From the New York Packet. Friday, December 14, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IN ADDITION to the defects already enumerated1 in the existing federal system, there are others of not less importance, which concur3 in rendering4 it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the union.
The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be of the number. The utility of such a power has been anticipated under the first head of our inquiries5; and for this reason, as well as from the universal conviction entertained upon the subject, little need be added in this place. It is indeed evident, on the most superficial view, that there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or finance, that more strongly demands a federal superintendence. The want of it has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction between the States. No nation acquainted with the nature of our political association would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations with the United States, by which they conceded privileges of any importance to them, while they were apprised7 that the engagements on the part of the union might at any moment be violated by its members, and while they found from experience that they might enjoy every advantage they desired in our markets, without granting us any return but such as their momentary8 convenience might suggest. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that Mr. Jenkinson, in ushering9 into the House of Commons a bill for regulating the temporary intercourse10 between the two countries, should preface its introduction by a declaration that similar provisions in former bills had been found to answer every purpose to the commerce of Great Britain, and that it would be prudent11 to persist in the plan until it should appear whether the American government was likely or not to acquire greater consistency12.(1)
Several States have endeavored, by separate prohibitions13, restrictions14, and exclusions15, to influence the conduct of that kingdom in this particular, but the want of concert, arising from the want of a general authority and from clashing and dissimilar views in the State, has hitherto frustrated16 every experiment of the kind, and will continue to do so as long as the same obstacles to a uniformity of measures continue to exist.
The interfering17 and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to the true spirit of the union, have, in different instances, given just cause of umbrage18 and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord19 than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy. "The commerce of the German empire(2) is in continual trammels from the multiplicity of the duties which the several princes and states exact upon the merchandises passing through their territories, by means of which the fine streams and navigable rivers with which Germany is so happily watered are rendered almost useless." Though the genius of the people of this country might never permit this description to be strictly20 applicable to us, yet we may reasonably expect, from the gradual conflicts of State regulations, that the citizens of each would at length come to be considered and treated by the others in no better light than that of foreigners and aliens.
The power of raising armies, by the most obvious construction of the articles of the Confederation, is merely a power of making requisitions upon the States for quotas22 of men. This practice in the course of the late war, was found replete23 with obstructions24 to a vigorous and to an economical system of defense26. It gave birth to a competition between the States which created a kind of auction27 for men. In order to furnish the quotas required of them, they outbid each other till bounties28 grew to an enormous and insupportable size. The hope of a still further increase afforded an inducement to those who were disposed to serve to procrastinate29 their enlistment30, and disinclined them from engaging for any considerable periods. Hence, slow and scanty31 levies32 of men, in the most critical emergencies of our affairs; short enlistments at an unparalleled expense; continual fluctuations33 in the troops, ruinous to their discipline and subjecting the public safety frequently to the perilous34 crisis of a disbanded army. Hence, also, those oppressive expedients35 for raising men which were upon several occasions practiced, and which nothing but the enthusiasm of liberty would have induced the people to endure.
This method of raising troops is not more unfriendly to economy and vigor25 than it is to an equal distribution of the burden. The States near the seat of war, influenced by motives36 of self-preservation, made efforts to furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities; while those at a distance from danger were, for the most part, as remiss37 as the others were diligent38, in their exertions39. The immediate40 pressure of this inequality was not in this case, as in that of the contributions of money, alleviated41 by the hope of a final liquidation42. The States which did not pay their proportions of money might at least be charged with their deficiencies; but no account could be formed of the deficiencies in the supplies of men. We shall not, however, see much reason to regret the want of this hope, when we consider how little prospect44 there is, that the most delinquent45 States will ever be able to make compensation for their pecuniary46 failures. The system of quotas and requisitions, whether it be applied47 to men or money, is, in every view, a system of imbecility in the union, and of inequality and injustice48 among the members.
The right of equal suffrage49 among the States is another exceptionable part of the Confederation. Every idea of proportion and every rule of fair representation conspire50 to condemn51 a principle, which gives to Rhode Island an equal weight in the scale of power with Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or New York; and to Delaware an equal voice in the national deliberations with Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North Carolina. Its operation contradicts the fundamental maxim52 of republican government, which requires that the sense of the majority should prevail. Sophistry53 may reply, that sovereigns are equal, and that a majority of the votes of the States will be a majority of confederated America. But this kind of logical legerdemain54 will never counteract55 the plain suggestions of justice and common-sense. It may happen that this majority of States is a small minority of the people of America;(3) and two thirds of the people of America could not long be persuaded, upon the credit of artificial distinctions and syllogistic56 subtleties57, to submit their interests to the management and disposal of one third. The larger States would after a while revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the smaller. To acquiesce58 in such a privation of their due importance in the political scale, would be not merely to be insensible to the love of power, but even to sacrifice the desire of equality. It is neither rational to expect the first, nor just to require the last. The smaller States, considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare depend on union, ought readily to renounce60 a pretension61 which, if not relinquished62, would prove fatal to its duration.
It may be objected to this, that not seven but nine States, or two thirds of the whole number, must consent to the most important resolutions; and it may be thence inferred that nine States would always comprehend a majority of the union. But this does not obviate63 the impropriety of an equal vote between States of the most unequal dimensions and populousness64; nor is the inference accurate in point of fact; for we can enumerate2 nine States which contain less than a majority of the people;(4) and it is constitutionally possible that these nine may give the vote. Besides, there are matters of considerable moment determinable by a bare majority; and there are others, concerning which doubts have been entertained, which, if interpreted in favor of the sufficiency of a vote of seven States, would extend its operation to interests of the first magnitude. In addition to this, it is to be observed that there is a probability of an increase in the number of States, and no provision for a proportional augmentation of the ratio of votes.
But this is not all: what at first sight may seem a remedy, is, in reality, a poison. To give a minority a negative upon the majority (which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite65 to a decision), is, in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser66. Congress, from the nonattendance of a few States, have been frequently in the situation of a Polish diet, where a single VOTE has been sufficient to put a stop to all their movements. A sixtieth part of the union, which is about the proportion of Delaware and Rhode Island, has several times been able to oppose an entire bar to its operations. This is one of those refinements67 which, in practice, has an effect the reverse of what is expected from it in theory. The necessity of unanimity68 in public bodies, or of something approaching towards it, has been founded upon a supposition that it would contribute to security. But its real operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy of the government, and to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices69 of an insignificant70, turbulent, or corrupt71 junto72, to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. In those emergencies of a nation, in which the goodness or badness, the weakness or strength of its government, is of the greatest importance, there is commonly a necessity for action. The public business must, in some way or other, go forward. If a pertinacious73 minority can control the opinion of a majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it, the majority, in order that something may be done, must conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense of the smaller number will overrule that of the greater, and give a tone to the national proceedings74. Hence, tedious delays; continual negotiation75 and intrigue76; contemptible77 compromises of the public good. And yet, in such a system, it is even happy when such compromises can take place: for upon some occasions things will not admit of accommodation; and then the measures of government must be injuriously suspended, or fatally defeated. It is often, by the impracticability of obtaining the concurrence78 of the necessary number of votes, kept in a state of inaction. Its situation must always savor79 of weakness, sometimes border upon anarchy80.
It is not difficult to discover, that a principle of this kind gives greater scope to foreign corruption81, as well as to domestic faction6, than that which permits the sense of the majority to decide; though the contrary of this has been presumed. The mistake has proceeded from not attending with due care to the mischiefs82 that may be occasioned by obstructing83 the progress of government at certain critical seasons. When the concurrence of a large number is required by the Constitution to the doing of any national act, we are apt to rest satisfied that all is safe, because nothing improper84 will be likely TO BE DONE, but we forget how much good may be prevented, and how much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what may be necessary, and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture85 in which they may happen to stand at particular periods.
Suppose, for instance, we were engaged in a war, in conjunction with one foreign nation, against another. Suppose the necessity of our situation demanded peace, and the interest or ambition of our ally led him to seek the prosecution86 of the war, with views that might justify87 us in making separate terms. In such a state of things, this ally of ours would evidently find it much easier, by his bribes88 and intrigues89, to tie up the hands of government from making peace, where two thirds of all the votes were requisite to that object, than where a simple majority would suffice. In the first case, he would have to corrupt a smaller number; in the last, a greater number. Upon the same principle, it would be much easier for a foreign power with which we were at war to perplex our councils and embarrass our exertions. And, in a commercial view, we may be subjected to similar inconveniences. A nation, with which we might have a treaty of commerce, could with much greater facility prevent our forming a connection with her competitor in trade, though such a connection should be ever so beneficial to ourselves.
Evils of this description ought not to be regarded as imaginary. One of the weak sides of republics, among their numerous advantages, is that they afford too easy an inlet to foreign corruption. An hereditary90 monarch91, though often disposed to sacrifice his subjects to his ambition, has so great a personal interest in the government and in the external glory of the nation, that it is not easy for a foreign power to give him an equivalent for what he would sacrifice by treachery to the state. The world has accordingly been witness to few examples of this species of royal prostitution, though there have been abundant specimens92 of every other kind.
In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the community, by the suffrages93 of their fellow-citizens, to stations of great pre-eminence and power, may find compensations for betraying their trust, which, to any but minds animated94 and guided by superior virtue95, may appear to exceed the proportion of interest they have in the common stock, and to overbalance the obligations of duty. Hence it is that history furnishes us with so many mortifying96 examples of the prevalency of foreign corruption in republican governments. How much this contributed to the ruin of the ancient commonwealths97 has been already delineated. It is well known that the deputies of the United Provinces have, in various instances, been purchased by the emissaries of the neighboring kingdoms. The Earl of Chesterfield (if my memory serves me right), in a letter to his court, intimates that his success in an important negotiation must depend on his obtaining a major's commission for one of those deputies. And in Sweden the parties were alternately bought by France and England in so barefaced98 and notorious a manner that it excited universal disgust in the nation, and was a principal cause that the most limited monarch in Europe, in a single day, without tumult99, violence, or opposition100, became one of the most absolute and uncontrolled.
A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains101 yet to be mentioned, the want of a judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound102 and define their true meaning and operation. The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained103 by judicial104 determinations. To produce uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in the last resort, to one SUPREME105 TRIBUNAL. And this tribunal ought to be instituted under the same authority which forms the treaties themselves. These ingredients are both indispensable. If there is in each State a court of final jurisdiction106, there may be as many different final determinations on the same point as there are courts. There are endless diversities in the opinions of men. We often see not only different courts but the judges of the came court differing from each other. To avoid the confusion which would unavoidably result from the contradictory107 decisions of a number of independent judicatories, all nations have found it necessary to establish one court paramount108 to the rest, possessing a general superintendence, and authorized109 to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule of civil justice.
This is the more necessary where the frame of the government is so compounded that the laws of the whole are in danger of being contravened110 by the laws of the parts. In this case, if the particular tribunals are invested with a right of ultimate jurisdiction, besides the contradictions to be expected from difference of opinion, there will be much to fear from the bias111 of local views and prejudices, and from the interference of local regulations. As often as such an interference was to happen, there would be reason to apprehend112 that the provisions of the particular laws might be preferred to those of the general laws; for nothing is more natural to men in office than to look with peculiar59 deference113 towards that authority to which they owe their official existence.
The treaties of the United States, under the present Constitution, are liable to the infractions of thirteen different legislatures, and as many different courts of final jurisdiction, acting114 under the authority of those legislatures. The faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole union, are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed. Is it possible that foreign nations can either respect or confide115 in such a government? Is it possible that the people of America will longer consent to trust their honor, their happiness, their safety, on so precarious116 a foundation?
In this review of the Confederation, I have confined myself to the exhibition of its most material defects; passing over those imperfections in its details by which even a great part of the power intended to be conferred upon it has been in a great measure rendered abortive117. It must be by this time evident to all men of reflection, who can divest118 themselves of the prepossessions of preconceived opinions, that it is a system so radically119 vicious and unsound, as to admit not of amendment120 but by an entire change in its leading features and characters.
The organization of Congress is itself utterly121 improper for the exercise of those powers which are necessary to be deposited in the union. A single assembly may be a proper receptacle of those slender, or rather fettered122, authorities, which have been heretofore delegated to the federal head; but it would be inconsistent with all the principles of good government, to intrust it with those additional powers which, even the moderate and more rational adversaries123 of the proposed Constitution admit, ought to reside in the United States. If that plan should not be adopted, and if the necessity of the union should be able to withstand the ambitious aims of those men who may indulge magnificent schemes of personal aggrandizement124 from its dissolution, the probability would be, that we should run into the project of conferring supplementary125 powers upon Congress, as they are now constituted; and either the machine, from the intrinsic feebleness of its structure, will moulder126 into pieces, in spite of our ill-judged efforts to prop43 it; or, by successive augmentations of its force an energy, as necessity might prompt, we shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most important prerogatives127 of sovereignty, and thus entail128 upon our posterity129 one of the most execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever contrived130. Thus, we should create in reality that very tyranny which the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous131 to avert132.
It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal system, that it never had a ratification133 by the PEOPLE. Resting on no better foundation than the consent of the several legislatures, it has been exposed to frequent and intricate questions concerning the validity of its powers, and has, in some instances, given birth to the enormous doctrine134 of a right of legislative135 repeal136. Owing its ratification to the law of a State, it has been contended that the same authority might repeal the law by which it was ratified137. However gross a heresy138 it may be to maintain that a PARTY to a COMPACT has a right to revoke139 that COMPACT, the doctrine itself has had respectable advocates. The possibility of a question of this nature proves the necessity of laying the foundations of our national government deeper than in the mere21 sanction of delegated authority. The fabric140 of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate141 authority.
PUBLIUS
2. Encyclopedia143, article "Empire."
3. New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey144, Delaware, Georgia, South Carolina, and Maryland are a majority of the whole number of the States, but they do not contain one third of the people.
4. Add New York and Connecticut to the foregoing seven, and they will be less than a majority.
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enumerated
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| v.列举，枚举，数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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enumerate
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| v.列举，计算，枚举，数 | |
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concur
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| v.同意，意见一致，互助，同时发生 | |
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rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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inquiries
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| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
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faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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apprised
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| v.告知，通知( apprise的过去式和过去分词 )；评价 | |
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momentary
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| adj.片刻的，瞬息的；短暂的 | |
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ushering
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| v.引，领，陪同( usher的现在分词 ) | |
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intercourse
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| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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consistency
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| n.一贯性，前后一致，稳定性；(液体的)浓度 | |
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prohibitions
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| 禁令，禁律( prohibition的名词复数 )； 禁酒； 禁例 | |
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restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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exclusions
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| n.不包括的项目：如接受服务项目是由投保以前已患有的疾病或伤害引致的，保险公司有权拒绝支付。；拒绝( exclusion的名词复数 )；排除；被排斥在外的人（或事物）；排外主义 | |
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frustrated
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| adj.挫败的，失意的，泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 )；挫败；使受挫折；令人沮丧 | |
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interfering
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| adj. 妨碍的 动词interfere的现在分词 | |
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umbrage
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| n.不快；树荫 | |
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discord
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| n.不和，意见不合，争论，（音乐）不和谐 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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quotas
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| （正式限定的）定量( quota的名词复数 )； 定额； 指标； 摊派 | |
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replete
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| adj.饱满的，塞满的；n.贮蜜蚁 | |
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obstructions
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| n.障碍物( obstruction的名词复数 )；阻碍物；阻碍；阻挠 | |
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vigor
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| n.活力，精力，元气 | |
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defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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auction
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| n.拍卖；拍卖会；vt.拍卖 | |
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bounties
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| （由政府提供的）奖金( bounty的名词复数 )； 赏金； 慷慨； 大方 | |
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procrastinate
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| v.耽搁，拖延 | |
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enlistment
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| n.应征入伍，获得，取得 | |
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scanty
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| adj.缺乏的，仅有的，节省的，狭小的，不够的 | |
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levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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fluctuations
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| 波动，涨落，起伏( fluctuation的名词复数 ) | |
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perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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expedients
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| n.应急有效的，权宜之计的( expedient的名词复数 ) | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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remiss
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| adj.不小心的，马虎 | |
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diligent
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| adj.勤勉的，勤奋的 | |
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exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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alleviated
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| 减轻，缓解，缓和( alleviate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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liquidation
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| n.清算，停止营业 | |
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prop
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| vt.支撑；n.支柱，支撑物；支持者，靠山 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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delinquent
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| adj.犯法的，有过失的；n.违法者 | |
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pecuniary
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| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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suffrage
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| n.投票，选举权，参政权 | |
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conspire
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| v.密谋，（事件等）巧合，共同导致 | |
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condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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52
maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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sophistry
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| n.诡辩 | |
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legerdemain
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| n.戏法，诈术 | |
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55
counteract
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| vt.对…起反作用，对抗，抵消 | |
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syllogistic
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| adj.三段论法的，演绎的，演绎性的 | |
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subtleties
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| 细微( subtlety的名词复数 )； 精细； 巧妙； 细微的差别等 | |
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acquiesce
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| vi.默许，顺从，同意 | |
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59
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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60
renounce
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| v.放弃；拒绝承认，宣布与…断绝关系 | |
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61
pretension
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| n.要求；自命，自称；自负 | |
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62
relinquished
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| 交出，让给( relinquish的过去式和过去分词 )； 放弃 | |
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63
obviate
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| v.除去，排除，避免，预防 | |
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64
populousness
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| 人口稠密 | |
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65
requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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66
lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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67
refinements
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| n.（生活）风雅；精炼( refinement的名词复数 )；改良品；细微的改良；优雅或高贵的动作 | |
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68
unanimity
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| n.全体一致，一致同意 | |
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69
artifices
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| n.灵巧( artifice的名词复数 )；诡计；巧妙办法；虚伪行为 | |
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70
insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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71
corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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72
junto
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| n.秘密结社；私党 | |
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73
pertinacious
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| adj.顽固的 | |
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74
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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75
negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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76
intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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77
contemptible
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| adj.可鄙的，可轻视的，卑劣的 | |
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78
concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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79
savor
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| vt.品尝，欣赏；n.味道，风味；情趣，趣味 | |
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80
anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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81
corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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82
mischiefs
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| 损害( mischief的名词复数 )； 危害； 胡闹； 调皮捣蛋的人 | |
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83
obstructing
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| 阻塞( obstruct的现在分词 )； 堵塞； 阻碍； 阻止 | |
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84
improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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posture
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| n.姿势，姿态，心态，态度；v.作出某种姿势 | |
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86
prosecution
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| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
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87
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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88
bribes
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| n.贿赂( bribe的名词复数 )；向（某人）行贿，贿赂v.贿赂( bribe的第三人称单数 )；向（某人）行贿，贿赂 | |
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89
intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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monarch
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| n.帝王，君主，最高统治者 | |
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specimens
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| n.样品( specimen的名词复数 )；范例；（化验的）抽样；某种类型的人 | |
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93
suffrages
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| （政治性选举的）选举权，投票权( suffrage的名词复数 ) | |
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animated
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| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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mortifying
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| adj.抑制的，苦修的v.使受辱( mortify的现在分词 )；伤害（人的感情）；克制；抑制（肉体、情感等） | |
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97
commonwealths
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| n.共和国( commonwealth的名词复数 )；联邦；团体；协会 | |
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98
barefaced
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| adj.厚颜无耻的，公然的 | |
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99
tumult
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| n.喧哗；激动，混乱；吵闹 | |
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100
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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101
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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102
expound
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| v.详述；解释；阐述 | |
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103
ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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104
judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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105
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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106
jurisdiction
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| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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107
contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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108
paramount
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| a.最重要的，最高权力的 | |
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109
authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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110
contravened
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| v.取消，违反( contravene的过去式 ) | |
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111
bias
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| n.偏见，偏心，偏袒；vt.使有偏见 | |
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112
apprehend
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| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
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113
deference
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| n.尊重，顺从；敬意 | |
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114
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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115
confide
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| v.向某人吐露秘密 | |
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116
precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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117
abortive
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| adj.不成功的，发育不全的 | |
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118
divest
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| v.脱去，剥除 | |
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119
radically
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| ad.根本地，本质地 | |
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120
amendment
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| n.改正，修正，改善，修正案 | |
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121
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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122
fettered
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| v.给…上脚镣，束缚( fetter的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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123
adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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124
aggrandizement
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| n.增大，强化，扩大 | |
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125
supplementary
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| adj.补充的，附加的 | |
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126
moulder
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| v.腐朽，崩碎 | |
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127
prerogatives
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| n.权利( prerogative的名词复数 )；特权；大主教法庭；总督委任组成的法庭 | |
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128
entail
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| vt.使承担，使成为必要，需要 | |
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129
posterity
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| n.后裔，子孙，后代 | |
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130
contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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131
solicitous
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| adj.热切的，挂念的 | |
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132
avert
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| v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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133
ratification
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| n.批准，认可 | |
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134
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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135
legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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136
repeal
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| n.废止，撤消；v.废止，撤消 | |
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137
ratified
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| v.批准，签认（合约等）( ratify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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138
heresy
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| n.异端邪说；异教 | |
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139
revoke
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| v.废除，取消，撤回 | |
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140
fabric
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| n.织物，织品，布；构造，结构，组织 | |
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141
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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142
recollect
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| v.回忆，想起，记起，忆起，记得 | |
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143
encyclopedia
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| n.百科全书 | |
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144
jersey
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| n.运动衫 | |
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