“Patriotism makes it a duty for us to acknowledge the fact that the Bourse represents one of the live forces of France,” wrote Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu in one of the finest tributes ever paid to a Stock Exchange. “It has been for France an instrument of regeneration after defeat, and it remains2 for us a powerful tool in war and in peace. Let us recall the already remote years of our convalescence3, after the invasion, years at once sorrowful and comforting, when with the gloom of defeat and the suffering of dismemberment, mingled4 the joy of feeling the revival5 of France. Whence came our first consolation6, our first vindication7 before the world? Whether glorious or not, it originated on the Bourse.”
The victorious8 Prussians were at the door in the humiliating crisis of 1870 and ’71 to which the author refers, France was prostrate9. Alsace and parts of Lorraine were to be ceded10 to the victors, together with an indemnity11 of five384 billion francs, and Paris was in control of the Reds. In that dreadful saturnalia of violence and crime which has made the name of the Commune infamous12, the honor of France was threatened, and the credit of the new Republican government, especially its ability to maintain its authority and to fulfill13 its terms with the Prussians, seemed hopeless and cheerless indeed. How Thiers became the brains of the rehabilitation14 of France, with what vigor15 he entered upon the task that has handed down his name as the most influential16 political figure in French history—with what rigorous measures MacMahon suppressed the Commune—these are spectacular incidents with which every schoolboy is familiar. But the work of the Bourse in that episode—silent, unobtrusive, and lacking the sensational17 features of which popular histories are made, is by no means so well known, although upon its labors18 devolved the real upbuilding of France. Thiers never ceased to congratulate himself on the assistance it gave the country at a time when the liberation of French territory hung in the balance.
“The Paris market came out unscathed from the ruins of the war and of the Commune,” continues our author, “and straight from the hardly ratified19 peace and quelled20 insurrection it threw itself into the work for France’s regeneration;385 because it was, indeed, for France’s regeneration that the stockbrokers21 and merchandise brokers23 worked under Thiers and MacMahon. In the worst days the Bourse had the uncommon25 merit of showing an example of faith in France. When more than one political skeptic26 and discouraged thinker allowed themselves to write down upon the crumbling27 walls of our burned-down palaces “Finis Galliae,” the Bourse kept its faith in France and her fortune, and that faith in France was spread by it all around, at home and abroad.
“Speculation28 was patriotic29 in its way; it exhibited a confidence in our resources which the discretion30 of many a wise man rated as foolhardy. Have we already forgotten our great loans for liberation? Without the Bourse, these colossal31 loans, the amount of which exceeded the dreams of financiers, would never have been subscribed32 for, or, if ever, it would have been only at rates much more onerous33 for the country. Without the Bourse, our French rentes would not have taken such rapid flight; our credit, restored even more quickly than our armies, would not have equaled that of our victors, on the very morrow of our defeat. In that regard, all that justice demanded us to say previously34 of the higher banking35 institutions may with right be repeated concerning the Bourse.
386 “To those who lived through that pale dawn of France’s recovery—the rush of the Bourse and of capitalists to offer us the thousands of millions which we required exceeded the eagerness and boldness of speculation. But even if we were to consider it but gambling36 and betting for speculation, such speculation was betting for France’s regeneration; it bravely placed its bet on the vanquished37. Those national and foreign financiers, who have been accused of pouncing38 upon her like birds of prey39, brought to the noble wounded their dollars and their credit, and if they reaped a profit thereby40, are we to reproach them for it, when they helped us to reconstruct our armies, our fleet, and our arsenals41?
“If France regained42 her rank among the nations of the world so quickly, the credit for it should be mainly given to the Bourse. And to its services in war, we should, if we wanted to be just, also add its services in time of peace. Without the extensiveness of the Paris market, and the stimulus43 given to our capitalists through speculation, how many things would have remained unaccomplished in the recklessly overdriven condition of our finances? We should have been unable to complete our railroad system, or renew our national stock of tools, or create beyond the seas a colonial empire which shall cause France to be again one387 of the great world powers. When the Bourse is on trial, such credentials45 should not be overlooked. Before condemning46 it in the name of morality and private interests, a patriot1 should give due consideration to its services rendered for the national weal; if all its defects and misdeeds be heaped up on one scale tray, then services of like importance will easily counterbalance them.”119
Singing the praises of Stock Exchanges is a thankless task, and one that falls upon deaf ears. The very nature of its functions makes dull reading. It cannot hope to enlist47 the lively enthusiasm of the casual observer, nor has it picturesqueness48 to brighten the pages of history. The layman49 visits the great exchanges as a matter of course; the scene is animated50 and diverting; he sees the outward manifestations51 of energy and movement, but too often he misses the great silent forces at work. The eye has a fine time of it, but the intellect comes away empty. These are reasons why I have ventured to quote the foregoing passages from M. Leroy-Beaulieu. Somewhere in his earnest tribute to the work of the Paris Bourse the reader may find food for thought.
388 The Bourse in Paris differs from all others in that its membership consists of but seventy. These Agents de Change, as they are called, enjoy an absolute monopoly not only to trade in government and other officially listed securities, but also to negotiate bills of exchange and similar instruments of credit. In these circumstances it is easy to see why the Bourse is an institution of enormous strength, notwithstanding the fact that, because of the deep-rooted conservatism of the French in financial matters, it stands a poor second to London in international business.
It exists by virtue54 of the decree of October 7, 1900, regulating the execution of article 90 of the Code du Commerce and of the law of March 28, 1885, as modified by the decree of January 29, 1898. These laws provide that Agents de Change of the Paris Bourse must be French citizens over twenty-five years of age, and in possession of civil and political rights; they must be nominated by official decree signed by the President of the Republic. They must have performed their military service or satisfied the law as to such service, they must produce a certificate of fitness and good character signed by the heads of several banking and commercial firms. Agents de Change are, in reality, officers of the government, since the seventy ministerial appointees are entrusted389 with the exclusive right of dealing56 in government securities; all such dealings, in fact, when not made directly by private individuals, must be made through Agents de Change.
The enjoyment57 by stockbrokers of a complete monopoly under government is sufficiently58 unique to warrant an inquiry59 as to the origin of such a curious privilege. The employment of stockbrokers by persons who wished to sell certificates, or other negotiable instruments of the period, was made obligatory60 by an edict of Louis XIV in 1705. Twenty “offices” (memberships) of brokers in Paris were then created, and these twenty were accorded a monopoly similar to that of to-day. Prior to that period there had been “offices” of exchange brokers, bank brokers, and merchandise brokers, but the King felt that these were not contributing enough to the Royal exchequer61 and swept them all away in the edict of 1705, when the present system had its birth. The wars and the King’s extravagances had placed the exchequer in a bad way, and between 1691 and 1709, some 40,000 privileges of various kinds were sold for cash, among them the privilege under which these twenty men were to do the business of stockbroking62 in Paris. “Sire,” said Pontchartrain, “every time Your Majesty63 creates an office, God creates a fool to buy it.”
390 But the stockbrokers were not to remain in undisturbed possession of their new privileges, for, whenever the state of the Royal finances was low, the King withdrew the old offices in order to grant new ones, always for cash, to fresh buyers, and this was repeated again and again. Thus the next King Louis XV, whose personal follies64, together with the schemes of the Scotchman, John Law,120 brought the country to the verge65 of ruin, repealed67 in 1726 the Edict of 1705 and returned to it again in 1733. His successor, the weak and incapable68 Louis XVI, repeated this performance in 1785, 1786, and in 1787. In 1788, the stockbrokers having agreed to waive69 accumulated interest on their security deposits, were again established in their powerful monopoly. The critical financial situation that arose in the early days of the Revolution saw them again legislated70 out of office (June 27, 1793); the Bourse was closed, the stockbrokers arrested and their goods confiscated71, because, in the imperfectly understood economics of the period, the decline in Frenchpaper currency (assignats) was attributed, faute de mieux, to stock-jobbing. Two years later the Bourse was opened again, and after eight days—the assignat continuing to decline, it was again closed. Meantime France went into bankruptcy72.
391 In 1801 the modern Bourse was established and firmly fixed73 by the legislative74 work of the Consulate75. The law then enacted76 requires that stockbrokers be appointed to their public trust by the government, which shall be guided in its choice by their moral character and their professional knowledge, and shall, besides, demand the pledging of a part of their fortune with the State as a guarantee of their good conduct and of proper expiation77 for their errors or failures. The law also emphasizes the principle of the freedom of commerce, expressly stating that nobody is obliged to have recourse to an intermediary, if he does not desire it. Further, the stockbrokers were subjected to several regulations with a view to prevent speculation and stock-jobbing. Thus, they were obliged to keep a journal; their books were to be marked and signed by the president of the Tribunal de Commerce; they could not trade nor carry on banking for their own account; no one who had been in bankruptcy was allowed to assume the duties of a stockbroker22.
The law also makes the stockbroker responsible for the delivery of the securities sold and for the payment of the sums stipulated78, even before either have been received by him from his clients, his security being appropriated for this pledge if need be. This responsibility was intended as392 a check upon transactions for future delivery, which, however, were made legal in 1885.121 This law of 1801, it will be observed, provided that stockbrokers were to be appointed by the government, and that their commissions were subject to repeal66. In 1816 they scored a great advantage by securing the enactment79 of a measure by which they were permitted to introduce their successors with the consent of the government. This “right of introduction,” says M. Vidal, “is practically an article for sale. The stockbroker, on retiring, does not sell his office (membership), but he sells to his successor the right of introduction.”
The price of this right in recent years has varied80 from 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 francs ($300,000 to $400,000). A candidate, proving satisfactory to the government, must in addition deposit 250,000 francs ($50,000) as a bond or security to the government, which pays interest on the deposit, and 120,000 francs ($24,000) as a fee to the caisse commune of the chambre syndicale, which means the treasury81 funds of the institution. The variations in the price of the “offices” or memberships have an interesting history. The first office sold was valued at 30,000 francs; about 1830 they rose to 850,000 francs; after the July393 Revolution they fell to 250,000 francs, and rose again to 950,000 francs before 1848. They declined at that time to 400,000 francs, and in 1857 reached 2,400,000 francs. After the war they fell to 1,400,000 francs.122 In 1898, when the number of Agents de Change was increased from sixty to seventy under the government’s reorganization, designed to meet the expansion in business, it was provided that each of the ten new members should purchase the offices from the old members at 1,372,000 francs each.
While the stockbrokers, as I shall term the Agents de Change henceforth, are placed by law under the disciplinary rule of the Minister of Finance, they themselves, as an association, choose by ballot82 a governing board (chambre syndicale) of eight of their members, to whom, with a chairman (Syndic) are entrusted55 the maintenance of discipline, the listing of securities, and all general matters concerning the welfare of the body.
In addition to the exclusive privileges entrusted to stockbrokers as already cited, they are constituted the sole authority for the quotations84 of the securities in which they deal, including quotations of metals; they alone give the necessary certificates for transfers of government securities394 on terms provided by law; they regulate processes by which lost or stolen certificates are rendered non-negotiable or restored to owners; they may be commissioned by the courts to negotiate loans, to liquidate85 pledged securities, and to dispose of the property of minors86. Settlement days in Paris are similar to those in London, occurring twice a month. That at the end of the month lasts five days, and that in the middle of the month four days. French rentes are settled only at the end of the month.
In forming partnerships87, only one person in the firm is entitled to act as stockbroker; the other partners must be simply financial partners, responsible for losses, as “special” partners are in New York, to the extent of the capital contributed. The holder88 of the membership must be the owner, in his own name, of at least one quarter of the sum representing the purchase price of his membership, plus the amount of the bond or security given. Stockbrokers are forbidden by law to disclose the name of any person for whom they buy or sell; for this reason all dealings are made in the broker24’s own names, as are also transfers. They must not, under any circumstances, carry on trading or banking operations for their own account, under penalty of expulsion. The bankruptcy of a stockbroker is395 prima facie a fraudulent bankruptcy, rendering89 him liable to arrest and other penalties, even under circumstances where an outsider would be immune.
While the impression prevails in many quarters that members of the Bourse are made responsible by law for any liabilities that may be incurred90 by their colleagues, such is not the case. The practice is, however, that the chambre syndicale, or governing body, voluntarily meets the liabilities of defaulting members from the general funds, although not compelled to do so. The nature of the monopoly which stockbrokers enjoy in Paris, and their position as officers of the French Executive government, renders this a thoroughly91 wise method, for, as we shall presently see, there is grave opposition92 to the exclusive rights entrusted to them, and it would not be good policy to fan the flames of this hostility93 by anything less than a mutual94 guarantee of solvency95.
Rates of commission to be charged by stockbrokers on the Paris Bourse are fixed by the decree of the Minister of Finance (July 22, 1901). These are the minimum charges, and no stockbroker is allowed to reduce them under any circumstances. He may, however, and usually does, share them with intermediates who bring him business.
If a client gives, say, an order to buy “at the396 average price” (cours moyen), the transaction takes place in this way: Before the opening of the session the stockbrokers and their clerks meet in a special room, where bids and offers are made “at the average price,” which is as yet undetermined; it will be decided96 during the session. When an offer and a bid coincide, the transaction is closed; only the price is missing. When the bell rings to announce the opening of the market, the brokers and their clerks leave the special room and proceed to the public hall around the railed enclosure (corbeille) whereupon the day’s business begins.
As orders are executed the dealer97 gives the price to a marker, whose entries establish the prices for the official quotation83 list, and, when this has been made up, those who have traded on the basis of “the average price” ascertain98 it by striking a mean between the high and low level. If only one price is quoted, that, of course, takes the place of the average price. If orders are given at fixed prices, or “at the market,” they are executed as elsewhere. It is important to note in this connection, that the market in Paris enjoys an intimate connection with many banks and credit institutions that act as intermediates in procuring99 business. Orders transmitted to the Bourse by the Bank of France in 1908, for account of its397 clients, amounted to 98,721, involving 500,000,000 francs capital.
While, as we have seen, stockbrokers alone have the right to deal in government and other listed securities, there are very many securities dealt in, in Paris, that have not been admitted to the Official List, either because the stockbrokers did not care to adopt them or because the securities did not fulfill the very rigorous statutory conditions. These may, however, be dealt in outside the Bourse, and the law recognizes and protects such transactions. In what I have written heretofore, I have confined myself to the operations of the parquet100, meaning the stockbrokers market, and so called because of the parquet floor on which they stand; we come now to the dealings on the coulisse, or curb101, named from the narrow passageway, la coulisse, in which these curb brokers congregate102. This market is called “the banker’s market” (marche en banque), but for our purpose we may call these dealers103 curb brokers, as distinguished104 from the stockbrokers of the parquet.123 The number of curb brokers is not limited; any one may become a398 coulissier if he is a French subject. He must have a capital of 100,000 francs in order to do business in the cash market for rentes, and of 500,000 francs for the settlement market. The curb is governed, as is the parquet, by two chambres syndicale, one for the account, and one for the cash market.
Although the French law provides that dealings in French rentes are the sole prerogative105 of the monopoly of stockbrokers, and fixes punishment for any intrusion into that field, the curb brokers, as a matter of fact, deal extensively and openly in rentes, and are powerful competitors of the stockbrokers. Their operations are not valid106, strictly107 speaking, but they are tolerated by the government for the reason that the credit of the State is benefited by making the market for rentes as free and extensive as possible. This tacit recognition by the government, of the fundamental law of economics that wide and unrestricted markets are the best markets, would seem on its face to raise a point as to the wisdom of a system that perpetuates108 a monopoly of seventy stockbrokers. The question is not a new one; it has been agitating109 financial Paris for years. Monopolies of any kind are not considered beneficial in this enlightened age; monopolies that make markets and establish values and prices are399 peculiarly abhorrent110. On this point we may quote M. Vidal, the author of a brilliant study on this subject:
“The actual financial power of the Paris stockbroker is put forward as an argument,” he says, speaking of the argument in favor of continuing the monopoly, “and it is affirmed that our financial market is the first in the world. In our opinion, even granting that this is true, which is far from having been proven, the cause is confounded with the effect. When a country, owing to its geographical111 location, its climate, and the character of its inhabitants, possesses numerous natural riches, and even moral riches, they co-operate in increasing its wealth; when it has the advantage of certain political and economic conditions, when it enjoys a monetary112 and commercial organization which promotes, instead of paralyzing, human activity in most of its manifestations, then that country is rich and deserves to be rich. And it may then happen that some organization, defective113 in itself, and the source of manifold vexations, is nevertheless prosperous, as much on account of certain facts of adaption as because it unavoidably lies within the reach of the rays of national wealth. It reflects that wealth.
“But the Paris Bourse does not owe its prosperity to its organization. Seventy ministerial400 appointees entrusted with the negotiation114 of one hundred and thirty billions of transferable securities are powerful personalities115. They would be more powerful if they were but thirty-five. They would be more powerful if there were but twenty of them, or ten, or five, or even one, if there were in the market but one autocrat116, a single arbiter117 of securities, centralizing bids and offers, and the king of the Bourse, just as we see in America an oil king and a steel king. In such a case the soundness of a market is more seeming than real. If that system had been applied118 to provisions and merchandise, infinitely119 more necessary for consumption than rentes or shares in companies, the market for wine, bread, and meat, appropriated by a few barons120, might, perhaps, be stupendously high, but in this respect experience speaks in favor of freedom of trade only.
“It seems, therefore, necessary that public and private credit should enjoy the benefit of an organization more pliable121 and more in harmony with the general condition of a country’s commerce. Let us therefore beware of mistaking the appearance of force for force itself—a deception122 that should impress us no more than the sight of the effigies123 of iron-clad warriors124, standing53 on rich trappings in a military museum. If our financial market were opened to all who have funds and401 understand the profession, it would be stronger still. If the market’s favorable situation were distributed among several hundred individuals, the division of risks would render the market more stable, competition would secure for our market the desired elasticity125, and, if wanted, regulation under the supervision126 of the Minister of Finance would create a condition halfway127 between unlimited128 freedom, which, with more or less reason, scares so many people, and monopoly, which is an old outfit129, in no way suiting our customs, and disturbing the harmony of our laws without rendering the services expected from it.”124
From the point of view of an American this would seem to be an unanswerable argument. If seventy men are constituted sole managers of a market for 130,000,000,000 francs of transferable securities, one of two things is sure to happen; either a public market will establish itself outside these seventy men, or the seventy will prevent the establishment of the public market. The first of these alternatives has occurred in the establishment of the coulisse; the second would have occurred if the stockbrokers could have accomplished44 it.
While the government took no hand in the402 matter, it was recognized that the coulisse gave to the public market a breadth and activity that did great good; as a matter of fact it benefited the stockbrokers themselves in a large way, for it enabled them to obtain from the government liberties not formerly130 enjoyed, but practised freely by the coulissiers, such as transactions in time bargains, dealings in foreign securities, and similar concessions131. This grant of a right to do business on time, or as we term it “future delivery,” was a tremendous step forward, since it removed an obstacle in the way of large speculative132 markets that had long been abolished in other financial centres. It put a stop to the “welching” of speculators on the plea of the gambling act, it legalized short sales, and it established a distinct advance in economic progress. To that extent the stockbrokers are indebted to their neighbors on the curb.125
403 Meanwhile, the opposition to the monopoly of the stockbrokers continues. “At all times,” says M. Vidal, “whenever there have been privileges, some men have been found to oppose them. Of course, these men are not theorists or pedants133; they are simply men whom this or that privilege prevents from working freely, and who represent the manifestation52 of that mysterious force of things which tends toward freedom of trade. Commercial law owes its birth only to these protestations of practical men in apparent revolt against the laws, which become the unconscious shapers of future legislation. From the day when there was an Agent de Change there was a “coulissier.” The first called the second a thief, because he encroached upon his privilege. The second hurled134 back the compliment, because the privilege robbed him of his natural right.”126
This has a familiar American ring. In 1843 a voluminous report to the Minister of Justice by the stockbrokers asked that the coulisse be404 destroyed. Nothing came of it, but in 1859 another attempt succeeded; the coulisse was suppressed. But the level of public credit which, it was hoped, would be raised by the suppression, actually sank. The business of the coulisse, and the market it created, disappeared with the coulisse itself. The government was very sensitive then as now in the matter of market prices for its rentes, and after the laborious135 process of hoisting136 them to 71, it was distressing137 to find that, coincident with the abolition138 of the curb market, they had fallen to 69. So, in 1861, the coulisse was permitted to reappear, and I fancy the days of its suppression are now at an end.
But the old hostility will break out again when business slackens, for the French have a saying that “horses fight when there is no more hay in the manger.” The problem is a pretty one from any angle, especially from the standpoint of American stockbrokers. It would seem plain that the monopoly, as such, cannot forever continue, yet the government faces a financial power of tremendous strength—a Frankenstein which the State itself has created—“and of which,” to quote M. Vidal, “it can rid itself only by indemnifying it.” At the present time the 70 memberships are worth 96,000,000 francs as a grand total; meantime, the longer the problem is postponed405 the more valuable they will become as the size and importance of the Paris market increases.
“But the French government does not seem inclined to study the question seriously; first, because the stockbrokers would have to be indemnified; and, secondly139, because the stockbrokers themselves are desirous of holding on to their present monopoly. As time passes, the securities, continually on the increase, tend to increase their profits. A financial power has been created whose existence, whose ever spreading influence, forms the subject of a serious economic problem, which some day may turn out to be an even more serious political problem.”127
It is interesting to note, in passing from this subject, that a much larger business is done in the coulisse than in the parquet, due to the fact that the curb brokers are not restricted in their securities as are the stockbrokers. The market for foreign securities alone, on the curb, has made wealthy men of many of the coulissiers. They publish a special quotation list, and while they have no officially fixed commission rates, these are established by custom and in practical operation they work satisfactorily. As might be expected, the curb brokers require from their customers smaller margins140 than those exacted406 by the stockbrokers—another reason why their business is large; again, the clients of the curb broker may attend the Bourse with him, be present and confer with him while he buys or sells for them, and in this way get into close touch with the market, a privilege not so easily enjoyed by the client of the stockbroker.
The Official Paris Bourse is open from 12 noon to 3 P.M.; the coulisse from 11:45 A.M. to 4 P.M. The Official List is published daily, and is divided into two parts, the first containing a full list of all the officially listed securities and of the dealings in them, and the second part a list of the dealings in what we used to call in New York “the unlisted department.” Rates of Exchange, prices of gold and silver bullion141, quotations of treasury bonds, and the rates of the Bank of France for discounts, interest, and loans, are also included. The coulisse also issues a list.
The volume of transferable securities in negotiation through the medium of the Paris stock markets was estimated by M. Alfred Neymarck in his report to the Institut International de Statistique, session of 1907, at 155,000,000,000 francs, an amount slightly in excess of the listed securities on the New York Stock Exchange. Of this total, which has been increased somewhat since 1907 through the admission of various Russian407 industrial securities, 65,000,000,000 francs were in French securities, 67,000,000,000 in foreign securities on the official (parquet) market, and 18,000,000,000 on the coulisse. Of home securities, the value of French rentes is here estimated at 24,000,000,000 francs, of bonds of the City of Paris, of treasury bonds, including those of the department and colonies, at 3,069,000,000; insurance securities at 702,000,000; those of the Crédit Foncier at 4,447,000,000; of banks and credit companies at 3,101,000,000; of railroad and navigation companies at 24,268,000,000; of railways and tramways at 2,200,000,000; of electricity, iron mills, foundries, and coal mines, at 2,463,000,000.
Of the foreign securities in the French market, Russian securities were valued at 10,000,000,000 francs in 1907, although they are to-day considerably142 in excess of that sum; divers143 foreign government funds at 47,000,000,000 and foreign railway securities at 6,000,000,000.128
Next to London, Paris easily leads the markets of the world from the standpoint of power and resources in an international sense. It is the great market for Russian bonds and for Russian industrials, speculation in the latter having reached such volume in 1912 as to lay the French408 public open to the charge of having lost its head, something that has not occurred in France since the Panama frenzy144 of 1894. France also holds most of the Spanish and Portuguese145 (3,500,000,000 francs) debt and has large capital invested in Egypt and the Suez Canal (3,500,000,000 francs). Capital investments in Roumania and Greece, Argentine, Brazil and Mexico, Tunis and the French colonies, Austria and Hungary, Italy, China and Japan, United States and Canada, Great Britain, Belgium and Holland, Germany, Turkey, Servia and Bulgaria, and Switzerland, aggregate146 16,150,000,000 francs, distributed in value in the order named.
The caution of French investors148 is proverbial; notwithstanding the two outbursts of imprudence that have occurred in this generation, it is difficult to induce the Frenchman to place his money in anything not a safe interest-yielding security under French laws. In no other country is investment raised to a higher plane, and speculation confined to a lower one. The political nature of the relationship between France and Russia has resulted from time to time, in patriotic subscription149 of French funds to Russian government loans, and thence to Russian industrials of all kinds, but the latter have suffered so severely150 in the demoralization of the autumn of 1912 as409 to justify151 the prediction that their popularity with the French has been seriously impaired152.
As to Russian government loans, the French investor147 is in a secure position, most of these issues having been endorsed153 by such powerful banks as the Bank of France, the Credit Lyonnais, the Comptoir d’Escompte, and the Société Génerale, and, indeed, it is to banks such as these and to the myriad154 smaller institutions throughout the country that investors of the peasantry and the middle classes are accustomed to turn for advice in financial matters. The large speculative clientele, as we know it in America, in England, and in Germany, is a decided minority in France, and those who indulge freely in speculation are canny155 and shrewd beyond their fellows in other lands. The foresight156 with which they diagnosed the events of the Boer War in 1899, and the celerity with which they disposed of their large speculative holdings of South African mining shares at top prices, is said by those who witnessed it to have been a prodigy157 of speculative skill.
Like all other careful observers French economists158 realize in a large sense that the creation of negotiable instruments and their distribution throughout all the countries of the world through the medium of the Stock Exchange is a very real cause of the wealth of nations; indeed, this point410 seems to be more thoroughly understood and appreciated by the mass of the French people than by the public elsewhere. When, in 1885, the government legalized transactions for future delivery and thus placed transactions in securities in the same category, under common law, with all other commercial transactions, it established a free market in France that has done wonders for the credit expansion of the Republic—an expansion likewise due, in no small measure, to the growth and development of the coulisse and to the consequent enlargement of a market that must have been restricted, of necessity, by a too rigorous strengthening of the stockbroker’s monopoly. In a word, the government, by France, of credit in its higher forms, clearly recognizes that as states, railways, and industrial enterprises have need to resort to credit through issues of securities, a wide market in constant contact with sources of wealth is required, and that nothing should be done by the government to interfere159 with the ebb160 and flow of these essential forces.
“The creating and successive issuing of this mass of securities,” to quote M. Neymarck, “always easy to purchase and to sell on the Bourse, have been the real cause of credit expansion. They were instrumental in accomplishing411 real marvels161 in France and abroad. As personal property has increased, endeavors have been made to render exchanges easy, and to make transfers as little expensive as possible; transferable securities, owing to their denomination162, their form, their mode of maturity163 for the payment of interest, their conditions for redemption, and the ease with which they are negotiated, have been brought within the reach of all purses, and have thus developed the spirit of saving. The consolidation164 of capital, under the form of stock companies, issuing shares and bonds that everybody can obtain, encompasses165 on all sides the civilized166 nations of the world.
“We may say, with Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, that now, owing to capital being accumulated in the shape of negotiable instruments, it is the stock company which takes us on a journey; often it provides us with food and lodging167, sells us coal and light, makes up our clothing, and even sells it to us; it procures168 news for us and inspires our newspapers. Further, it insures our lives and our dwellings169; it feeds the unassuming Parisian in the ‘Bouillons’ (cheap cook-shops), and feasts the stylish170 Parisian in the fashionable wine taverns171.
“The distribution of all these securities has materially contributed to the formation of small inheritances. It has influenced the development412 of savings172 institutions, mutual benefit societies, pension funds, and insurance; it has thus rendered invaluable173 service in the public r?le it has fulfilled. Thanks to it, these companies multiply and increase as the capitalization of their funds is made easier.
“It has also had another result. It has shown that there is no longer a plutocracy174, but a veritable financial democracy; when these thousands of millions of certificates are minutely segregated175, there are only found atoms of certificates of stocks and bonds, and atoms of income—so great is the number of capitalists and independent individuals who divide these securities and these incomes among themselves.”
The End
The End
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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3
convalescence
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| n.病后康复期 | |
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4
mingled
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| 混合，混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 )； 混进，与…交往[联系] | |
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5
revival
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| n.复兴，复苏，（精力、活力等的）重振 | |
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6
consolation
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| n.安慰，慰问 | |
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7
vindication
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| n.洗冤，证实 | |
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8
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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9
prostrate
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| v.拜倒，平卧，衰竭；adj.拜倒的，平卧的，衰竭的 | |
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10
ceded
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| v.让给，割让，放弃( cede的过去式 ) | |
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11
indemnity
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| n.赔偿，赔款，补偿金 | |
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12
infamous
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| adj.声名狼藉的，臭名昭著的，邪恶的 | |
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13
fulfill
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| vt.履行，实现，完成；满足，使满意 | |
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14
rehabilitation
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| n.康复，悔过自新，修复，复兴，复职，复位 | |
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15
vigor
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| n.活力，精力，元气 | |
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16
influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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17
sensational
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| adj.使人感动的，非常好的，轰动的，耸人听闻的 | |
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18
labors
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| v.努力争取(for)( labor的第三人称单数 )；苦干；详细分析；（指引擎）缓慢而困难地运转 | |
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19
ratified
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| v.批准，签认（合约等）( ratify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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20
quelled
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| v.（用武力）制止，结束，镇压( quell的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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21
stockbrokers
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| n.股票经纪人( stockbroker的名词复数 ) | |
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22
stockbroker
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| n.股票（或证券），经纪人（或机构） | |
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23
brokers
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| n.（股票、外币等）经纪人( broker的名词复数 )；中间人；代理商；（订合同的）中人v.做掮客（或中人等）( broker的第三人称单数 )；作为权力经纪人进行谈判；以中间人等身份安排… | |
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24
broker
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| n.中间人，经纪人；v.作为中间人来安排 | |
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25
uncommon
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| adj.罕见的，非凡的，不平常的 | |
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26
skeptic
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| n.怀疑者，怀疑论者，无神论者 | |
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27
crumbling
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| adj.摇摇欲坠的 | |
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28
speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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29
patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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30
discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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31
colossal
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| adj.异常的，庞大的 | |
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32
subscribed
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| v.捐助( subscribe的过去式和过去分词 )；签署，题词；订阅；同意 | |
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33
onerous
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| adj.繁重的 | |
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34
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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35
banking
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| n.银行业，银行学，金融业 | |
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36
gambling
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| n.赌博；投机 | |
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37
vanquished
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| v.征服( vanquish的过去式和过去分词 )；战胜；克服；抑制 | |
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38
pouncing
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| v.突然袭击( pounce的现在分词 )；猛扑；一眼看出；抓住机会（进行抨击） | |
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39
prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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40
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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41
arsenals
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| n.兵工厂，军火库( arsenal的名词复数 )；任何事物的集成 | |
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42
regained
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| 复得( regain的过去式和过去分词 )； 赢回； 重回； 复至某地 | |
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43
stimulus
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| n.刺激，刺激物，促进因素，引起兴奋的事物 | |
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44
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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45
credentials
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| n.证明，资格，证明书，证件 | |
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46
condemning
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|
| v.（通常因道义上的原因而）谴责( condemn的现在分词 )；宣判；宣布…不能使用；迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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47
enlist
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| vt.谋取(支持等)，赢得；征募；vi.入伍 | |
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48
picturesqueness
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49
layman
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| n.俗人，门外汉，凡人 | |
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50
animated
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| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
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51
manifestations
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| n.表示，显示（manifestation的复数形式） | |
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52
manifestation
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| n.表现形式；表明；现象 | |
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53
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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54
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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55
entrusted
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|
| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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56
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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57
enjoyment
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| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
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58
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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59
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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60
obligatory
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| adj.强制性的，义务的，必须的 | |
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61
exchequer
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| n.财政部；国库 | |
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62
stockbroking
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| n.炒股 | |
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63
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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64
follies
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| 罪恶，时事讽刺剧； 愚蠢，蠢笨，愚蠢的行为、思想或做法( folly的名词复数 ) | |
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65
verge
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| n.边，边缘；v.接近，濒临 | |
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66
repeal
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| n.废止，撤消；v.废止，撤消 | |
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67
repealed
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| 撤销，废除( repeal的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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68
incapable
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|
| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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69
waive
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| vt.放弃，不坚持(规定、要求、权力等) | |
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70
legislated
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| v.立法，制定法律( legislate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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71
confiscated
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| 没收，充公( confiscate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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72
bankruptcy
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|
| n.破产；无偿付能力 | |
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73
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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74
legislative
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|
| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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75
consulate
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| n.领事馆 | |
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76
enacted
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| 制定（法律），通过（法案）( enact的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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77
expiation
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| n.赎罪，补偿 | |
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78
stipulated
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|
| vt.& vi.规定；约定adj.[法]合同规定的 | |
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79
enactment
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| n.演出，担任…角色；制订，通过 | |
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80
varied
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|
| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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81
treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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82
ballot
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|
| n.（不记名）投票，投票总数，投票权；vi.投票 | |
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83
quotation
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| n.引文，引语，语录；报价，牌价，行情 | |
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84
quotations
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| n.引用( quotation的名词复数 )；[商业]行情（报告）；（货物或股票的）市价；时价 | |
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85
liquidate
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| v.偿付，清算，扫除；整理，破产 | |
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86
minors
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|
| n.未成年人( minor的名词复数 )；副修科目；小公司；[逻辑学]小前提v.[主美国英语]副修，选修，兼修( minor的第三人称单数 ) | |
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87
partnerships
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| n.伙伴关系( partnership的名词复数 )；合伙人身份；合作关系 | |
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88
holder
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| n.持有者，占有者；(台，架等)支持物 | |
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89
rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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90
incurred
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| [医]招致的，遭受的； incur的过去式 | |
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91
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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92
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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93
hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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94
mutual
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|
| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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95
solvency
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| n.偿付能力，溶解力 | |
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96
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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97
dealer
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| n.商人，贩子 | |
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98
ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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99
procuring
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的现在分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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100
parquet
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| n.镶木地板 | |
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101
curb
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| n.场外证券市场，场外交易；vt.制止，抑制 | |
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102
congregate
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| v.(使)集合，聚集 | |
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103
dealers
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| n.商人( dealer的名词复数 )；贩毒者；毒品贩子；发牌者 | |
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104
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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105
prerogative
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| n.特权 | |
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106
valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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107
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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108
perpetuates
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| n.使永存，使人记住不忘( perpetuate的名词复数 )；使永久化，使持久化，使持续 | |
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109
agitating
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| 搅动( agitate的现在分词 )； 激怒； 使焦虑不安； （尤指为法律、社会状况的改变而）激烈争论 | |
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110
abhorrent
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| adj.可恶的，可恨的，讨厌的 | |
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111
geographical
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| adj.地理的；地区(性)的 | |
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112
monetary
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| adj.货币的，钱的；通货的；金融的；财政的 | |
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113
defective
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| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
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114
negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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115
personalities
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| n. 诽谤，（对某人容貌、性格等所进行的）人身攻击； 人身攻击；人格, 个性, 名人( personality的名词复数 ) | |
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116
autocrat
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| n.独裁者；专横的人 | |
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117
arbiter
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| n.仲裁人，公断人 | |
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118
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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119
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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120
barons
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| 男爵( baron的名词复数 )； 巨头； 大王； 大亨 | |
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121
pliable
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| adj.易受影响的；易弯的；柔顺的，易驾驭的 | |
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122
deception
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| n.欺骗，欺诈；骗局，诡计 | |
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123
effigies
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| n.（人的）雕像，模拟像，肖像( effigy的名词复数 ) | |
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124
warriors
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| 武士，勇士，战士( warrior的名词复数 ) | |
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125
elasticity
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| n.弹性，伸缩力 | |
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126
supervision
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| n.监督，管理 | |
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127
halfway
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| adj.中途的，不彻底的，部分的；adv.半路地，在中途，在半途 | |
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128
unlimited
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| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
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129
outfit
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| n.（为特殊用途的）全套装备，全套服装 | |
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130
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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131
concessions
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| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
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132
speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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pedants
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| n.卖弄学问的人，学究，书呆子( pedant的名词复数 ) | |
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134
hurled
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| v.猛投，用力掷( hurl的过去式和过去分词 )；大声叫骂 | |
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laborious
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| adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅 | |
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hoisting
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| 起重，提升 | |
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137
distressing
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| a.使人痛苦的 | |
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138
abolition
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| n.废除，取消 | |
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139
secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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140
margins
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| 边( margin的名词复数 )； 利润； 页边空白； 差数 | |
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141
bullion
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| n.金条，银条 | |
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142
considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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143
divers
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| adj.不同的；种种的 | |
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144
frenzy
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| n.疯狂，狂热，极度的激动 | |
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145
Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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146
aggregate
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| adj.总计的，集合的；n.总数；v.合计；集合 | |
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investor
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| n.投资者，投资人 | |
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148
investors
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| n.投资者，出资者( investor的名词复数 ) | |
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subscription
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| n.预订，预订费，亲笔签名，调配法，下标（处方） | |
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severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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152
impaired
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| adj.受损的；出毛病的；有（身体或智力）缺陷的v.损害，削弱( impair的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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153
endorsed
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| vt.& vi.endorse的过去式或过去分词形式v.赞同( endorse的过去式和过去分词 )；在（尤指支票的）背面签字；在（文件的）背面写评论；在广告上说本人使用并赞同某产品 | |
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154
myriad
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| adj.无数的；n.无数，极大数量 | |
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155
canny
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| adj.谨慎的，节俭的 | |
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foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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157
prodigy
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| n.惊人的事物，奇迹，神童，天才，预兆 | |
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158
economists
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| n.经济学家，经济专家( economist的名词复数 ) | |
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159
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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ebb
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| vi.衰退，减退；n.处于低潮，处于衰退状态 | |
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161
marvels
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| n.奇迹( marvel的名词复数 )；令人惊奇的事物（或事例）；不平凡的成果；成就v.惊奇，对…感到惊奇( marvel的第三人称单数 ) | |
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162
denomination
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| n.命名，取名，(度量衡、货币等的)单位 | |
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maturity
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| n.成熟；完成；(支票、债券等)到期 | |
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consolidation
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| n.合并,巩固 | |
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165
encompasses
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| v.围绕( encompass的第三人称单数 )；包围；包含；包括 | |
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166
civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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lodging
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| n.寄宿，住所；(大学生的)校外宿舍 | |
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procures
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的第三人称单数 )；拉皮条 | |
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dwellings
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| n.住处，处所( dwelling的名词复数 ) | |
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170
stylish
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| adj.流行的，时髦的；漂亮的，气派的 | |
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171
taverns
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| n.小旅馆，客栈，酒馆( tavern的名词复数 ) | |
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172
savings
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| n.存款，储蓄 | |
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173
invaluable
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| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
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174
plutocracy
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| n.富豪统治 | |
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175
segregated
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| 分开的； 被隔离的 | |
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