By a large preliminary simplification, Life may be defined as the mode of existence of an organism in relation to its medium. To render this of any value, however, a clear conception of the organism is first indispensable; and this must be preceded by an examination of the various attempts to define life in anticipation3 of such a clear conception.
26. Every phenomenon, or group of phenomena4, may be viewed under two aspects—the statical, which considers the conditions of existence; and the dynamical, which considers these conditions in their resultant,—in their action. The statical definition of Life will express the connexus of the properties of organized substance, all those conditions, of matter, form, and texture5, and of relation to external forces, on which the organism depends. These various conditions, condensed into a single symbol, constitute Vitality6 or Vital Force, and are hence taken as the Cause of vital phenomena. The dynamical definition will express the connexus of Functions and Faculties7 of the organism, which are the statical properties of organized substance in action, under definite relations.
It is obvious that the term Life must vary with the varying significates it condenses,—every variation in the complexity8 of the organism will bring a corresponding25 fulness in the signification of the term. The life of a plant is less significant than the life of an animal; and the life of a mollusc less than that of a fish. But not only is the term one of varying significance, it is always an abstract term which drops out of sight particular concrete differences, registering only the universal resemblances.
* * * * *
27. It would be a profitless labor9 to search out, and a wearisome infliction10 to set down, the various definitions which have been proposed and accepted; but certain characteristic examples may be selected. All that I am acquainted with belong to two classes: 1°, the meta-physiological11 hypothesis of an extra-organic agent, animating12 lifeless matter by unknown powers; 2°, the physiological hypothesis which seeks the cause of the phenomena (i. e. the conditions) within the organism itself,—a group of conditions akin13 to those manifested elsewhere, but differently combined. The first hypotheses are known under the names of Animism and Vitalism,—more commonly the latter. The second are known as Organicism and Materialism,—but the latter term only applies to some of the definitions.
28. Under Vitalism are included all the hypotheses of a soul, a spirit, an arch?us, a vital principle, a vital force, a nisus formativus, a plan or divine idea, which have from time to time represented the metaphysical stage of Biology. The characteristic of that stage is the personification of a mystery, accompanied by the persuasion14 that to name a mystery is to explain it. In all sciences when processes are imperfectly observed, the theory of the processes (which is a systematic15 survey of the available evidence marshalled in the order of causal dependence) is supplemented by hypothesis, which fills up with a guess the gap left by observation. The difference between the26 metaphysical and the positive stages of a science lies in the kind of guess thus introduced to supplement theory, and the degree of reliance accorded to it. I have more than once insisted on the scientific canon that “to be valid16, an explanation must be expressed in terms of phenomena already observed”; now it is quite clear that most of the extra-organic hypotheses do not fulfil this condition; no one having ever observed a spirit, an arch?us, or a vital principle; but only imagined these agents to explain the facts observed. As an example of the difference, and a proof that the value of an hypothesis does not rest on the facility with which it connects observations, and seems to explain them, take the three hypotheses of animal spirits, nervous fluid, and electricity, by which neural17 processes have been explained. The animal spirits are imaginary; the nervous fluid is without a basis in observation, no evidence of such a fluid having been detected; but electricity (or, speaking rigorously, the movements classed as electrical), although not proved to be the agent in nerve-action, is proved to exist in nerves as elsewhere, and its modes of operation are verifiable. It, therefore, and it alone of the three hypotheses, is in conformity18 with the scientific canon. It may not, on full investigation19, meet all requirements; it may be rejected as imperfect; but it is the kind of guess which scientific theory demands.
The second difference noticeable between the metaphysical and the positive stages is the degree of reliance accorded to hypothesis; which is very much the same as that noticeable in the uncritical and critical attitudes of untrained and trained intellects. The one accepts a guess as if it were a proof; is fascinated by the facility of linking together isolated20 observations, and, relying on the guess as truth, proceeds to deduce conclusions from it; the other accepts a guess as an aid in research, trying by27 its aid to come upon some observation which will reveal the hidden process; but careful never to allow the guess to supersede21 observation, or to form a basis of deductions22 not immediately verified.
29. A glance at the metaphysiological definitions will detect both the kind of guess and the kind of reliance which prevailed. The mystery was not simply recognized, it was personified as an entity23: Will and Intelligence were liberally accorded to it, for it was supposed to shape matter, and direct force into predestined paths by prescience of a distant end. The observed facts of the egg passing through successive changes into a complex organism were so marvellous, so unlike any facts observable in the inorganic24 world, that they seemed to demand a cause drawn25 from higher sources. The mystery of life obtruded26 itself at every turn. It was named, and men fancied it explained. But in truth no mystery is got rid of by explanation, however valid; it is only shifted farther back. Explanation is the resolution of a complex phenomenon into its conditions of existence—the product is reduced to its factors; the explanation is final when this resolution has been so complete that a reconstruction27 of the product is possible from the factors. The vast majority of explanations—especially in the organic region—are no more than what mathematicians29 call “a first approximation.” It is through successive approximations that science advances; but even when the final stage is reached a mystery remains30. We may know that certain elements combine in certain proportions to produce certain substances; but why they produce these, and not different substances, is no clearer than why muscles contract or organisms die. This Why is, however, an idle question. That alone which truly concerns us is the How, and not the Why.
30. Biology is still a long way off the How. But it28 can boast of many approximations; and its theories are to be tested by the degree of approximation they effect. In this light the physiological, intra-organic, hypotheses manifestly have the advantage. Many of them are indeed very unacceptable; they are guided by a mistaken conception of the truths reached by Analysis. For when men first began to discard the extra-organic hypotheses, and to look into the organism itself, they were so much impressed by the mechanical facts observed, that they endeavored to reduce all the phenomena to Mechanics. The circulation became simply a question of hydraulics. Digestion31 was explained as trituration. The chemists then appeared, and their shibboleths32 were “affinities” and “oxidations.” With Bichat arose the anatomical school, which decomposing33 the organism into organs, the organs into tissues, and these tissues into their elements, sought the analytical34 conditions of existence of the organism in the properties of these tissues, and the functions of these organs. The extra-organic agent was thus finally shown to be not only a fiction, but a needless fiction.
Every student of the history of the science will note how from the very necessities of the case the metaphysiologists, without relinquishing37 their Vital Principle, have been led more and more to enter on the track of the physiologists36, pursuing their researches more and more into the processes going on in the organism, and assigning more and more causal efficiency to these, with a corresponding restriction38 of the province of their extra-organic cause. Hence in the ranks of the vitalists have been found some of the very best observers and theorists; but they were such in despite of, and not in consequence of, their hypothesis, which was only invoked39 by them when evidence was at fault. Nor, unscientific as vitalism is, can we deny that it has been so far serviceable to the science, that it has corrected the materialist40 error of29 endeavoring to explain organic phenomena by physico-chemical laws; and has persistently41 kept in view the radical42 difference between organic and inorganic.
31. These remarks may justify43 a selection of definitions, classified under the two heads. The selection is fitly opened by the Aristotelian definition which prevailed for centuries.
Aristotle distinguishes Life, which he says means “the faculties of self-nourishment, self-development, and self-decay,” from the Vital Principle. Every natural body manifesting life may be regarded as an essential existence (ο?σ?α); but then it is an existence only as a synthesis (?? συθ?τη); and since an organism is such a synthesis, being possessed44 of Life, it cannot be the Vital Principle (ψυχ?). Therefore it follows that the Vital Principle must be an essence, as being the Form of a natural body holding life in potentiality. The Vital Principle is the primary reality of an organism. “It is therefore as idle to ask whether the Vital Principle and Organism are one, as whether the wax and the impress on it are one.... Thus if an eye were an animal, Vision would be its Vital Principle: for Vision is, abstractedly considered, the essence of the eye; but the eye is the body of Vision, and if Vision be wanting, then, save in name, it is no longer an eye.”
Apart from certain metaphysical implications, inevitable45 at that period, there is profound insight in this passage. His adversary46 Telesio quite misconceives the meaning here assigned to the Vital Principle.8
32. Let us pass over all the intermediate forms of the hypothesis, and descend47 to Kant, who defines Life “an internal principle of action” (this does not distinguish it30 from fermentation); an organism he says is “that in which every part is at once means and end.” “Each part of the living body has its cause of existence in the whole organism; whereas in non-living bodies each part has its cause in itself.” Johannes Müller adopts a similar view: “The harmonious48 action of the essential parts of the individual subsist49 only by the influence of a force, the operation of which is extended to all parts of the body, and does not depend on any single parts; this force must exist before the parts, which are in fact formed by it during the development of the embryo50.... The vital force inherent in them generates from the organic matter the essential organs which constitute the whole being. This rational creative force is exerted in every animal strictly51 in accordance with what the nature of each requires.”
33. This is decidedly inferior to Aristotle, who did not confound the vegetative with the rational principle. It rests on the old metaphysical error of a vis medicatrix, an error which cannot sustain itself against the striking facts which constantly point to a vis destructrix, a destructive tendency quite as inexorable as the curative tendency. And the experimental biologist soon becomes impressed with the fact that the tissues have indeed a selective action, by which from out the nutrient52 material only these substances are assimilated which will enter into combination with them; but this selective action is fatal, no less than reparative: substances which poison the tissue are taken up as readily as those which nourish it. The idea of prescience, therefore, cannot be sustained; it is indeed seldom met with now in the writings of any but the Montpellier school, who continue the traditions of Stahl’s teaching. It has been so long exploded elsewhere that one is surprised to find an English physiologist35 clinging to a modification53 of it—I mean Dr. Lionel Beale, who repeatedly insists on Life as “a peculiar54 Force, temporarily31 associated with matter,” a “power capable of controlling and directing both matter and force,” an “undiscovered form of force having no connection with primary energy or motion.” “The higher phenomena of the nervous system are probably due primarily to the movements of the germinal matter due to vital power, which vital power of this the highest form of germinal matter is in fact the living I.”
34. Apart from the primary objection to all these definitions, namely, that they seek to express organic phenomena in terms of an extra-organic principle, to formulate55 the facts observed in terms of a cause inferred, there is the fatal objection that they speak confidently on what is avowedly56 unknown. If the force be, as Dr. Beale says, “undiscovered,” on what grounds can he assert that it has no connection with the forces which are known? All that the observed facts warrant is the assertion that organic phenomena are special (which no one denies), and must therefore depend on special combinations of matter and force. But on this ground we might assume a crystallizing Force, and a coagulating Force, having no connection with the molecular57 forces manifested elsewhere: these also are special phenomena, not to be confounded with each other.
35. Schelling defines Life as “a principle of individuation” and a “cycle of successive changes determined58 and fixed59 by this internal principle.” Which is so vague that it may be applied60 in very different senses. Bichat’s celebrated61 definition (which is only a paraphrase62 of a sentence in Stahl), “the sum of the functions which resist Death,” although an endeavor to express the facts from the Intra-organic point of view, is not only vague, but misrepresents one of the cardinal63 conditions, by treating the External Medium as antagonistic64 to Life, whereas Life is only possible in the relation to a Medium.
32 36. Were it not so vague, the definition proposed by Dugès and Béclard would be unexceptionable: the former says it is “the special activity of organized beings”; the latter, “the sum of the phenomena proper to organized bodies.” When supplemented by a description of organized bodies, these formul? are compendious65 and exact. The same remark applies to the definition of Lamarck: “that state of things which permits organic movements; and these movements, which constitute active life, result from a stimulus66 which excites them.”
37. De Blainville, and after him Comte and Charles Robin67, define it thus: “Life is the twofold internal movement of composition and decomposition68 at once general and continuous.” This, excellent as regards what is called vegetal life, is very properly objected to by Mr. Herbert Spencer in that it excludes those nervous and muscular functions which are the most conspicuous69 and distinctive70 of vital phenomena. The same objection must be urged against Professor Owen’s definition: “Life is a centre of intussusceptive assimilative force capable of reproduction by spontaneous fission71.”
38. In 1853, after reviewing the various attempts to express in a sentence what a volume could only approximately expound72, I proposed the following: “Life is a series of definite and successive changes, both of structure and composition, which take place within an individual without destroying its identity.” This has been criticised by Mr. Herbert Spencer and by Dr. Lionel Beale, and if I had not withdrawn73 it before their criticisms appeared, I should certainly have modified and enlarged it afterwards. I mention it, however, because it is an approach to a more satisfactory formula in so far as it specifies74 two cardinal characteristics distinguishing organisms from all anorganisms, namely, the incessant75 evolution through definite stages, and the preservation76 of specific integrity33 throughout the changes; not only the organism as a whole is preserved amidst incessant molecular change, but each tissue lives only so long as the reciprocal molecular composition and decomposition persist. On both of these points I shall have to speak hereafter. The definition, however, is not only defective77 in its restriction to the molecular changes of Nutrition, taking no account of the Properties and Functions of the organism; but defective also in giving no expression to equally important relations of the organism to the medium.
39. This last point is distinctly expressed in Mr. Spencer’s definition: “Life is the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations.” Considered as a formula of the most general significance, embracing therefore what is common to all orders of vital phenomena, this is the best yet proposed.9 If I propose another it will not be to displace but to run alongside with Mr. Spencer’s; and this only for more ready convenience. Before doing so I must say a few words by way of clearing the ground.
40. What does the term Life stand for? What are the concrete significates of this abstract symbol? As before stated, it is sometimes a compendious shorthand for the special phenomena distinguishing living from non-living bodies; and sometimes it expresses not these observed phenomena, but their conditions of existence, which are by one school personified in an abstract and extra-organic cause. Thus the life of an animal, a man, or a34 nation, means—1°, the special manifestations78 of these organisms, and groups of organisms; or 2°, the causes which produce these manifestations. We are often misunderstood by others, and sometimes vague to ourselves, when we do not bear these two different meanings in view. It was probably some sense of this which made Aristotle distinguish Vitality from Life, as that of the one uniform cause separated from its multiple effects; it was certainly the motive79 of Fletcher, who thus expressly limits the meanings: “Vitality or Irritability80, the property which characterizes organized beings of being acted on by certain powers otherwise than either strictly mechanically or strictly chemically; Life, the sum of the actions of organized beings resulting directly from their vitality so acted on.”10
Vitality and Life being thus discriminated81 as the statical and the dynamical aspects of the organism, we find in relation to the former two radically82 opposed conceptions: the metaphysiological or extra-organic, and the physiological or intra-organic. The first conceives Vitality to be a Vital Principle, or extra-organic agent, sometimes a soul, spirit, arch?us, idea, and sometimes a force, which easily becomes translated into a property.
The conception of an entity must be rejected, because it is metempirical and unverifiable, § 34. The conception of a force must be rejected, because it is irreconcilable83 with any definite idea we have of force. What the term Force signifies in Physics and Chemistry, namely, mass animated84 by velocity85, or directed pressure, which is the activity of the agent,—is precisely86 that which these vitalists pertinaciously87 exclude. They assume a force which has nothing in common with mass and velocity; which is not a resultant, but a principle; which35 instead of being a directed quantity, is itself autonomous88 and directive, shaping matter into organization, and endowing it with powers not assignable to matter. If this vital force has any mass at its back, it is a spiritual mass; if it is directed, the direction issues from a “Mind somewhere.” Now this conception is purely89 metempirical. Not only is it inexact to speak of Vitality as a force, it is almost equally inexact to speak of it as a property; since it is a term which includes a variety of properties; and when Fletcher assigns the synonym90 of Irritability, this at once reveals the inexactness; for beside this property, we must place Assimilation, Evolution, Disintegration91, Reproduction, Contractility, and Sensibility,—all characteristic properties included in Vitality.
41. Having thus rejected the conceptions of entity, force, and property, we are left in presence of—1°, the organic conditions as the elements, and 2°, of their synthesis (in the state called organization) as the personified principle. Vital forces, or the vital force, if we adopt the term for brevity’s sake, is a symbol of the conditions of existence of organized matter; and since organisms are specially28 distinguishable from anorganisms by this speciality of their synthesis, and not by any difference in the nature of the elements combined, this state of organization is the “force” or “principle” of which we are in quest. To determine what Life means, we must observe and classify the phenomena presented by living beings. To determine what Vitality—or organization—means, we must observe and classify the processes which go on in organized substances. These will occupy us in the succeeding chapters; here I may so far anticipate as to propose the following definitions:—
42. Life is the functional92 activity of an organism in relation to its medium, as a synthesis of three terms:36 Structure, Aliment, and Instrument; it is the sum of functions which are the resultants of Vitality; Vitality being the sum of the properties of matter in the state of organization.
43. Vital phenomena are the phenomena manifested in organisms when external agencies disturb their molecular equilibrium93; and by organisms when they react on external objects. Thus everything done in an organism, or by an organism, is a vital act, although physical and chemical agencies may form essential components94 of the act. If I shrink when struck, or if I whip a horse, the blow is in each case physical, but the shrinking and the striking are vital.
Every part of a living organism is therefore vital, as pertaining95 to Life; but no part has this Life when isolated; for Life is the synthesis of all the parts: a federation96 of the organs when the organism is complex, a federation of the organic substances when the organism is a simple cell.
44. All definitions, although didactically placed at the introduction of a treatise97, are properly the final expression of the facts which the treatise has established, and they cannot therefore be fully98 apprehended99 until the mind is familiarized with the details they express. Much, therefore, which to the reader may seem unintelligible100 or questionable101 in the foregoing definition, must be allowed to pass until he has gone through the chapters which follow.
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hierarchy
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| n.等级制度；统治集团，领导层 | |
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symbolizes
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| v.象征，作为…的象征( symbolize的第三人称单数 ) | |
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anticipation
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| n.预期，预料，期望 | |
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phenomena
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texture
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| n.(织物)质地；(材料)构造；结构；肌理 | |
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vitality
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| n.活力，生命力，效力 | |
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faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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complexity
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labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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infliction
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physiological
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| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
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animating
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| v.使有生气( animate的现在分词 )；驱动；使栩栩如生地动作；赋予…以生命 | |
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akin
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| adj.同族的，类似的 | |
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persuasion
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systematic
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valid
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neural
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conformity
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investigation
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isolated
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supersede
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deductions
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entity
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inorganic
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reconstruction
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specially
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mathematicians
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remains
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digestion
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shibboleths
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decomposing
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analytical
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physiologist
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physiologists
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relinquishing
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restriction
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invoked
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materialist
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persistently
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radical
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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possessed
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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descend
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harmonious
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subsist
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embryo
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strictly
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nutrient
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modification
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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formulate
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| v.用公式表示；规划；设计；系统地阐述 | |
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avowedly
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molecular
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| adj.分子的；克分子的 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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paraphrase
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| vt.将…释义，改写；n.释义，意义 | |
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cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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antagonistic
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| adj.敌对的 | |
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compendious
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| adj.简要的，精简的 | |
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stimulus
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| n.刺激，刺激物，促进因素，引起兴奋的事物 | |
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robin
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| n.知更鸟，红襟鸟 | |
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decomposition
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| n. 分解, 腐烂, 崩溃 | |
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conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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distinctive
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| adj.特别的，有特色的，与众不同的 | |
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fission
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| n.裂开；分裂生殖 | |
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expound
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| v.详述；解释；阐述 | |
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withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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specifies
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| v.指定( specify的第三人称单数 )；详述；提出…的条件；使具有特性 | |
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incessant
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| adj.不停的，连续的 | |
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preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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defective
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| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
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manifestations
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| n.表示，显示（manifestation的复数形式） | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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irritability
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| n.易怒 | |
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discriminated
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| 分别，辨别，区分( discriminate的过去式和过去分词 )； 歧视，有差别地对待 | |
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radically
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| ad.根本地，本质地 | |
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irreconcilable
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| adj.（指人）难和解的，势不两立的 | |
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animated
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| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
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velocity
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| n.速度，速率 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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pertinaciously
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| adv.坚持地；固执地；坚决地；执拗地 | |
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autonomous
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| adj.自治的；独立的 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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synonym
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| n.同义词，换喻词 | |
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disintegration
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| n.分散，解体 | |
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functional
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| adj.为实用而设计的，具备功能的，起作用的 | |
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equilibrium
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| n.平衡，均衡，相称，均势，平静 | |
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components
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| （机器、设备等的）构成要素，零件，成分； 成分( component的名词复数 )； [物理化学]组分； [数学]分量； （混合物的）组成部分 | |
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pertaining
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| 与…有关系的，附属…的，为…固有的(to) | |
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federation
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| n.同盟，联邦，联合，联盟，联合会 | |
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treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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unintelligible
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| adj.无法了解的，难解的，莫明其妙的 | |
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questionable
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| adj.可疑的，有问题的 | |
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