For the Independent Journal. Saturday, January 19, 1788
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered under two general points of view. The FIRST relates to the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the government, including the restraints imposed on the States. The SECOND, to the particular structure of the government, and the distribution of this power among its several branches.
Under the FIRST view of the subject, two important questions arise: 1. Whether any part of the powers transferred to the general government be unnecessary or improper1? 2. Whether the entire mass of them be dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction2 left in the several States?
Is the aggregate3 power of the general government greater than ought to have been vested in it? This is the FIRST question.
It cannot have escaped those who have attended with candor4 to the arguments employed against the extensive powers of the government, that the authors of them have very little considered how far these powers were necessary means of attaining5 a necessary end. They have chosen rather to dwell on the inconveniences which must be unavoidably blended with all political advantages; and on the possible abuses which must be incident to every power or trust, of which a beneficial use can be made. This method of handling the subject cannot impose on the good sense of the people of America. It may display the subtlety6 of the writer; it may open a boundless7 field for rhetoric8 and declamation9; it may inflame10 the passions of the unthinking, and may confirm the prejudices of the misthinking: but cool and candid11 people will at once reflect, that the purest of human blessings12 must have a portion of alloy13 in them; that the choice must always be made, if not of the lesser14 evil, at least of the GREATER, not the PERFECT, good; and that in every political institution, a power to advance the public happiness involves a discretion15 which may be misapplied and abused. They will see, therefore, that in all cases where power is to be conferred, the point first to be decided16 is, whether such a power be necessary to the public good; as the next will be, in case of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually as possible against a perversion17 of the power to the public detriment18.
That we may form a correct judgment19 on this subject, it will be proper to review the several powers conferred on the government of the union; and that this may be the more conveniently done they may be reduced into different classes as they relate to the following different objects: 1. Security against foreign danger; 2. Regulation of the intercourse20 with foreign nations; 3. Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States; 4. Certain miscellaneous objects of general utility; 5. Restraint of the States from certain injurious acts; 6. Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers.
The powers falling within the FIRST class are those of declaring war and granting letters of marque; of providing armies and fleets; of regulating and calling forth21 the militia22; of levying23 and borrowing money.
Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive24 objects of civil society. It is an avowed25 and essential object of the American union. The powers requisite26 for attaining it must be effectually confided27 to the federal councils.
Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative. It would be superfluous28, therefore, to enter into a proof of the affirmative. The existing Confederation establishes this power in the most ample form.
Is the power of raising armies and equipping fleets necessary? This is involved in the foregoing power. It is involved in the power of self-defense29.
But was it necessary to give an INDEFINITE POWER of raising TROOPS, as well as providing fleets; and of maintaining both in PEACE, as well as in WAR?
The answer to these questions has been too far anticipated in another place to admit an extensive discussion of them in this place. The answer indeed seems to be so obvious and conclusive30 as scarcely to justify31 such a discussion in any place. With what color of propriety32 could the force necessary for defense be limited by those who cannot limit the force of offense33? If a federal Constitution could chain the ambition or set bounds to the exertions34 of all other nations, then indeed might it prudently35 chain the discretion of its own government, and set bounds to the exertions for its own safety.
How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like manner, the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined37 by these rules, and by no others. It is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation38. It is worse than in vain; because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power, every precedent39 of which is a germ of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions. If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations who may be within the reach of its enterprises to take corresponding precautions. The fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch40 of military establishments in the time of peace. They were introduced by Charles VII. of France. All Europe has followed, or been forced into, the example. Had the example not been followed by other nations, all Europe must long ago have worn the chains of a universal monarch41. Were every nation except France now to disband its peace establishments, the same event might follow. The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined valor42 of all other nations and rendered her the mistress of the world.
Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her military triumphs; and that the liberties of Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, with few exceptions, been the price of her military establishments. A standing43 force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest scale it has its inconveniences. On an extensive scale its consequences may be fatal. On any scale it is an object of laudable circumspection44 and precaution. A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude45 itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence46 in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties.
The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped on the proposed Constitution. The union itself, which it cements and secures, destroys every pretext47 for a military establishment which could be dangerous. America united, with a handful of troops, or without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture48 to foreign ambition than America disunited, with a hundred thousand veterans ready for combat. It was remarked, on a former occasion, that the want of this pretext had saved the liberties of one nation in Europe. Being rendered by her insular49 situation and her maritime50 resources impregnable to the armies of her neighbors, the rulers of Great Britain have never been able, by real or artificial dangers, to cheat the public into an extensive peace establishment. The distance of the United States from the powerful nations of the world gives them the same happy security. A dangerous establishment can never be necessary or plausible51, so long as they continue a united people. But let it never, for a moment, be forgotten that they are indebted for this advantage to the union alone. The moment of its dissolution will be the date of a new order of things. The fears of the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger States, or Confederacies, will set the same example in the New, as Charles VII. did in the Old World. The example will be followed here from the same motives52 which produced universal imitation there. Instead of deriving53 from our situation the precious advantage which Great Britain has derived54 from hers, the face of America will be but a copy of that of the continent of Europe. It will present liberty everywhere crushed between standing armies and perpetual taxes. The fortunes of disunited America will be even more disastrous55 than those of Europe. The sources of evil in the latter are confined to her own limits. No superior powers of another quarter of the globe intrigue56 among her rival nations, inflame their mutual57 animosities, and render them the instruments of foreign ambition, jealousy58, and revenge. In America the miseries59 springing from her internal jealousies60, contentions61, and wars, would form a part only of her lot. A plentiful62 addition of evils would have their source in that relation in which Europe stands to this quarter of the earth, and which no other quarter of the earth bears to Europe.
This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves peace, every man who loves his country, every man who loves liberty, ought to have it ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in his heart a due attachment63 to the union of America, and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it.
Next to the effectual establishment of the union, the best possible precaution against danger from standing armies is a limitation of the term for which revenue may be appropriated to their support. This precaution the Constitution has prudently added. I will not repeat here the observations which I flatter myself have placed this subject in a just and satisfactory light. But it may not be improper to take notice of an argument against this part of the Constitution, which has been drawn64 from the policy and practice of Great Britain. It is said that the continuance of an army in that kingdom requires an annual vote of the legislature; whereas the American Constitution has lengthened65 this critical period to two years. This is the form in which the comparison is usually stated to the public: but is it a just form? Is it a fair comparison? Does the British Constitution restrain the parliamentary discretion to one year? Does the American impose on the Congress appropriations66 for two years? On the contrary, it cannot be unknown to the authors of the fallacy themselves, that the British Constitution fixes no limit whatever to the discretion of the legislature, and that the American ties down the legislature to two years, as the longest admissible term.
Had the argument from the British example been truly stated, it would have stood thus: The term for which supplies may be appropriated to the army establishment, though unlimited67 by the British Constitution, has nevertheless, in practice, been limited by parliamentary discretion to a single year. Now, if in Great Britain, where the House of Commons is elected for seven years; where so great a proportion of the members are elected by so small a proportion of the people; where the electors are so corrupted68 by the representatives, and the representatives so corrupted by the Crown, the representative body can possess a power to make appropriations to the army for an indefinite term, without desiring, or without daring, to extend the term beyond a single year, ought not suspicion herself to blush, in pretending that the representatives of the United States, elected FREELY by the WHOLE BODY of the people, every SECOND YEAR, cannot be safely intrusted with the discretion over such appropriations, expressly limited to the short period of TWO YEARS?
A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself. Of this truth, the management of the opposition69 to the federal government is an unvaried exemplification. But among all the blunders which have been committed, none is more striking than the attempt to enlist70 on that side the prudent36 jealousy entertained by the people, of standing armies. The attempt has awakened71 fully72 the public attention to that important subject; and has led to investigations73 which must terminate in a thorough and universal conviction, not only that the constitution has provided the most effectual guards against danger from that quarter, but that nothing short of a Constitution fully adequate to the national defense and the preservation of the union, can save America from as many standing armies as it may be split into States or Confederacies, and from such a progressive augmentation, of these establishments in each, as will render them as burdensome to the properties and ominous74 to the liberties of the people, as any establishment that can become necessary, under a united and efficient government, must be tolerable to the former and safe to the latter.
The palpable necessity of the power to provide and maintain a navy has protected that part of the Constitution against a spirit of censure75, which has spared few other parts. It must, indeed, be numbered among the greatest blessings of America, that as her union will be the only source of her maritime strength, so this will be a principal source of her security against danger from abroad. In this respect our situation bears another likeness76 to the insular advantage of Great Britain. The batteries most capable of repelling77 foreign enterprises on our safety, are happily such as can never be turned by a perfidious78 government against our liberties.
The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of them deeply interested in this provision for naval79 protection, and if they have hitherto been suffered to sleep quietly in their beds; if their property has remained safe against the predatory spirit of licentious80 adventurers; if their maritime towns have not yet been compelled to ransom81 themselves from the terrors of a conflagration82, by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden invaders83, these instances of good fortune are not to be ascribed to the capacity of the existing government for the protection of those from whom it claims allegiance, but to causes that are fugitive84 and fallacious. If we except perhaps Virginia and Maryland, which are peculiarly vulnerable on their eastern frontiers, no part of the union ought to feel more anxiety on this subject than New York. Her seacoast is extensive. A very important district of the State is an island. The State itself is penetrated85 by a large navigable river for more than fifty leagues. The great emporium of its commerce, the great reservoir of its wealth, lies every moment at the mercy of events, and may almost be regarded as a hostage for ignominious86 compliances with the dictates87 of a foreign enemy, or even with the rapacious88 demands of pirates and barbarians89. Should a war be the result of the precarious90 situation of European affairs, and all the unruly passions attending it be let loose on the ocean, our escape from insults and depredations91, not only on that element, but every part of the other bordering on it, will be truly miraculous92. In the present condition of America, the States more immediately exposed to these calamities93 have nothing to hope from the phantom94 of a general government which now exists; and if their single resources were equal to the task of fortifying95 themselves against the danger, the object to be protected would be almost consumed by the means of protecting them.
The power of regulating and calling forth the militia has been already sufficiently96 vindicated97 and explained.
The power of levying and borrowing money, being the sinew of that which is to be exerted in the national defense, is properly thrown into the same class with it. This power, also, has been examined already with much attention, and has, I trust, been clearly shown to be necessary, both in the extent and form given to it by the Constitution. I will address one additional reflection only to those who contend that the power ought to have been restrained to external—taxation98 by which they mean, taxes on articles imported from other countries. It cannot be doubted that this will always be a valuable source of revenue; that for a considerable time it must be a principal source; that at this moment it is an essential one. But we may form very mistaken ideas on this subject, if we do not call to mind in our calculations, that the extent of revenue drawn from foreign commerce must vary with the variations, both in the extent and the kind of imports; and that these variations do not correspond with the progress of population, which must be the general measure of the public wants. As long as agriculture continues the sole field of labor99, the importation of manufactures must increase as the consumers multiply. As soon as domestic manufactures are begun by the hands not called for by agriculture, the imported manufactures will decrease as the numbers of people increase. In a more remote stage, the imports may consist in a considerable part of raw materials, which will be wrought100 into articles for exportation, and will, therefore, require rather the encouragement of bounties101, than to be loaded with discouraging duties. A system of government, meant for duration, ought to contemplate102 these revolutions, and be able to accommodate itself to them.
Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power of taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against the Constitution, on the language in which it is defined. It has been urged and echoed, that the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises103, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States," amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged104 to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress105 under which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction.
Had no other enumeration106 or definition of the powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color for it; though it would have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate107 in all possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the forms of conveyances108, must be very singularly expressed by the terms "to raise money for the general welfare."
But what color can the objection have, when a specification109 of the objects alluded110 to by these general terms immediately follows, and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? If the different parts of the same instrument ought to be so expounded111, as to give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any signification whatsoever112? For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital113 of particulars. But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than to confound and mislead, is an absurdity114, which, as we are reduced to the dilemma115 of charging either on the authors of the objection or on the authors of the Constitution, we must take the liberty of supposing, had not its origin with the latter.
The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it appears that the language used by the convention is a copy from the articles of Confederation. The objects of the union among the States, as described in article third, are "their common defense, security of their liberties, and mutual and general welfare." The terms of article eighth are still more identical: "All charges of war and all other expenses that shall be incurred116 for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury," etc. A similar language again occurs in article ninth. Construe117 either of these articles by the rules which would justify the construction put on the new Constitution, and they vest in the existing Congress a power to legislate in all cases whatsoever. But what would have been thought of that assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general expressions, and disregarding the specifications118 which ascertain119 and limit their import, they had exercised an unlimited power of providing for the common defense and general welfare? I appeal to the objectors themselves, whether they would in that case have employed the same reasoning in justification120 of Congress as they now make use of against the convention. How difficult it is for error to escape its own condemnation121!
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1
improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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jurisdiction
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| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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aggregate
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| adj.总计的，集合的；n.总数；v.合计；集合 | |
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candor
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| n.坦白，率真 | |
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attaining
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的现在分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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subtlety
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| n.微妙，敏锐，精巧；微妙之处，细微的区别 | |
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boundless
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| adj.无限的；无边无际的；巨大的 | |
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rhetoric
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| n.修辞学，浮夸之言语 | |
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declamation
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| n. 雄辩，高调 | |
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inflame
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| v.使燃烧；使极度激动；使发炎 | |
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candid
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| adj.公正的，正直的；坦率的 | |
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blessings
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| n.（上帝的）祝福( blessing的名词复数 )；好事；福分；因祸得福 | |
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alloy
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| n.合金，(金属的)成色 | |
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lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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perversion
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| n.曲解；堕落；反常 | |
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detriment
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| n.损害；损害物，造成损害的根源 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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intercourse
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| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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levying
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| 征（兵）( levy的现在分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税 | |
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primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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avowed
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| adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
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requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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confided
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| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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conclusive
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| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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offense
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| n.犯规，违法行为；冒犯，得罪 | |
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exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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prudently
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| adv. 谨慎地，慎重地 | |
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prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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epoch
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| n.(新)时代；历元 | |
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monarch
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| n.帝王，君主，最高统治者 | |
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valor
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| n.勇气，英勇 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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circumspection
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| n.细心，慎重 | |
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preclude
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| vt.阻止，排除，防止；妨碍 | |
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prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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posture
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| n.姿势，姿态，心态，态度；v.作出某种姿势 | |
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insular
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| adj.岛屿的，心胸狭窄的 | |
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maritime
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| adj.海的，海事的，航海的，近海的，沿海的 | |
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51
plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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52
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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53
deriving
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| v.得到( derive的现在分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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54
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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55
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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56
intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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58
jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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59
miseries
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| n.痛苦( misery的名词复数 )；痛苦的事；穷困；常发牢骚的人 | |
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jealousies
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| n.妒忌( jealousy的名词复数 )；妒羡 | |
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contentions
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| n.竞争( contention的名词复数 )；争夺；争论；论点 | |
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plentiful
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| adj.富裕的，丰富的 | |
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attachment
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| n.附属物，附件；依恋；依附 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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lengthened
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| （时间或空间）延长，伸长( lengthen的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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appropriations
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| n.挪用（appropriation的复数形式） | |
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unlimited
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| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
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corrupted
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| （使）败坏( corrupt的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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enlist
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| vt.谋取(支持等)，赢得；征募；vi.入伍 | |
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awakened
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| v.（使）醒( awaken的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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investigations
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| （正式的）调查( investigation的名词复数 )； 侦查； 科学研究； 学术研究 | |
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ominous
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| adj.不祥的，不吉的，预兆的，预示的 | |
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censure
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| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
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likeness
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| n.相像，相似（之处） | |
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repelling
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| v.击退( repel的现在分词 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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perfidious
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| adj.不忠的，背信弃义的 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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licentious
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| adj.放纵的，淫乱的 | |
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ransom
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| n.赎金，赎身；v.赎回，解救 | |
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conflagration
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| n.建筑物或森林大火 | |
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invaders
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| 入侵者，侵略者，侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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fugitive
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| adj.逃亡的，易逝的；n.逃犯，逃亡者 | |
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penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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ignominious
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| adj.可鄙的，不光彩的，耻辱的 | |
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dictates
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| n.命令，规定，要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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rapacious
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| adj.贪婪的，强夺的 | |
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barbarians
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| n.野蛮人( barbarian的名词复数 )；外国人；粗野的人；无教养的人 | |
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precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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depredations
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| n.劫掠，毁坏( depredation的名词复数 ) | |
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miraculous
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| adj.像奇迹一样的，不可思议的 | |
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calamities
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| n.灾祸，灾难( calamity的名词复数 )；不幸之事 | |
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phantom
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| n.幻影，虚位，幽灵；adj.错觉的，幻影的，幽灵的 | |
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fortifying
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| 筑防御工事于( fortify的现在分词 )； 筑堡于； 增强； 强化（食品） | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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vindicated
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| v.澄清（某人/某事物）受到的责难或嫌疑( vindicate的过去式和过去分词 )；表明或证明（所争辩的事物）属实、正当、有效等；维护 | |
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taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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wrought
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| v.引起；以…原料制作；运转；adj.制造的 | |
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bounties
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| （由政府提供的）奖金( bounty的名词复数 )； 赏金； 慷慨； 大方 | |
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102
contemplate
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| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
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excises
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| n.国内货物税，消费税( excise的名词复数 )v.切除，删去( excise的第三人称单数 ) | |
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alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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distress
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| n.苦恼，痛苦，不舒适；不幸；vt.使悲痛 | |
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enumeration
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| n.计数，列举；细目；详表；点查 | |
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legislate
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| vt.制定法律；n.法规，律例；立法 | |
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108
conveyances
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| n.传送( conveyance的名词复数 )；运送；表达；运输工具 | |
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specification
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| n.详述；[常pl.]规格，说明书，规范 | |
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alluded
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| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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expounded
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| 论述，详细讲解( expound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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112
whatsoever
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| adv.（用于否定句中以加强语气）任何；pron.无论什么 | |
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recital
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| n.朗诵，独奏会，独唱会 | |
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absurdity
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| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
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dilemma
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| n.困境，进退两难的局面 | |
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incurred
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| [医]招致的，遭受的； incur的过去式 | |
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construe
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| v.翻译，解释 | |
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118
specifications
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| n.规格；载明；详述；（产品等的）说明书；说明书( specification的名词复数 )；详细的计划书；载明；详述 | |
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119
ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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120
justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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121
condemnation
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| n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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