From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 18, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
DURATION in office has been mentioned as the second requisite1 to the energy of the Executive authority. This has relation to two objects: to the personal firmness of the executive magistrate2, in the employment of his constitutional powers; and to the stability of the system of administration which may have been adopted under his auspices3. With regard to the first, it must be evident, that the longer the duration in office, the greater will be the probability of obtaining so important an advantage. It is a general principle of human nature, that a man will be interested in whatever he possesses, in proportion to the firmness or precariousness4 of the tenure5 by which he holds it; will be less attached to what he holds by a momentary6 or uncertain title, than to what he enjoys by a durable7 or certain title; and, of course, will be willing to risk more for the sake of the one, than for the sake of the other. This remark is not less applicable to a political privilege, or honor, or trust, than to any article of ordinary property. The inference from it is, that a man acting8 in the capacity of chief magistrate, under a consciousness that in a very short time he MUST lay down his office, will be apt to feel himself too little interested in it to hazard any material censure9 or perplexity, from the independent exertion10 of his powers, or from encountering the ill-humors, however transient, which may happen to prevail, either in a considerable part of the society itself, or even in a predominant faction11 in the legislative12 body. If the case should only be, that he MIGHT lay it down, unless continued by a new choice, and if he should be desirous of being continued, his wishes, conspiring13 with his fears, would tend still more powerfully to corrupt15 his integrity, or debase his fortitude16. In either case, feebleness and irresolution17 must be the characteristics of the station.
There are some who would be inclined to regard the servile pliancy18 of the Executive to a prevailing19 current, either in the community or in the legislature, as its best recommendation. But such men entertain very crude notions, as well of the purposes for which government was instituted, as of the true means by which the public happiness may be promoted. The republican principle demands that the deliberate sense of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the management of their affairs; but it does not require an unqualified complaisance20 to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests. It is a just observation, that the people commonly INTEND the PUBLIC GOOD. This often applies to their very errors. But their good sense would despise the adulator22 who should pretend that they always REASON RIGHT about the MEANS of promoting it. They know from experience that they sometimes err21; and the wonder is that they so seldom err as they do, beset23, as they continually are, by the wiles24 of parasites25 and sycophants26, by the snares27 of the ambitious, the avaricious28, the desperate, by the artifices29 of men who possess their confidence more than they deserve it, and of those who seek to possess rather than to deserve it. When occasions present themselves, in which the interests of the people are at variance30 with their inclinations31, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians32 of those interests, to withstand the temporary delusion33, in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate34 reflection. Instances might be cited in which a conduct of this kind has saved the people from very fatal consequences of their own mistakes, and has procured35 lasting36 monuments of their gratitude37 to the men who had courage and magnanimity enough to serve them at the peril38 of their displeasure.
But however inclined we might be to insist upon an unbounded complaisance in the Executive to the inclinations of the people, we can with no propriety39 contend for a like complaisance to the humors of the legislature. The latter may sometimes stand in opposition40 to the former, and at other times the people may be entirely41 neutral. In either supposition, it is certainly desirable that the Executive should be in a situation to dare to act his own opinion with vigor42 and decision.
The same rule which teaches the propriety of a partition between the various branches of power, teaches us likewise that this partition ought to be so contrived43 as to render the one independent of the other. To what purpose separate the executive or the judiciary from the legislative, if both the executive and the judiciary are so constituted as to be at the absolute devotion of the legislative? Such a separation must be merely nominal45, and incapable46 of producing the ends for which it was established. It is one thing to be subordinate to the laws, and another to be dependent on the legislative body. The first comports47 with, the last violates, the fundamental principles of good government; and, whatever may be the forms of the Constitution, unites all power in the same hands. The tendency of the legislative authority to absorb every other, has been fully14 displayed and illustrated48 by examples in some preceding numbers. In governments purely49 republican, this tendency is almost irresistible50. The representatives of the people, in a popular assembly, seem sometimes to fancy that they are the people themselves, and betray strong symptoms of impatience51 and disgust at the least sign of opposition from any other quarter; as if the exercise of its rights, by either the executive or judiciary, were a breach52 of their privilege and an outrage53 to their dignity. They often appear disposed to exert an imperious control over the other departments; and as they commonly have the people on their side, they always act with such momentum54 as to make it very difficult for the other members of the government to maintain the balance of the Constitution.
It may perhaps be asked, how the shortness of the duration in office can affect the independence of the Executive on the legislature, unless the one were possessed55 of the power of appointing or displacing the other. One answer to this inquiry56 may be drawn57 from the principle already remarked that is, from the slender interest a man is apt to take in a short-lived advantage, and the little inducement it affords him to expose himself, on account of it, to any considerable inconvenience or hazard. Another answer, perhaps more obvious, though not more conclusive58, will result from the consideration of the influence of the legislative body over the people; which might be employed to prevent the re-election of a man who, by an upright resistance to any sinister59 project of that body, should have made himself obnoxious60 to its resentment61.
It may be asked also, whether a duration of four years would answer the end proposed; and if it would not, whether a less period, which would at least be recommended by greater security against ambitious designs, would not, for that reason, be preferable to a longer period, which was, at the same time, too short for the purpose of inspiring the desired firmness and independence of the magistrate.
It cannot be affirmed, that a duration of four years, or any other limited duration, would completely answer the end proposed; but it would contribute towards it in a degree which would have a material influence upon the spirit and character of the government. Between the commencement and termination of such a period, there would always be a considerable interval62, in which the prospect63 of annihilation would be sufficiently64 remote, not to have an improper65 effect upon the conduct of a man indued with a tolerable portion of fortitude; and in which he might reasonably promise himself, that there would be time enough before it arrived, to make the community sensible of the propriety of the measures he might incline to pursue. Though it be probable that, as he approached the moment when the public were, by a new election, to signify their sense of his conduct, his confidence, and with it his firmness, would decline; yet both the one and the other would derive66 support from the opportunities which his previous continuance in the station had afforded him, of establishing himself in the esteem67 and good-will of his constituents68. He might, then, hazard with safety, in proportion to the proofs he had given of his wisdom and integrity, and to the title he had acquired to the respect and attachment69 of his fellow-citizens. As, on the one hand, a duration of four years will contribute to the firmness of the Executive in a sufficient degree to render it a very valuable ingredient in the composition; so, on the other, it is not enough to justify70 any alarm for the public liberty. If a British House of Commons, from the most feeble beginnings, FROM THE MERE44 POWER OF ASSENTING71 OR DISAGREEING TO THE IMPOSITION OF A NEW TAX, have, by rapid strides, reduced the prerogatives72 of the crown and the privileges of the nobility within the limits they conceived to be compatible with the principles of a free government, while they raised themselves to the rank and consequence of a coequal branch of the legislature; if they have been able, in one instance, to abolish both the royalty73 and the aristocracy, and to overturn all the ancient establishments, as well in the Church as State; if they have been able, on a recent occasion, to make the monarch74 tremble at the prospect of an innovation(1) attempted by them, what would be to be feared from an elective magistrate of four years' duration, with the confined authorities of a President of the United States? What, but that he might be unequal to the task which the Constitution assigns him? I shall only add, that if his duration be such as to leave a doubt of his firmness, that doubt is inconsistent with a jealousy75 of his encroachments.
PUBLIUS
1. This was the case with respect to Mr. Fox's India bill, which was carried in the House of Commons, and rejected in the House of Lords, to the entire satisfaction, as it is said, of the people.
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1 requisite | |
adj.需要的,必不可少的;n.必需品 | |
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2 magistrate | |
n.地方行政官,地方法官,治安官 | |
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3 auspices | |
n.资助,赞助 | |
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4 precariousness | |
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5 tenure | |
n.终身职位;任期;(土地)保有权,保有期 | |
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6 momentary | |
adj.片刻的,瞬息的;短暂的 | |
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7 durable | |
adj.持久的,耐久的 | |
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8 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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9 censure | |
v./n.责备;非难;责难 | |
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10 exertion | |
n.尽力,努力 | |
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11 faction | |
n.宗派,小集团;派别;派系斗争 | |
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12 legislative | |
n.立法机构,立法权;adj.立法的,有立法权的 | |
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13 conspiring | |
密谋( conspire的现在分词 ); 搞阴谋; (事件等)巧合; 共同导致 | |
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14 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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15 corrupt | |
v.贿赂,收买;adj.腐败的,贪污的 | |
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16 fortitude | |
n.坚忍不拔;刚毅 | |
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17 irresolution | |
n.不决断,优柔寡断,犹豫不定 | |
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18 pliancy | |
n.柔软,柔顺 | |
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19 prevailing | |
adj.盛行的;占优势的;主要的 | |
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20 complaisance | |
n.彬彬有礼,殷勤,柔顺 | |
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21 err | |
vi.犯错误,出差错 | |
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22 adulator | |
n.好奉承的人 | |
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23 beset | |
v.镶嵌;困扰,包围 | |
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24 wiles | |
n.(旨在欺骗或吸引人的)诡计,花招;欺骗,欺诈( wile的名词复数 ) | |
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25 parasites | |
寄生物( parasite的名词复数 ); 靠他人为生的人; 诸虫 | |
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26 sycophants | |
n.谄媚者,拍马屁者( sycophant的名词复数 ) | |
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27 snares | |
n.陷阱( snare的名词复数 );圈套;诱人遭受失败(丢脸、损失等)的东西;诱惑物v.用罗网捕捉,诱陷,陷害( snare的第三人称单数 ) | |
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28 avaricious | |
adj.贪婪的,贪心的 | |
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29 artifices | |
n.灵巧( artifice的名词复数 );诡计;巧妙办法;虚伪行为 | |
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30 variance | |
n.矛盾,不同 | |
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31 inclinations | |
倾向( inclination的名词复数 ); 倾斜; 爱好; 斜坡 | |
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32 guardians | |
监护人( guardian的名词复数 ); 保护者,维护者 | |
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33 delusion | |
n.谬见,欺骗,幻觉,迷惑 | |
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34 sedate | |
adj.沉着的,镇静的,安静的 | |
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35 procured | |
v.(努力)取得, (设法)获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 );拉皮条 | |
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36 lasting | |
adj.永久的,永恒的;vbl.持续,维持 | |
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37 gratitude | |
adj.感激,感谢 | |
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38 peril | |
n.(严重的)危险;危险的事物 | |
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39 propriety | |
n.正当行为;正当;适当 | |
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40 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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41 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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42 vigor | |
n.活力,精力,元气 | |
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43 contrived | |
adj.不自然的,做作的;虚构的 | |
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44 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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45 nominal | |
adj.名义上的;(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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46 incapable | |
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
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47 comports | |
v.表现( comport的第三人称单数 ) | |
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48 illustrated | |
adj. 有插图的,列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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49 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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50 irresistible | |
adj.非常诱人的,无法拒绝的,无法抗拒的 | |
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51 impatience | |
n.不耐烦,急躁 | |
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52 breach | |
n.违反,不履行;破裂;vt.冲破,攻破 | |
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53 outrage | |
n.暴行,侮辱,愤怒;vt.凌辱,激怒 | |
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54 momentum | |
n.动力,冲力,势头;动量 | |
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55 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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56 inquiry | |
n.打听,询问,调查,查问 | |
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57 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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58 conclusive | |
adj.最后的,结论的;确凿的,消除怀疑的 | |
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59 sinister | |
adj.不吉利的,凶恶的,左边的 | |
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60 obnoxious | |
adj.极恼人的,讨人厌的,可憎的 | |
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61 resentment | |
n.怨愤,忿恨 | |
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62 interval | |
n.间隔,间距;幕间休息,中场休息 | |
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63 prospect | |
n.前景,前途;景色,视野 | |
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64 sufficiently | |
adv.足够地,充分地 | |
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65 improper | |
adj.不适当的,不合适的,不正确的,不合礼仪的 | |
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66 derive | |
v.取得;导出;引申;来自;源自;出自 | |
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67 esteem | |
n.尊敬,尊重;vt.尊重,敬重;把…看作 | |
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68 constituents | |
n.选民( constituent的名词复数 );成分;构成部分;要素 | |
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69 attachment | |
n.附属物,附件;依恋;依附 | |
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70 justify | |
vt.证明…正当(或有理),为…辩护 | |
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71 assenting | |
同意,赞成( assent的现在分词 ) | |
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72 prerogatives | |
n.权利( prerogative的名词复数 );特权;大主教法庭;总督委任组成的法庭 | |
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73 royalty | |
n.皇家,皇族 | |
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74 monarch | |
n.帝王,君主,最高统治者 | |
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75 jealousy | |
n.妒忌,嫉妒,猜忌 | |
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