The inflexibility1 of the laws, which prevents them from adapting themselves to circumstances, may, in certain cases, render them disastrous2, and make them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the State. The order and slowness of the forms they enjoin3 require a space of time which circumstances sometimes withhold4. A thousand cases against which the legislator has made no provision may present themselves, and it is a highly necessary part of foresight5 to be conscious that everything cannot be foreseen.
It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions so strong as to render it impossible to suspend their operation. Even Sparta allowed its laws to lapse6.
However, none but the greatest dangers can counter-balance that of changing the public order, and the sacred power of the laws should never be arrested save when the existence of the country is at stake. In these rare and obvious cases, provision is made for the public security by a particular act entrusting7 it to him who is most worthy8. This commitment may be carried out in either of two ways, according to the nature of the danger.
If increasing the activity of the government is a sufficient remedy, power is concentrated in the hands of one or two of its members: in this case the change is not in the authority of the laws, but only in the form of administering them. If, on the other hand, the peril9 is of such a kind that the paraphernalia10 of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation11, the method is to nominate a supreme12 ruler, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no doubt about the general will, and it is clear that the people's first intention is that the State shall not perish. Thus the suspension of the legislative13 authority is in no sense its abolition14; the magistrate15 who silences it cannot make it speak; he dominates it, but cannot represent it. He can do anything, except make laws.
The first method was used by the Roman senate when, in a consecrated16 formula, it charged the consuls17 to provide for the safety of the Republic. The second was employed when one of the two consuls nominated a dictator:[1] a custom Rome borrowed from Alba.
During the first period of the Republic, recourse was very often had to the dictatorship, because the State had not yet a firm enough basis to be able to maintain itself by the strength of its constitution alone. As the state of morality then made superfluous18 many of the precautions which would have been necessary at other times, there was no fear that a dictator would abuse his authority, or try to keep it beyond his term of office. On the contrary, so much power appeared to be burdensome to him who was clothed with it, and he made all speed to lay it down, as if taking the place of the laws had been too troublesome and too perilous19 a position to retain.
It is therefore the danger not of its abuse, but of its cheapening, that makes me attack the indiscreet use of this supreme magistracy in the earliest times. For as long as it was freely employed at elections, dedications20 and purely21 formal functions, there was danger of its becoming less formidable in time of need, and of men growing accustomed to regarding as empty a title that was used only on occasions of empty ceremonial.
Towards the end of the Republic, the Romans, having grown more circumspect22, were as unreasonably23 sparing in the use of the dictatorship as they had formerly24 been lavish25. It is easy to see that their fears were without foundation, that the weakness of the capital secured it against the magistrates26 who were in its midst; that a dictator might, in certain cases, defend the public liberty, but could never endanger it; and that the chains of Rome would be forged, not in Rome itself, but in her armies. The weak resistance offered by Marius to Sulla, and by Pompey to C?sar, clearly showed what was to be expected from authority at home against force from abroad.
This misconception led the Romans to make great mistakes; such, for example, as the failure to nominate a dictator in the Catilinarian conspiracy27. For, as only the city itself, with at most some province in Italy, was concerned, the unlimited28 authority the laws gave to the dictator would have enabled him to make short work of the conspiracy, which was, in fact, stifled29 only by a combination of lucky chances human prudence30 had no right to expect.
Instead, the senate contented31 itself with entrusting its whole power to the consuls, so that Cicero, in order to take effective action, was compelled on a capital point to exceed his powers; and if, in the first transports of joy, his conduct was approved, he was justly called, later on, to account for the blood of citizens spilt in violation32 of the laws. Such a reproach could never have been levelled at a dictator. But the consul's eloquence33 carried the day; and he himself, Roman though he was, loved his own glory better than his country, and sought, not so much the most lawful34 and secure means of saving the State, as to get for himself the whole honour of having done so.[2] He was therefore justly honoured as the liberator35 of Rome, and also justly punished as a law-breaker. However brilliant his recall may have been, it was undoubtedly36 an act of pardon.
However this important trust be conferred, it is important that its duration should be fixed37 at a very brief period, incapable38 of being ever prolonged. In the crises which lead to its adoption39, the State is either soon lost, or soon saved; and, the present need passed, the dictatorship becomes either tyrannical or idle. At Rome, where dictators held office for six months only, most of them abdicated40 before their time was up. If their term had been longer, they might well have tried to prolong it still further, as the decemvirs did when chosen for a year. The dictator had only time to provide against the need that had caused him to be chosen; he had none to think of further projects.
[1] The nomination41 was made secretly by night, as if there were something shameful42 in setting a man above the laws.
[2] That is what he could not be sure of, if he proposed a dictator; for he dared not nominate himself, and could not be certain that his colleague would nominate him.
点击收听单词发音
1 inflexibility | |
n.不屈性,顽固,不变性;不可弯曲;非挠性;刚性 | |
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2 disastrous | |
adj.灾难性的,造成灾害的;极坏的,很糟的 | |
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3 enjoin | |
v.命令;吩咐;禁止 | |
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4 withhold | |
v.拒绝,不给;使停止,阻挡 | |
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5 foresight | |
n.先见之明,深谋远虑 | |
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6 lapse | |
n.过失,流逝,失效,抛弃信仰,间隔;vi.堕落,停止,失效,流逝;vt.使失效 | |
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7 entrusting | |
v.委托,托付( entrust的现在分词 ) | |
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8 worthy | |
adj.(of)值得的,配得上的;有价值的 | |
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9 peril | |
n.(严重的)危险;危险的事物 | |
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10 paraphernalia | |
n.装备;随身用品 | |
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11 preservation | |
n.保护,维护,保存,保留,保持 | |
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12 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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13 legislative | |
n.立法机构,立法权;adj.立法的,有立法权的 | |
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14 abolition | |
n.废除,取消 | |
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15 magistrate | |
n.地方行政官,地方法官,治安官 | |
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16 consecrated | |
adj.神圣的,被视为神圣的v.把…奉为神圣,给…祝圣( consecrate的过去式和过去分词 );奉献 | |
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17 consuls | |
领事( consul的名词复数 ); (古罗马共和国时期)执政官 (古罗马共和国及其军队的最高首长,同时共有两位,每年选举一次) | |
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18 superfluous | |
adj.过多的,过剩的,多余的 | |
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19 perilous | |
adj.危险的,冒险的 | |
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20 dedications | |
奉献( dedication的名词复数 ); 献身精神; 教堂的)献堂礼; (书等作品上的)题词 | |
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21 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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22 circumspect | |
adj.慎重的,谨慎的 | |
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23 unreasonably | |
adv. 不合理地 | |
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24 formerly | |
adv.从前,以前 | |
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25 lavish | |
adj.无节制的;浪费的;vt.慷慨地给予,挥霍 | |
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26 magistrates | |
地方法官,治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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27 conspiracy | |
n.阴谋,密谋,共谋 | |
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28 unlimited | |
adj.无限的,不受控制的,无条件的 | |
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29 stifled | |
(使)窒息, (使)窒闷( stifle的过去式和过去分词 ); 镇压,遏制; 堵 | |
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30 prudence | |
n.谨慎,精明,节俭 | |
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31 contented | |
adj.满意的,安心的,知足的 | |
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32 violation | |
n.违反(行为),违背(行为),侵犯 | |
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33 eloquence | |
n.雄辩;口才,修辞 | |
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34 lawful | |
adj.法律许可的,守法的,合法的 | |
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35 liberator | |
解放者 | |
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36 undoubtedly | |
adv.确实地,无疑地 | |
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37 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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38 incapable | |
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
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39 adoption | |
n.采用,采纳,通过;收养 | |
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40 abdicated | |
放弃(职责、权力等)( abdicate的过去式和过去分词 ); 退位,逊位 | |
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41 nomination | |
n.提名,任命,提名权 | |
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42 shameful | |
adj.可耻的,不道德的 | |
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