We have here two quite distinct moral persons, the government and the Sovereign, and in consequence two general wills, one general in relation to all the citizens, the other only for the members of the administration. Thus, although the government may regulate its internal policy as it pleases, it can never speak to the people save in the name of the Sovereign, that is, of the people itself, a fact which must not be forgotten.
The first societies governed themselves aristocratically. The heads of families took counsel together on public affairs. The young bowed without question to the authority of experience. Hence such names as priests, elders, senate, and gerontes. The savages1 of North America govern themselves in this way even now, and their government is admirable.
But, in proportion as artificial inequality produced by institutions became predominant over natural inequality, riches or power[1] were put before age, and aristocracy became elective. Finally, the transmission of the father's power along with his goods to his children, by creating patrician2 families, made government hereditary3, and there came to be senators of twenty.
There are then three sorts of aristocracy—natural, elective and hereditary. The first is only for simple peoples; the third is the worst of all governments; the second is the best, and is aristocracy properly so called.
Besides the advantage that lies in the distinction between the two powers, it presents that of its members being chosen; for, in popular government, all the citizens are born magistrates4; but here magistracy is confined to a few, who become such only by election.[2] By this means uprightness, understanding, experience and all other claims to pre-eminence and public esteem5 become so many further guarantees of wise government.
Moreover, assemblies are more easily held, affairs better discussed and carried out with more order and diligence, and the credit of the State is better sustained abroad by venerable senators than by a multitude that is unknown or despised.
In a word, it is the best and most natural arrangement that the wisest should govern the many, when it is assured that they will govern for its profit, and not for their own. There is no need to multiply instruments, or get twenty thousand men to do what a hundred picked men can do even better, but it must not be forgotten mat corporate6 interest here begins to direct the public power less under the regulation of the general will, and that a further inevitable7 propensity8 takes away from the laws part of the executive power.
If we are to speak of what is individually desirable, neither should the State be so small, nor a people so simple and upright, that the execution of the laws follows immediately from the public will, as it does in a good democracy. Nor should the nation be so great that the rulers have to scatter9 in order to govern it and are able to play the Sovereign each in his own department, and, beginning by making themselves independent, end by becoming masters.
But if aristocracy does not demand all the virtues10 needed by popular government, it demands others which are peculiar11 to itself; for instance, moderation on the side of the rich and contentment on that of the poor; for it seems that thorough-going equality would be out of place, as it was not found even at Sparta.
Furthermore, if this form of government carries with it a certain inequality of fortune, this is justifiable12 in order that as a rule the administration of public affairs may be entrusted13 to those who are most able to give them their whole time, but not, as Aristotle maintains, in order that the rich may always be put first. On the contrary, it is of importance that an opposite choice should occasionally teach the people that the deserts of men offer claims to pre-eminence more important than those of riches.
[1] It is clear that the word optimates meant, among the ancients, not the best, but the most powerful.
[2] It is of great importance that the form of the election of magistrates should be regulated by law; for if it is left at the discretion14 of the prince, it is impossible to avoid falling into hereditary aristocracy, as the Republics of Venice and Berne actually did. The first of these has therefore long been a State dissolved; the second, however, is maintained by the extreme wisdom of the senate, and forms an honourable15 and highly dangerous exception.
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1 savages | |
未开化的人,野蛮人( savage的名词复数 ) | |
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2 patrician | |
adj.贵族的,显贵的;n.贵族;有教养的人;罗马帝国的地方官 | |
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3 hereditary | |
adj.遗传的,遗传性的,可继承的,世袭的 | |
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4 magistrates | |
地方法官,治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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5 esteem | |
n.尊敬,尊重;vt.尊重,敬重;把…看作 | |
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6 corporate | |
adj.共同的,全体的;公司的,企业的 | |
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7 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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8 propensity | |
n.倾向;习性 | |
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9 scatter | |
vt.撒,驱散,散开;散布/播;vi.分散,消散 | |
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10 virtues | |
美德( virtue的名词复数 ); 德行; 优点; 长处 | |
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11 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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12 justifiable | |
adj.有理由的,无可非议的 | |
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13 entrusted | |
v.委托,托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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14 discretion | |
n.谨慎;随意处理 | |
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15 honourable | |
adj.可敬的;荣誉的,光荣的 | |
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