From the New York Packet. Tuesday, April 1, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE President is "to nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls1, judges of the Supreme2 Court, and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution. But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, or in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies3 which may happen during the recess4 of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session."
It has been observed in a former paper, that "the true test of a good government is its aptitude5 and tendency to produce a good administration." If the justness of this observation be admitted, the mode of appointing the officers of the United States contained in the foregoing clauses, must, when examined, be allowed to be entitled to particular commendation. It is not easy to conceive a plan better calculated than this to promote a judicious6 choice of men for filling the offices of the union; and it will not need proof, that on this point must essentially7 depend the character of its administration.
It will be agreed on all hands, that the power of appointment, in ordinary cases, ought to be modified in one of three ways. It ought either to be vested in a single man, or in a select assembly of a moderate number; or in a single man, with the concurrence8 of such an assembly. The exercise of it by the people at large will be readily admitted to be impracticable; as waiving9 every other consideration, it would leave them little time to do anything else. When, therefore, mention is made in the subsequent reasonings of an assembly or body of men, what is said must be understood to relate to a select body or assembly, of the description already given. The people collectively, from their number and from their dispersed10 situation, cannot be regulated in their movements by that systematic11 spirit of cabal12 and intrigue13, which will be urged as the chief objections to reposing14 the power in question in a body of men.
Those who have themselves reflected upon the subject, or who have attended to the observations made in other parts of these papers, in relation to the appointment of the President, will, I presume, agree to the position, that there would always be great probability of having the place supplied by a man of abilities, at least respectable. Premising this, I proceed to lay it down as a rule, that one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze15 and estimate the peculiar16 qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of men of equal or perhaps even of superior discernment.
The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget17 a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation. He will, on this account, feel himself under stronger obligations, and more interested to investigate with care the qualities requisite18 to the stations to be filled, and to prefer with impartiality19 the persons who may have the fairest pretensions20 to them. He will have fewer personal attachments22 to gratify, than a body of men who may each be supposed to have an equal number; and will be so much the less liable to be misled by the sentiments of friendship and of affection. A single well-directed man, by a single understanding, cannot be distracted and warped24 by that diversity of views, feelings, and interests, which frequently distract and warp23 the resolutions of a collective body. There is nothing so apt to agitate25 the passions of mankind as personal considerations whether they relate to ourselves or to others, who are to be the objects of our choice or preference. Hence, in every exercise of the power of appointing to offices, by an assembly of men, we must expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and antipathies26, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who compose the assembly. The choice which may at any time happen to be made under such circumstances, will of course be the result either of a victory gained by one party over the other, or of a compromise between the parties. In either case, the intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too often out of sight. In the first, the qualifications best adapted to uniting the suffrages27 of the party, will be more considered than those which fit the person for the station. In the last, the coalition28 will commonly turn upon some interested equivalent: "Give us the man we wish for this office, and you shall have the one you wish for that." This will be the usual condition of the bargain. And it will rarely happen that the advancement29 of the public service will be the primary object either of party victories or of party negotiations30.
The truth of the principles here advanced seems to have been felt by the most intelligent of those who have found fault with the provision made, in this respect, by the convention. They contend that the President ought solely31 to have been authorized32 to make the appointments under the federal government. But it is easy to show, that every advantage to be expected from such an arrangement would, in substance, be derived33 from the power of nomination34, which is proposed to be conferred upon him; while several disadvantages which might attend the absolute power of appointment in the hands of that officer would be avoided. In the act of nomination, his judgment35 alone would be exercised; and as it would be his sole duty to point out the man who, with the approbation36 of the Senate, should fill an office, his responsibility would be as complete as if he were to make the final appointment. There can, in this view, be no difference between nominating and appointing. The same motives37 which would influence a proper discharge of his duty in one case, would exist in the other. And as no man could be appointed but on his previous nomination, every man who might be appointed would be, in fact, his choice.
But might not his nomination be overruled? I grant it might, yet this could only be to make place for another nomination by himself. The person ultimately appointed must be the object of his preference, though perhaps not in the first degree. It is also not very probable that his nomination would often be overruled. The Senate could not be tempted39, by the preference they might feel to another, to reject the one proposed; because they could not assure themselves, that the person they might wish would be brought forward by a second or by any subsequent nomination. They could not even be certain, that a future nomination would present a candidate in any degree more acceptable to them; and as their dissent40 might cast a kind of stigma41 upon the individual rejected, and might have the appearance of a reflection upon the judgment of the chief magistrate42, it is not likely that their sanction would often be refused, where there were not special and strong reasons for the refusal.
To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate? I answer, that the necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though, in general, a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment21, or from a view to popularity. In addition to this, it would be an efficacious source of stability in the administration.
It will readily be comprehended, that a man who had himself the sole disposition43 of offices, would be governed much more by his private inclinations44 and interests, than when he was bound to submit the propriety45 of his choice to the discussion and determination of a different and independent body, and that body an entire branch of the legislature. The possibility of rejection46 would be a strong motive38 to care in proposing. The danger to his own reputation, and, in the case of an elective magistrate, to his political existence, from betraying a spirit of favoritism, or an unbecoming pursuit of popularity, to the observation of a body whose opinion would have great weight in forming that of the public, could not fail to operate as a barrier to the one and to the other. He would be both ashamed and afraid to bring forward, for the most distinguished47 or lucrative48 stations, candidates who had no other merit than that of coming from the same State to which he particularly belonged, or of being in some way or other personally allied49 to him, or of possessing the necessary insignificance50 and pliancy51 to render them the obsequious52 instruments of his pleasure.
To this reasoning it has been objected that the President, by the influence of the power of nomination, may secure the complaisance53 of the Senate to his views. This supposition of universal venalty in human nature is little less an error in political reasoning, than the supposition of universal rectitude. The institution of delegated power implies, that there is a portion of virtue54 and honor among mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation of confidence; and experience justifies55 the theory. It has been found to exist in the most corrupt56 periods of the most corrupt governments. The venalty of the British House of Commons has been long a topic of accusation57 against that body, in the country to which they belong as well as in this; and it cannot be doubted that the charge is, to a considerable extent, well founded. But it is as little to be doubted, that there is always a large proportion of the body, which consists of independent and public-spirited men, who have an influential58 weight in the councils of the nation. Hence it is (the present reign59 not excepted) that the sense of that body is often seen to control the inclinations of the monarch60, both with regard to men and to measures. Though it might therefore be allowable to suppose that the Executive might occasionally influence some individuals in the Senate, yet the supposition, that he could in general purchase the integrity of the whole body, would be forced and improbable. A man disposed to view human nature as it is, without either flattering its virtues61 or exaggerating its vices62, will see sufficient ground of confidence in the probity63 of the Senate, to rest satisfied, not only that it will be impracticable to the Executive to corrupt or seduce64 a majority of its members, but that the necessity of its co-operation, in the business of appointments, will be a considerable and salutary restraint upon the conduct of that magistrate. Nor is the integrity of the Senate the only reliance. The Constitution has provided some important guards against the danger of executive influence upon the legislative65 body: it declares that "No senator or representative shall during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments66 whereof shall have been increased, during such time; and no person, holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office."
PUBLIUS
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1
consuls
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| 领事( consul的名词复数 )； （古罗马共和国时期）执政官 （古罗马共和国及其军队的最高首长，同时共有两位，每年选举一次） | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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vacancies
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| n.空房间( vacancy的名词复数 )；空虚；空白；空缺 | |
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recess
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| n.短期休息，壁凹（墙上装架子，柜子等凹处） | |
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aptitude
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| n.(学习方面的)才能，资质，天资 | |
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judicious
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| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
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essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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waiving
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| v.宣布放弃( waive的现在分词 )；搁置；推迟；放弃（权利、要求等） | |
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dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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cabal
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| n.政治阴谋小集团 | |
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intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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reposing
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| v.将（手臂等）靠在某人（某物）上( repose的现在分词 ) | |
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analyze
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| vt.分析，解析 (=analyse) | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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beget
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| v.引起；产生 | |
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requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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impartiality
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| n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
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pretensions
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| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
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attachment
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| n.附属物，附件；依恋；依附 | |
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attachments
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| n.（用电子邮件发送的）附件( attachment的名词复数 )；附着；连接；附属物 | |
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warp
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| vt.弄歪，使翘曲，使不正常，歪曲，使有偏见 | |
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warped
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| adj.反常的；乖戾的；（变）弯曲的；变形的v.弄弯，变歪( warp的过去式和过去分词 )；使（行为等）不合情理，使乖戾， | |
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agitate
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| vi.(for,against)煽动，鼓动；vt.搅动 | |
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antipathies
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| 反感( antipathy的名词复数 )； 引起反感的事物； 憎恶的对象； （在本性、倾向等方面的）不相容 | |
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suffrages
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| （政治性选举的）选举权，投票权( suffrage的名词复数 ) | |
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coalition
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| n.结合体，同盟，结合，联合 | |
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advancement
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| n.前进，促进，提升 | |
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negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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nomination
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| n.提名，任命，提名权 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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approbation
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| n.称赞；认可 | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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39
tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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dissent
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| n./v.不同意，持异议 | |
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stigma
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| n.耻辱，污名；(花的)柱头 | |
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magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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43
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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44
inclinations
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| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
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45
propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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46
rejection
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| n.拒绝，被拒，抛弃，被弃 | |
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47
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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lucrative
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| adj.赚钱的，可获利的 | |
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allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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insignificance
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| n.不重要；无价值；无意义 | |
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51
pliancy
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| n.柔软，柔顺 | |
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52
obsequious
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| adj.谄媚的，奉承的，顺从的 | |
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53
complaisance
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| n.彬彬有礼，殷勤，柔顺 | |
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54
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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55
justifies
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| 证明…有理( justify的第三人称单数 )； 为…辩护； 对…作出解释； 为…辩解（或辩护） | |
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corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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accusation
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| n.控告，指责，谴责 | |
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influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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monarch
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| n.帝王，君主，最高统治者 | |
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virtues
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| 美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处 | |
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vices
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| 缺陷( vice的名词复数 )； 恶习； 不道德行为； 台钳 | |
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probity
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| n.刚直；廉洁，正直 | |
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seduce
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| vt.勾引，诱奸，诱惑，引诱 | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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emoluments
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| n.报酬，薪水( emolument的名词复数 ) | |
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