Amateur and expert alike argue on a thousand disputed points of tactics, of strategy, and of policy: it has always been so: probably it will be so for ever. But the censorship imposed by the Government, on the outbreak of war, has achieved a record.
It has earned the unanimous and unsparing condemnation2 of everybody. Men who have agreed on no other point shake hands upon this. For sheer, blundering ineptitude4, for blind inability to appreciate the mind and temper of our countrymen, in its utter ignorance of the psychological characteristics of the nation and of the Empire, to say nothing of the rest of the world, the methods of the censorship, surely, approach very closely the limits of human capacity for failure.
When I say "the censorship" I mean, of course, the system, speaking in the broadest sense. It matters nothing whether the chief censor1, for the moment, be, by the circumstance of the day, Mr. F.E. Smith or Sir Stanley Buckmaster. Both, I make no doubt, have done their difficult work to the best of their ability, and have been loyally[Pg 67] followed, to the best of their several abilities, by their colleagues. The faults and failures of the censorship have their roots elsewhere.
Now to avoid, at the outset, any possibility of misunderstanding, I want to make it absolutely clear that in all the numerous criticisms that have been levelled at the censorship, objection has been taken not to the fact that news is censored5, but to the methods employed and to the extent to which the suppression of news has been carried.
I believe that no single newspaper in the British Isles6 has objected to the censorship, as such. I am quite sure that the public would very definitely condemn3 any demand that the censorship should be abolished. Much as we all desire to learn the full story of the war, it is obvious that to permit the indiscriminate publication of any and every story sent over the wires, would be to make the enemy a present of much information of almost priceless value. Early and accurate information is of supreme7 importance in war time, and certainly no Englishman worthy8 of the name would desire that the slightest advantage should be offered to our country's enemies by the premature9 publication of news which, on every military consideration, ought to be kept secret.
This is, unquestionably, the attitude of the great daily newspapers in London and the provinces, which have been the worst sufferers by the censor's eccentricities10. They realise, quite clearly, the vital and imperative11 necessity for the suppression of information which would be of value to the enemy, and, as a matter of fact, the editors of the principal journals exercise themselves a private censorship which is quite rigid12, and far more intelligently applied13 than the veto of the official bureau. It would surprise a good many people to learn of the vast amount[Pg 68] of information which, by one channel or another, reaches the offices of the great dailies long before the Press Bureau gives a sign that it has even heard of the matters in question. The great retreat from Mons is an excellent instance. It was known perfectly14 well, at the time, that the entire British Expeditionary Force was in a position of the gravest peril15, and it is, perhaps, not too much to say that had the public possessed16 the same knowledge there would have been a degree of depression which would have made the "black week" of the South African War gay and cheerful by comparison, even if there had not been something very nearly approaching an actual panic.
But the secret was well and loyally kept within the walls of the newspaper offices, as I, personally, think it should have been: I do not blame the military authorities in the least for holding back the fact that the position was one of extreme gravity. Bad news comes soon enough in every war, and it would be senseless folly17 to create alarm by telling people of dangers which, as in this case, may in the end be averted18. The public quarrel with the censorship rests on other, and totally different, grounds.
That a strict censorship should be exercised over military news which might prove of value to the enemy will be cheerfully admitted by every one. We all know, despite official assurances to the contrary, that German spies are still active in our midst, and, even now, there is—or at any rate until quite recently there was—little or no difficulty in sending information from this country to Germany. No one will cavil20 at any restrictions21 necessary to prevent the enemy anticipating our plans and movements, and if the censorship had not gone beyond this, no one would have had any reason to complain.
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What may perhaps be called the classic instance of the perils22 of premature publication occurred during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. In those days there was no censorship, and France, in consequence, received a lesson so terrible that it is never likely to be forgotten. It is more than likely, indeed, that it is directly responsible for the merciless severity of the French censorship to-day.
A French journal published the news that MacMahon had changed the direction in which his army was marching. The news was telegraphed to England and published in the papers here. It at once came to the attention of one of the officials of the German Embassy in London, who, realising its importance, promptly23 cabled it to Germany. For Moltke the news was simply priceless, and the altered dispositions24 he promptly made resulted in MacMahon and his entire force capitulating at Metz. Truly a terrible price to pay for the single indiscretion of a French newspaper!
It is not to be denied that to some extent certain of the "smarter" of the British newspapers are responsible for the severity of the censorship in force to-day. In effect, the censorship of news in this country dates from the last war in South Africa. Some of the English journals, in their desire to secure "picture-stories," forgot that the war correspondent has very great responsibilities quite apart from the mere25 purveying26 of news.
The result was the birth of a war correspondent of an entirely27 new type. The older men—the friends of my youth, Forbes, Burleigh, Howard Russell, and the like—had seen and studied war in many phases: they knew war, and distinguished28 with a sure instinct the news that was permissible29 as well as interesting, from the news that was interesting but[Pg 70] not permissible. Their work, because of their knowledge, showed discipline and restraint, and it can be said, broadly, that they wrote nothing which would advantage the enemy in the slightest degree.
In the war in South Africa we saw a tremendous change. Many of the men sent out were simply able word-spinners, supremely30 innocent of military knowledge, knowing absolutely nothing of military operations, unable to judge whether a bit of news would be of value to the enemy or not. Their business was to get "word-pictures"—and they got them. In doing so they sealed the doom31 of the war correspondent. The feeble and inefficient32 censorship established at Cape33 Town, for want of intelligent guidance, did little or nothing to protect the Army, and the result was that valuable information, published in London, was promptly telegraphed to the Boer leaders by way of Louren?o Marques. Many skilfully34 planned British movements, in consequence, went hopelessly to pieces, and by the time war was over, Lord Roberts and military men generally were fully19 agreed that, when the next war came, it would be absolutely necessary to establish a censorship of a very drastic nature.
We see that censorship in operation to-day, but far transcending35 its proper function. It was established—or it should have been established—for the sole purpose of preventing the publication of news likely to be of value to the enemy. Had it stopped there, no one could have complained.
I contend that in point of fact it has, throughout the war, operated not merely to prevent the enemy getting news which it was highly desirable should be kept from him, but to suppress news which the British public—the most patriotic36 and level-headed public in all the world—has every right to demand.[Pg 71] We are not a nation of board-school children or hysterical37 girls. Over and over again the British public has shown that it can bear bad news with fortitude38, just as it can keep its head in victory. Those of us who still remember the terrible "black week" in South Africa, with its full story of the horror of defeat at Colenso, Magersfontein, and Stormberg, remember how the only effect of the disaster was the ominous39 deepening of the grim British determination to "see it through": the tightening40 of the lips and the hardening of the jaws41 that meant unshakable resolve; the silent, dour42, British grip on the real essentials of the situation that, once and for all, settled the fate of Kruger's ambitions.
Are Britons to-day so changed from the Britons of 1899 that they cannot bear the truth; that they cannot face disaster; that they are indeed the degenerates43 they have been labelled by boastful Germans? Perish the thought! Britain is not decadent44; she is to-day as strong and virile45 as of old and her sons are proving it daily on the plains of Flanders, as they proved it when they fought the Kaiser's hordes46 to a standstill on the banks of the Marne during the "black week" of last autumn. Why then should the public be treated as puling infants spoon-fed on tiny scraps47 of good news when it is happily available, and left in the bliss48 of ignorance when things are not going quite so well?
From November 20th, 1914, up to February 17th, 1915—a period of three months of intense anxiety and strain—not one single word of news from the Commander-in-Chief of the greatest Army Britain has ever put into the field was vouchsafed49 to the British public. For that, of course, it is impossible to blame Sir John French. But the bare fact is[Pg 72] sufficient condemnation of the entirely unjustifiable methods of secrecy50 with which we are waging a war on which the whole future of our beloved nation and Empire depends. The public was left to imagine that the war had reached something approaching a "deadlock51." The ever-mounting tale of casualties showed that, in very truth, there had been, in that silent period of three months, fighting on a scale to which this country has been a stranger for a century.
Will any one outside the Government contend that this absurd secrecy can be justified52, either by military necessity or by a well-meant but, as I think, hopelessly mistaken regard for the feelings of the public?
We are not Germans that it should be necessary to lull53 us into a lethargic54 sleep with stories of imaginary victories, or to refrain from harrowing our souls when, as must happen in all wars, things occasionally go wrong.
We want the truth, and we are entitled to have it!
I do not say that we have been deliberately55 told that which is not true. I believe the authorities can be acquitted56 of any deliberate falsification of news. But I do say, without hesitation57, that much news was kept back which the country was entitled to know, and which could have been made public without the slightest prejudice to our military position. At the same time, publication has been permitted of wholly baseless stories, such as that of the great fight at La Bassée, to which I will allude58 later, which the authorities must have known to be unfounded.
It is not for us to criticise59 the policy of our gallant60 Allies, the French. We must leave it to them to decide how much or how little they will reveal to[Pg 73] their own people. I contend, with all my heart, that the British public should not have been fobbed off with the studiously-guarded French official report, with its meaningless—so far as the general public is concerned—daily recital61 of the capture or loss of a trench62 here and there, or with the chatty disquisitions of our amiable63 "Eye-Witness" at the British Headquarters, who manages to convey the minimum of real information in the maximum of words. It is highly interesting, I admit, to learn of that heroic soldier who brained four Germans "on his own" with a shovel64; it is very interesting to read of the "nut" making his happy and elaborate war-time toilet in the open air; and we are glad to hear all about German prisoners lamenting65 the lack of food. But these things, and countless66 others of which "Eye-Witness" has told us, are not the root of the matter. We want the true story of the campaign, and the plain fact is that we do not get it, and no one pretends that we get it.
Cheerful confidence is an excellent thing in war, as well as in all other human undertakings67. Blind optimism is a foolhardy absurdity68; blank pessimism69 is about as dangerous a frame of mind as can be conceived. I am not quite sure, in my own mind, whether the methods of the censorship are best calculated to promote dangerous optimism, or the reverse, but I am perfectly certain that they are not calculated to evoke70 that calm courage and iron resolve, in the face of known perils, which is the best augury71 of victory in the long run. Probably they produce a result varying according to the temperament72 of the individual. One day you meet a man in the club who assures you that everything is going well and that we have the Germans "in our pocket." That is the foolishness of optimism,[Pg 74] produced by the story of success and the suppression of disagreeable truths.
Twenty-four hours later you meet a gloomy individual who assures you we are no nearer beating the Germans than we were three months ago. That is the depths of pessimism. Both frames of mind are derived73 from the "official news" which the Government thinks fit to issue.
Here and there, if you are lucky, you meet the man who realises that we are up against the biggest job the Empire has ever tackled, and that, if we are to win through, the country must be plainly told the facts and plainly warned that it is necessary to make the most strenuous74 exertions75 of which we are capable. That is the man who forms his opinions not from the practically worthless official news, but from independent study of the whole gigantic problem. And that is the only frame of mind which will enable us to win this war. It is a frame of mind which the official news vouchsafed to us is not, in the least degree, calculated to produce.
In the prosecution76 of a war of such magnitude as the present unhappy conflict the public feeling of a truly democratic country such as ours is of supreme importance. It is, in fact, the most valuable asset of the military authorities, and it is a condition precedent77 for success that the nation shall be frankly78 told the truth, so far as it can be told without damage to our military interests.
Mr. Bonar Law, in the House of Commons, put the case in a nutshell when he said that—
"He had felt, from the beginning of the war, that as much information was not being given as might be given without damage to national interests. Nothing could be worse for the country than to do what the Japanese did—conceal disasters until the end of[Pg 75] the war. He did not say that there had been any concealment79, but the one thing necessary was to let the people of this and other countries feel that our official news was true, and could be relied upon. He wondered whether the House realised what a tremendous event the battle of Ypres, in November, was. The British losses there, he thought, were bigger than any battle in which purely80 English troops were engaged. It was a terrible fight, against overwhelming odds81, out of which British troops came with tremendous honour. All the account they had had was Sir John French's despatch82. Surely the country could have more than that. Whoever was in charge, when weighing the possible damage which might be brought about by the giving of news, should also bear in mind the great necessity for keeping people in this country as well informed as possible."
That, I venture to think, is a perfectly fair and legitimate83 criticism. The battle of Ypres was fought in November. Mr. Law was speaking in February. Who can say what the country would have gained in recruiting, in strength of determination, in everything that goes to make up the morale84 so necessary for the vigorous conduct of a great campaign, had it been given, at once, an adequate description of the "terrible fight against overwhelming odds" out of which the British Thomas Atkins came with so much honour?
The military critics of our newspapers have, perhaps, been one of the greatest failures of the entire campaign. One of them, on the day before Namur fell, assured us that the place could hold out for three months. Another asserted that the Russians would be in Berlin by September 10th. Another, just before the Germans drove the Russians for the second time out of East Prussia, declared that Russia's campaign was virtually ended! Besides,[Pg 76] all the so-called "histories" of the war published have been utter failures. Personally, I do not think the nation is greatly perturbed85, at the present moment, about the conduct of the actual military operations. No one is a politician to-day, and there is every desire, happily, to support the Government in any measure necessary to bring the war to a conclusion. We have not the materials, even if it were desirable, to criticise the conduct or write the history of the war, and we have no wish to do so. But we desire to learn, and we have the right to learn, the facts.
It has always been an unhappy characteristic of the military mind that it has been quite unable, perhaps unwilling86, to appreciate the mentality87 of the mere civilian88 who only has to pay the bill, and look as pleasant as possible under the ordeal89. And I suspect, very strongly, that it is just this feeling which lies at the root of a good deal of what we have had to endure under the censorship. In its essence, the censorship is a military precaution, perfectly proper and praiseworthy, but only if applied according to the real needs of the situation. Quite properly the military mind is impatient of the intrusion of the civilian in purely military affairs, and I have no doubt whatever that that fact explains the gratifying presence—in defiance90 of our long usage and to the annoyance91 of a certain type of politician—of Lord Kitchener at the War Office to-day. But military domination of the war situation, however admirable from the military point of view, has failed to take into sufficient account the purely civilian interest in the progress of the war and the extent to which the military arm must rely upon the civilian in carrying the war to a successful conclusion.
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Our military organisation92, rightly or wrongly, is based upon the voluntary system. We cannot, under present conditions, obtain, as the conscriptionist countries do, the recruits we require merely by calling to the Colours, with a stroke of the pen, men who are liable for service. We have to request, to persuade, to advertise, and to lead men to see their duty and to do it. To enable us to do this satisfactorily, public opinion must be kept well informed, must be stimulated93 by a knowledge of the real situation. When war broke out, and volunteers were called for, a tremendous wave of enthusiasm swept over the country. The recruiting organisation broke down, and, as I have pointed94 out, the Government found themselves with more men on their hands than they could possibly train or equip at the moment. Instead of taking men's names, telling them the exact facts, and sending them home to wait till they could be called for, the War Office raised the physical standard for recruits, and this dealt a blow at popular enthusiasm from which it has never recovered. Recruiting dropped to an alarming degree, and, so recently as February, Mr. Tennant, in the House of Commons, despite the efforts that had been made in the meantime, was forced to drop a pretty strong hint that "a little more energy" was advisable.
Now the connection between the manner in which the recruiting question was handled, and the general methods adopted by the censorship, is a good deal closer than might be imagined at first sight. Both show the same utter failure on the part of the military authorities to appreciate the psychology95 of the civilian. Psychology, the science of the public opinion of the nation, must, in any democratic country, play a very large part in the successful[Pg 78] conduct of a great war; and in sympathetic understanding of the temper of the masses, our military authorities, alike in regard to the censorship and recruiting question, have been entirely outclassed by the autocratic officials of Germany. I do not advocate German methods. The gospel of hate and lies—which has kept German people at fever-heat—would fail entirely here. We need no "Hymns96 of Hate" or lying bulletins to induce Britons to do their duty if the needs of the situation are thoroughly97 brought home to them.
But we have to face this disquieting98 fact, that, whatever the methods employed, the German people to-day are far more enthusiastic and determined99 in their prosecution of the war than we are.
That is a plain and unmistakable truth. I do not believe the great mass of the British public realises, even to-day, vitally and urgently, the immense gravity of the situation, and for that I blame the narrow and pedantic100 views that have kept the country in comparative ignorance of the real facts of the situation.
We have been at war for eight months and we have not yet got the men we require. Recruits have come forward in large numbers, it is true, and are still coming forward. But there is a very distinct lack of that splendid and enduring enthusiasm which a true realisation of the facts would inevitably101 evoke. Priceless opportunities for stimulating102 that enthusiasm have been, all along, lost by the persistent103 refusal to allow the full story of British heroism104 and devotion to be told.
We can take the battle of Ypres as a single outstanding example. The full story of that great fight would have done more for recruiting in a week than all the displayed advertisements and elaborate pla[Pg 79]cards with which our walls are so profusely105 adorned106 could achieve in a month!
Sir John French's despatch, as a military record, bears the hall-mark of military genius, but it is idle to pretend that it is a literary document calculated to stir the blood and fire the imagination of our countrymen. Admirable in its firm restraint from the military point of view, it takes no account of the civilian imagination. That is not Sir John French's business. He is a great soldier, and it is no reproach to him that his despatch is not exactly what is required by the urgency of the situation. Moreover, it came too late to exercise its full effect. Had the story of Ypres been given to the public promptly, and in the form in which it would have been cast by a graphic107 writer who understood the subject with which he was dealing108 and the public for whom he was writing, we should probably have been better off to-day by thousands and thousands of the much-needed recruits. The failure to take advantage of such a glorious opportunity for the stimulation109 of enthusiasm by purely legitimate means, convicts our censorship authorities of a total failure to appreciate the mentality of the public whose supposed interests they serve.
And as with successes, so with failures. It is the peculiar110 characteristic of the British people that either a great victory or a great disaster has the immediate111 result of nerving them to fuller efforts. We saw that in South Africa: it has been seen a hundred times in our long history. Let us turn for a moment to the affair at Givenchy on December 20th. Sir John French's despatch makes it clear that the repulse112 of the Indian Division on that occasion was a very serious matter, so serious, in fact, that it required the full effort of the entire First[Pg 80] Division, under Sir Douglas Haig, to restore the position. Yet, at the time, the British public was very far from fully informed of what had happened: much of our information, indeed, was derived from German sources; and these sources being naturally suspect, the magnitude of the operations was never realised.
There may have been excellent military reasons for concealing113, for the moment, the real position, though I strongly suspect that the Germans were quite as well informed about it as we were. But there could be no possible reason for concealing the fact from the public for a couple of months, and thus losing another opportunity of powerfully stimulating our national patriotism114 and determination.
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censor
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| n./vt.审查，审查员；删改 | |
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condemnation
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| n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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ineptitude
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| n.不适当；愚笨，愚昧的言行 | |
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censored
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| 受审查的，被删剪的 | |
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isles
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| 岛( isle的名词复数 ) | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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premature
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| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
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eccentricities
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| n.古怪行为( eccentricity的名词复数 )；反常；怪癖 | |
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imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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averted
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| 防止，避免( avert的过去式和过去分词 )； 转移 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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cavil
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| v.挑毛病，吹毛求疵 | |
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restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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perils
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| 极大危险( peril的名词复数 )； 危险的事（或环境） | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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purveying
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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distinguished
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permissible
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| adj.可允许的，许可的 | |
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supremely
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| adv.无上地，崇高地 | |
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doom
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| n.厄运，劫数；v.注定，命定 | |
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inefficient
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| adj.效率低的，无效的 | |
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cape
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| n.海角，岬；披肩，短披风 | |
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skilfully
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transcending
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| 超出或超越（经验、信念、描写能力等）的范围( transcend的现在分词 )； 优于或胜过… | |
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patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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hysterical
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| adj.情绪异常激动的，歇斯底里般的 | |
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fortitude
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| n.坚忍不拔；刚毅 | |
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ominous
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| adj.不祥的，不吉的，预兆的，预示的 | |
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tightening
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| 上紧，固定，紧密 | |
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jaws
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| n.口部；嘴 | |
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dour
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| adj.冷酷的，严厉的；（岩石）嶙峋的；顽强不屈 | |
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degenerates
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| 衰退，堕落，退化( degenerate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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decadent
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| adj.颓废的，衰落的，堕落的 | |
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virile
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| adj.男性的；有男性生殖力的；有男子气概的；强有力的 | |
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46
hordes
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| n.移动着的一大群( horde的名词复数 )；部落 | |
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47
scraps
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| 油渣 | |
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48
bliss
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| n.狂喜，福佑，天赐的福 | |
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49
vouchsafed
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| v.给予，赐予( vouchsafe的过去式和过去分词 )；允诺 | |
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secrecy
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| n.秘密，保密，隐蔽 | |
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51
deadlock
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| n.僵局，僵持 | |
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52
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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53
lull
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| v.使安静，使入睡，缓和，哄骗；n.暂停，间歇 | |
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54
lethargic
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| adj.昏睡的，懒洋洋的 | |
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deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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acquitted
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| 宣判…无罪( acquit的过去式和过去分词 )； 使（自己）作出某种表现 | |
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hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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58
allude
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| v.提及，暗指 | |
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59
criticise
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| v.批评，评论；非难 | |
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60
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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recital
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| n.朗诵，独奏会，独唱会 | |
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62
trench
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| n./v.(挖)沟，(挖)战壕 | |
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63
amiable
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| adj.和蔼可亲的，友善的，亲切的 | |
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shovel
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| n.铁锨，铲子，一铲之量；v.铲，铲出 | |
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lamenting
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| adj.悲伤的，悲哀的v.（为…）哀悼，痛哭，悲伤( lament的现在分词 ) | |
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countless
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| adj.无数的，多得不计其数的 | |
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67
undertakings
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| 企业( undertaking的名词复数 )； 保证； 殡仪业； 任务 | |
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absurdity
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| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
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pessimism
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| n.悲观者，悲观主义者，厌世者 | |
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evoke
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| vt.唤起，引起，使人想起 | |
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augury
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| n.预言，征兆，占卦 | |
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temperament
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| n.气质，性格，性情 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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strenuous
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| adj.奋发的，使劲的；紧张的；热烈的，狂热的 | |
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exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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prosecution
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| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
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precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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concealment
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| n.隐藏, 掩盖，隐瞒 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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odds
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| n.让步，机率，可能性，比率；胜败优劣之别 | |
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despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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morale
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| n.道德准则，士气，斗志 | |
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perturbed
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| adj.烦燥不安的v.使（某人）烦恼，不安( perturb的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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mentality
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| n.心理，思想，脑力 | |
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civilian
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| adj.平民的，民用的，民众的 | |
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ordeal
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| n.苦难经历，（尤指对品格、耐力的）严峻考验 | |
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defiance
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| n.挑战，挑衅，蔑视，违抗 | |
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annoyance
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| n.恼怒，生气，烦恼 | |
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organisation
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| n.组织，安排，团体，有机休 | |
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stimulated
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| a.刺激的 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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hymns
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| n.赞美诗，圣歌，颂歌( hymn的名词复数 ) | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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disquieting
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| adj.令人不安的，令人不平静的v.使不安，使忧虑，使烦恼( disquiet的现在分词 ) | |
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99
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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100
pedantic
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| adj.卖弄学问的；迂腐的 | |
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101
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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102
stimulating
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| adj.有启发性的，能激发人思考的 | |
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103
persistent
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| adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的 | |
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104
heroism
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| n.大无畏精神，英勇 | |
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105
profusely
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| ad.abundantly | |
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106
adorned
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| [计]被修饰的 | |
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107
graphic
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| adj.生动的，形象的，绘画的，文字的，图表的 | |
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108
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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109
stimulation
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| n.刺激，激励，鼓舞 | |
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110
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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111
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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112
repulse
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| n.击退，拒绝；vt.逐退，击退，拒绝 | |
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113
concealing
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，遮住( conceal的现在分词 ) | |
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114
patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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