It is rather late in the day to make all this fuss about the publication of war documents, for generals, admirals, and ministers in all lands, including ours, have during the last three years been inundating2 the European and American public with a flood of reminiscences, explanations, criticisms, attacks and defences on the conduct of operations, either of the Great War or the Great Peace, in which they were engaged. Warriors3 on land and on sea have displayed an unprecedented4 eagerness[Pg 362] to inform the public as to their own share in the great victory, and as to how much more brilliant that share would have been but for the wrongheadedness or stupidity of some collaborator6. Like Julius C?sar, they mean to live in history not merely through their battles, but also through their commentaries upon them. On the other hand, statesmen have been engaged in disclaiming8 responsibility for particular parts of the Treaty of Versailles, and where blame has been attached to them, either by opponents or supporters, for the form in which those parts were cast, they have striven hard to prove that it was attributable to pressure which they were unable to resist from other actors in the drama. In each case highly confidential9 information is disclosed, secret documents are used, cabinet and council proceedings10 are published, without the slightest regard to precedent5. One disclosure has led to another, one revelation has rendered another inevitable11.
A general, admiral or minister criticises on the strength of half-disclosed minutes or documents some other public functionary12, military, naval13, or political. What is the latter to do? His reputation is at stake. Is he not to be allowed to repair[Pg 363] the omission14 or to correct the misquotation? Take the case of ministers who played an important part in the conduct of the war or the peace, and whose actions have been subjected to malignant16 and persistent17 misrepresentation. In attacking these ministers statements are made which, if accepted by the public, would irretrievably damage or even destroy their reputation. In formulating18 the attack a document is partially19 quoted, or the report of a council or cabinet meeting is misquoted. The minister knows that a full and fair quotation15 would clear his good name of the imputation20 sought to be cast upon it. Is he not to be allowed, in those circumstances, to publish it? A mere7 denial would carry no weight. A full revelation would settle the dispute in his favour. The publication cannot conceivably affect any public interest, it would supply no information which could serve any possible enemy of his country. Is he not to be allowed to use the only means available to redeem21 his credit from the ruin of accepted calumny22? His critic has been allowed to disclose secret information without protest. Is he to be forbidden to do so in self-defence? He claims that he served his country faithfully to the best of his powers in time of crisis and peril23. For[Pg 364] that he is defamed by men who had access to secret information and use it freely without criticism, censure24 or demur25. Why should his country deny him the same privilege for his protection? That is the case which the cabinet committee will have to consider. Whatever general rules may be laid down they must in all fairness take into account these exceptional circumstances. Those who are now taking a prominent part in emphasising the enormity of giving to the public documents which were acquired in the public service had not a word to say when portions of those documents were used for purposes with which they were in sympathy. Is it not rather late for them to protest now? There is such a thing as fair play even when politicians are attacked.
So far as the British are concerned the writing of the books of the type alluded26 to was started, I think, by Field-Marshal Lord French of Ypres, in his book, 1914. This work is of the nature of an apologia; and the writer, to assist in establishing his case, alludes27 to discussions with the cabinet and does not hesitate to quote textually secret memoranda28 and dispatches written by himself and others. The late Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Fisher,[Pg 365] gives in his book, Memories, examples of his own intervention29 at the war council meetings. In his autobiography30, From Private to Field-Marshal, which appeared some time later, Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, who was for over two years the confidential adviser31 of the cabinet and as such attended all war councils and most war cabinet meetings, when it suits his argument gives to the public his version of what passed at these highly secret conclaves32. Though he does not quote secret documents textually, he describes the proceedings and deliberations of the supreme33 war council, inter-Allied conferences and the war cabinet, and refers to the opinions of individuals. In his recent speeches he has gone even further. A still more recent work, Sir Douglas Haig's Command, is the result of collaboration34 by two authors of whom one, at least, held an official position during the war, being Sir Douglas Haig's private secretary when he was Commander-in-Chief of the British army in France. This book is even less reticent35. It, also, is essentially36 an apologia and justification37 of an individual. To establish their case, the writers not only summarise38 some of the secret proceedings of the supreme war council and war cabinet, but give[Pg 366] extracts of their decisions. These extracts are freely used as the basis of animadversion on the council and cabinet of that day. It is true that some of the quotations39 are stated to be taken from French books previously40 published, but others are not, which arouses curiosity as to the source of the knowledge displayed.
In addition there have been endless articles in magazines and newspapers, some signed, some written anonymously41, all attacking either ministers, generals or admirals, and most of them clearly supplied with secret information by men who must have acquired it in their official capacity. As to all these disclosures protest has hitherto been silent. But when it is indicated that replies are forthcoming and that these replies will reveal the real nature of the misquoted documents or proceedings, the wrath42 of the assailants and their sympathisers knows no bounds.
What happened in reference to the consultations43 held in connection with the framing of the peace treaty affords an illustration of the way these revelations occur. The question of the publication of these proceedings was definitely discussed at Versailles, after the signature of the peace treaty with[Pg 367] Germany on the 28th June, 1919, by President Wilson, representing the United States, M. Clemenceau and M. Simon, representing France, M. Sonnino, representing Italy, M. Makino, representing Japan, and myself. This is what occurred on that occasion. For the first time I quote from my own notes written at the time:
"President Wilson was strongly of opinion that these documents ought to be treated as purely44 private conversation, and he objected to the communication of the accounts given in the Notes of the private conversations, in which all present had spoken their minds with great freedom, as improper45 use might afterwards be made of these documents. On the other hand, he did not object to the Notes being communicated to special individuals in the personal confidence of members of the Council. Though he looked upon certain statements, the conclusions and the actions as being official, and therefore available in the appropriate offices, the actual conversations were private. In the United States no one had the right to claim documents of this kind. President Wilson's view was that each government should take the course traditional in its[Pg 368] own country with the clear and distinct understanding that no one should under any circumstances make the procès verbal public. M. Clemenceau did not think that such documents should be regarded as private property, whilst M. Sonnino thought they need not be considered as official documents.
"For my own part I was anxious to know what the precedents46 were. I also felt bound to enter a caveat47 that if attacks should be made on the political heads I might be forced in particular cases to refer to these Notes, and I gave warning that I might have to do so unless a protest was then made. M. Clemenceau agreed so far, that it might be impossible to refuse extracts from the procès verbaux to prove particular facts."
It will be observed from this record that I was the first to safeguard the interest of persons who, I felt certain, would be attacked for their share in the treaty. I am the last to take advantage of the proviso.
What followed? M. Clemenceau was bitterly attacked by his political opponents for surrendering French rights to the treaty. President Wilson was also attacked by his political opponents for[Pg 369] his assent48 to other provisions of the treaty. In self-defence they authorised the publication of the secret reports of the Paris meeting.
M. Clemenceau entrusted49 his defence to M. Tardieu. M. Tardieu, in his book The Truth About the Treaty, gives most of his attention to the drawing up of that international instrument, but deals with the last portion of the war period and quotes from the proceedings of inter-allied conferences, and also of the supreme war council, giving the opinions of individuals. He does the same with the deliberations of the peace conference. In fact the whole book is based on international proceedings of a secret nature. M. Poincaré, in maligning50 his rivals, has not refrained from making full use of information which came to his knowledge as President of the Republic. For example, in his article, Souvenirs et Documents, in the Temps of the 12th September, 1921, he quotes in extenso a letter of April, 1919, from himself as President of the Republic to the President of the Council, M. Clemenceau, and a letter from me in reply to the President of the Council. My consent was not even asked to the publication of my letter. This correspondence referred to the period proposed to be placed on the[Pg 370] occupation by the Allies of the left bank of the Rhine. According to Signor Nitti, M. Poincaré makes somewhat similar disclosures in his articles published in the Revue des Deux Mondes. All these disclosures were partial, truncated51 and, therefore, misleading. They did not give the public a complete account of what occurred. The impression created was, therefore, unfair to the other actors in that great drama. That is undoubtedly52 what impelled53 ex-President Wilson to hand over his documents to Mr. Ray Baker54 with a view to the presentation of the case from the standpoint of the American delegation55. Hence his book, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement. It is mostly based on the secret minutes of the supreme war council, numerous extracts from which are given. Signor Nitti, the late Italian premier56, on the other hand, expressly states that he does not publish any document which was not intended for publication. Nevertheless, he prints a memorandum57 written by myself for the peace conference in March, 1919, under the title of Some Considerations for the Peace Conference before they finally Draft their Terms, and also M. Clemenceau's reply, both of which are secret documents. But he excuses his [Pg 371]action in this case because extracts from this memorandum had already been published.
I only mention these matters, not by way of arraignment58 of these various distinguished59 men for divulging60 secrets they ought to have kept under lock and key. That is not in the least my object. I do so in order to point out that general rules as to the conditions under which confidential material can be used are not applicable to circumstances of the Great War and the peace that ensued. Disclosures already made largely for purposes of criticism and aspersion61 upon individuals or bodies of individuals have given the assailed62 parties a special position which cannot in justice be overlooked.
London, March 17th, 1923.
The End
The End
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1
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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inundating
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| v.淹没( inundate的现在分词 )；（洪水般地）涌来；充满；给予或交予（太多事物）使难以应付 | |
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warriors
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| 武士，勇士，战士( warrior的名词复数 ) | |
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unprecedented
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| adj.无前例的，新奇的 | |
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precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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collaborator
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| n.合作者，协作者 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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disclaiming
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| v.否认( disclaim的现在分词 ) | |
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confidential
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| adj.秘（机）密的，表示信任的，担任机密工作的 | |
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proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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functionary
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| n.官员；公职人员 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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omission
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| n.省略，删节；遗漏或省略的事物，冗长 | |
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quotation
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| n.引文，引语，语录；报价，牌价，行情 | |
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16
malignant
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| adj.恶性的，致命的；恶意的，恶毒的 | |
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persistent
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| adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的 | |
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18
formulating
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| v.构想出( formulate的现在分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
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19
partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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imputation
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| n.归罪，责难 | |
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redeem
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| v.买回，赎回，挽回，恢复，履行（诺言等） | |
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calumny
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| n.诽谤，污蔑，中伤 | |
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23
peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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24
censure
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| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
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demur
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| v．表示异议，反对 | |
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26
alluded
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| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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27
alludes
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| 提及，暗指( allude的第三人称单数 ) | |
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28
memoranda
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| n. 备忘录, 便条 名词memorandum的复数形式 | |
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29
intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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30
autobiography
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| n.自传 | |
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adviser
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| n.劝告者，顾问 | |
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32
conclaves
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| n.秘密会议，教皇选举会议，红衣主教团( conclave的名词复数 ) | |
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33
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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collaboration
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| n.合作，协作；勾结 | |
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35
reticent
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| adj.沉默寡言的；言不如意的 | |
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essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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38
summarise
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| vt.概括，总结 | |
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39
quotations
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| n.引用( quotation的名词复数 )；[商业]行情（报告）；（货物或股票的）市价；时价 | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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41
anonymously
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| ad.用匿名的方式 | |
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42
wrath
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| n.愤怒，愤慨，暴怒 | |
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43
consultations
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| n.磋商（会议）( consultation的名词复数 )；商讨会；协商会；查找 | |
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44
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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45
improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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46
precedents
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| 引用单元； 范例( precedent的名词复数 )； 先前出现的事例； 前例； 先例 | |
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47
caveat
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| n.警告； 防止误解的说明 | |
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48
assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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49
entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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50
maligning
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| vt.污蔑，诽谤（malign的现在分词形式） | |
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51
truncated
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| adj.切去顶端的，缩短了的，被删节的v.截面的( truncate的过去式和过去分词 )；截头的；缩短了的；截去顶端或末端 | |
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52
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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53
impelled
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| v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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54
baker
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| n.面包师 | |
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55
delegation
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| n.代表团；派遣 | |
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56
premier
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| adj.首要的；n.总理，首相 | |
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57
memorandum
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| n.备忘录，便笺 | |
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58
arraignment
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| n.提问，传讯，责难 | |
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59
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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60
divulging
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| v.吐露，泄露( divulge的现在分词 ) | |
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61
aspersion
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| n.诽谤，中伤 | |
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62
assailed
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| v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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