For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, January 23, 1788
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE FOURTH class comprises the following miscellaneous powers:
1. A power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for a limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully1 coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual provisions for either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress.
2. "To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever2, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession3 of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States; and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislatures of the States in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals4, dockyards, and other needful buildings."
The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of government, carries its own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every legislature of the union, I might say of the world, by virtue5 of its general supremacy6. Without it, not only the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings7 interrupted with impunity8; but a dependence9 of the members of the general government on the State comprehending the seat of the government, for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring on the national councils an imputation10 of awe11 or influence, equally dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory to the other members of the Confederacy. This consideration has the more weight, as the gradual accumulation of public improvements at the stationary12 residence of the government would be both too great a public pledge to be left in the hands of a single State, and would create so many obstacles to a removal of the government, as still further to abridge13 its necessary independence. The extent of this federal district is sufficiently14 circumscribed15 to satisfy every jealousy16 of an opposite nature. And as it is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of the State ceding17 it; as the State will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights and the consent of the citizens inhabiting it; as the inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest to become willing parties to the cession; as they will have had their voice in the election of the government which is to exercise authority over them; as a municipal legislature for local purposes, derived19 from their own suffrages20, will of course be allowed them; and as the authority of the legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants of the ceded22 part of it, to concur23 in the cession, will be derived from the whole people of the State in their adoption24 of the Constitution, every imaginable objection seems to be obviated25.
The necessity of a like authority over forts, magazines, etc., established by the general government, is not less evident. The public money expended26 on such places, and the public property deposited in them, requires that they should be exempt27 from the authority of the particular State. Nor would it be proper for the places on which the security of the entire union may depend, to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it. All objections and scruples28 are here also obviated, by requiring the concurrence29 of the States concerned, in every such establishment.
3. "To declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption30 of blood, or forfeiture31, except during the life of the person attained32."
As treason may be committed against the United States, the authority of the United States ought to be enabled to punish it. But as new-fangled and artificial treasons have been the great engines by which violent factions33, the natural offspring of free government, have usually wreaked34 their alternate malignity35 on each other, the convention have, with great judgment36, opposed a barrier to this peculiar37 danger, by inserting a constitutional definition of the crime, fixing the proof necessary for conviction of it, and restraining the Congress, even in punishing it, from extending the consequences of guilt38 beyond the person of its author.
4. "To admit new States into the union; but no new State shall be formed or erected39 within the jurisdiction40 of any other State; nor any State be formed by the junction41 of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress."
In the articles of Confederation, no provision is found on this important subject. Canada was to be admitted of right, on her joining in the measures of the United States; and the other COLONIES, by which were evidently meant the other British colonies, at the discretion42 of nine States. The eventual43 establishment of NEW STATES seems to have been overlooked by the compilers of that instrument. We have seen the inconvenience of this omission44, and the assumption of power into which Congress have been led by it. With great propriety45, therefore, has the new system supplied the defect. The general precaution, that no new States shall be formed, without the concurrence of the federal authority, and that of the States concerned, is consonant46 to the principles which ought to govern such transactions. The particular precaution against the erection of new States, by the partition of a State without its consent, quiets the jealousy of the larger States; as that of the smaller is quieted by a like precaution, against a junction of States without their consent.
5. "To dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States," with a proviso, that "nothing in the Constitution shall be so construed47 as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State."
This is a power of very great importance, and required by considerations similar to those which show the propriety of the former. The proviso annexed48 is proper in itself, and was probably rendered absolutely necessary by jealousies49 and questions concerning the Western territory sufficiently known to the public.
6. "To guarantee to every State in the union a republican form of government; to protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence."
In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial50 innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other; and the greater right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was entered into should be SUBSTANTIALLY maintained. But a right implies a remedy; and where else could the remedy be deposited, than where it is deposited by the Constitution? Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a federal coalition51 of any sort, than those of a kindred nature. "As the confederate republic of Germany," says Montesquieu, "consists of free cities and petty states, subject to different princes, experience shows us that it is more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland." "Greece was undone," he adds, "as soon as the king of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphictyons." In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the monarchical52 form, of the new confederate, had its share of influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext53 for alterations54 in the State governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves. These questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the general government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues55 and influence of foreign powers? To the second question it may be answered, that if the general government should interpose by virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be, of course, bound to pursue the authority. But the authority extends no further than to a GUARANTY of a republican form of government, which supposes a pre-existing government of the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter. The only restriction56 imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange republican for antirepublican Constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance57.
A protection against invasion is due from every society to the parts composing it. The latitude58 of the expression here used seems to secure each State, not only against foreign hostility59, but against ambitious or vindictive60 enterprises of its more powerful neighbors. The history, both of ancient and modern confederacies, proves that the weaker members of the union ought not to be insensible to the policy of this article.
Protection against domestic violence is added with equal propriety. It has been remarked, that even among the Swiss cantons, which, properly speaking, are not under one government, provision is made for this object; and the history of that league informs us that mutual61 aid is frequently claimed and afforded; and as well by the most democratic, as the other cantons. A recent and well-known event among ourselves has warned us to be prepared for emergencies of a like nature.
At first view, it might seem not to square with the republican theory, to suppose, either that a majority have not the right, or that a minority will have the force, to subvert63 a government; and consequently, that the federal interposition can never be required, but when it would be improper64. But theoretic reasoning, in this as in most other cases, must be qualified65 by the lessons of practice. Why may not illicit66 combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State; and if the authority of the State ought, in the latter case, to protect the local magistracy, ought not the federal authority, in the former, to support the State authority? Besides, there are certain parts of the State constitutions which are so interwoven with the federal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given to the one without communicating the wound to the other. Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of government. It will be much better that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power, than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody67 and obstinate68 contest. The existence of a right to interpose, will generally prevent the necessity of exerting it.
Is it true that force and right are necessarily on the same side in republican governments? May not the minor62 party possess such a superiority of pecuniary69 resources, of military talents and experience, or of secret succors70 from foreign powers, as will render it superior also in an appeal to the sword? May not a more compact and advantageous71 position turn the scale on the same side, against a superior number so situated72 as to be less capable of a prompt and collected exertion73 of its strength? Nothing can be more chimerical74 than to imagine that in a trial of actual force, victory may be calculated by the rules which prevail in a census75 of the inhabitants, or which determine the event of an election! May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of CITIZENS may become a majority of PERSONS, by the accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of those whom the constitution of the State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage21? I take no notice of an unhappy species of population abounding76 in some of the States, who, during the calm of regular government, are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous77 scenes of civil violence, may emerge into the human character, and give a superiority of strength to any party with which they may associate themselves.
In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms, and tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of confederate States, not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality78 of judges, they would unite the affection of friends. Happy would it be if such a remedy for its infirmities could be enjoyed by all free governments; if a project equally effectual could be established for the universal peace of mankind!
Should it be asked, what is to be the redress79 for an insurrection pervading80 all the States, and comprising a superiority of the entire force, though not a constitutional right? the answer must be, that such a case, as it would be without the compass of human remedies, so it is fortunately not within the compass of human probability; and that it is a sufficient recommendation of the federal Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of a calamity81 for which no possible constitution can provide a cure.
Among the advantages of a confederate republic enumerated82 by Montesquieu, an important one is, "that should a popular insurrection happen in one of the States, the others are able to quell83 it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound."
7. "To consider all debts contracted, and engagements entered into, before the adoption of this Constitution, as being no less valid84 against the United States, under this Constitution, than under the Confederation."
This can only be considered as a declaratory proposition; and may have been inserted, among other reasons, for the satisfaction of the foreign creditors85 of the United States, who cannot be strangers to the pretended doctrine86, that a change in the political form of civil society has the magical effect of dissolving its moral obligations.
Among the lesser87 criticisms which have been exercised on the Constitution, it has been remarked that the validity of engagements ought to have been asserted in favor of the United States, as well as against them; and in the spirit which usually characterizes little critics, the omission has been transformed and magnified into a plot against the national rights. The authors of this discovery may be told, what few others need to be informed of, that as engagements are in their nature reciprocal, an assertion of their validity on one side, necessarily involves a validity on the other side; and that as the article is merely declaratory, the establishment of the principle in one case is sufficient for every case. They may be further told, that every constitution must limit its precautions to dangers that are not altogether imaginary; and that no real danger can exist that the government would DARE, with, or even without, this constitutional declaration before it, to remit89 the debts justly due to the public, on the pretext here condemned90.
8. "To provide for amendments92 to be ratified93 by three fourths of the States under two exceptions only."
That useful alterations will be suggested by experience, could not but be foreseen. It was requisite94, therefore, that a mode for introducing them should be provided. The mode preferred by the convention seems to be stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards equally against that extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate95 its discovered faults. It, moreover, equally enables the general and the State governments to originate the amendment91 of errors, as they may be pointed96 out by the experience on one side, or on the other. The exception in favor of the equality of suffrage in the Senate, was probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States, implied and secured by that principle of representation in one branch of the legislature; and was probably insisted on by the States particularly attached to that equality. The other exception must have been admitted on the same considerations which produced the privilege defended by it.
9. "The ratification97 of the conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the States, ratifying98 the same."
This article speaks for itself. The express authority of the people alone could give due validity to the Constitution. To have required the unanimous ratification of the thirteen States, would have subjected the essential interests of the whole to the caprice or corruption of a single member. It would have marked a want of foresight99 in the convention, which our own experience would have rendered inexcusable.
Two questions of a very delicate nature present themselves on this occasion: 1. On what principle the Confederation, which stands in the solemn form of a compact among the States, can be superseded100 without the unanimous consent of the parties to it? 2. What relation is to subsist101 between the nine or more States ratifying the Constitution, and the remaining few who do not become parties to it?
The first question is answered at once by recurring102 to the absolute necessity of the case; to the great principle of self-preservation; to the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed. PERHAPS, also, an answer may be found without searching beyond the principles of the compact itself. It has been heretofore noted103 among the defects of the Confederation, that in many of the States it had received no higher sanction than a mere88 legislative104 ratification. The principle of reciprocality seems to require that its obligation on the other States should be reduced to the same standard. A compact between independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a breach105 of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach, committed by either of the parties, absolves106 the others, and authorizes107 them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a justification108 for dispensing109 with the consent of particular States to a dissolution of the federal pact18, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the MULTIPLIED and IMPORTANT infractions with which they may be confronted? The time has been when it was incumbent110 on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same motives111 dictate112.
The second question is not less delicate; and the flattering prospect113 of its being merely hypothetical forbids an overcurious discussion of it. It is one of those cases which must be left to provide for itself. In general, it may be observed, that although no political relation can subsist between the assenting114 and dissenting115 States, yet the moral relations will remain uncancelled. The claims of justice, both on one side and on the other, will be in force, and must be fulfilled; the rights of humanity must in all cases be duly and mutually respected; whilst considerations of a common interest, and, above all, the remembrance of the endearing scenes which are past, and the anticipation116 of a speedy triumph over the obstacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in vain MODERATION on one side, and PRUDENCE117 on the other.
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1
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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whatsoever
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| adv.（用于否定句中以加强语气）任何；pron.无论什么 | |
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cession
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| n.割让，转让 | |
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arsenals
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| n.兵工厂，军火库( arsenal的名词复数 )；任何事物的集成 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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impunity
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| n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
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dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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imputation
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| n.归罪，责难 | |
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awe
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| n.敬畏，惊惧；vt.使敬畏，使惊惧 | |
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stationary
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| adj.固定的，静止不动的 | |
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abridge
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| v.删减，删节，节略，缩短 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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circumscribed
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| adj.[医]局限的：受限制或限于有限空间的v.在…周围划线( circumscribe的过去式和过去分词 )；划定…范围；限制；限定 | |
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jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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ceding
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| v.让给，割让，放弃( cede的现在分词 ) | |
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pact
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| n.合同，条约，公约，协定 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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suffrages
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| （政治性选举的）选举权，投票权( suffrage的名词复数 ) | |
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suffrage
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| n.投票，选举权，参政权 | |
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ceded
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| v.让给，割让，放弃( cede的过去式 ) | |
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concur
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| v.同意，意见一致，互助，同时发生 | |
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adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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obviated
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| v.避免，消除（贫困、不方便等）( obviate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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expended
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| v.花费( expend的过去式和过去分词 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
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exempt
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| adj.免除的；v.使免除；n.免税者，被免除义务者 | |
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scruples
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| n.良心上的不安( scruple的名词复数 )；顾虑，顾忌v.感到于心不安，有顾忌( scruple的第三人称单数 ) | |
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concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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forfeiture
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| n.（名誉等）丧失 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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factions
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| 组织中的小派别，派系( faction的名词复数 ) | |
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wreaked
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| 诉诸（武力），施行（暴力），发（脾气）( wreak的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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malignity
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| n.极度的恶意，恶毒；（病的）恶性 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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guilt
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| n.犯罪；内疚；过失，罪责 | |
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ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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jurisdiction
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| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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eventual
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| adj.最后的，结局的，最终的 | |
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omission
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| n.省略，删节；遗漏或省略的事物，冗长 | |
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propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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consonant
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| n.辅音；adj.[音]符合的 | |
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47
construed
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| v.解释（陈述、行为等）( construe的过去式和过去分词 )；翻译，作句法分析 | |
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annexed
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| [法] 附加的，附属的 | |
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jealousies
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| n.妒忌( jealousy的名词复数 )；妒羡 | |
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50
monarchial
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| 国王的，帝王风度的 | |
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coalition
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| n.结合体，同盟，结合，联合 | |
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monarchical
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| adj. 国王的，帝王的，君主的，拥护君主制的 =monarchic | |
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pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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alterations
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| n.改动( alteration的名词复数 )；更改；变化；改变 | |
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intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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restriction
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| n.限制，约束 | |
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grievance
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| n.怨愤，气恼，委屈 | |
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latitude
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| n.纬度，行动或言论的自由(范围)，(pl.)地区 | |
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hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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vindictive
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| adj.有报仇心的，怀恨的，惩罚的 | |
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61
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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subvert
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| v.推翻；暗中破坏；搅乱 | |
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improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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illicit
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| adj.非法的，禁止的，不正当的 | |
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67
bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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pecuniary
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| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
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70
succors
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| n.救助，帮助（尤指需要时）( succor的名词复数 )v.给予帮助( succor的第三人称单数 ) | |
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71
advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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72
situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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73
exertion
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| n.尽力，努力 | |
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74
chimerical
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| adj.荒诞不经的，梦幻的 | |
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census
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| n.(官方的)人口调查，人口普查 | |
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abounding
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| adj.丰富的，大量的v.大量存在，充满，富于( abound的现在分词 ) | |
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tempestuous
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| adj.狂暴的 | |
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78
impartiality
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| n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
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redress
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| n.赔偿，救济，矫正；v.纠正，匡正，革除 | |
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80
pervading
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| v.遍及，弥漫( pervade的现在分词 ) | |
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81
calamity
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| n.灾害，祸患，不幸事件 | |
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enumerated
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| v.列举，枚举，数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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83
quell
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| v.压制，平息，减轻 | |
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valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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creditors
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| n.债权人，债主( creditor的名词复数 ) | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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remit
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| v.汇款，汇寄；豁免（债务），免除（处罚等） | |
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condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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amendment
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| n.改正，修正，改善，修正案 | |
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amendments
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| （法律、文件的）改动( amendment的名词复数 )； 修正案； 修改； （美国宪法的）修正案 | |
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ratified
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| v.批准，签认（合约等）( ratify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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perpetuate
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| v.使永存，使永记不忘 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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ratification
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| n.批准，认可 | |
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98
ratifying
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| v.批准，签认（合约等）( ratify的现在分词 ) | |
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foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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100
superseded
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| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
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101
subsist
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| vi.生存，存在，供养 | |
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102
recurring
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| adj.往复的，再次发生的 | |
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103
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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104
legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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absolves
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| 宣告…无罪，赦免…的罪行，宽恕…的罪行( absolve的第三人称单数 )； 不受责难，免除责任 [义务] ,开脱（罪责） | |
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107
authorizes
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| 授权，批准，委托( authorize的名词复数 ) | |
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108
justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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109
dispensing
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| v.分配( dispense的现在分词 )；施与；配（药） | |
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incumbent
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| adj.成为责任的，有义务的；现任的，在职的 | |
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111
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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112
dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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113
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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114
assenting
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| 同意，赞成( assent的现在分词 ) | |
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115
dissenting
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| adj.不同意的 | |
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116
anticipation
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| n.预期，预料，期望 | |
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117
prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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