69. The question is one of extreme complexity8, but may be greatly simplified, if we can manage to reduce it to purely9 physiological10 terms, and consider the phenomena11 in their objective aspect. In dealing12 with nerves and their actions this was comparatively easy; we had for the most part only physiological processes to unravel13. It is otherwise in dealing with nerve-centres—the subjective14 or psychological aspect of the phenomena inevitably15 thrusts itself on our attention; and all the mysteries of Feeling and Thought cloud our vision of the212 neural16 process. Do what we will, we cannot altogether divest17 Sensibility of its psychological connotations, cannot help interpreting it in terms of Consciousness; so that even when treating of sensitive phenomena observed in molluscs and insects, we always imagine these more or less suffused18 with Feeling, as this is known in our own conscious states.
70. Feeling is recognized as in some way or other bound up with neural processes; but Physiology proper has only to concern itself with the processes; and the question whether these can, and do, go on unaccompanied by Feeling, is, strictly19 speaking, one which belongs to Psychology20. It demands as a preliminary that the term Feeling be defined; and the answer will depend upon that definition, namely, whether Feeling be interpreted as synonymous with Consciousness in the restricted sense, or synonymous with the more general term Sentience21. If the former, then since there are unquestionably neural processes of which we are not conscious, we must specify22 the particular groups which subserve Feeling; as we specify the particular groups which subserve the sensations of Sight, Hearing, Taste, etc.; and localize the separate functions in separate organs. If the latter, then, since all neural processes have a common character, we have only to localize the particular variations of its manifestation23, and distinguish sensitive phenomena as we distinguish motor phenomena.
71. It is absolutely certain that the Feeling we attribute to a mollusc is different from that which we attribute to a man; if only because the organisms of the two are so widely different, and have been under such different conditions of excitation. If every feeling is the functional result of special organic activities, varying with the co-operant elements, we can have no more warrant for assuming the existence of the same particular forms213 of Feeling in organisms that are unlike, than for assuming the 47th proposition of Euclid to be presented by any three straight lines. The lines are the necessary basis for the construction, but they are not the triangle, except when in a special configuration24. This is not denying that animals feel (in the general sense of that term), it is only asserting that their feelings must be very unlike our own. Even in our own race we see marked differences—some modes of feeling being absolutely denied to individuals only slightly differing from their fellows. If, however, we admit that different animals must have different modes of Feeling, we must also admit that the neuro-muscular activities are generically25 alike in all, because of the fundamental similarity in the structures. Whether we shall assign Feeling to the mollusc or not will depend on the meaning of the term; but, at all events, we require some term general enough to include the phenomena manifested by the mollusc, and those manifested by all other animals. Sensibility is the least objectionable term. Unless we adopt some such general designation, physiological and psychological interpretations become contradictory26 and obscure. The current doctrine27 which assigns Sensibility to the brain, denying it to all other centres, is seriously defective28, inasmuch as it implies that tissues similar in kind have utterly29 diverse properties; in other words, that the same nerve-tissue which manifests Sensibility in the brain has no such property in the spinal30 cord.
72. How is this tenable? No one acquainted at first hand with the facts denies that the objective phenomena exhibited by the brainless animal have the same general character as those of the animal possessing a brain: the actions of the two are identical in all cases which admit of comparison. That is to say, the objective appearances are the same; differing only in so far as the mechanisms214 are made different by the presence or absence of certain parts. The brain not being a necessary part of the mechanical adjustments in swimming, or pushing aside an irritating object, the brainless frog swims and defends itself in the same way as the normal frog. But no sooner do we pass from the objective interpretation3, and introduce the subjective element of Feeling among the series of factors necessary to the product—no sooner do we ask whether the brainless frog feels the irritation32 against which it struggles, or wills the movements by which it swims—than the question has shifted its ground, and has passed from Physiology to Psychology. The appeal is no longer made to Observation, but to Interpretation. Observation tells us here nothing directly of Feeling. What it does tell us, however, is the identity of the objective phenomena; and Physiology demands that a common term be employed to designate the character common to the varied33 phenomena. Sensibility is such a term. But most modern physiologists34, under the bias36 of tradition, refuse to extend Sensibility to the spinal cord, in spite of the evidences of the spinal cord possessing that property in common with the brain. They prefer to invoke37 a new property; they assign spinal action to a Reflex Mechanism31 which has nothing of the character of Sensibility, because they have identified Sensibility with Consciousness, and have restricted Consciousness to a special group of sensitive phenomena.
73. Nor is it to be denied that on this ground they have a firm basis. Every one could testify to the fact that many processes normally go on without being accompanied by consciousness, in the special meaning of the term. Reflex actions,—such as winking38, breathing, swallowing,—notoriously produced by stimulation39 of sensitive surfaces, take place without our “feeling” them, or being “conscious” of them. Hence it is concluded that215 the Reflex mechanism suffices without the intervention40 of Sensibility. I altogether dispute the conclusion; and in a future Problem will endeavor to show that Sensibility is necessary to Reflex Action. But without awaiting that exposition we may at once confront the evidence, by adducing the familiar fact that “unconscious” processes go on in the brain as well as in the spinal cord; and this not simply in the sphere of Volition41, but also in the sphere of Thought.110 We act and think “automatically” at times, and are quite “unconscious” of what we are doing, or of the data we are logically grouping. We often think as unconsciously as we breathe; although from time to time we become conscious of both processes. Yet who will assert that these unconscious processes were independent of Sensibility? Who will maintain that because cerebral42 processes are sometimes unaccompanied by that peculiar43 state named Consciousness, therefore all its processes are unaccompanied by Feeling? And if here we admit that the Reflex mechanism in the brain is a sensitive mechanism, surely we must equally admit that the similar Reflex mechanism in the spinal cord is sensitive?
74. Let it be understood that Sensibility is the common property of nerve-centres, and physiological interpretations will become clear and consistent. Consciousness, as understood by psychologists, is not a property of tissue, it is a function of the organism, dependent indeed on Sensibility, but not convertible44 with it. There is a greater distinction between the two than between Sensation, the reaction of a sensory45 organ, and Perception, the216 combined result of sensory and cerebral reactions; or than that between Contractility, the property of the muscles, and Flying, the function of a particular group of muscles. It is not possible to have Consciousness without Sensibility; but perfectly46 possible to have Sensations without Consciousness. This will perhaps seem as inconceivable to the reader as it seemed to Schr?der van der Kolk.111
75. Let us illustrate47 it by the analogy of Pain. There is a vast amount of sensation normally excited which is totally unaccompanied by the feelings classed as painful. The action of the special senses may be exaggerated to an intolerable degree, but the exaggeration never passes into pain: the retina may be blinded with excess of light, and the ear stunned48 with sound—the optic nerve may be pricked49 or cut—but no pain results. The systemic sensations also are habitually50 painless, though they pass into pain in abnormal states. Clearly, then, Pain is not the necessary consequence of Sensibility; and this is true not only of certain sensitive parts, but of all; as is proved in the well-known facts of Analgesia51, in which complete insensibility of the skin as regards Pain co-exists with vivid sensibility as regards Touch and Temperature. Hence the majority of physiologists refuse to acknowledge that the struggles and cries of an animal, after removal of the brain, are evidences of pain; maintaining that they are “simply reflex actions.” This is probable; the more so as we know the struggles and cries which tickling52 will produce, yet no pain accompanies tickling. But if the struggles and cries are not evidence of pain, they are surely evidence of Sensibility.
76. Now for the term Pain in the foregoing paragraph217 substitute the term Consciousness, and you will perhaps allow that while it may be justifiable53 to interpret the actions of a brainless animal as due to a mechanism which is unaccompanied by the specially54 conditioned forms of Sensibility classed under Consciousness—just as it is unaccompanied by the specially conditioned forms of Perception and Emotion—there is no justification55 for assuming the mechanism not to have been a sensitive mechanism. The wingless bird cannot manifest any Of the phenomena of flight; but we do not therefore deny that its other movements depend on Contractility.
77. Difficult as it must be to keep the physiological question apart from the psychological when treating of Sensibility, we shall never succeed in our analysis unless the two questions are separately treated. The physiologist35 considers organisms and their actions from their objective side, and tries to detect the mechanism of the observed phenomena. These he has to interpret in terms of Matter and Motion. The psychologist interprets them in terms of Feeling. The actions which we see in others we cannot feel, except as visual sensations; the changes which we feel in ourselves we cannot see in others, except as bodily movements. The reaction of a sensory organ is by the physiologist called a sensation,—borrowing the term from the psychologist; he explains it as due to the stimulus56 which changes the molecular57 condition of the organ; and this changed condition, besides being seen to be followed by a muscular movement, is inferred to be accompanied by a change of Feeling. The psychologist has direct knowledge only of the change of Feeling which follows on some other change; he infers that it is originated by the action of some external cause, and infers that a neural process precedes, or accompanies, the feeling. Obviously there are two distinct questions here, involving distinct methods. The physiologist is compelled to complete218 his objective observations by subjective suggestions; compelled to add Feeling to the terms of Matter and Motion, in spite of the radical58 diversity of their aspects. The psychologist also is compelled to complete his subjective observations by objective interpretations, linking the internal changes to the external changes. A complete theory must harmonize the two procedures.
78. In a subsequent Problem we shall have to examine the nature of Sensation in its psychological aspect; here we have first to describe its physiological aspect. To the psychologist, a sensation is simply a fact of Consciousness; he has nothing whatever to do with the neural process, which the physiologist considers to be the physical basis of this fact; and he therefore regards the physiologists as talking nonsense when they talk of “unconscious sensations,” the phrase being to him equivalent to “unfelt feelings,” or “invisible light.” It is quite otherwise with the physiologist, who viewing a sensation solely59 as a neural process, the reaction of a sensory organ, can lawfully60 speak of unconscious sensations, as the physicist62 can speak of invisible rays of light,—meaning those rays which are of a different order of undulation from the visible rays, and which may become visible when the susceptibility of the retina is exalted63. He knows that there are different modes, and different complexities64 of neural process; to one class he assigns consciousness, to the other unconsciousness. If he would be severely65 precise, he would never speak of sensation at all, but only of sensory reaction. But such precision would be pedantic66 and idle. He wants the connotations of the term sensation, and therefore uses it.
79. The functional activity of a gland67 is stimulated68 by a neural process reflected from a centre; by a similar process a muscle is called into action. No one supposes that the neural process is, in the one case secretory69, in the219 other motory: in both it is the same process in the nerve; and our investigation70 of it would be greatly hampered71 if we did not disengage it from all the suggestions hovering72 around the ideas of secretion73 and muscular action. In like manner we must disengage the neural process of a sensory reaction from all the suggestions hovering around the idea of Consciousness, when that term designates a complex of many reactions. In Problem III. we shall enter more particularly into the distinction between Sensibility and Consciousness; for the present it must suffice to say that great ambiguity74 exists in the current usage of these terms. Sometimes Consciousness stands as the equivalent of Sensibility; sometimes as a particular mode of Sensibility known as Reflection, Attention, and Thought. The former meaning is an extension of the term similar to that given to the word Rose, which originally meaning Red came to be restricted to a particular red flower; and after other flowers of the same kind were discovered which had yellow and white petals75, instead of red, the term rose still adhered even to these. “Yellow Rose” is therefore as great a verbal solecism as unconscious sensation. We have separated the redness from the rose, and can then say that the color is one thing, the flower another. By a similar process of abstraction we separate Consciousness from Sensation, and we can then say that there are sensations without consciousness. In consequence of this, psychologists often maintain that to have a sensation and be conscious of it are two different states. We are said to hear a sound, and yet not to be conscious of hearing it. The sound excites a movement, but it does not excite our consciousness. Now although it is true that there are roses which are not red, it is not true that there are roses which have no color at all. Although it is true that there are sensations which are not of the particular mode of Sensibility which psychologists220 specially designate as Consciousness, it is not true that there are sensations which are not modes of Sensibility.
80. And what is Sensibility which, on its subjective side, is Sentience? In one sense it may be answered that we do not know. In another sense it is that which we know most clearly and positively76: Sentience forms the substance of all knowledge. Being the ultimate of knowledge, every effort must be vain which attempts to explain it by reduction to simpler elements. The human mind, impatient of ultimates, is always striving to pierce beyond the fundamental mysteries; and this impatience77 leads to the attempts so often made to explain Sensibility by reducing it to terms of Matter and Motion. But inasmuch as a clear analysis of Matter and Motion displays that our knowledge of these is simply a knowledge of modes of Feeling, the reduction of Sentience or Sensibility to Matter and Motion is simply the reduction of Sensibility to some of its modes. This point gained, a clear conception of the advantages of introducing the ideas of Matter and Motion will result. It will then be the familiar and indispensable method of explaining the little known by the better known. The objective aspect of things is commonly represented in the visible and palpable; because what we can see we can also generally touch, and what we can touch we can taste and smell; but we cannot touch an odor nor a sound; we cannot see them; we can only connect the odorous and sonorous78 objects with visible or palpable conditions. Everywhere we find sensations referred to visible or palpable causes; and hence the desire to find this objective basis for every change in Sensibility. The sensation, or state of consciousness, is the ultimate fact; we can only explain it by describing its objective conditions.
81. Thus much on the philosophical79 side. Returning to our physiological point, we must say that a sensation221 is, objectively, the reaction of a sensory organ, or organism; subjectively80, a change of feeling. Objectively it is a phenomenon of movement, but distinguishable from other phenomena by the speciality of its conditions. It is a vital phenomenon, not a purely mechanical phenomenon. Although the molecular movement conforms, of course, to mechanical principles, and may be viewed abstractly as a purely mechanical result, yet, because it takes place under conditions never found in machines, it has characters which markedly separate it from the movements of machines. Among these differential characters may be cited that of selective adaptation,112 which is most conspicuous81 in volition.
82. In the early stages of animal evolution there is no differentiation82 into muscle and nerve. The whole organism is equally sensitive (or irritable) in every part. Muscles appear, and then they are the most sensitive222 parts. Nerves appear, and the seat of Sensibility has been transferred to them; not that the muscles have lost theirs, but their irritability83 is now represented by their dominant84 character of Contractility, and the nerves have taken on the special office of Sensibility. That is to say, while both muscle and nerve form integral elements of the sensitive reaction, the process itself is analytically85 conceived as a combination of two distinct properties, resident in two distinct tissues.
83. Carrying further this analytical86 artifice87, I propose to distinguish the central organs as the seat of Sensibility, confining Neurility to the peripheral88 nerves. In physiological reality both systems, central and peripheral, are one; the separation is artificial. Strictly speaking, therefore, Neurility—or nerve-action—is the general property of nerve-tissue, central and peripheral. But since Neurility may be manifested by nerves apart from centres, whereas Sensibility demands the co-operation of both, and since we have often to consider the central process in itself, without attending to the process in the nerves, it is well to have two characteristic terms. I shall therefore always use the term Sensibility for the reactions of the nervous centres,—Sentience being its psychological equivalent; although the reader will understand that in point of fact there is no break, nor transformation89, as the wave of change passes from sensory nerve to centre, and from centre to motor nerve: there is one continuous process of change. But just as we analytically distinguish the sensory from the motor element of this indissoluble process, so we may distinguish the ingoing and outgoing stages from the combining stage. Sensibility, then, represents the property of combining and grouping stimulations.
84. Fully61 aware of the misleading connotations of the term, and of the difficulty which will be felt in disengaging223 it from these, especially in reference to Consciousness, I have long hesitated before adopting it. But the advantages greatly outweigh90 the disadvantages. Sensibility has long been admitted to express the peculiar modes of reaction in plants and animals low down in the scale. No one hesitates to speak of a sensitive plant, or a sensitive surface. The tentacles91 of a polype are said to be sensitive; though probably no one thereby92 means that the polype has what psychologists mean by Consciousness. By employing the general term Sensibility to designate the whole range of reactions peculiar to the nerve-centres, when these special organs exist, it will be possible to interpret all the physiological and psychological phenomena observed in animals and men on one uniform method. The observed variations will then be referable to varieties in organisms.
85. Suppose, for illustration, an organism like the human except that it is wholly deficient93 in Sight, Hearing, Taste, and Smell. It has no sense but Touch—or the general reaction under contact with external objects. It will move on being stimulated, and will combine its movements differently under different stimulations. It will feel, and logically combine its feelings. But its mass of feeling will be made of far simpler elements than ours; its combinations fewer; and the contents of its Consciousness so very different from ours that we are unable to conceive what it will be like; we can only be sure that it will not be very like our own. This truncated94 Organism will have its Sensibility; and we must assign this property to its central nerve-tissue, as we assign our own. If now we descend95 lower, and suppose an organism with no centres whatever, but which nevertheless displays evidence of Sensibility—feelings and combinations of movements—we must then conclude that the property specialized96 in a particular tissue of the224 highly differentiated97 organism is here diffused98 throughout.
It is obvious that the sensations or feelings of these supposed organisms will have a common character with the feelings of more highly differentiated organisms, although the modes of manifestation are so various. If we recognize a common character in muscular movements so various as the rhythmic99 pulsation100 of the heart, the larger rhythm of inspiration and expiration101, the restless movements of the eye and tongue, the complexities of manipulation, the consensus102 of movements in flying, swimming, walking, speaking, singing, etc., so may we recognize a common character in all the varieties of sensation. The special character of a movement depends on the moving organ. The special character of a sensation depends on the sensory organ. Contractility is the abstract term which expresses all possible varieties of contraction103. Sensibility—or Sentience—is the abstract term which expresses all possible varieties of sensation.
86. The view here propounded104 may find a more ready acceptance when its application to all physiological questions has been tested, and it is seen to give coherence105 to many scattered106 and hitherto irreconcilable107 facts. Meanwhile let a glance be taken at the inconsistencies of the current doctrine. That doctrine declares one half of the gray substance of the spinal cord to be capable only of receiving a sensitive stimulation, the other half capable only of originating a motor stimulation. We might with equal propriety108 declare that one half of a muscle is capable only of receiving a contractile stimulation, and the other half of contracting. The ingoing nerve, passing from the surface to the posterior part of the spinal cord, excites the activity of the gray substance into which it penetrates109; with the anterior110 part of this gray substance225 an outgoing nerve is connected, and through it the excitation is propagated to a muscle: contraction results. Such are the facts. In our analysis we separate the sensory from the motor aspect, and we then imagine that this ideal distinction represents a real separation. We suppose a phenomenon of Sensibility independent of a phenomenon of Contractility—suppose the one to be “transformed” into the other—and we then marvel111 “how during this passage the excitation changes its nature.”113
87. Before exerting ingenuity112 in explaining a fact, it is always well to make sure that the fact itself is correctly stated. Does the neural excitation change its nature in passing from the posterior to the anterior gray substance? I can see no evidence of it. Indeed the statement seems to confound a neural process with a muscular process. The neural process is one continuous excitation along the whole line of ingoing nerve, centre, and outgoing nerve, which nowhere ceases or changes into another process, until the excitation of the muscle introduces a new factor. So long as the excitation keeps within the nerve-tissue, it is one and the same process of change; its issue in a contraction, a secretion, or a change in the conditions of consciousness, depends on the organs it stimulates113.
88. I have already called attention to the artificial nature of all our distinctions, and the necessity of such artifices114. They are products of that
“Secondary power
By which we multiply distinctions, then
That we perceive, and not that we have made.”114
The distinction of Central and Peripheral systems is not226 simply anatomical, it has a physiological justification in this, that the Central System is the organ of connection. Any one part of it directly excited by an ingoing nerve propagates that excitation throughout the whole central mass, and thus affects every part of the organism. Therefore we place Sensibility in it.
But this general Property subserves various Functions, according as the Central System is variously related to different organs. This fact has given rise to the idea that different portions of the cerebro-spinal axis116 have different properties—which is a serious error. What is certain is that the Cerebrum must have a different function from that of the Thalami, and the Cerebellum one different from the Medulla Oblongata; while that of the Medulla Spinalis is different from all. Precisely117 on the same grounds that a muscle-nerve has a different office from a skin-nerve, or the pneumogastric from the acoustic118. But all nerves have one Neurility in common; all centres have one Sensibility in common.
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functional
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| adj.为实用而设计的，具备功能的，起作用的 | |
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relinquishment
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| n.放弃；撤回；停止 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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interpretations
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| n.解释( interpretation的名词复数 )；表演；演绎；理解 | |
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axiomatic
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| adj.不需证明的，不言自明的 | |
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postulate
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| n.假定，基本条件；vt.要求，假定 | |
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physiology
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| n.生理学，生理机能 | |
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complexity
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| n.复杂(性)，复杂的事物 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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physiological
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| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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unravel
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| v.弄清楚（秘密）；拆开，解开，松开 | |
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subjective
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| a.主观(上)的，个人的 | |
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inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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neural
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| adj.神经的，神经系统的 | |
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divest
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| v.脱去，剥除 | |
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suffused
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| v.（指颜色、水气等）弥漫于，布满( suffuse的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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sentience
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| n.感觉性；感觉能力；知觉 | |
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specify
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| vt.指定，详细说明 | |
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manifestation
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| n.表现形式；表明；现象 | |
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configuration
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| n.结构，布局，形态，(计算机)配置 | |
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generically
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contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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defective
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| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
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utterly
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spinal
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| adj.针的，尖刺的，尖刺状突起的；adj.脊骨的，脊髓的 | |
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mechanism
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| n.机械装置；机构，结构 | |
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irritation
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| n.激怒，恼怒，生气 | |
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varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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physiologists
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| n.生理学者( physiologist的名词复数 )；生理学( physiology的名词复数 )；生理机能 | |
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physiologist
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| n.生理学家 | |
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bias
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| n.偏见，偏心，偏袒；vt.使有偏见 | |
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invoke
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| v.求助于(神、法律)；恳求，乞求 | |
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winking
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| n.瞬眼，目语v.使眼色( wink的现在分词 )；递眼色（表示友好或高兴等）；（指光）闪烁；闪亮 | |
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stimulation
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| n.刺激，激励，鼓舞 | |
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intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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volition
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| n.意志；决意 | |
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cerebral
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| adj.脑的，大脑的；有智力的，理智型的 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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convertible
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| adj.可改变的，可交换，同意义的；n.有活动摺篷的汽车 | |
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sensory
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| adj.知觉的，感觉的，知觉器官的 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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stunned
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| adj. 震惊的，惊讶的 动词stun的过去式和过去分词 | |
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49
pricked
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| 刺，扎，戳( prick的过去式和过去分词 )； 刺伤； 刺痛； 使剧痛 | |
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habitually
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| ad.习惯地，通常地 | |
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51
analgesia
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| n.无痛觉，痛觉丧失 | |
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52
tickling
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| 反馈，回授，自旋挠痒法 | |
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53
justifiable
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| adj.有理由的，无可非议的 | |
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54
specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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stimulus
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| n.刺激，刺激物，促进因素，引起兴奋的事物 | |
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molecular
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| adj.分子的；克分子的 | |
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58
radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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59
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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60
lawfully
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| adv.守法地，合法地；合理地 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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62
physicist
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| n.物理学家，研究物理学的人 | |
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63
exalted
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| adj.(地位等)高的，崇高的；尊贵的，高尚的 | |
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complexities
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| 复杂性(complexity的名词复数)； 复杂的事物 | |
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severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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pedantic
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| adj.卖弄学问的；迂腐的 | |
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67
gland
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| n.腺体，(机)密封压盖，填料盖 | |
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stimulated
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| a.刺激的 | |
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secretory
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| adj.分泌的，能分泌的，促分泌的n.分泌腺，分泌器官 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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hampered
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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hovering
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| 鸟( hover的现在分词 )； 靠近（某事物）； （人）徘徊； 犹豫 | |
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secretion
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| n.分泌 | |
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ambiguity
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| n.模棱两可；意义不明确 | |
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petals
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| n.花瓣( petal的名词复数 ) | |
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positively
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| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
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impatience
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| n.不耐烦，急躁 | |
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sonorous
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| adj.响亮的，回响的；adv.圆润低沉地；感人地；n.感人，堂皇 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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subjectively
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| 主观地； 臆 | |
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conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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differentiation
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| n.区别，区分 | |
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83
irritability
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| n.易怒 | |
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dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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analytically
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| adv.有分析地，解析地 | |
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analytical
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| adj.分析的；用分析法的 | |
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87
artifice
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| n.妙计，高明的手段；狡诈，诡计 | |
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peripheral
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| adj.周边的，外围的 | |
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transformation
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| n.变化；改造；转变 | |
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outweigh
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| vt.比...更重，...更重要 | |
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tentacles
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| n.触手( tentacle的名词复数 )；触角；触须；触毛 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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deficient
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| adj.不足的，不充份的，有缺陷的 | |
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truncated
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| adj.切去顶端的，缩短了的，被删节的v.截面的( truncate的过去式和过去分词 )；截头的；缩短了的；截去顶端或末端 | |
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95
descend
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| vt./vi.传下来，下来，下降 | |
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96
specialized
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| adj.专门的，专业化的 | |
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97
differentiated
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| 区分，区别，辨别( differentiate的过去式和过去分词 )； 区别对待； 表明…间的差别，构成…间差别的特征 | |
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diffused
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| 散布的，普及的，扩散的 | |
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99
rhythmic
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| adj.有节奏的，有韵律的 | |
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100
pulsation
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| n.脉搏，悸动，脉动；搏动性 | |
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101
expiration
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| n.终结，期满，呼气，呼出物 | |
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102
consensus
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| n.(意见等的)一致，一致同意，共识 | |
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103
contraction
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| n.缩略词，缩写式，害病 | |
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104
propounded
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| v.提出（问题、计划等）供考虑[讨论]，提议( propound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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105
coherence
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| n.紧凑；连贯；一致性 | |
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106
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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107
irreconcilable
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| adj.（指人）难和解的，势不两立的 | |
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108
propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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109
penetrates
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| v.穿过( penetrate的第三人称单数 )；刺入；了解；渗透 | |
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110
anterior
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| adj.较早的；在前的 | |
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111
marvel
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| vi.(at)惊叹vt.感到惊异；n.令人惊异的事 | |
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112
ingenuity
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| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
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113
stimulates
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| v.刺激( stimulate的第三人称单数 )；激励；使兴奋；起兴奋作用，起刺激作用，起促进作用 | |
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114
artifices
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| n.灵巧( artifice的名词复数 )；诡计；巧妙办法；虚伪行为 | |
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115
puny
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| adj.微不足道的，弱小的 | |
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116
axis
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| n.轴，轴线，中心线；坐标轴，基准线 | |
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117
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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118
acoustic
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| adj.听觉的，声音的；(乐器)原声的 | |
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