As the particular will acts constantly in opposition2 to the general will, the government continually exerts itself against the Sovereignty. The greater this exertion3 becomes, the more the constitution changes; and, as there is in this case no other corporate4 will to create an equilibrium5 by resisting the will of the prince, sooner or later the prince must inevitably6 suppress the Sovereign and break the social treaty. This is the unavoidable and inherent defect which, from the very birth of the body politic7, tends ceaselessly to destroy it, as age and death end by destroying the human body.
There are two general courses by which government degenerates8: i.e. when it undergoes contraction9, or when the State is dissolved.
Government undergoes contraction when it passes from the many to the few, that is, from democracy to aristocracy, and from aristocracy to royalty10. To do so is its natural propensity11.[1] If it took the backward course from the few to the many, it could be said that it was relaxed; by this inverse12 sequence is impossible.
Indeed, governments never change their form except when their energy is exhausted13 and leaves them too weak to keep what they have. If a government at once extended its sphere and relaxed its stringency14, its force would become absolutely nil15, and it would persist still less. It is therefore necessary to wind up the spring and tighten16 the hold as it gives way: or else the State it sustains will come to grief.
The dissolution of the State may come about in either of two ways.
First, when the prince ceases to administer the State in accordance with the laws, and usurps18 the Sovereign power. A remarkable19 change then occurs: not the government, but the State, undergoes contraction; I mean that the great State is dissolved, and another is formed within it, composed solely20 of the members of the government, which becomes for the rest of the people merely master and tyrant21. So that the moment the government usurps the Sovereignty, the social compact is broken and all private citizens recover by right their natural liberty, and are forced, but not bound, to obey.
The same thing happens when the members of the government severally usurp17 the power they should exercise only as a body; this is as great an infraction22 of the laws, and results in even greater disorders23. There are then, so to speak, as many princes as there are magistrates24, and the State, no less divided than the government, either perishes or changes its form.
When the State is dissolved, the abuse of government, whatever it is, bears the common name of anarchy26. To distinguish, democracy degenerates into ochlocracy and aristocracy into oligarchy27 and I would add that royalty degenerates into tyranny; but this last word is ambiguous and needs explanation.
In vulgar usage, a tyrant is a king who governs violently and without regard for justice and law. In the exact sense, a tyrant is an individual who arrogates28 to himself the royal authority without having a right to it. This is how the Greeks understood the word "tyrant": they applied29 it indifferently to good and bad princes whose authority was not legitimate30.[2] Tyrant and usurper31 are thus perfectly32 synonymous terms.
In order that I may give different things different names, I call him who usurps the royal authority tyrant, and him who usurps the sovereign power a despot. The tyrant is he who thrusts himself in contrary to the laws to govern in accordance with the laws; the despot is he who sets himself above the laws themselves. Thus the tyrant cannot be a despot, but the despot is always a tyrant.
[1] The slow formation and the progress of the Republic of Venice in its lagoons33 are a notable instance of this sequence; and it is most astonishing that, after more than twelve hundred years' existence, the Venetians seem to be still at the second stage, which they reached with the Serrar di Consiglio in 1198. As for the ancient Dukes who are brought up against them, it is proved, whatever the Squittinio della libertà veneta may say of them, that they were in no sense Sovereigns.
A case certain to be cited against my view is that of the Roman Republic, which, it will be said, followed exactly the opposite course, and passed from monarchy34 to aristocracy and from aristocracy to democracy. I by no means take this view of it.
What Romulus first set up was a mixed government, which soon deteriorated35 into despotism. From special causes, the State died an untimely death, as new-born children sometimes perish without reaching manhood. The expulsion of the Tarquins was the real period of the birth of the Republic. But at first it took on no constant form, because, by not abolishing the patriciate, it left half its work undone36. For, by this means, hereditary37 aristocracy, the worst of all legitimate forms of administration, remained in conflict with democracy, and the form of the government, as Macchiavelli has proved, was only fixed38 on the establishment of the tribunate: only then was there a true government and a veritable democracy. In fact, the people was then not only Sovereign, but also magistrate25 and judge; the senate was only a subordinate tribunal, to temper and concentrate the government, and the consuls39 themselves, though they were patricians40, first magistrates, and absolute generals in war, were in Rome itself no more than presidents of the people.
From that point, the government followed its natural tendency, and inclined strongly to aristocracy. The patriciate, we may say, abolished itself, and the aristocracy was found no longer in the body of patricians as at Venice and Genoa, but in the body of the senate, which was composed of patricians and plebeians41, and even in the body of tribunes when they began to usurp an active function: for names do not affect facts, and, when the people has rulers who govern for it, whatever name they bear, the government is an aristocracy.
The abuse of aristocracy led to the civil wars and the triumvirate. Sulla, Julius C?sar and Augustus became in fact real monarchs42; and finally, under the despotism of Tiberius, the State was dissolved. Roman history then confirms, instead of invalidating, the principle I have laid down.
[2] Omnes enim et habentur et dicuntur tyranni, qui potestate utuntur perpetua in ea civitate qu? libertate usa est (Cornelius Nepos, Life of Miltiades). [For all those are called and considered tyrants43, who hold perpetual power in a State that has known liberty.] It is true that Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics44, Book viii, chapter x) distinguishes the tyrant from the king by the fact that the former governs in his own interest, and the latter only for the good of his subjects; but not only did all Greek authors in general use the word tyrant in a different sense, as appears most clearly in Xenophon's Hiero, but also it would follow from Aristotle's distinction that, from the very beginning of the world, there has not yet been a single king.
点击收听单词发音
1 degenerate | |
v.退步,堕落;adj.退步的,堕落的;n.堕落者 | |
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2 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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3 exertion | |
n.尽力,努力 | |
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4 corporate | |
adj.共同的,全体的;公司的,企业的 | |
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5 equilibrium | |
n.平衡,均衡,相称,均势,平静 | |
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6 inevitably | |
adv.不可避免地;必然发生地 | |
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7 politic | |
adj.有智虑的;精明的;v.从政 | |
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8 degenerates | |
衰退,堕落,退化( degenerate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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9 contraction | |
n.缩略词,缩写式,害病 | |
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10 royalty | |
n.皇家,皇族 | |
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11 propensity | |
n.倾向;习性 | |
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12 inverse | |
adj.相反的,倒转的,反转的;n.相反之物;v.倒转 | |
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13 exhausted | |
adj.极其疲惫的,精疲力尽的 | |
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14 stringency | |
n.严格,紧迫,说服力;严格性;强度 | |
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15 nil | |
n.无,全无,零 | |
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16 tighten | |
v.(使)变紧;(使)绷紧 | |
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17 usurp | |
vt.篡夺,霸占;vi.篡位 | |
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18 usurps | |
篡夺,霸占( usurp的第三人称单数 ); 盗用; 篡夺,篡权 | |
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19 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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20 solely | |
adv.仅仅,唯一地 | |
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21 tyrant | |
n.暴君,专制的君主,残暴的人 | |
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22 infraction | |
n.违反;违法 | |
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23 disorders | |
n.混乱( disorder的名词复数 );凌乱;骚乱;(身心、机能)失调 | |
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24 magistrates | |
地方法官,治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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25 magistrate | |
n.地方行政官,地方法官,治安官 | |
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26 anarchy | |
n.无政府状态;社会秩序混乱,无秩序 | |
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27 oligarchy | |
n.寡头政治 | |
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28 arrogates | |
v.冒称,妄取( arrogate的第三人称单数 );没来由地把…归属(于) | |
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29 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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30 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
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31 usurper | |
n. 篡夺者, 僭取者 | |
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32 perfectly | |
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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33 lagoons | |
n.污水池( lagoon的名词复数 );潟湖;(大湖或江河附近的)小而浅的淡水湖;温泉形成的池塘 | |
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34 monarchy | |
n.君主,最高统治者;君主政体,君主国 | |
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35 deteriorated | |
恶化,变坏( deteriorate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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36 undone | |
a.未做完的,未完成的 | |
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37 hereditary | |
adj.遗传的,遗传性的,可继承的,世袭的 | |
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38 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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39 consuls | |
领事( consul的名词复数 ); (古罗马共和国时期)执政官 (古罗马共和国及其军队的最高首长,同时共有两位,每年选举一次) | |
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40 patricians | |
n.(古罗马的)统治阶层成员( patrician的名词复数 );贵族,显贵 | |
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41 plebeians | |
n.平民( plebeian的名词复数 );庶民;平民百姓;平庸粗俗的人 | |
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42 monarchs | |
君主,帝王( monarch的名词复数 ) | |
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43 tyrants | |
专制统治者( tyrant的名词复数 ); 暴君似的人; (古希腊的)僭主; 严酷的事物 | |
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44 ethics | |
n.伦理学;伦理观,道德标准 | |
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