M. Clemenceau, in the remarkable1 series of speeches delivered in the United States of America, implies a breach2 of faith on the part of Britain in reference to the pact3 to guarantee France against the possibility of German aggression4. England has no better friend in the whole of France than M. Clemenceau. Throughout a strenuous5 but consistent career he has never varied6 in his friendship for England. Many a time has he been bitterly assailed7 for that friendship. French journalists are not sparing of innuendo8 against those they hate. They hate fiercely and they hit recklessly, and M. Clemenceau, a man of scrupulous9 integrity, at one period in his stormy political life was charged by certain organs of the Paris press with being in the pay of England. If, therefore, he now does an injustice10 to Britain I am convinced it is not from[Pg 105] blind hatred11 of our country, but from temporary forgetfulness of the facts.
He states the facts with reference to the original pact quite fairly. It was proffered12 as an answer to those who claimed that the left bank of the Rhine should be annexed13 to France.
There was a strong party in France which urged M. Clemenceau to demand that the Rhine should be treated as the natural frontier of their country, and that advantage should be taken of the overwhelming defeat of Germany to extend the boundaries of France to that fateful river. For unknown centuries it has been fought over and across—a veritable river of blood. If French Chauvinism had achieved its purpose at the Paris conference the Rhine would within a generation once more overflow14 its banks and devastate15 Europe. The most moderate and insidious16 form this demand took was a proposal that the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine should remain in French occupation until the treaty had been fulfilled. That meant for ever. Reparations alone—skilfully handled by the Quai d'Orsay—would preclude17 the possibility of ever witnessing fulfilment. The argument by which they supported their claim was the[Pg 106] defencelessness of the French frontier without some natural barrier. France had been twice invaded and overrun within living memory by her formidable neighbour. The German military power was now crushed, and rich and populous18 provinces of the German Empire had been restored to France and Poland, but the population of Germany was still fifty per cent. greater than that of France and it was growing at an alarming rate, whilst the French population was at a standstill. German towns and villages were clamant with sturdy children.
You cannot talk long to a Frenchman without realising how this spectre of German children haunts France and intimidates19 her judgment20. These children, it is said, are nourished on vengeance21: one day the struggle will be resumed, and France has no natural defence against the avenging22 hordes23 that are now playing on German streets and with the hum of whose voices German kindergartens resound24.
We were told the Rhine is the only possible line of resistance. Providence25 meant it to play that part, and it is only the sinister26 interference of statesmen who love not France that deprives[Pg 107] Frenchmen of this security for peace which a far-seeing Nature has provided.
The fact that this involved the subjection to a foreign yoke27 of millions of men of German blood, history, and sympathies, and that the incorporation28 of so large an alien element, hostile in every fibre to French rule, would be a constant source of trouble and anxiety to the French Government, whilst it would not merely provide an incentive29 to Germany to renew war but would justify30 and dignify31 the attack by converting it into a war of liberation—all that had no effect on the Rhenian school of French politics.
This school is as powerful as ever. In one respect it is more powerful, for in 1919 there was a statesman at the head of affairs who had the strength as well as the sagacity to resist their ill-judged claims.
But what about 1922? Where is the foresight32 and where is the strength? There is a real danger that the fifteen years' occupation may on one pretext33 or another be indefinitely prolonged. When it comes to an end will there be a ministry34 in France strong enough to withdraw the troops? Before the fifteen years' occupation is terminated will there be[Pg 108] a ministry or a series of ministries35 strong enough to resist the demand put forward without ceasing in the French press that the occupation should be made effective?
Upon the answer to these questions the peace of Europe—the peace of the world, perhaps the life of our civilisation—depends. The pressure to do the evil thing that will once more spill rivers of human blood is insistent36. The temptation is growing, the resistance is getting feebler. America and Britain standing37 together can alone avert38 the catastrophe39. But they can do so only by making it clear that the aggressor—whoever it be—will have the invincible40 might of these two commonwealths41 arrayed against any nation that threatens to embroil42 the world in another conflict.
There are men in Germany who preach vengeance. They must be told that a war of revenge will find the same allies side by side inflicting43 punishment on the peace-breakers. There are men in France who counsel annexation44 of territories populated by another race. They must be warned that such a step will alienate45 the sympathies of Britain and America, and that when the inevitable46 war of liberation comes the sympathies of America and[Pg 109] Britain will be openly ranged on the side of those who are fighting for national freedom.
The time has come for saying these things, and if they are not said in high places humanity will one day call those who occupy those places to a reckoning.
The pact was designed to strengthen the hands of M. Clemenceau against the aggressive party which was then and still is anxious to commit France to the colossal47 error of annexing48 territory which has always been purely49 German.
M. Clemenceau knows full well that Britain has been ready any time during the last three years up to a few months ago to take upon herself the burden of that pact with or without the United States of America. At Cannes early this year I made a definite proposal to that effect. It was a written offer made by me on behalf of the British government to M. Briand, who was then prime minister of France.
I was anxious to secure the co-operation of France in a general endeavour to clear up the European situation and establish a real peace from the Urals to the Atlantic seaboard. French suspicions and French apprehensions50 constituted a serious [Pg 110]difficulty in the way of settlement, and I thought that if it were made clear to France that the whole strength of the British Empire could be depended upon to come to her aid in the event of threatened invasion French opinion would be in a better mood to discuss the outstanding questions which agitate51 Europe.
International goodwill52 is essential to the re-establishment of the shattered machinery53 of international commerce. With a great country like France, to which the issue of the war had given a towering position on the continent of Europe, in a condition of fretfulness, it was impossible to settle Europe.
Hence the offer which was made by the British government. M. Briand was prepared to welcome this offer and to proceed to a calm consideration of the perplexities of the European situation. It was agreed to summon a conference at Genoa to discuss the condition of European exchange, credit and trade. It was also resolved that an effort should be made to establish peace with Russia and to bring that great country once more inside the community of nations. A great start was made on the path of genuine appeasement54. The German[Pg 111] Government were invited to send their chief Minister to the Cannes conference in order to arrive at a workable settlement of the vexed55 question of reparations. The invitation received a prompt response, and Dr. Rathenau, accompanied by two or three leading ministers and a retinue56 of financial experts, reached Cannes in time to take part in the discussions.
The negotiations57 were proceeding58 helpfully, and another week might have produced results which would have pacified59 the tumult60 of suspicious nations and inaugurated the promise of fraternity. But, alas61, Satan is not done with Europe. A ministerial crisis in France brought our hopes tumbling to the ground. The conference was broken up on the threshold of fulfilment.
Suspicion once more seized the tiller, and Europe, just as she seemed to be entering the harbour of goodwill, was swung back violently into the broken seas of international distrust. The offer made by Britain to stand alone on the pact of guarantee to France was rejected with disdain62. We were told quite brutally63 that it was no use without a military convention. This we declined to enter into. Europe has suffered too much from military[Pg 112] conventions to warrant the repetition of such a disastrous64 experiment.
The pact with Britain lies for the moment in the waste-paper basket. But we never flung it there. M. Clemenceau ought to have made his complaint in Paris against men of his own race and not in New York against Englishmen. With the pact went the effort to make peace in Europe.
The history of Genoa is too recent to require any recapitulation of its features. The new French ministry did not play the part of an inviting65 government responsible for pressing to a successful end the objects of Cannes, but rather that of the captious66 critic who had to be persuaded along every inch of the road and who threatened at every obstacle to turn back and leave the rest of Europe to struggle along with its burden, amid the mocking laughter of France.
I am not complaining of M. Barthou. He did his best under most humiliating conditions to remain loyal to the conference which his government had joined in summoning. But his task was an impossible one. He was hampered67, embarrassed and tangled68 at every turn. Whenever he took any step[Pg 113] forward he was lassoed by a despatch69 from Paris. I have good authority for stating that he received over eight hundred of these communications in the course of the conference!
What could the poor man do under such bewildering conditions? The other European countries were perplexed70 and distracted. They were anxious that Genoa should end in a stable peace. There was no doubt about the sincerity71, the passionate72 sincerity, of the desire for peace throughout Europe, but European nations could not help seeing that one of the great powers was working for a failure. They had a natural anxiety not to appear to take sides.
It is a marvel73 that in spite of this unfortunate attitude adopted by the French Government a pact was signed which has, at any rate, preserved the peace in Eastern Europe for several months.
Before the conference we heard of armies being strengthened along frontiers and of movements of troops with a menacing intent from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Genoa at least dispelled74 that cloud. But a permanent peace has not yet been established and the pact with Russia will soon expire. I am,[Pg 114] however, hopeful that the spirit of Genoa will stand between contending armies and prevent the clash of swords.
All this, however, is leading me away from an examination of M. Clemenceau's suggestion that Britain did not keep faith in the matter of guaranteeing France against German aggression.
The offer was definitely renewed at Cannes, and M. Poincaré has not accepted it.
I have my own opinion as to why he has not done so. It is not merely that he does not wish to set the seal of his approval upon a predecessor's achievement. I am afraid the reason is of a more sinister kind. If France accepts Britain's guarantee of defence of her frontier every excuse for annexing the left bank of the Rhine disappears.
If this is the explanation, if French ministers have made up their minds that under no conditions will they, even at the end of the period of occupation, withdraw from the Rhine, then a new chapter opens in the history of Europe and the world, with a climax75 of horror such as mankind has never yet witnessed.
The German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine are intensely German—in race, language,[Pg 115] tradition and sympathies. There are seventy millions of Germans in Europe. A generation hence there may be a hundred millions. They will never rest content so long as millions of their fellow-countrymen are under a foreign yoke on the other side of the Rhine, and it will only be a question of time and opportunity for the inevitable war of liberation to begin.
We know what the last war was like. No one can foretell76 the terrors of the next. The march of science is inexorable, and wherever it goes it is at the bidding of men, whether to build or to destroy. Is it too much to ask that America should, in time, take an effective interest in the development along the Rhine? To that extent I am in complete accord with M. Clemenceau. Neither Britain nor America can afford to ignore the man?uvres going on along its banks. It is a far cry from the Rhine to the Mississippi, but not so far as it used to be.
There are now graves not far from the Rhine wherein lies the dust of men who, less than six years ago, came from the banks of the Mississippi, with their faces towards the Rhine.
London, December 2nd, 1922.
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1
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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pact
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| n.合同，条约，公约，协定 | |
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aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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strenuous
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| adj.奋发的，使劲的；紧张的；热烈的，狂热的 | |
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varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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assailed
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| v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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innuendo
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| n.暗指，讽刺 | |
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scrupulous
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| adj.审慎的，小心翼翼的，完全的，纯粹的 | |
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injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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proffered
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| v.提供，贡献，提出( proffer的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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annexed
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| [法] 附加的，附属的 | |
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overflow
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| v.(使)外溢，(使)溢出；溢出，流出，漫出 | |
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devastate
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| v.使荒芜，破坏，压倒 | |
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insidious
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| adj.阴险的，隐匿的，暗中为害的，（疾病）不知不觉之间加剧 | |
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preclude
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| vt.阻止，排除，防止；妨碍 | |
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populous
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| adj.人口稠密的，人口众多的 | |
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intimidates
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| n.恐吓，威胁( intimidate的名词复数 )v.恐吓，威胁( intimidate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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vengeance
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| n.报复，报仇，复仇 | |
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avenging
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| adj.报仇的，复仇的v.为…复仇，报…之仇( avenge的现在分词 )；为…报复 | |
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hordes
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| n.移动着的一大群( horde的名词复数 )；部落 | |
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resound
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| v.回响 | |
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providence
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| n.深谋远虑，天道，天意；远见；节约；上帝 | |
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sinister
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| adj.不吉利的，凶恶的，左边的 | |
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yoke
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| n.轭；支配；v.给...上轭，连接，使成配偶 | |
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incorporation
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| n.设立，合并，法人组织 | |
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incentive
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| n.刺激；动力；鼓励；诱因；动机 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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dignify
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| vt.使有尊严；使崇高；给增光 | |
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foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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ministries
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| （政府的）部( ministry的名词复数 )； 神职； 牧师职位； 神职任期 | |
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insistent
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| adj.迫切的，坚持的 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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avert
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| v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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catastrophe
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| n.大灾难，大祸 | |
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invincible
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| adj.不可征服的，难以制服的 | |
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commonwealths
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| n.共和国( commonwealth的名词复数 )；联邦；团体；协会 | |
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42
embroil
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| vt.拖累；牵连；使复杂 | |
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43
inflicting
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的现在分词 ) | |
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44
annexation
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| n.吞并，合并 | |
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45
alienate
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| vt.使疏远，离间；转让(财产等) | |
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46
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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47
colossal
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| adj.异常的，庞大的 | |
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48
annexing
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| 并吞( annex的现在分词 )； 兼并； 强占； 并吞（国家、地区等） | |
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49
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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50
apprehensions
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| 疑惧 | |
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51
agitate
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| vi.(for,against)煽动，鼓动；vt.搅动 | |
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52
goodwill
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| n.善意，亲善，信誉，声誉 | |
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53
machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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54
appeasement
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| n.平息，满足 | |
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55
vexed
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| adj.争论不休的；（指问题等）棘手的；争论不休的问题；烦恼的v.使烦恼( vex的过去式和过去分词 )；使苦恼；使生气；详细讨论 | |
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56
retinue
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| n.侍从；随员 | |
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57
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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59
pacified
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| 使（某人）安静( pacify的过去式和过去分词 )； 息怒； 抚慰； 在（有战争的地区、国家等）实现和平 | |
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60
tumult
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| n.喧哗；激动，混乱；吵闹 | |
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61
alas
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| int.唉(表示悲伤、忧愁、恐惧等) | |
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62
disdain
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| n.鄙视，轻视；v.轻视，鄙视，不屑 | |
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63
brutally
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| adv.残忍地，野蛮地，冷酷无情地 | |
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64
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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inviting
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| adj.诱人的，引人注目的 | |
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captious
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| adj.难讨好的，吹毛求疵的 | |
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67
hampered
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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tangled
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| adj. 纠缠的，紊乱的 动词tangle的过去式和过去分词 | |
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69
despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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70
perplexed
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| adj.不知所措的 | |
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sincerity
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| n.真诚，诚意；真实 | |
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72
passionate
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，激昂的，易动情的，易怒的，性情暴躁的 | |
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marvel
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| vi.(at)惊叹vt.感到惊异；n.令人惊异的事 | |
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dispelled
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| v.驱散，赶跑( dispel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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75
climax
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| n.顶点；高潮；v.(使)达到顶点 | |
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foretell
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| v.预言，预告，预示 | |
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