A man of good judgment in a given set of affairs is a man in so far educated, trained, whatever may be his literacy. And if our schools turn out their pupils in that attitude of mind which is conducive2 to good judgment in any department of affairs in which the pupils are placed, they have done more than if they sent out their pupils merely possessed4 of vast stores of information, or high degrees of skill in specialized5 branches. To know what is good judgment we need first to know what judgment is.
Judgment and inference
That there is an intimate connection between judgment and inference is obvious enough. The aim of inference is to terminate itself in an adequate judgment of a situation, and the course of inference goes on through a series of partial and tentative judgments6. What are these units, these terms of inference when we examine them on their own account? Their significant traits may be readily gathered from a consideration of the operations to which the word judgment was originally applied7: namely, the authoritative8 decision of matters in legal controversy9—the procedure of the judge on the bench. There are three such features: (1) a controversy, consisting of opposite claims regarding the same objective situation; (2) a process of defining and elaborating these claims and of sifting10 the facts adduced to[Pg 102] support them; (3) a final decision, or sentence, closing the particular matter in dispute and also serving as a rule or principle for deciding future cases.
Uncertainty11 the antecedent of judgment
1. Unless there is something doubtful, the situation is read off at a glance; it is taken in on sight, i.e. there is merely apprehension12, perception, recognition, not judgment. If the matter is wholly doubtful, if it is dark and obscure throughout, there is a blind mystery and again no judgment occurs. But if it suggests, however vaguely13, different meanings, rival possible interpretations14, there is some point at issue, some matter at stake. Doubt takes the form of dispute, controversy; different sides compete for a conclusion in their favor. Cases brought to trial before a judge illustrate16 neatly17 and unambiguously this strife18 of alternative interpretations; but any case of trying to clear up intellectually a doubtful situation exemplifies the same traits. A moving blur19 catches our eye in the distance; we ask ourselves: "What is it? Is it a cloud of whirling dust? a tree waving its branches? a man signaling to us?" Something in the total situation suggests each of these possible meanings. Only one of them can possibly be sound; perhaps none of them is appropriate; yet some meaning the thing in question surely has. Which of the alternative suggested meanings has the rightful claim? What does the perception really mean? How is it to be interpreted, estimated, appraised20, placed? Every judgment proceeds from some such situation.
Judgment defines the issue,
2. The hearing of the controversy, the trial, i.e. the weighing of alternative claims, divides into two branches, either of which, in a given case, may be more conspicuous21 than the other. In the consideration of a legal dispute, these two branches are sifting the evidence and[Pg 103] selecting the rules that are applicable; they are "the facts" and "the law" of the case. In judgment they are (a) the determination of the data that are important in the given case (compare the inductive movement); and (b) the elaboration of the conceptions or meanings suggested by the crude data (compare the deductive movement). (a) What portions or aspects of the situation are significant in controlling the formation of the interpretation15? (b) Just what is the full meaning and bearing of the conception that is used as a method of interpretation? These questions are strictly22 correlative; the answer to each depends upon the answer to the other. We may, however, for convenience, consider them separately.
(a) by selecting what facts are evidence
(a) In every actual occurrence, there are many details which are part of the total occurrence, but which nevertheless are not significant in relation to the point at issue. All parts of an experience are equally present, but they are very far from being of equal value as signs or as evidences. Nor is there any tag or label on any trait saying: "This is important," or "This is trivial." Nor is intensity23, or vividness or conspicuousness24, a safe measure of indicative and proving value. The glaring thing may be totally insignificant25 in this particular situation, and the key to the understanding of the whole matter may be modest or hidden (compare p. 74). Features that are not significant are distracting; they proffer26 their claims to be regarded as clues and cues to interpretation, while traits that are significant do not appear on the surface at all. Hence, judgment is required even in reference to the situation or event that is present to the senses; elimination27 or rejection28, selection, discovery, or bringing to light must take place.[Pg 104] Till we have reached a final conclusion, rejection and selection must be tentative or conditional29. We select the things that we hope or trust are cues to meaning. But if they do not suggest a situation that accepts and includes them (see p. 81), we reconstitute our data, the facts of the case; for we mean, intellectually, by the facts of the case those traits that are used as evidence in reaching a conclusion or forming a decision.
Expertness in selecting evidence
No hard and fast rules for this operation of selecting and rejecting, or fixing upon the facts, can be given. It all comes back, as we say, to the good judgment, the good sense, of the one judging. To be a good judge is to have a sense of the relative indicative or signifying values of the various features of the perplexing situation; to know what to let go as of no account; what to eliminate as irrelevant30; what to retain as conducive to outcome; what to emphasize as a clue to the difficulty.[18] This power in ordinary matters we call knack31, tact32, cleverness; in more important affairs, insight, discernment. In part it is instinctive33 or inborn34; but it also represents the funded outcome of long familiarity with like operations in the past. Possession of this ability to seize what is evidential or significant and to let the rest go is the mark of the expert, the connoisseur35, the judge, in any matter.
Intuitive judgments
Mill cites the following case, which is worth noting as an instance of the extreme delicacy36 and accuracy to which may be developed this power of sizing up the significant factors of a situation. "A Scotch37 manufacturer procured38 from England, at a high rate of wages, a working dyer, famous for producing very fine colors, with the view of teaching to his other workmen the same[Pg 105] skill. The workman came; but his method of proportioning the ingredients, in which lay the secret of the effects he produced, was by taking them up in handfuls, while the common method was to weigh them. The manufacturer sought to make him turn his handling system into an equivalent weighing system, that the general principles of his peculiar39 mode of proceeding40 might be ascertained41. This, however, the man found himself quite unable to do, and could therefore impart his own skill to nobody. He had, from individual cases of his own experience, established a connection in his mind between fine effects of color and tactual perceptions in handling his dyeing materials; and from these perceptions he could, in any particular case, infer the means to be employed and the effects which would be produced." Long brooding over conditions, intimate contact associated with keen interest, thorough absorption in a multiplicity of allied42 experiences, tend to bring about those judgments which we then call intuitive; but they are true judgments because they are based on intelligent selection and estimation, with the solution of a problem as the controlling standard. Possession of this capacity makes the difference between the artist and the intellectual bungler43.
Such is judging ability, in its completest form, as to the data of the decision to be reached. But in any case there is a certain feeling along for the way to be followed; a constant tentative picking out of certain qualities to see what emphasis upon them would lead to; a willingness to hold final selection in suspense44; and to reject the factors entirely45 or relegate46 them to a different position in the evidential scheme if other features yield more solvent47 suggestions. Alertness, flexibility48, curios[Pg 106]ity are the essentials; dogmatism, rigidity49, prejudice, caprice, arising from routine, passion, and flippancy50 are fatal.
(b) To decide an issue, the appropriate principles must also be selected
(b) This selection of data is, of course, for the sake of controlling the development and elaboration of the suggested meaning in the light of which they are to be interpreted (compare p. 76). An evolution of conceptions thus goes on simultaneously51 with the determination of the facts; one possible meaning after another is held before the mind, considered in relation to the data to which it is applied, is developed into its more detailed52 bearings upon the data, is dropped or tentatively accepted and used. We do not approach any problem with a wholly na?ve or virgin53 mind; we approach it with certain acquired habitual54 modes of understanding, with a certain store of previously55 evolved meanings, or at least of experiences from which meanings may be educed56. If the circumstances are such that a habitual response is called directly into play, there is an immediate57 grasp of meaning. If the habit is checked, and inhibited58 from easy application, a possible meaning for the facts in question presents itself. No hard and fast rules decide whether a meaning suggested is the right and proper meaning to follow up. The individual's own good (or bad) judgment is the guide. There is no label on any given idea or principle which says automatically, "Use me in this situation"—as the magic cakes of Alice in Wonderland were inscribed59 "Eat me." The thinker has to decide, to choose; and there is always a risk, so that the prudent60 thinker selects warily61, subject, that is, to confirmation62 or frustration63 by later events. If one is not able to estimate wisely what is relevant to the interpretation of a given perplexing or doubtful issue, it avails[Pg 107] little that arduous64 learning has built up a large stock of concepts. For learning is not wisdom; information does not guarantee good judgment. Memory may provide an antiseptic refrigerator in which to store a stock of meanings for future use, but judgment selects and adopts the one used in a given emergency—and without an emergency (some crisis, slight or great) there is no call for judgment. No conception, even if it is carefully and firmly established in the abstract, can at first safely be more than a candidate for the office of interpreter. Only greater success than that of its rivals in clarifying dark spots, untying65 hard knots, reconciling discrepancies66, can elect it or prove it a valid67 idea for the given situation.
Judging terminates in a decision or statement
3. The judgment when formed is a decision; it closes (or concludes) the question at issue. This determination not only settles that particular case, but it helps fix a rule or method for deciding similar matters in the future; as the sentence of the judge on the bench both terminates that dispute and also forms a precedent68 for future decisions. If the interpretation settled upon is not controverted69 by subsequent events, a presumption70 is built up in favor of similar interpretation in other cases where the features are not so obviously unlike as to make it inappropriate. In this way, principles of judging are gradually built up; a certain manner of interpretation gets weight, authority. In short, meanings get standardized71, they become logical concepts (see below, p. 118).
§ 2. The Origin and Nature of Ideas
Ideas are conjectures73 employed in judging
This brings us to the question of ideas in relation to judgments.[19] Something in an obscure situation sug[Pg 108]gests something else as its meaning. If this meaning is at once accepted, there is no reflective thinking, no genuine judging. Thought is cut short uncritically; dogmatic belief, with all its attending risks, takes place. But if the meaning suggested is held in suspense, pending74 examination and inquiry75, there is true judgment. We stop and think, we de-fer conclusion in order to in-fer more thoroughly76. In this process of being only conditionally77 accepted, accepted only for examination, meanings become ideas. That is to say, an idea is a meaning that is tentatively entertained, formed, and used with reference to its fitness to decide a perplexing situation,—a meaning used as a tool of judgment.
Or tools of interpretation
Let us recur78 to our instance of a blur in motion appearing at a distance. We wonder what the thing is, i.e. what the blur means. A man waving his arms, a friend beckoning79 to us, are suggested as possibilities. To accept at once either alternative is to arrest judgment. But if we treat what is suggested as only a suggestion, a supposition, a possibility, it becomes an idea, having the following traits: (a) As merely a suggestion, it is a conjecture72, a guess, which in cases of greater dignity we call a hypothesis or a theory. That is to say, it is a possible but as yet doubtful mode of interpretation. (b) Even though doubtful, it has an office to perform; namely, that of directing inquiry and examination. If this blur means a friend beckoning, then careful observation should show certain other traits. If it is a man driving unruly cattle, certain other traits should be found. Let us look and see if these traits are found. Taken merely as a doubt, an idea would paralyze inquiry. Taken merely as a certainty, it would arrest[Pg 109] inquiry. Taken as a doubtful possibility, it affords a standpoint, a platform, a method of inquiry.
Pseudo-ideas
Ideas are not then genuine ideas unless they are tools in a reflective examination which tends to solve a problem. Suppose it is a question of having the pupil grasp the idea of the sphericity of the earth. This is different from teaching him its sphericity as a fact. He may be shown (or reminded of) a ball or a globe, and be told that the earth is round like those things; he may then be made to repeat that statement day after day till the shape of the earth and the shape of the ball are welded together in his mind. But he has not thereby80 acquired any idea of the earth's sphericity; at most, he has had a certain image of a sphere and has finally managed to image the earth after the analogy of his ball image. To grasp sphericity as an idea, the pupil must first have realized certain perplexities or confusing features in observed facts and have had the idea of spherical81 shape suggested to him as a possible way of accounting82 for the phenomena83 in question. Only by use as a method of interpreting data so as to give them fuller meaning does sphericity become a genuine idea. There may be a vivid image and no idea; or there may be a fleeting84, obscure image and yet an idea, if that image performs the function of instigating85 and directing the observation and relation of facts.
Ideas furnish the only alternative to "hit or miss" methods
Logical ideas are like keys which are shaping with reference to opening a lock. Pike, separated by a glass partition from the fish upon which they ordinarily prey86, will—so it is said—butt their heads against the glass until it is literally87 beaten into them that they cannot get at their food. Animals learn (when they learn at all) by a "cut and try" method; by doing at random[Pg 110] first one thing and another thing and then preserving the things that happen to succeed. Action directed consciously by ideas—by suggested meanings accepted for the sake of experimenting with them—is the sole alternative both to bull-headed stupidity and to learning bought from that dear teacher—chance experience.
They are methods of indirect attack
It is significant that many words for intelligence suggest the idea of circuitous88, evasive activity—often with a sort of intimation of even moral obliquity89. The bluff90, hearty91 man goes straight (and stupidly, it is implied) at some work. The intelligent man is cunning, shrewd (crooked), wily, subtle, crafty92, artful, designing—the idea of indirection is involved.[20] An idea is a method of evading93, circumventing94, or surmounting95 through reflection obstacles that otherwise would have to be attacked by brute96 force. But ideas may lose their intellectual quality as they are habitually97 used. When a child was first learning to recognize, in some hesitating suspense, cats, dogs, houses, marbles, trees, shoes, and other objects, ideas—conscious and tentative meanings—intervened as methods of identification. Now, as a rule, the thing and the meaning are so completely fused that there is no judgment and no idea proper, but only automatic recognition. On the other hand, things that are, as a rule, directly apprehended98 and familiar become subjects of judgment when they present themselves in unusual contexts: as forms, distances, sizes, positions when we attempt to draw them; triangles, squares, and circles when they turn up, not in connection with familiar toys, implements99, and utensils100, but as problems in geometry.
[Pg 111]
§ 3. Analysis and Synthesis
Judging clears up things: analysis
Through judging confused data are cleared up, and seemingly incoherent and disconnected facts brought together. Things may have a peculiar feeling for us, they may make a certain indescribable impression upon us; the thing may feel round (that is, present a quality which we afterwards define as round), an act may seem rude (or what we afterwards classify as rude), and yet this quality may be lost, absorbed, blended in the total value of the situation. Only as we need to use just that aspect of the original situation as a tool of grasping something perplexing or obscure in another situation, do we abstract or detach the quality so that it becomes individualized. Only because we need to characterize the shape of some new object or the moral quality of some new act, does the element of roundness or rudeness in the old experience detach itself, and stand out as a distinctive101 feature. If the element thus selected clears up what is otherwise obscure in the new experience, if it settles what is uncertain, it thereby itself gains in positiveness and definiteness of meaning. This point will meet us again in the following chapter; here we shall speak of the matter only as it bears upon the questions of analysis and synthesis.
Mental analysis is not like physical divisionMisapprehension of analysis in education
Even when it is definitely stated that intellectual and physical analyses are different sorts of operations, intellectual analysis is often treated after the analogy of physical; as if it were the breaking up of a whole into all its constituent102 parts in the mind instead of in space. As nobody can possibly tell what breaking a whole into its parts in the mind means, this conception leads to the further notion that logical analysis is a mere3 enumeration103 and listing of all conceivable qualities and relations.[Pg 112] The influence upon education of this conception has been very great.[21] Every subject in the curriculum has passed through—or still remains104 in—what may be called the phase of anatomical or morphological method: the stage in which understanding the subject is thought to consist of multiplying distinctions of quality, form, relation, and so on, and attaching some name to each distinguished105 element. In normal growth, specific properties are emphasized and so individualized only when they serve to clear up a present difficulty. Only as they are involved in judging some specific situation is there any motive106 or use for analyses, i.e. for emphasis upon some element or relation as peculiarly significant.
The same putting the cart before the horse, the product before the process, is found in that overconscious formulation of methods of procedure so current in elementary instruction. (See p. 60.) The method that is employed in discovery, in reflective inquiry, cannot possibly be identified with the method that emerges after the discovery is made. In the genuine operation of inference, the mind is in the attitude of search, of hunting, of projection108, of trying this and that; when the conclusion is reached, the search is at an end. The Greeks used to discuss: "How is learning (or inquiry) possible? For either we know already what we are after, and then we do not learn or inquire; or we do not know, and then we cannot inquire, for we do not know what to look for." The dilemma109 is at least suggestive, for it points to the true alternative: the use in inquiry of doubt, of tentative suggestion, of experimen[Pg 113]tation. After we have reached the conclusion, a reconsideration of the steps of the process to see what is helpful, what is harmful, what is merely useless, will assist in dealing110 more promptly111 and efficaciously with analogous112 problems in the future. In this way, more or less explicit113 method is gradually built up. (Compare the earlier discussion on p. 62 of the psychological and the logical.)
Method comes before its formulation
It is, however, a common assumption that unless the pupil from the outset consciously recognizes and explicitly114 states the method logically implied in the result he is to reach, he will have no method, and his mind will work confusedly or anarchically; while if he accompanies his performance with conscious statement of some form of procedure (outline, topical analysis, list of headings and subheadings, uniform formula) his mind is safeguarded and strengthened. As a matter of fact, the development of an unconscious logical attitude and habit must come first. A conscious setting forth115 of the method logically adapted for reaching an end is possible only after the result has first been reached by more unconscious and tentative methods, while it is valuable only when a review of the method that achieved success in a given case will throw light upon a new, similar case. The ability to fasten upon and single out (abstract, analyze) those features of one experience which are logically best is hindered by premature insistence116 upon their explicit formulation. It is repeated use that gives a method definiteness; and given this definiteness, precipitation into formulated117 statement should follow naturally. But because teachers find that the things which they themselves best understand are marked off and defined in clear-cut ways, our schoolrooms are pervaded[Pg 114] with the superstition118 that children are to begin with already crystallized formul? of method.
Judgment reveals the bearing or significance of facts: synthesis
As analysis is conceived to be a sort of picking to pieces, so synthesis is thought to be a sort of physical piecing together; and so imagined, it also becomes a mystery. In fact, synthesis takes place wherever we grasp the bearing of facts on a conclusion, or of a principle on facts. As analysis is emphasis, so synthesis is placing; the one causes the emphasized fact or property to stand out as significant; the other gives what is selected its context, or its connection with what is signified. Every judgment is analytic119 in so far as it involves discernment, discrimination, marking off the trivial from the important, the irrelevant from what points to a conclusion; and it is synthetic120 in so far as it leaves the mind with an inclusive situation within which the selected facts are placed.
Analysis and synthesis are correlative
Educational methods that pride themselves on being exclusively analytic or exclusively synthetic are therefore (so far as they carry out their boasts) incompatible121 with normal operations of judgment. Discussions have taken place, for example, as to whether the teaching of geography should be analytic or synthetic. The synthetic method is supposed to begin with the partial, limited portion of the earth's surface already familiar to the pupil, and then gradually piece on adjacent regions (the county, the country, the continent, and so on) till an idea of the entire globe is reached, or of the solar system that includes the globe. The analytic method is supposed to begin with the physical whole, the solar system or globe, and to work down through its constituent portions till the immediate environment is reached. The underlying122 conceptions are of physical wholes and physical[Pg 115] parts. As matter of fact, we cannot assume that the portion of the earth already familiar to the child is such a definite object, mentally, that he can at once begin with it; his knowledge of it is misty123 and vague as well as incomplete. Accordingly, mental progress will involve analysis of it—emphasis of the features that are significant, so that they will stand out clearly. Moreover, his own locality is not sharply marked off, neatly bounded, and measured. His experience of it is already an experience that involves sun, moon, and stars as parts of the scene he surveys; it involves a changing horizon line as he moves about; that is, even his more limited and local experience involves far-reaching factors that take his imagination clear beyond his own street and village. Connection, relationship with a larger whole, is already involved. But his recognition of these relations is inadequate124, vague, incorrect. He needs to utilize125 the features of the local environment which are understood to help clarify and enlarge his conceptions of the larger geographical126 scene to which they belong. At the same time, not till he has grasped the larger scene will many of even the commonest features of his environment become intelligible127. Analysis leads to synthesis; while synthesis perfects analysis. As the pupil grows in comprehension of the vast complicated earth in its setting in space, he also sees more definitely the meaning of the familiar local details. This intimate interaction between selective emphasis and interpretation of what is selected is found wherever reflection proceeds normally. Hence the folly128 of trying to set analysis and synthesis over against each other.
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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conducive
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| adj.有益的，有助的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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specialized
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| adj.专门的，专业化的 | |
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judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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authoritative
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| adj.有权威的，可相信的；命令式的；官方的 | |
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controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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sifting
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| n.筛，过滤v.筛( sift的现在分词 )；筛滤；细查；详审 | |
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uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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vaguely
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| adv.含糊地，暖昧地 | |
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interpretations
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| n.解释( interpretation的名词复数 )；表演；演绎；理解 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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neatly
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| adv.整洁地，干净地，灵巧地，熟练地 | |
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strife
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| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
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blur
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| n.模糊不清的事物；vt.使模糊，使看不清楚 | |
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appraised
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| v.估价( appraise的过去式和过去分词 )；估计；估量；评价 | |
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conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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intensity
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| n.强烈，剧烈；强度；烈度 | |
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conspicuousness
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| 显著，卓越，突出； 显著性 | |
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insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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proffer
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| v.献出，赠送；n.提议，建议 | |
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elimination
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| n.排除，消除，消灭 | |
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rejection
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| n.拒绝，被拒，抛弃，被弃 | |
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conditional
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| adj.条件的，带有条件的 | |
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irrelevant
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| adj.不恰当的，无关系的，不相干的 | |
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knack
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| n.诀窍，做事情的灵巧的，便利的方法 | |
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tact
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| n.机敏，圆滑，得体 | |
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instinctive
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| adj.(出于)本能的；直觉的；(出于)天性的 | |
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inborn
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| adj.天生的，生来的，先天的 | |
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connoisseur
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| n.鉴赏家，行家，内行 | |
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delicacy
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| n.精致，细微，微妙，精良；美味，佳肴 | |
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scotch
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| n.伤口，刻痕；苏格兰威士忌酒；v.粉碎，消灭，阻止；adj.苏格兰(人)的 | |
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procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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43
Bungler
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| n.笨拙者，经验不够的人 | |
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44
suspense
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| n.（对可能发生的事）紧张感，担心，挂虑 | |
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45
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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46
relegate
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| v.使降级，流放，移交，委任 | |
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47
solvent
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| n.溶剂；adj.有偿付能力的 | |
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48
flexibility
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| n.柔韧性，弹性，（光的）折射性，灵活性 | |
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49
rigidity
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| adj.钢性，坚硬 | |
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50
flippancy
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| n.轻率；浮躁；无礼的行动 | |
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51
simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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52
detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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53
virgin
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| n.处女，未婚女子；adj.未经使用的；未经开发的 | |
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54
habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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55
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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56
educed
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| v.引出( educe的过去式和过去分词 )；唤起或开发出（潜能）；推断（出）；从数据中演绎（出） | |
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57
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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58
inhibited
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| a.拘谨的，拘束的 | |
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59
inscribed
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| v.写，刻( inscribe的过去式和过去分词 )；内接 | |
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60
prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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61
warily
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| adv.留心地 | |
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62
confirmation
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| n.证实，确认，批准 | |
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63
frustration
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| n.挫折，失败，失效，落空 | |
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64
arduous
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| adj.艰苦的，费力的，陡峭的 | |
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65
untying
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| untie的现在分词 | |
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66
discrepancies
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| n.差异，不符合（之处），不一致（之处）( discrepancy的名词复数 ) | |
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67
valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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68
precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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69
controverted
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| v.争论，反驳，否定( controvert的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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70
presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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71
standardized
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| adj.标准化的 | |
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72
conjecture
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| n./v.推测，猜测 | |
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73
conjectures
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| 推测，猜想( conjecture的名词复数 ) | |
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74
pending
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| prep.直到，等待…期间；adj.待定的；迫近的 | |
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75
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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76
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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77
conditionally
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| adv. 有条件地 | |
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78
recur
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| vi.复发，重现，再发生 | |
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79
beckoning
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| adj.引诱人的，令人心动的v.（用头或手的动作）示意，召唤( beckon的现在分词 ) | |
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80
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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81
spherical
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| adj.球形的；球面的 | |
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82
accounting
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| n.会计，会计学，借贷对照表 | |
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83
phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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84
fleeting
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| adj.短暂的，飞逝的 | |
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85
instigating
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| v.使（某事物）开始或发生，鼓动( instigate的现在分词 ) | |
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86
prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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87
literally
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| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
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88
circuitous
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| adj.迂回的路的，迂曲的，绕行的 | |
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89
obliquity
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| n.倾斜度 | |
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90
bluff
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| v.虚张声势，用假象骗人；n.虚张声势，欺骗 | |
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91
hearty
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| adj.热情友好的；衷心的；尽情的，纵情的 | |
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92
crafty
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| adj.狡猾的，诡诈的 | |
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93
evading
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| 逃避( evade的现在分词 )； 避开； 回避； 想不出 | |
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94
circumventing
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| v.设法克服或避免（某事物），回避( circumvent的现在分词 )；绕过，绕行，绕道旅行 | |
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95
surmounting
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| 战胜( surmount的现在分词 )； 克服（困难）； 居于…之上； 在…顶上 | |
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96
brute
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| n.野兽，兽性 | |
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97
habitually
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| ad.习惯地，通常地 | |
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98
apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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99
implements
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| n.工具( implement的名词复数 )；家具；手段；[法律]履行（契约等）v.实现( implement的第三人称单数 )；执行；贯彻；使生效 | |
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100
utensils
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| 器具，用具，器皿( utensil的名词复数 )； 器物 | |
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101
distinctive
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| adj.特别的，有特色的，与众不同的 | |
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102
constituent
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| n.选民；成分，组分；adj.组成的，构成的 | |
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103
enumeration
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| n.计数，列举；细目；详表；点查 | |
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104
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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105
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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106
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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107
premature
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| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
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108
projection
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| n.发射，计划，突出部分 | |
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109
dilemma
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| n.困境，进退两难的局面 | |
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110
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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111
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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112
analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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113
explicit
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| adj.详述的，明确的；坦率的；显然的 | |
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114
explicitly
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| ad.明确地，显然地 | |
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115
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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116
insistence
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| n.坚持；强调；坚决主张 | |
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117
formulated
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| v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
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118
superstition
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| n.迷信，迷信行为 | |
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119
analytic
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| adj.分析的，用分析方法的 | |
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120
synthetic
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| adj.合成的，人工的；综合的；n.人工制品 | |
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121
incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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122
underlying
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| adj.在下面的，含蓄的，潜在的 | |
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123
misty
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| adj.雾蒙蒙的，有雾的 | |
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124
inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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125
utilize
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| vt.使用，利用 | |
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126
geographical
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| adj.地理的；地区(性)的 | |
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127
intelligible
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| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
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128
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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