No one denies that most of the reflex actions often have conscious sensations preceding and accompanying them, but these are said not to be essential to the performance of the actions, because they may be absent and the actions still take place. It is notorious that we breathe, wink5, swallow, etc., whether we are conscious of these actions or not. Our conclusion therefore is that these peculiar1 states of Consciousness are accessory, not essential to the performance of these actions. The fact is patent, the conclusion irresistible6. But now consider the equivoque: because an action takes place without our being conscious of it, the action is said to have had no sensation determining it. This, which is a truism when we limit Consciousness to one of the special modes Of Sensibility, or limit sensation to this limited Consciousness, is a falsism when we accept Consciousness as the total of all combined sensibilities, or Sensation as the reaction of the sensory7 mechanism8. That a reflex action is determined9 by the sensory mechanism, no one disputes;468 whether the reaction of a sensory mechanism shall be called a sensation or not, is a question of terms. I have shown why it must be so called if anything like coherence10 is to be preserved in physiological11 investigations13; and I have more than once suggested that the fact of intellectual processes taking place at times with no more consciousness than reflex actions, is itself sufficient to show that a process does not lapse14 from the mental to the mechanical sphere simply by passing unconsciously.
Inasmuch as an organism is a complex of organs, its total function must be a complex of particular functions, each of which may analytically15 be treated apart. Vitality16 is the total of all its physiological functions, and Consciousness the total of all its psychological functions. But inasmuch as it is only in its relation to the whole that each part has functional17 significance, and cannot therefore be isolated18 in reality, as it is in theory—cannot live by itself, act by itself, independently of the organism of which it is an organ, there is strict accuracy in saying that no particular sensation can exist without involving Consciousness; for this is only saying that no sensory organ can react without at the same time involving a reaction of the general sensorium. But since this general sensorium is simultaneously19 affected20 by various excitations each of which is a force, every sensation, perception, emotion, or volition21 is a resultant of the composition of these forces; and as there can be only one resultant at a time, to be replaced by another in swift succession, this one represents the state of Consciousness, and this state may or may not be felt under the peculiar mode named “Consciousness,” in its special meaning. In other words, the reaction of a sensory organ is always sentient22, but not always consentient.
2. Let us illustrate23 this by the sensation of musical tone. When we hear a tone we are affected not only by469 the fundamental tone, representing the vibrations24 of the sounding body as a whole, but also by the harmonics or overtones, representing the vibrations of the several parts of that whole. It is these latter vibrations which give the tone its timbre25, or peculiar quality; and as the harmonics are variable with the variable structure of the vibrating parts, two bodies which have the same fundamental tone may have markedly different qualities. There are some tones which are almost entirely26 free from harmonics; that is to say, their harmonics are too faint for our ear to appreciate them, though we know that the vibrations must be present. Apply this to the excitations of the sensorium. Each excitation will have its fundamental feeling, and more or less accompanying thrills of other feelings: it is these thrills which are the harmonics, giving to each excitation its specific quality; but they may be so faint that no specific quality is discriminated27. A fly settles on your hand while you are writing, the faint thrill which accompanies this excitation of your sensory nerve gives the specific sensation of tickling28, and this causes you to move your hand with a jerk. If your attention is preoccupied29, you are said to be unconscious of the sensation, and the jerk of your hand is called a reflex action; but if your attention is not preoccupied, or if the thrill is vivid, you are said to be conscious of the sensation, and the action is no longer reflex, but volitional30. Obviously here the difference depends not on the sentient excitation by an impression on the nerve, but on the state of the general sensorium and its consequent reaction. Had not the impression been carried to the sensorium, no movement would have followed the fly’s alighting on your hand, because no sensation (sensory reaction) would have been excited; the hypothesis of a purely mechanical reflex is quite inadmissible.
3. Or take another case. It sometimes happens that470 we fall asleep while some one is reading to us aloud. The sounds of the reader’s voice at first awaken32 the familiar thrills which give the tones their quality, and the words their significance; but gradually as sleep steals over us, the organism ceases to react thus; the words lose more and more of their significance, the tones lose more and more of their harmonics; at last we pass into the state of unconsciousness—we cease to hear what is read. But do we cease to feel? We have not heard, but we have been affected by the sounds. Not by distinguishable sensations; nevertheless a state of the general Sensibility has been induced. To prove that we have been affected is easy. Let the reader suddenly cease, and if our sleep be not too profound, we at once awake. Now, unless the sound of his voice had affected us, it is clear that the cessation of that could not have affected us. Or let us suppose our sleep to be unbroken by the cessation of the sound; even this will not prove that we have been unaffected by the sounds, it will merely prove that those sounds, or their cessation, did not excite a conscious state. For let the reader, in no louder tone, ask, “Are you asleep?” and we start up, with round eyes, declaring, “Not at all.” Nay33, should even this question fail to awaken us, the speaker need only utter some phrase likely to excite a thrill—such as, “There’s the postman!” or, “I smell fire!” and we start up.
I remember once trying the experiment on a wearied waiter, who had fallen asleep in one of the unoccupied boxes of a tavern34. His arm rested on the table, and his head rested on his arm: he snored the snore of the weary, in spite of the noisy laughter and talk of the guests. I called out “Johnson,” in a loud tone. It never moved him. I then called “Wilson,” but he snored on. No sooner did I call “waiter,” than he raised his head with a sleepy “yessir.” Now, to suppose, in this case, that he471 had no sensation when the words “Johnson” and “Wilson” reached his ears, but had a sensation when the word “waiter” reached his ears, is to suppose that two similar causes will not produce a similar effect. The dissyllable “Johnson” would excite as potent35 a reaction of his sensory organ as the dissyllable “waiter”; but the thrills—the reflex feelings—were different, because the word “Johnson” was not associated in his mind with any definite actions, whereas the word “waiter” was so associated as to become an automatic impulse.231
4. Two sisters are asleep in the same bed, and a child cries in the next room. The sounds of these cries will give a similar stimulus36 to the auditory nerve of each sister, and excite a similar sensory reaction in each. Nevertheless, the one sister sleeps on undisturbed, and is said not to hear the cry. The other springs out of bed, and attends to the child, because she being accustomed to attend on the child and soothe37 it when crying, the primary sensation has excited secondary sensations, thrills which lead to accustomed actions. Could we look into the mind of the sleeping sister, we should doubtless find that the sensation excited by the child’s cry had merged38 itself in the general stream, and perhaps modified her dreams. Let her become a mother, or take on the tender duties of a mother, and her vigilance will equal that of her sister; because the cry will then excite a definite reflex feeling, and a definite course of action. But this very sister, who is so sensitive to the cry of a child, will be undisturbed by a much louder noise; a dog may bark, or a heavy wagon39 thunder along the street, without causing her to turn in bed.232
472 Although during sleep the nervous centres have by no means their full activity, they are always capable of responding to a stimulus, and sensation will always be produced. When the servant taps at your bedroom door in the morning, you are said not to hear the tap, if asleep; you do not perceive it; but the sound reaches and rouses you nevertheless, since when the second tap comes, although no louder, you distinctly recognize it. In etherized patients, sensation is constantly observed returning before any consciousness of what is going on returns. “I was called,” says Mr. Potter, “to give chloroform to a lady for the extraction of ten teeth. The first five were extracted without the slightest movement, but as the operation proceeded, sensation returned, and I was obliged to use considerable force to keep her in the chair during the extraction of the last tooth. She came to herself very shortly after, and was delighted to find she had got over all her troubles without having felt it the least in the world.”233
5. We do not see the stars at noonday, yet they shine. We do not see the sunbeams playing among the leaves on a cloudy day, yet it is by these beams that the leaves and all other objects are visible. There is a general illumination from the sun and stars, but of this we are seldom aware, because our attention falls upon the illumined objects, brighter or darker than this general tone. There is a sort of analogy to this in the general Consciousness, which is composed of the sum of sensations excited by the incessant40 simultaneous action of internal and external stimuli41. This forms, as it were, the daylight of our existence. We do not habitually42 attend to it, because attention falls on those particular sensations of pleasure or of pain, of greater or of less intensity43, which usurp44 a prominence45 among the objects of the sensitive panorama46. But just473 as we need the daylight to see the brilliant and the sombre forms of things, we need this living Consciousness to feel the pleasures and the pains of life. It is therefore as erroneous to imagine that we have no other sensations than those which we distinctly recognize—as to imagine that we see no other light than what is reflected from the shops and equipages, the colors and splendors47 which arrest the eye.
The amount of light received from the stars may be small, but it is present. The greater glory of the sunlight may render this starlight inappreciable, but it does not render it inoperative. In like manner the amount of sensation received from some of the centres may be inappreciable in the presence of more massive influences from other centres; but though inappreciable it cannot be inoperative—it must form an integer in the sum.
6. The reader’s daily experience will assure him that over and above all the particular sensations capable of being separately recognized, there is a general stream of Sensation which constitutes his feeling of existence—the Consciousness of himself as a sensitive being. The ebullient48 energy which one day exalts49 life, and the mournful depression which the next day renders life a burden almost intolerable, are feelings not referable to any of the particular sensations, but arise from the massive yet obscure sensibilities of the viscera, which form so important a part of the general stream of Sensation. Some of these may emerge into distinct recognition. We may feel the heart beat, the intestines50 move, the glands51 secrete52; anything unusual in their action will force itself on our attention.
“What we have been long used to,” says Whytt, “we become scarcely sensible of; while things which are new, though much more trifling53, and of weaker impression, affect us remarkably54. Thus he who is wont55 to spend his474 time in the country is surprisingly affected, upon first coming into a populous56 city, with the noise and bustle57 which prevail there: of this, however, he becomes daily less sensible, till at length he regards it no more than they who have been used to it all their lifetime. The same seems to be the case also with what passes within our bodies. Few persons in health feel the beating of their heart, though it strikes against their ribs58 with considerable force every second; whereas the motion of a fly upon one’s face or hands occasions a very sensible and uneasy titillation59. The pulsation60 of the great aorta61 itself is wholly unobserved by us; yet the unusual beating of a small artery62 in any of the fingers becomes very remarkable63.”
7. A large amount of sensation is derived64 from the muscular sense, yet we are not aware of the nice adjustments of the muscles, regulated by this sensibility, when we sit or walk. No sooner are we placed in an exceptional position, as in walking on a narrow ledge65, than we become distinctly aware of the effort required to preserve equilibrium66. It is not the novelty of the position which has increased our sensibility; that has only caused us to attend to our sensations. In like manner, the various streams of sensation which make up our general sense of existence, separately escape notice until one of them becomes obstructed67, or increases in impetuosity. When we are seated at a window, and look out at the trees and sky, we are so occupied with the aspects and the voices of external Nature, that no attention whatever is given to the fact of our own existence; yet all this while there has been a massive and diffusive68 feeling arising from the organic processes; and of this we become distinctly aware if we close our eyes, shut off all sounds, and abstract the sensations of touch and temperature—it is then perceived as a vast and powerful stream of sensation, belonging to none of the special Senses, but to the System as a whole.475 It is on this general stream that depend those well-known but indescribable states named “feeling well” and “feeling ill”—the bien être and malaise of every day. Of two men looking from the same window, on the same landscape, one will be moved to unutterable sadness, yearning69 for the peace of death; the other will feel his soul suffused70 with serenity71 and content: the one has a gloomy background, into which the sensations excited by the landscape are merged; the other has a happy background, on which the sensations play like ripples72 on a sunny lake. The tone of each man’s feeling is determined by the state of his general consciousness. Except in matters of pure demonstration73, we are all determined towards certain conclusions as much by this general consciousness as by logic12. Our philosophy, when not borrowed, is little more than the expression of our personality.
8. Having thus explained the relation of particular sensations to the general state of Consciousness considered as the function of the whole organism, we may henceforward speak of particular sentient states, as we speak of particular organs and functions, all the while presupposing that the organs and functions necessarily involve the organism, since apart from the organism they have no such significance. The reaction of a sensory organ is therefore always a sentient phenomenon. Apart from the living organism there can be no such vital reaction, but only a physical reaction. It is commonly supposed that sensation is simply the molecular74 excitation of the cerebrum; yet no one will maintain that if the cerebrum of a corpse75 be excited, by a galvanic current sent through the optic nerve, for instance, this excitation will be a sensation. Whence we may conclude that it is not the physical reaction or stimulus which constitutes sensation, but the physiological reaction of the living organism.
476 9. Now this is the point which the advocates of the Reflex Theory, implicitly76 or explicitly77, always deny. Let us trace the origin of the fallacy, if possible. When we remove the eye from a recently killed animal, and let a beam of light fall on it, the pupil contracts. This is a purely mechanical action; no one would suggest that a sensation determined it. When we remove the leg, and irritate its nerve, the leg is jerked out. This is also a purely mechanical action. When we remove the brain from an animal, and pinch its toes, the leg is withdrawn78 or the pincers are pushed aside. Is this equally a purely mechanical action? And if not, why not?
The Reflex Theory would have us believe that all three cases were mechanical, at least in so far as they were all destitute80 of sentient co-operation, the ground for this conclusion being the hypothesis that the brain is the exclusive seat of sensation. The Reflex Theory further concludes that since these, and analogous81 actions, are performed when the brain is removed, they, being thus independent of sentience82, may be performed when the brain is present without any co-operation of sentience. The grounds for this conclusion being the facts that in the normal state of the organism there are many actions of which we are sometimes conscious, and at other times unconscious; and some actions—such as the dilatation and contraction83 of the pupil—of which we are never conscious. This observation of parts detached from the organism seems confirmed by observation of actions passing in our own organisms, both converging84 to the conclusion that the actions in question are purely mechanical, involving no sentience whatever. We are taught, therefore, that there is besides the sentient mechanism, to which all conscious actions are referred, a reflex mechanism, to which all unconscious actions are referred. The cerebro-spinal85 axis86, acting87 as a whole, constitutes the first;477 the spinal axis, acting without the co-operation of the cerebrum, constitutes the second.
10. Before proceeding88 with our exposition of the theory it may be well to state two considerations which must be constantly in view. If it should appear that there is any reasonable evidence for refusing to limit Sensibility to the cerebrum—and this evidence I shall adduce—the Reflex Theory must obviously be remodelled89. Nor is this all. We might see overwhelming evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the cerebrum is the exclusive seat of Sensibility, and still reject as a fallacy the conclusion that because certain actions can be performed in the absence of the cerebrum, therefore those actions in the normal organism are likewise performed without cerebral90 co-operation. I mean that it is a fallacy to conclude from the contractions91 of the pupil, and the jerking of the leg, when eye and leg are detached from the organism, that therefore when eye and leg form integral parts of the organism, such contractions and jerkings are mechanical reflexes without sentient conditions. And the fallacy is analogous to that which would conclude from the observations of a mechanical automaton92, that similar appearances in a vital organism were equally automatic and mechanical. So long as both sets of phenomena93 are apprehended94 simply as they appear to the sense of sight, they may be indistinguishable; but no sooner do we apprehend95 them through other modes, and examine the modes of production of the phenomena, than we come upon cardinal96 differences. A limb detached from the organism is like a phrase detached from a sentence: it has lost its vital significance, its functional value, in losing its connection with the other parts. The whole sentence is necessary for the slightest meaning of its constituent97 words, and each word is a language-element only when ideally or verbally connected with the other words478 required to form a sentence; without subject, predicate, and copula, no sentence can be formed. So the organic connexus of parts with a living whole is necessary for the simplest function of each organ; and a limb, or any other part, is a physiological element only when (ideally or really) an integral of a vital whole. The organism may be truncated98 by the removal of certain parts, as the sentence may be abbreviated99 by the removal of certain phrases; but so long as subject, predicate, and copula remain, there is a meaning in the sentence; and so long as the organic connexus needful for vitality remains100, there will be vital function. The eye detached from the organism is no longer a part of the living whole, it no longer lives, its phenomena cease to be vital, its movements cease to have sentient conditions. The movements of the pupil may seem to be the same as those of the living eye; but when we come to examine their modes of production, we learn that they are not the same. The stimulus of light falling on the eye in the two cases necessarily has a different effect, because the effect is the result of the co-operating causes, and the co-operation in the one case is that of a lifeless organ, in the other that of a living organism. So long as the eye forms an integral part of the organism, every stimulus acting on the eye necessarily acts on the organism, and every reaction of the organ is necessarily conditioned by the state of the organism. Further, every stimulation101 of a sensory nerve necessarily affects the general sensorium, since the whole nervous system is structurally102 continuous and functionally103 co-operant. (See Prob. II. § 16.) Therefore, the stimulation of the eye, although too faint to be discriminated as a conscious sensation, must enter as a sentient tremor104 into the general stream of Sentience; and although we have no test delicate enough to reveal this operation, we know the obverse operation of conscious sensation on479 the movements of the pupil—in surprise, for example, the pupil is dilated105.
11. There are still stronger reasons for asserting that the spinal reflexes are necessarily conditioned by the general state of the sensorium, so that in the normal organism we cannot legitimately106 exclude them from Sentience; and the Reflex Theory is therefore unphysiological, even on the hypothesis that the cerebrum is the exclusive seat of Sensibility. This hypothesis, however, seems to me untenable; and all the observed facts which it is invented to explain admit of a far more consistent explanation. It is irrational107 to suppose that a limb, detached from the body, felt the stimulus which caused its muscles to contract. The limb is not a living organism, having a sentient mechanism in its nervous mechanism. Not less irrational is it to suppose that when the limb forms an integral part of a living organism, with a sentient mechanism of nerves and nerve-centres, this organism does not react on the stimulus which excites the muscles of the limb to contract; nor, pursuing the same train of reasoning, is it irrational to suppose that when this living organism has been mutilated, and certain parts destroyed, which do not in their destruction prevent the connexus of the rest, but leave intact a sentient mechanism of nerves and nerve-centres, then also this truncated organism still reacts as a whole, still feels the stimulus which causes the muscles of the limb to contract. Hypothesis for hypothesis, we may at least say that the one is as reasonable as the other. And I shall be disappointed if, when the reader has gone through all the evidence hereafter to be adduced, he does not conclude that the hypothesis which assigns Sensibility to the nervous mechanism as a whole is not the more acceptable of the two.
12. Let us now pursue our exposition of the Reflex480 Theory. All that we have endeavoured to establish respecting the essential identity of the processes in conscious and unconscious states, and voluntary and involuntary actions,—an identity which does not exclude differences of degree corresponding with these different terms,—is ignored or denied in the Reflex Theory. Whereas I suppose all processes to be reflex processes, some of them having the voluntary, others the involuntary character, physiologists108 generally distinguish the involuntary as reflex, and invent for this class a special mechanism. According to Marshall Hall, who originated the modern form of this theory, actions are divisible into four distinct classes: the voluntary, dependent on the brain; the involuntary, dependent on the irritability109 of the muscular fibre; the respiratory, wherein “the motive110 influence passes in a direct line from one point of the nervous system to certain muscles”; and the reflex, dependent on the “true spinal system” of incident-excitor nerves, and of reflex-motor nerves. These last-named actions are produced when an impression on the sensitive surface is conveyed, by an excitor-nerve, to the spinal cord, and is there reflected back on the muscles by a corresponding motor-nerve. In this process no sensation whatever occurs. The action is purely reflex, purely excito-motor—like the action of an ordinary mechanism.234
Müller, who shares with Marshall Hall the glory of having established this classification, thinks that although the absence of sensation is a characteristic of the reflex actions, these actions may be, and are at times, accompanied by sensation. “The view I take of the matter is the following: Irritation111 of sensitive fibres of a spinal nerve excites primarily a centripetal112 action of the nervous principle481 conveying the impression to the spinal cord; if the centripetal action can then be continued to the sensorium commune, a true sensation is the result; if, on account of division of the cord, it cannot be communicated to the sensorium, it still exerts its whole influence upon the cord; in both cases a reflex motor action may be the result.”235
13. It is needless nowadays to point out that the existence of a distinct system of excito-motor nerves belongs to Imaginary Anatomy113; but it is not needless to point out that the Imaginary Physiology114 founded on it still survives. The hypothetical process seems to me not less at variance115 with observation and induction116, than the hypothetical structure invented for its basis. We have already seen that what Anatomy positively117 teaches is totally unlike the reflex mechanism popularly imagined. The sensory nerve is not seen to enter the spinal cord at one point, and pass over to a corresponding point of exit; it is seen to enter the gray substance, which is continuous throughout the spinal cord; it is there lost to view, its course being untraceable. Nor does the physiological process present the aspect demanded by the theory: it is not that of a direct and uniform reflexion, such as would result from an impression on one spot transmitted across the spinal cord to a corresponding motor-nerve. The impression is sometimes followed by one movement, sometimes by another very different movement, each determined by the state of neural118 tension in the whole central system.
Even the facts on which the Reflex Theory is based are differently interpreted by different physiologists. Van Deen, for instance, considers that Reflexion takes place without Volition, but not without Sensation; and Budge119, that it takes place without perception (Vorstellung). And482 when it is remembered that most of the reflex actions will be accompanied by distinct consciousness whenever attention is directed to them, or the vividness of the stimulation is slightly increased, it becomes evident that the absence of Consciousness (discrimination) is not the differentia of Reflex action.
14. Nor can the absence of spontaneity be accepted as a differentia. All actions are excited by stimulation, internal or external. What are called the spontaneous actions are simply those which are prompted by internal, or by not recognizable stimuli; and could we see the process, we should see a neural change initiated120 by some stimulation, whether the change was conscious and volitional, or unconscious and automatic. The dog rising from sleep and restlessly moving about, is acting spontaneously, whether the stimulation which awakens121 him be a sensation of hunger, a sensation of sound, the sharp pain of a prick122, or a dash of cold water. If he wags his tail at the sight of his master, or wags it when dreaming, the stimulation is said to be spontaneous; but if after his spinal cord has been divided the tail wags when his abdomen123 is tickled125, the action is called reflex. In all three cases there has been a process of excitation and reflexion.
15. The advocates of the Reflex Theory insist that spontaneity is always absent in brainless animals; whence the conclusion that the brain is the exclusive organ of sensation. But the fact asserted is contradicted by the evidence. No experimenter can have failed to observe numberless examples of spontaneity in brainless animals. Many examples have already been incidentally noticed in previous pages. Let me add one more from my notes: I decapitated a toad126 and a triton, and divided the spinal cord of another triton and a frog. At first the movements of the decapitated animals were insignificant127; but on the second day the headless toad was quite as lively as the483 frog; and the headless triton little less so than his companion with cord divided but brain intact. I have, at the time of writing this, a frog whose cord was divided some weeks ago. He remains almost motionless unless when touched; he is generally found in the same spot, and in the same attitude to-day as yesterday, unless touched, or unless the table be shaken. He occasionally moves one of the forelegs; occasionally one of the hind-legs; but without changing his position. If he were brainless, this quiescence128 would be cited in proof of the absence of spontaneity in the absence of the brain; but this conclusion would be fallacious, and is seen to be so in the spontaneous movements of his companion who has no brain.
16. With spontaneity is associated the idea of volition, and with volition choice. Now I admit that it is complicating129 the question to ask any one to conceive a headless animal choosing one action rather than another; but it is equally difficult to reconcile ourselves to the idea of “choice” in contemplating130 the actions of a mollusc. In what sense we can speak of the volition of a mollusc or an insect has already been considered (p. 408). When a man in a fit of coughing seizes a glass of water to allay131 the tickling in his throat, we have no hesitation132 in declaring this to be volitional—and the remedy to be chosen. But when a brainless animal adopts some unusual means, after the failure of the usual means, to allay an irritation, we still hesitate to call the action volitional. I see, however, no objection to calling it the adaptation of a sensitive mechanism which is markedly unlike any inorganic133 mechanism.
Place a child of two or three years old upon his back, and tickle124 his right cheek with a feather. He will probably move his head away. Continue tickling, and he will rub the spot with his right hand, never using the left hand for the right cheek, so long as the right hand is free; but484 if you hold his right hand, he will use the left. Does any one dispute the voluntary character of these actions?
Now compare the actions of the sleeping child under similar circumstances, and their sequence will be precisely134 similar. This contrast is the more illustrative, because physiologists generally assume that in sleep consciousness and volition are suspended. They say: “The brain sleeps, the spinal cord never; volition and sensation may be suspended, but not reflex action.” This proposition is extremely questionable135; yet it is indispensable to the reflex theory; because unless sensation and volition are suspended during sleep, we must admit that they can act, without at the same time calling into activity that degree of sensibility which is supposed to constitute consciousness. The child moves in his sleep, defends himself in his sleep; but he is not “aware” of it.
“Children,” says Pflüger, “sleep more soundly than adults, and seem to be more sensitive in sleep. I tickled the right nostril136 of a three-year-old boy. He at once raised his right hand to push me away, and then rubbed the place. When I tickled the left nostril he raised the left hand. I then softly drew both arms down, and laid them close to the body, embedding137 the left arm in the clothes, and placing on it a pillow, by gentle pressure on which I could keep the arm down without awakening138 him. Having done this I tickled his left nostril. He at once began to move the imprisoned139 arm, but could not reach his face with it, because I held it firmly though gently down. He now drew his head aside, and I continued tickling, whereupon he raised the right hand, and with it rubbed the left nostril—an action he never performed when the left hand was free.”
17. This simple but ingenious experiment establishes one important point, namely, that the so-called reflex actions observed in sleep are determined by sensation and485 volition. The sleeping child behaves exactly as the waking child behaved; the only difference being in the energy and rapidity of the actions. If the waking child felt and willed, surely the sleeping child, when it performed precisely similar actions, cannot be said to have felt nothing, willed nothing? It is not at one moment a sentient organism, and at the next an insentient mechanism.
It is possible to meet this case by assuming that the child was nearly awake, and that a dim consciousness was aroused by the tickling, so that the cerebral activity was in fact awakened140. But, plausible141 as this explanation may be (and I am the more ready to admit it because I believe the brain always co-operates when it is present), it altogether fails when we come to experiments on decapitated animals. If any one will institute a series of such experiments, taking care to compare the actions of the animal before and after decapitation, he will perceive that there is no more difference between them than between those of the sleeping and the waking child.
18. Even more striking is the following experiment, devised by Pflüger, which I have verified, and varied142, many times: A frog is decapitated, or its brain is removed.236 When it has recovered from the effect of the ether, and manifests lively sensibility, we place it on its back, and touch, with acetic143 acid, the skin of its thigh144 just above the condylus internus femoris. (Let the reader imagine his own shoulder burnt at the point where it can be reached with the thumb of the same arm, and he will486 realize the operation.) No sooner does the acid begin to burn than the frog stretches out the other leg, so that its body is somewhat drawn79 towards it. The leg that has been burnt is now bent145, and the back of the foot is applied146 to the spot, rubbing the acid away—just as your thumb might rub your shoulder. This is very like the action of the tickled child, who always uses the right hand to rub the right cheek, unless it be held; but when the child’s right hand is prevented from rubbing, the left will be employed; and precisely this do we observe with the brainless frog: prevent it from using its right leg, and it will use its left!
This has been proved by decapitating another frog, and cutting off the foot of the leg which is to be irritated. No sooner is the acid applied, than the leg is bent as before, and the stump147 is moved to and fro, as if to rub away the acid. But the acid is not rubbed away, and the animal becomes restless, as if trying to hit upon some other plan for freeing himself of the irritation. And it is worthy148 of remark that he often hits upon plans very similar to those which an intelligent human being adopts under similar circumstances. Thus, the irritation continuing, he will sometimes cease the vain efforts with his stump, and stretching that leg straight out, bends the other leg over towards the irritated spot, and rubs the acid away. But, to show how far this action is from one of “mere mechanism,” how far it is from being a direct reflex of an impression on a group of muscles, the frog does not always hit even on this plan. Sometimes it bends its irritated leg more energetically, and likewise bends the body towards it, so as to permit the spot to be rubbed against the flank—just as the child, when both his hands are held, will bend his cheek towards his shoulder and rub it there.
19. It is difficult to resist such evidence as is here487 manifested. The brainless frog “chooses” a new plan when the old one fails, just as the waking child chooses. And an illustration of how sensations guide and determine movements, may be seen in another observation of the brainless frog, when, as often happens, it does not hit upon either of the plans just mentioned, but remains apparently149 restless and helpless; if under these circumstances we perform a part of the action for it, it will complete what we have begun: if we rub the irritated leg, at some distance from the spot where the acid is, with the foot of the other, the frog suddenly avails itself of this guiding sensation, and at once directs its foot to the irritated spot.
In these experiments on the triton and the frog, the evidence of sensation and volition is all the stronger, because the reactions produced by irritations150 are not uniform. If when a decapitated animal were stimulated151 it always reacted in precisely the same way, and never chose new means on the failure of the old, it would be conceivable to attribute the results to simple reflex action—i. e. the mechanical transference of an impulse along a prescribed path. It is possible so to conceive the breathing, or the swallowing mechanism: the impression may be directly reflected on certain groups of muscles. But I cannot conceive a machine suddenly striking out new methods, when the old methods fail. I cannot conceive a machine thrown into disorder152 when its accustomed actions fail, and in this disorder suddenly lighting31 upon an action likely to succeed, and continuing that; but I can conceive this to be done by an organism, for my own experience and observation of animals assures me that this is always the way new lines of action are adopted. And this which is observed of the unmutilated animal, I have just shown to be observed of the brainless animal; wherefore the conclusion is, that if ever the frog is sentient,488 if ever its actions are guided by sensation, they are so when its brain is removed.
20. Schr?der van der Kolk thinks that Pflüger was deceived in attributing sensation and volition to the frog, because the reflex actions are, he says, so nicely adapted to their ends, that they are undistinguishable from voluntary actions. The mechanism is such that, by means of the communications established between various groups of cells, all these actions adapted to an end may be excited by every stimulus. But I deny the fact. I deny that all the actions are awakened by every stimulus. Only some few are awakened, and those are not always the same, nor do they follow the same order of succession. One decapitated frog does not behave exactly like another under similar circumstances; does not behave exactly like himself at different seasons; unlike a machine, he manifests spontaneity in his actions, and volition in the direction of his actions.
21. The reader will notice that my illustrations show these actions of the brainless animal to have the same external characters as those of the unmutilated animals. I am therefore not here concerned to prove the psychical153 nature of these actions, unless it be granted that the unmutilated animal has sensation and volition. This of course can only be inferred, not proved. But the inference must not be allowed in the one case and refused in the other. Young rabbits and puppies when taken from their mothers manifest discomfort154 by restless movement and whining155. Do they feel the discomfort they thus express? If ever rabbits and puppies may be said to feel, we must answer, Yes. Well, if the brain be removed from rabbits and puppies, precisely similar phenomena are observed when these young animals are taken from their mothers. “I observed the motions, which seemed the result of discomfort, quickly cease when I warmed the young rabbit by breathing on it. After a while it489 was completely at rest, and seemed sunk in deep sleep; occasionally, however, it moved one of its legs without any external stimulus having been applied, and this not spasmodically, but in the manner of a sleeping animal.”237 Is this cessation of the restlessness, when warmth is restored, not evidence of sensation? We see an infant restless, struggling, and squalling; and we believe that it is hungry, or that some other sensations agitate156 it; it is put to the breast, and its squalls subside157; or a finger is placed in its mouth, and it sucks that, in a peaceful lull158, for a few moments, to recommence squalling when the finger yields no satisfaction. If we accept these as signs of sensation, I do not see how we can deny such sensation to the brainless animal which will also cease to cry, and will suck the delusive159 finger.
22. One of the earliest advocates of the Reflex Theory sums up his observations in these words: “It is clear that brainless animals, although without sensation, because not endowed with mind, nevertheless, by means of external impressions which operate incessantly160 on them, perform all the acts and manifest all the activity of the sentient animal; everything that is effected sensationally161 and volitionally163, they effect by means of the organic forces of the impressions.”238 Call Sensibility one of the organic forces, if you please, but so long as the acts performed are not only the same as those of a sentient animal, but are performed by the same mechanism, they have every claim to the character of sensational162 acts which can be urged in the case of these animals when the brain is present. And the only reason on which this claim is disputed is the assumed loss of all sensation with the loss of the brain. Here, therefore, lies the central point to be determined.
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1
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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peculiarity
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| n.独特性，特色；特殊的东西；怪癖 | |
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3
exclusion
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| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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wink
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| n.眨眼，使眼色，瞬间；v.眨眼，使眼色，闪烁 | |
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irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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sensory
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| adj.知觉的，感觉的，知觉器官的 | |
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mechanism
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| n.机械装置；机构，结构 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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coherence
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| n.紧凑；连贯；一致性 | |
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physiological
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| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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13
investigations
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| （正式的）调查( investigation的名词复数 )； 侦查； 科学研究； 学术研究 | |
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14
lapse
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| n.过失，流逝，失效，抛弃信仰，间隔；vi.堕落，停止，失效，流逝；vt.使失效 | |
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analytically
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| adv.有分析地，解析地 | |
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vitality
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| n.活力，生命力，效力 | |
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functional
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| adj.为实用而设计的，具备功能的，起作用的 | |
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18
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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volition
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| n.意志；决意 | |
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sentient
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| adj.有知觉的，知悉的；adv.有感觉能力地 | |
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illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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24
vibrations
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| n.摆动( vibration的名词复数 )；震动；感受；（偏离平衡位置的）一次性往复振动 | |
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timbre
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| n.音色，音质 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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27
discriminated
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| 分别，辨别，区分( discriminate的过去式和过去分词 )； 歧视，有差别地对待 | |
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28
tickling
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| 反馈，回授，自旋挠痒法 | |
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29
preoccupied
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| adj.全神贯注的，入神的；被抢先占有的；心事重重的v.占据（某人）思想，使对…全神贯注，使专心于( preoccupy的过去式) | |
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30
volitional
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| adj.意志的，凭意志的，有意志的 | |
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31
lighting
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| n.照明，光线的明暗，舞台灯光 | |
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32
awaken
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| vi.醒，觉醒；vt.唤醒，使觉醒，唤起，激起 | |
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33
nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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34
tavern
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| n.小旅馆，客栈；小酒店 | |
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35
potent
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| adj.强有力的，有权势的；有效力的 | |
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36
stimulus
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| n.刺激，刺激物，促进因素，引起兴奋的事物 | |
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37
soothe
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| v.安慰；使平静；使减轻；缓和；奉承 | |
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38
merged
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| （使）混合( merge的过去式和过去分词 )； 相融； 融入； 渐渐消失在某物中 | |
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39
wagon
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| n.四轮马车，手推车，面包车；无盖运货列车 | |
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40
incessant
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| adj.不停的，连续的 | |
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41
stimuli
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| n.刺激（物） | |
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42
habitually
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| ad.习惯地，通常地 | |
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43
intensity
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| n.强烈，剧烈；强度；烈度 | |
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44
usurp
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| vt.篡夺，霸占；vi.篡位 | |
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45
prominence
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| n.突出；显著；杰出；重要 | |
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46
panorama
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| n.全景，全景画，全景摄影，全景照片[装置] | |
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47
splendors
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| n.华丽( splendor的名词复数 )；壮丽；光辉；显赫 | |
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ebullient
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| adj.兴高采烈的，奔放的 | |
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49
exalts
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| 赞扬( exalt的第三人称单数 )； 歌颂； 提升； 提拔 | |
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50
intestines
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| n.肠( intestine的名词复数 ) | |
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51
glands
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| n.腺( gland的名词复数 ) | |
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52
secrete
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| vt.分泌；隐匿，使隐秘 | |
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53
trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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54
remarkably
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| ad.不同寻常地，相当地 | |
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55
wont
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| adj.习惯于；v.习惯；n.习惯 | |
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56
populous
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| adj.人口稠密的，人口众多的 | |
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57
bustle
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| v.喧扰地忙乱，匆忙，奔忙；n.忙碌；喧闹 | |
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58
ribs
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| n.肋骨( rib的名词复数 )；（船或屋顶等的）肋拱；肋骨状的东西；（织物的）凸条花纹 | |
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59
titillation
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| n.搔痒，愉快；搔痒感 | |
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60
pulsation
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| n.脉搏，悸动，脉动；搏动性 | |
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61
aorta
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| n.主动脉 | |
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62
artery
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| n.干线，要道；动脉 | |
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63
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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64
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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65
ledge
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| n.壁架，架状突出物；岩架，岩礁 | |
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66
equilibrium
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| n.平衡，均衡，相称，均势，平静 | |
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67
obstructed
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| 阻塞( obstruct的过去式和过去分词 )； 堵塞； 阻碍； 阻止 | |
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68
diffusive
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| adj.散布性的，扩及的，普及的 | |
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69
yearning
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| a.渴望的；向往的；怀念的 | |
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70
suffused
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| v.（指颜色、水气等）弥漫于，布满( suffuse的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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71
serenity
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| n.宁静，沉着，晴朗 | |
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72
ripples
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| 逐渐扩散的感觉( ripple的名词复数 ) | |
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73
demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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74
molecular
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| adj.分子的；克分子的 | |
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corpse
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| n.尸体，死尸 | |
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76
implicitly
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| adv. 含蓄地, 暗中地, 毫不保留地 | |
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explicitly
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| ad.明确地，显然地 | |
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78
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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80
destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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81
analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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82
sentience
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| n.感觉性；感觉能力；知觉 | |
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83
contraction
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| n.缩略词，缩写式，害病 | |
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84
converging
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| adj.收敛[缩]的，会聚的，趋同的v.（线条、运动的物体等）会于一点( converge的现在分词 )；（趋于）相似或相同；人或车辆汇集；聚集 | |
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85
spinal
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| adj.针的，尖刺的，尖刺状突起的；adj.脊骨的，脊髓的 | |
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86
axis
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| n.轴，轴线，中心线；坐标轴，基准线 | |
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87
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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88
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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89
remodelled
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| v.改变…的结构[形状]( remodel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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90
cerebral
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| adj.脑的，大脑的；有智力的，理智型的 | |
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91
contractions
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| n.收缩( contraction的名词复数 )；缩减；缩略词；（分娩时）子宫收缩 | |
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92
automaton
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| n.自动机器，机器人 | |
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93
phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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94
apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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95
apprehend
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| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
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96
cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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97
constituent
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| n.选民；成分，组分；adj.组成的，构成的 | |
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98
truncated
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| adj.切去顶端的，缩短了的，被删节的v.截面的( truncate的过去式和过去分词 )；截头的；缩短了的；截去顶端或末端 | |
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abbreviated
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| adj. 简短的，省略的 动词abbreviate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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100
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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101
stimulation
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| n.刺激，激励，鼓舞 | |
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102
structurally
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| 在结构上 | |
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103
functionally
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| adv.机能上地，官能地 | |
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104
tremor
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| n.震动，颤动，战栗，兴奋，地震 | |
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dilated
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| adj.加宽的，扩大的v.（使某物）扩大，膨胀，张大( dilate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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106
legitimately
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| ad.合法地；正当地，合理地 | |
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107
irrational
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| adj.无理性的，失去理性的 | |
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108
physiologists
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| n.生理学者( physiologist的名词复数 )；生理学( physiology的名词复数 )；生理机能 | |
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109
irritability
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| n.易怒 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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irritation
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| n.激怒，恼怒，生气 | |
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112
centripetal
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| adj.向心的 | |
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113
anatomy
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| n.解剖学，解剖；功能，结构，组织 | |
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114
physiology
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| n.生理学，生理机能 | |
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115
variance
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| n.矛盾，不同 | |
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116
induction
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| n.感应，感应现象 | |
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117
positively
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| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
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118
neural
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| adj.神经的，神经系统的 | |
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119
budge
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| v.移动一点儿；改变立场 | |
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120
initiated
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| n. 创始人 adj. 新加入的 vt. 开始，创始，启蒙，介绍加入 | |
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121
awakens
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| v.（使）醒( awaken的第三人称单数 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到 | |
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122
prick
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| v.刺伤，刺痛，刺孔；n.刺伤，刺痛 | |
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abdomen
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| n.腹，下腹(胸部到腿部的部分) | |
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tickle
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| v.搔痒，胳肢；使高兴；发痒；n.搔痒，发痒 | |
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tickled
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| （使）发痒( tickle的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）愉快，逗乐 | |
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toad
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| n.蟾蜍，癞蛤蟆 | |
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127
insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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128
quiescence
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| n.静止 | |
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complicating
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| 使复杂化( complicate的现在分词 ) | |
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contemplating
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| 深思，细想，仔细考虑( contemplate的现在分词 )； 注视，凝视； 考虑接受（发生某事的可能性）； 深思熟虑，沉思，苦思冥想 | |
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allay
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| v.消除，减轻(恐惧、怀疑等) | |
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hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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inorganic
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| adj.无生物的；无机的 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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questionable
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| adj.可疑的，有问题的 | |
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nostril
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| n.鼻孔 | |
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137
embedding
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| 把…嵌入，埋入( embed的现在分词 )； 植入； 埋置； 包埋 | |
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awakening
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| n.觉醒，醒悟 adj.觉醒中的；唤醒的 | |
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imprisoned
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| 下狱，监禁( imprison的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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awakened
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| v.（使）醒( awaken的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到 | |
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plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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acetic
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| adj.酸的 | |
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144
thigh
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| n.大腿；股骨 | |
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bent
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| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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stump
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| n.残株，烟蒂，讲演台；v.砍断，蹒跚而走 | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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irritations
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| n.激怒( irritation的名词复数 )；恼怒；生气；令人恼火的事 | |
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stimulated
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| a.刺激的 | |
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152
disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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psychical
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| adj.有关特异功能现象的；有关特异功能官能的；灵魂的；心灵的 | |
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discomfort
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| n.不舒服，不安，难过，困难，不方便 | |
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155
whining
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| n. 抱怨，牢骚 v. 哭诉，发牢骚 | |
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156
agitate
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| vi.(for,against)煽动，鼓动；vt.搅动 | |
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157
subside
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| vi.平静，平息；下沉，塌陷，沉降 | |
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158
lull
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| v.使安静，使入睡，缓和，哄骗；n.暂停，间歇 | |
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159
delusive
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| adj.欺骗的，妄想的 | |
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160
incessantly
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| ad.不停地 | |
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161
sensationally
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162
sensational
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| adj.使人感动的，非常好的，轰动的，耸人听闻的 | |
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volitionally
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| adv.意志地，有意志力地 | |
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