sea. Anything that frightens his depositors, or even remotely suggests panic, gives him a cold chill. People who talk of manipulation by New York bankers as a cause of the panic of 1907 or any other panic are blind to the fact that any disturbance of normal conditions is the one thing that bankers would avoid as they would avoid the plague.
There was a third cause of the panic in the course pursued by the President. In some quarters it is still termed “the Roosevelt panic,” and there exists a belief that the President by his actions and speeches played a large part in bringing about the crisis. Personally, I feel that this has been exaggerated. There had been, unquestionably, wrongdoing by certain corporation managers. The President, with a characteristic vigor not unknown to politicians, seized upon it as a theme for his speeches, and the “evils,” the “malefactors,” the “corruption” and “dishonesty” with which he bruised160 the air, raised a suspicion in many quarters as to the status and security of the whole financial situation and undoubtedly161 contributed to the frightened liquidation of the211 day. The impression these utterances162 produced abroad, where American securities were popular, was painful, and led one returning tourist to remark that Europe was acquiring the idea that we were “a nation of swindlers.”
All panics are largely psychological, and this was no exception. The President’s public speeches came at a time when emotion, apprehension, and alarm filled men’s minds; and at a time when those irrational moods were most likely to exaggerate the difficulties that existed, and to conjure7 up difficulties that did not exist. Panics seem to come from lack of money, the real difficulty is lack of confidence, and it was to this that the President’s course directly contributed.
I am of the opinion that, judged by his public utterances, especially his October speech at Nashville, Tenn., the President had not the remotest idea that such an awful shock as the panic of 1907 was imminent163. He was not a student of economic conditions; he had no familiarity with crisis-producing phenomena; he had never seen a panic at close quarters. His speeches did not cause the panic, for that disturbance was foreordained; they served, however, to hasten it, to intensify164 it, and to keep it alive. Perhaps I may add that the sparks beaten by him from the anvil165 of political expediency166 at that unfortunate212 moment threw more light upon the President himself than upon the evils he condemned167. Perhaps, too, that was what the President most desired. In any case, the fact remains168 that just as there is too much confidence in times of excessive expansion, so there is too little in times of unreasoning depression; and that the President’s attitude aggravated169 the latter situations is undeniable.
But by what stretch of the imagination can the Stock Exchange be credited with playing any part in this third cause of the panic? If temporary depression results from exposure of wrongdoing among railroad, industrial, or financial institutions, nowhere in the land is execration170 poured forth171 upon the evil-doers more vigorously than within its four walls. Far from complaining, the Stock Exchange and the whole investment community welcome such exposures, despite their effect on the market, for the precise reason that their own protection and benefit, if nothing else, is promoted by it.
There was yet another reason for the panic, closely related to the attitude of the President. I refer to the predicament of the railways of the country as 1906 passed into 1907. Staggering under a load of traffic which sorely taxed their equipment, the managers of these properties213 cried aloud to the investing public for funds. But capital was not to be had. Tied up in real-estate speculation and in quarters whence it could not be easily recovered, the normal supply of capital was immobile and inert172. What was worse, encouraged by the attitude of the President, an epidemic173 of radical174 anti-railroad legislation became manifest in the several States, new and onerous175 burdens of taxation176 were imposed, and a wave of distrust and suspicion regarding railway investments was created. Simultaneously177 the cost of wages and materials advanced—both characteristic phenomena indicating trouble—and, as a consequence of all this blockade, the ratio of net to gross in the matter of increased earnings fell from the normal proportion of about 40 per cent. in the first nine months of 1906, to less than 10 per cent. in the same months of 1907.
Railroads are public utilities that must continue to handle business offered them no matter what happens, and so, to meet all these abnormal demands, but one course was left open to them, and that was to raise funds by issues of new stock. This, of course, amounted practically to an assessment178 of stockholders; as an expedient179 it failed because “Wall Street” had already recognized the symptoms of disease. It was too late. Money and credit attract money and credit, and214 confidence attracts both. There was a shocking absence of confidence in the emergency of 1907, and the railroads suffered enormously by it.
With this matter certainly Wall Street had nothing to do; it could not in fact do more than it had just done in pointing out to the country at large, through a drastic process of liquidation, the obvious withdrawal of far-sighted investors180 from a situation that had become tense. Nor can the railroads be censured181, because the great volume of business that confronted them was not created by them, and yet had to be transported by them. The fault lay, of course, in the wholesale and reckless expansion of all lines of industry, and in the immensely increased extravagance of public and private life.
I venture the prediction that when these conditions again prevail, as they must in a great and vigorous country like ours, the Stock Exchange will still be found sounding its warnings, but it will not do to hope that those who learned the bitter lesson of 1907 will profit by that experience, because the condition of mental disturbance which is a part of every panic cannot be regulated by the will, nor kept within bounds by the statute law. The one lesson we have learned from the predicament of the railroads in 1907 is that there is a tendency toward disturbance in large accessions215 either of business or of capital. “At intervals,” says Walter Bagehot, “the blind capital of a country is particularly large and craving182; it seeks for some one to devour183 it, and there is ‘plethora’; it finds some one, and there is ‘speculation’; it is devoured184, and there is ‘panic.’”75
Summarized briefly, I have attempted to show in the foregoing pages that the Stock Exchange for many months prior to the panic had been steadily185 liquidating186 and contracting, and had served notice on the country at large that the time had come to put a stop to the prevalent over-expansion. It has been demonstrated that instead of heeding187 these warnings the general business of the country, as evidenced by the increases in loans and commercial discounts and by an over-speculation in real estate and in public and private extravagances, continued to expand up to the very eve of the panic, and was stopped then and there only by sheer lack of capital. Nothing can be of greater importance in any consideration of the 1907 crisis than that its overshadowing cause was the attempt to do too much business on too little capital, and compared with this all other aspects of that situation are of minor importance.
I have shown that an antiquated188 currency216 system played a conspicuous part in the crisis, through contributory negligence189 on the part of our law-makers. The part played by the President has been cited as a third, though somewhat negligible, factor in sowing the seed of distrust, and also the trying position in which the great common carriers of the country found themselves after the seeds of distrust had been sown. These were the four causes of the panic of 1907.76
How well the Stock Exchange did its work in that great emergency is a matter of record. It did not close its doors; there were no failures; no relaxation190 of the protection afforded the public; no departure from the high standard of morality which is ever its goal. In one week, ending October 25th, 5,166,560 shares passed through its217 hands, representing, with the transactions in bonds, a par20 valuation exceeding $483,000,000.
Now, in the very nature of things, a financial panic is the inability of many debtors191 to meet their obligations, plus the fear that many others may be in the same plight192. At such a time men hasten to sell for cash that for which there is the readiest market. Thus they sell securities because securities are immediately convertible193; thus they turn to the Stock Exchange, because that is what Stock Exchanges are for. Hence it follows that in a crisis such as that of 1907 the ruinous decline manifests itself more sharply, and is felt more keenly, on the Stock Exchange than on the Cotton Exchange or the Produce Exchange. Men turn to it for first aid to the injured, and the greater the casualty list, the more marked is the disturbance of values. That this is not well understood by the public often unfortunately leads to suggestions of improper194 methods where none exist.
Finally, where do we stand? Orthodox economists like Wells talk of over-production as a cause of panics; currency experts bewail a lack of circulating media; theorists of the school of Jevons are driven to seek in sun-spots the potent195 force of all our harvests; Levi and Mill dwell upon the periodicity of panics and would fix their appearance by schedules of time; politicians and218 thinkers-in-embryo point the finger at Wall Street, and yet, with all that has been written, thirteen great crises at home and abroad within the last century show that we have not begun to get at these disturbances. Drought has been a cause of mischief, yet we have learned to irrigate196 and to conserve197; epidemics198 have smitten199 us, yet we have mastered sanitation200; floods have ruined whole territories, yet we have built dikes and levees. But every now and then, when business seems to be at its best, when merchants are dividing large profits, and when labor is best rewarded, a panic occurs and the whole structure collapses201.
To say that Wall Street or Lombard Street or any group of men anywhere can bring such conditions to pass is to deny all the facts of experience. Depressions may come from any of a hundred causes, but panics originate in the mind; they are manias202. Walter Bagehot gave up trying to prescribe for them because he realized that sudden frenzy204 is not an ailment205 to be foreseen and prevented. “But one thing is certain,” he said, “that at particular times a great many stupid people have a great deal of stupid money;” to which he adds, “our scheme is not to allow any man to have a hundred pounds who cannot prove to the Lord Chancellor that he knows what to do with a hundred pounds.” When thousands219 of people ignore all the warnings of experience, as they always will do; when with a blind misdirection of energy they sink borrowed capital in quagmires206 at fancy prices, as they always have done; and when, shorn of their all, they are simultaneously seized with a mania203 to denounce others for the consequences of their own folly, as they always must do, one cannot avoid the thought that perhaps Bagehot’s humorous solution is the best that has been devised.
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1
statute
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| n.成文法，法令，法规；章程，规则，条例 | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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irrational
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| adj.无理性的，失去理性的 | |
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trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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undue
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| adj.过分的；不适当的；未到期的 | |
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conjured
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| 用魔术变出( conjure的过去式和过去分词 )； 祈求，恳求； 变戏法； （变魔术般地） 使…出现 | |
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conjure
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| v.恳求，祈求；变魔术，变戏法 | |
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mitigate
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| vt.（使）减轻，（使）缓和 | |
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err
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| vi.犯错误，出差错 | |
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soften
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| v.(使)变柔软；(使)变柔和 | |
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lull
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| v.使安静，使入睡，缓和，哄骗；n.暂停，间歇 | |
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coma
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| n.昏迷，昏迷状态 | |
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vigor
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| n.活力，精力，元气 | |
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incessantly
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| ad.不停地 | |
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impels
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| v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的第三人称单数 ) | |
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onward
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| adj.向前的，前进的；adv.向前，前进，在先 | |
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speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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toll
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| n.过路(桥)费；损失，伤亡人数；v.敲(钟) | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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par
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| n.标准，票面价值，平均数量；adj.票面的，平常的，标准的 | |
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vicissitudes
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| n.变迁，世事变化；变迁兴衰( vicissitude的名词复数 )；盛衰兴废 | |
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calamities
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| n.灾祸，灾难( calamity的名词复数 )；不幸之事 | |
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sanguine
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| adj.充满希望的，乐观的，血红色的 | |
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ardent
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，强烈的，烈性的 | |
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engender
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| v.产生，引起 | |
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deluge
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| n./vt.洪水，暴雨，使泛滥 | |
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pessimists
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| n.悲观主义者( pessimist的名词复数 ) | |
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intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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29
zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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30
entangled
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| adj.卷入的；陷入的；被缠住的；缠在一起的v.使某人（某物/自己）缠绕，纠缠于（某物中），使某人（自己）陷入（困难或复杂的环境中）( entangle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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mesh
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| n.网孔，网丝，陷阱；vt.以网捕捉，啮合，匹配；vi.适合； [计算机]网络 | |
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32
follies
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| 罪恶，时事讽刺剧； 愚蠢，蠢笨，愚蠢的行为、思想或做法( folly的名词复数 ) | |
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bruises
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| n.瘀伤，伤痕，擦伤( bruise的名词复数 ) | |
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inflamed
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| adj.发炎的，红肿的v.（使）变红，发怒，过热( inflame的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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wrath
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| n.愤怒，愤慨，暴怒 | |
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reiteration
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| n. 重覆, 反覆, 重说 | |
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humble
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| adj.谦卑的，恭顺的；地位低下的；v.降低，贬低 | |
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ineffable
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| adj.无法表达的，不可言喻的 | |
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perpetuating
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| perpetuate的现在进行式 | |
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indictment
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| n.起诉；诉状 | |
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conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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reigned
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| vi.当政，统治（reign的过去式形式） | |
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appalling
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| adj.骇人听闻的，令人震惊的，可怕的 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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47
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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48
grievance
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| n.怨愤，气恼，委屈 | |
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49
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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50
sinister
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| adj.不吉利的，凶恶的，左边的 | |
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51
savings
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| n.存款，储蓄 | |
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52
delightful
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| adj.令人高兴的，使人快乐的 | |
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53
hustings
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| n.竞选活动 | |
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54
bias
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| n.偏见，偏心，偏袒；vt.使有偏见 | |
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55
injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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56
chaos
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| n.混乱，无秩序 | |
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57
disturbances
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| n.骚乱( disturbance的名词复数 )；打扰；困扰；障碍 | |
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58
liquidation
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| n.清算，停止营业 | |
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59
compliance
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| n.顺从；服从；附和；屈从 | |
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60
precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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precedents
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| 引用单元； 范例( precedent的名词复数 )； 先前出现的事例； 前例； 先例 | |
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62
portent
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| n.预兆；恶兆；怪事 | |
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63
heeded
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| v.听某人的劝告，听从( heed的过去式和过去分词 )；变平，使（某物）变平( flatten的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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64
collateral
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| adj.平行的；旁系的；n.担保品 | |
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65
barometer
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| n.气压表，睛雨表，反应指标 | |
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66
dealers
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| n.商人( dealer的名词复数 )；贩毒者；毒品贩子；发牌者 | |
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67
liquidated
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| v.清算( liquidate的过去式和过去分词 )；清除（某人）；清偿；变卖 | |
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68
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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vividly
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| adv.清楚地，鲜明地，生动地 | |
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unprecedented
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| adj.无前例的，新奇的 | |
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71
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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72
tyro
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| n.初学者；生手 | |
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73
hoisted
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| 把…吊起，升起( hoist的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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74
cynically
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| adv.爱嘲笑地，冷笑地 | |
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75
torpor
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| n.迟钝；麻木；（动物的）冬眠 | |
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76
kindly
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| adj.和蔼的，温和的，爽快的；adv.温和地，亲切地 | |
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bankruptcies
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| n.破产( bankruptcy的名词复数 )；倒闭；彻底失败；（名誉等的）完全丧失 | |
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78
earnings
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| n.工资收人；利润，利益，所得 | |
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plunged
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| v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
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predecessors
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| n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 )；前辈；（被取代的）原有事物；前身 | |
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81
cataclysm
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| n.洪水，剧变，大灾难 | |
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82
solvent
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| n.溶剂；adj.有偿付能力的 | |
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83
misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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fraught
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| adj.充满…的，伴有(危险等)的；忧虑的 | |
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mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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forestall
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| vt.抢在…之前采取行动；预先阻止 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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holders
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| 支持物( holder的名词复数 )； 持有者； （支票等）持有人； 支托（或握持）…之物 | |
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vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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pervade
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| v.弥漫，遍及，充满，渗透，漫延 | |
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pervaded
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| v.遍及，弥漫( pervade的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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92
climax
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| n.顶点；高潮；v.(使)达到顶点 | |
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conclusively
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| adv.令人信服地，确凿地 | |
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collapse
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| vi.累倒；昏倒；倒塌；塌陷 | |
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impending
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| a.imminent, about to come or happen | |
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catastrophes
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| n.灾祸( catastrophe的名词复数 )；灾难；不幸事件；困难 | |
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catastrophe
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| n.大灾难，大祸 | |
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chancellor
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| n.(英)大臣；法官；(德、奥)总理；大学校长 | |
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blessing
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| n.祈神赐福；祷告；祝福，祝愿 | |
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providence
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| n.深谋远虑，天道，天意；远见；节约；上帝 | |
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devastating
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| adj.毁灭性的，令人震惊的，强有力的 | |
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economist
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| n.经济学家，经济专家，节俭的人 | |
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labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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104
memorable
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| adj.值得回忆的，难忘的，特别的，显著的 | |
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105
foretold
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| v.预言，预示( foretell的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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106
feverish
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| adj.发烧的，狂热的，兴奋的 | |
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107
revival
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| n.复兴，复苏，（精力、活力等的）重振 | |
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108
prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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109
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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110
derangement
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| n.精神错乱 | |
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111
precipitated
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| v.（突如其来地）使发生( precipitate的过去式和过去分词 )；促成；猛然摔下；使沉淀 | |
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112
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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113
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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114
banking
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| n.银行业，银行学，金融业 | |
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115
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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116
impaired
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| adj.受损的；出毛病的；有（身体或智力）缺陷的v.损害，削弱( impair的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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117
treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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118
spasm
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| n.痉挛，抽搐；一阵发作 | |
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119
contraction
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| n.缩略词，缩写式，害病 | |
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120
hoarding
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| n.贮藏；积蓄；临时围墙；囤积v.积蓄并储藏（某物）( hoard的现在分词 ) | |
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121
retrenchment
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| n.节省，删除 | |
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122
humbug
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| n.花招，谎话，欺骗 | |
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123
ominous
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| adj.不祥的，不吉的，预兆的，预示的 | |
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124
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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125
slaughter
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| n.屠杀，屠宰；vt.屠杀，宰杀 | |
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126
philistines
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| n.市侩，庸人( philistine的名词复数 )；庸夫俗子 | |
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127
alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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128
indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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129
stringency
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| n.严格，紧迫，说服力；严格性；强度 | |
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130
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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131
judicious
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| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
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132
wholesale
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| n.批发；adv.以批发方式；vt.批发，成批出售 | |
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133
arteries
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| n.动脉( artery的名词复数 )；干线，要道 | |
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134
wholesome
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| adj.适合；卫生的；有益健康的；显示身心健康的 | |
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135
serene
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| adj. 安详的，宁静的，平静的 | |
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136
phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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137
ashore
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| adv.在(向)岸上，上岸 | |
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138
ebb
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| vi.衰退，减退；n.处于低潮，处于衰退状态 | |
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139
gambling
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| n.赌博；投机 | |
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140
repentant
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| adj.对…感到悔恨的 | |
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141
pendulum
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| n.摆，钟摆 | |
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142
recurrence
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| n.复发，反复，重现 | |
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143
faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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144
minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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145
labored
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| adj.吃力的，谨慎的v.努力争取(for)( labor的过去式和过去分词 )；苦干；详细分析；（指引擎）缓慢而困难地运转 | |
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146
gatherings
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| 聚集( gathering的名词复数 )； 收集； 采集； 搜集 | |
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147
chamber
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| n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所 | |
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148
mischievous
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| adj.调皮的，恶作剧的，有害的，伤人的 | |
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149
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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150
frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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151
literally
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| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
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152
vaults
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| n.拱顶( vault的名词复数 )；地下室；撑物跳高；墓穴 | |
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153
economists
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| n.经济学家，经济专家( economist的名词复数 ) | |
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154
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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155
lawful
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| adj.法律许可的，守法的，合法的 | |
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156
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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157
layman
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| n.俗人，门外汉，凡人 | |
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158
abhorrence
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| n.憎恶；可憎恶的事 | |
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159
harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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160
bruised
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| [医]青肿的，瘀紫的 | |
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161
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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162
utterances
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| n.发声( utterance的名词复数 )；说话方式；语调；言论 | |
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163
imminent
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| adj.即将发生的，临近的，逼近的 | |
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164
intensify
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| vt.加强；变强；加剧 | |
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165
anvil
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| n.铁钻 | |
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166
expediency
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| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
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167
condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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168
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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169
aggravated
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| 使恶化( aggravate的过去式和过去分词 )； 使更严重； 激怒； 使恼火 | |
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170
execration
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| n.诅咒，念咒，憎恶 | |
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171
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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172
inert
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| adj.无活动能力的，惰性的；迟钝的 | |
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173
epidemic
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| n.流行病；盛行；adj.流行性的，流传极广的 | |
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174
radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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175
onerous
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| adj.繁重的 | |
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176
taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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177
simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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178
assessment
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| n.评价；评估；对财产的估价，被估定的金额 | |
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179
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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180
investors
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| n.投资者，出资者( investor的名词复数 ) | |
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181
censured
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| v.指责，非难，谴责( censure的过去式 ) | |
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182
craving
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| n.渴望,热望 | |
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183
devour
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| v.吞没；贪婪地注视或谛听，贪读；使着迷 | |
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184
devoured
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| 吞没( devour的过去式和过去分词 )； 耗尽； 津津有味地看； 狼吞虎咽地吃光 | |
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185
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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186
liquidating
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| v.清算( liquidate的现在分词 )；清除（某人）；清偿；变卖 | |
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187
heeding
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| v.听某人的劝告，听从( heed的现在分词 ) | |
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188
antiquated
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| adj.陈旧的，过时的 | |
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189
negligence
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| n.疏忽，玩忽，粗心大意 | |
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190
relaxation
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| n.松弛，放松；休息；消遣；娱乐 | |
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191
debtors
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| n.债务人，借方( debtor的名词复数 ) | |
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192
plight
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| n.困境，境况，誓约，艰难；vt.宣誓，保证，约定 | |
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193
convertible
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| adj.可改变的，可交换，同意义的；n.有活动摺篷的汽车 | |
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194
improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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195
potent
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| adj.强有力的，有权势的；有效力的 | |
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196
irrigate
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| vt.灌溉，修水利，冲洗伤口，使潮湿 | |
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197
conserve
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| vt.保存，保护，节约，节省，守恒，不灭 | |
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198
epidemics
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| n．流行病 | |
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199
smitten
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| 猛打，重击，打击( smite的过去分词 ) | |
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200
sanitation
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| n.公共卫生，环境卫生，卫生设备 | |
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201
collapses
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| 折叠( collapse的第三人称单数 )； 倒塌； 崩溃； （尤指工作劳累后）坐下 | |
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202
manias
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| n.（mania的复数形式） | |
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203
mania
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| n.疯狂；躁狂症，狂热，癖好 | |
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204
frenzy
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| n.疯狂，狂热，极度的激动 | |
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205
ailment
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| n.疾病，小病 | |
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206
quagmires
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| n.沼泽地，泥潭( quagmire的名词复数 ) | |
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