From MCLEAN's Edition, New York. Wednesday, May 28, 1788
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers, announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for discussion two points: "the analogy of the proposed government to your own State constitution," and "the additional security which its adoption1 will afford to republican government, to liberty, and to property." But these heads have been so fully2 anticipated and exhausted3 in the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be possible to do any thing more than repeat, in a more dilated4 form, what has been heretofore said, which the advanced stage of the question, and the time already spent upon it, conspire5 to forbid.
It is remarkable6, that the resemblance of the plan of the convention to the act which organizes the government of this State holds, not less with regard to many of the supposed defects, than to the real excellences7 of the former. Among the pretended defects are the re-eligibility of the Executive, the want of a council, the omission8 of a formal bill of rights, the omission of a provision respecting the liberty of the press. These and several others which have been noted9 in the course of our inquiries10 are as much chargeable on the existing constitution of this State, as on the one proposed for the union; and a man must have slender pretensions11 to consistency12, who can rail at the latter for imperfections which he finds no difficulty in excusing in the former. Nor indeed can there be a better proof of the insincerity and affectation of some of the zealous13 adversaries15 of the plan of the convention among us, who profess16 to be the devoted17 admirers of the government under which they live, than the fury with which they have attacked that plan, for matters in regard to which our own constitution is equally or perhaps more vulnerable.
The additional securities to republican government, to liberty and to property, to be derived18 from the adoption of the plan under consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which the preservation19 of the union will impose on local factions20 and insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in single States, who may acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders and favorites, to become the despots of the people; in the diminution21 of the opportunities to foreign intrigue22, which the dissolution of the Confederacy would invite and facilitate; in the prevention of extensive military establishments, which could not fail to grow out of wars between the States in a disunited situation; in the express guaranty of a republican form of government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion23 of titles of nobility; and in the precautions against the repetition of those practices on the part of the State governments which have undermined the foundations of property and credit, have planted mutual24 distrust in the breasts of all classes of citizens, and have occasioned an almost universal prostration25 of morals.
Thus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned to myself; with what success, your conduct must determine. I trust at least you will admit that I have not failed in the assurance I gave you respecting the spirit with which my endeavors should be conducted. I have addressed myself purely26 to your judgments27, and have studiously avoided those asperities29 which are too apt to disgrace political disputants of all parties, and which have been not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents of the Constitution. The charge of a conspiracy30 against the liberties of the people, which has been indiscriminately brought against the advocates of the plan, has something in it too wanton and too malignant31, not to excite the indignation of every man who feels in his own bosom32 a refutation of the calumny33. The perpetual changes which have been rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the great, have been such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible men. And the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations which have been in various ways practiced to keep the truth from the public eye, have been of a nature to demand the reprobation34 of all honest men. It is not impossible that these circumstances may have occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression which I did not intend; it is certain that I have frequently felt a struggle between sensibility and moderation; and if the former has in some instances prevailed, it must be my excuse that it has been neither often nor much.
Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in the course of these papers, the proposed Constitution has not been satisfactorily vindicated35 from the aspersions thrown upon it; and whether it has not been shown to be worthy36 of the public approbation37, and necessary to the public safety and prosperity. Every man is bound to answer these questions to himself, according to the best of his conscience and understanding, and to act agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates38 of his judgment28. This is a duty from which nothing can give him a dispensation. 'T is one that he is called upon, nay39, constrained40 by all the obligations that form the bands of society, to discharge sincerely and honestly. No partial motive41, no particular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary passion or prejudice, will justify42 to himself, to his country, or to his posterity43, an improper44 election of the part he is to act. Let him beware of an obstinate45 adherence46 to party; let him reflect that the object upon which he is to decide is not a particular interest of the community, but the very existence of the nation; and let him remember that a majority of America has already given its sanction to the plan which he is to approve or reject.
I shall not dissemble that I feel an entire confidence in the arguments which recommend the proposed system to your adoption, and that I am unable to discern any real force in those by which it has been opposed. I am persuaded that it is the best which our political situation, habits, and opinions will admit, and superior to any the revolution has produced.
Concessions47 on the part of the friends of the plan, that it has not a claim to absolute perfection, have afforded matter of no small triumph to its enemies. "Why," say they, "should we adopt an imperfect thing? Why not amend48 it and make it perfect before it is irrevocably established?" This may be plausible49 enough, but it is only plausible. In the first place I remark, that the extent of these concessions has been greatly exaggerated. They have been stated as amounting to an admission that the plan is radically50 defective51, and that without material alterations53 the rights and the interests of the community cannot be safely confided54 to it. This, as far as I have understood the meaning of those who make the concessions, is an entire perversion55 of their sense. No advocate of the measure can be found, who will not declare as his sentiment, that the system, though it may not be perfect in every part, is, upon the whole, a good one; is the best that the present views and circumstances of the country will permit; and is such an one as promises every species of security which a reasonable people can desire.
I answer in the next place, that I should esteem56 it the extreme of imprudence to prolong the precarious58 state of our national affairs, and to expose the union to the jeopardy59 of successive experiments, in the chimerical60 pursuit of a perfect plan. I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man. The result of the deliberations of all collective bodies must necessarily be a compound, as well of the errors and prejudices, as of the good sense and wisdom, of the individuals of whom they are composed. The compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct States in a common bond of amity61 and union, must as necessarily be a compromise of as many dissimilar interests and inclinations62. How can perfection spring from such materials?
The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately published in this city,(1) are unanswerable to show the utter improbability of assembling a new convention, under circumstances in any degree so favorable to a happy issue, as those in which the late convention met, deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the arguments there used, as I presume the production itself has had an extensive circulation. It is certainly well worthy the perusal63 of every friend to his country. There is, however, one point of light in which the subject of amendments64 still remains66 to be considered, and in which it has not yet been exhibited to public view. I cannot resolve to conclude without first taking a survey of it in this aspect.
It appears to me susceptible67 of absolute demonstration68, that it will be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments to the Constitution. The moment an alteration52 is made in the present plan, it becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and must undergo a new decision of each State. To its complete establishment throughout the union, it will therefore require the concurrence70 of thirteen States. If, on the contrary, the Constitution proposed should once be ratified71 by all the States as it stands, alterations in it may at any time be effected by nine States. Here, then, the chances are as thirteen to nine(2) in favor of subsequent amendment65, rather than of the original adoption of an entire system.
This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must inevitably72 consist of a great variety of particulars, in which thirteen independent States are to be accommodated in their interests or opinions of interest. We may of course expect to see, in any body of men charged with its original formation, very different combinations of the parts upon different points. Many of those who form a majority on one question, may become the minority on a second, and an association dissimilar to either may constitute the majority on a third. Hence the necessity of moulding and arranging all the particulars which are to compose the whole, in such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact; and hence, also, an immense multiplication73 of difficulties and casualties in obtaining the collective assent74 to a final act. The degree of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the number of particulars and the number of parties.
But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be a single proposition, and might be brought forward singly. There would then be no necessity for management or compromise, in relation to any other point—no giving nor taking. The will of the requisite75 number would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue. And consequently, whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place. There can, therefore, be no comparison between the facility of affecting an amendment, and that of establishing in the first instance a complete Constitution.
In opposition76 to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has been urged that the persons delegated to the administration of the national government will always be disinclined to yield up any portion of the authority of which they were once possessed77. For my own part I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments which may, upon mature consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the organization of the government, not to the mass of its powers; and on this account alone, I think there is no weight in the observation just stated. I also think there is little weight in it on another account. The intrinsic difficulty of governing THIRTEEN STATES at any rate, independent of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and integrity, will, in my opinion constantly impose on the national rulers the necessity of a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their constituents78. But there is yet a further consideration, which proves beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the observation is futile79. It is this that the national rulers, whenever nine States concur69, will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth article of the plan, the Congress will be obliged "on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the States (which at present amount to nine), to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be valid80, to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by conventions in three fourths thereof." The words of this article are peremptory81. The Congress "shall call a convention." Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion82 of that body. And of consequence, all the declamation83 about the disinclination to a change vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds or three fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments which may affect local interests, can there be any room to apprehend84 any such difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative to the general liberty or security of the people. We may safely rely on the disposition86 of the State legislatures to erect87 barriers against the encroachments of the national authority.
If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that I am myself deceived by it, for it is, in my conception, one of those rare instances in which a political truth can be brought to the test of a mathematical demonstration. Those who see the matter in the same light with me, however zealous they may be for amendments, must agree in the propriety88 of a previous adoption, as the most direct road to their own object.
The zeal14 for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of the Constitution, must abate89 in every man who is ready to accede90 to the truth of the following observations of a writer equally solid and ingenious: "To balance a large state or society (says he), whether monarchical91 or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere85 dint92 of reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many must unite in the work; EXPERIENCE must guide their labor93; TIME must bring it to perfection, and the FEELING of inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they inevitably fall into in their first trials and experiments."(3) These judicious94 reflections contain a lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers of the union, and ought to put them upon their guard against hazarding anarchy95, civil war, a perpetual alienation96 of the States from each other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious97 demagogue, in the pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain, but from TIME and EXPERIENCE. It may be in me a defect of political fortitude98, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an equal tranquillity99 with those who affect to treat the dangers of a longer continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A NATION, without a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, is, in my view, an awful spectacle. The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a PRODIGY100, to the completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile it to no rules of prudence57 to let go the hold we now have, in so arduous101 an enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States, and after having passed over so considerable a part of the ground, to recommence the course. I dread102 the more the consequences of new attempts, because I know that POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS, in this and in other States, are enemies to a general national government in every possible shape.
PUBLIUS
1. Entitled "An Address to the People of the State of New York."
2. It may rather be said TEN, for though two thirds may set on foot the measure, three fourths must ratify103.
3. Hume's Essays, Vol. I, p. 128: "The Rise of Arts and Sciences."
The End
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
adoption
|
|
| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
fully
|
|
| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
exhausted
|
|
| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
dilated
|
|
| adj.加宽的，扩大的v.（使某物）扩大，膨胀，张大( dilate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
conspire
|
|
| v.密谋，（事件等）巧合，共同导致 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
remarkable
|
|
| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
excellences
|
|
| n.卓越( excellence的名词复数 )；（只用于所修饰的名词后）杰出的；卓越的；出类拔萃的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
omission
|
|
| n.省略，删节；遗漏或省略的事物，冗长 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
noted
|
|
| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
inquiries
|
|
| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
pretensions
|
|
| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
consistency
|
|
| n.一贯性，前后一致，稳定性；(液体的)浓度 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
zealous
|
|
| adj.狂热的，热心的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
zeal
|
|
| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
adversaries
|
|
| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
profess
|
|
| v.声称，冒称，以...为业，正式接受入教，表明信仰 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
devoted
|
|
| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
derived
|
|
| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
preservation
|
|
| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
factions
|
|
| 组织中的小派别，派系( faction的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
diminution
|
|
| n.减少；变小 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
intrigue
|
|
| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
exclusion
|
|
| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
mutual
|
|
| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
prostration
|
|
| n. 平伏, 跪倒, 疲劳 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
purely
|
|
| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
judgments
|
|
| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
judgment
|
|
| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
asperities
|
|
| n.粗暴( asperity的名词复数 )；（表面的）粗糙；（环境的）艰苦；严寒的天气 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
conspiracy
|
|
| n.阴谋，密谋，共谋 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
malignant
|
|
| adj.恶性的，致命的；恶意的，恶毒的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
bosom
|
|
| n.胸，胸部；胸怀；内心；adj.亲密的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
calumny
|
|
| n.诽谤，污蔑，中伤 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
reprobation
|
|
| n.斥责 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
vindicated
|
|
| v.澄清（某人/某事物）受到的责难或嫌疑( vindicate的过去式和过去分词 )；表明或证明（所争辩的事物）属实、正当、有效等；维护 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
worthy
|
|
| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
approbation
|
|
| n.称赞；认可 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
dictates
|
|
| n.命令，规定，要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
nay
|
|
| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
constrained
|
|
| adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
motive
|
|
| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
justify
|
|
| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
posterity
|
|
| n.后裔，子孙，后代 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
improper
|
|
| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
obstinate
|
|
| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
adherence
|
|
| n.信奉，依附，坚持，固着 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
concessions
|
|
| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
amend
|
|
| vt.修改，修订，改进；n.[pl.]赔罪，赔偿 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
plausible
|
|
| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
radically
|
|
| ad.根本地，本质地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
defective
|
|
| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
alteration
|
|
| n.变更，改变；蚀变 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
alterations
|
|
| n.改动( alteration的名词复数 )；更改；变化；改变 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
confided
|
|
| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
perversion
|
|
| n.曲解；堕落；反常 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
esteem
|
|
| n.尊敬，尊重；vt.尊重，敬重；把…看作 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
prudence
|
|
| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
precarious
|
|
| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
jeopardy
|
|
| n.危险；危难 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
chimerical
|
|
| adj.荒诞不经的，梦幻的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
amity
|
|
| n.友好关系 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
inclinations
|
|
| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
perusal
|
|
| n.细读，熟读；目测 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
amendments
|
|
| （法律、文件的）改动( amendment的名词复数 )； 修正案； 修改； （美国宪法的）修正案 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
amendment
|
|
| n.改正，修正，改善，修正案 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
remains
|
|
| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
susceptible
|
|
| adj.过敏的，敏感的；易动感情的，易受感动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
demonstration
|
|
| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
concur
|
|
| v.同意，意见一致，互助，同时发生 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
concurrence
|
|
| n.同意；并发 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
ratified
|
|
| v.批准，签认（合约等）( ratify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
inevitably
|
|
| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
multiplication
|
|
| n.增加，增多，倍增；增殖，繁殖；乘法 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
assent
|
|
| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
requisite
|
|
| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
opposition
|
|
| n.反对，敌对 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
possessed
|
|
| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
constituents
|
|
| n.选民( constituent的名词复数 )；成分；构成部分；要素 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
futile
|
|
| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
valid
|
|
| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
peremptory
|
|
| adj.紧急的，专横的，断然的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
82
discretion
|
|
| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
declamation
|
|
| n. 雄辩，高调 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
apprehend
|
|
| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
85
mere
|
|
| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
86
disposition
|
|
| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
87
erect
|
|
| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
88
propriety
|
|
| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
89
abate
|
|
| vi.(风势，疼痛等)减弱，减轻，减退 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
90
accede
|
|
| v.应允，同意 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
91
monarchical
|
|
| adj. 国王的，帝王的，君主的，拥护君主制的 =monarchic | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
92
dint
|
|
| n.由于，靠；凹坑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
93
labor
|
|
| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
94
judicious
|
|
| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
95
anarchy
|
|
| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
96
alienation
|
|
| n.疏远；离间；异化 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
97
victorious
|
|
| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
98
fortitude
|
|
| n.坚忍不拔；刚毅 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
99
tranquillity
|
|
| n. 平静, 安静 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
100
prodigy
|
|
| n.惊人的事物，奇迹，神童，天才，预兆 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
101
arduous
|
|
| adj.艰苦的，费力的，陡峭的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
102
dread
|
|
| vt.担忧，忧虑；惧怕，不敢；n.担忧，畏惧 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
103
ratify
|
|
| v.批准，认可，追认 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |