Sir George Robertson, in his Chitral, says that “food is so scarce that a fat man has never yet been seen in the country; even the upper classes look underfed, and the most effective of bribes6 is a full meal. The hill tracks, which form the main lines of communication, are seldom easy; they are often difficult, sometimes dangerous.”
The country is watered by the river which goes in its northern course indifferently by the names of the Yarkhun, the Mastuj or the Chitral River, and which, flowing from a glacier7 of the Hindu Kush, runs south-westerly to Asmar, where it becomes known as the Kunar River, and falls into the Kabul River near Jalalabad. During its course it receives the drainage of numerous valleys on either side, and is spanned by many rope bridges, by several untrustworthy native-built bridges, usually constructed on a rough cantilever9 principle, and by good suspension bridges at important crossings, such as Chitral, Mastuj, Drosh and other places. “Even when the rivers are moderately placid10 and shallow, the fords,” 185Sir George Robertson tells us, “are always bad, because of the boulders11 and stones in their beds; they are frequently devious12 also; and, consequently, always require a guide. It is dangerous to miss the proper line, for then one is liable to be carried into deep, heavy water, or to find oneself in a quicksand.”[79]
The Roads to Chitral
There are two main routes from Chitral to India: that which has been followed in the preceding chapter, from Chitral over the Lowari Pass, through Dir and Swat, and across the Malakand to railhead at Dargai; and another from Chitral across the Shandur Pass to the Gilgit road, and thence through Kashmir and the Jhelum Valley to the rail at Rawal Pindi. Those passes leading to the north or to the west are for the most part very difficult; some are impracticable for pack animals, some are only passable at all during certain brief seasons of the year; others again could only be crossed by a lightly equipped force of selected troops under unusually favourable13 circumstances. The Baroghil Pass (12,460 feet), which leads out of the Yarkhun Valley into Wakhan, is practicable for laden14 animals during eight months of the year, and climbs over what Holdich calls “the comparatively easy slopes of the flat-backed Hindu Kush.” Many passes, but all more or less difficult, lead from Chitral into Kafiristan, while that leading from Chitral to Upper Badakshan—the Dorah Pass (14,800 feet)—is much trodden, and is used by laden animals as a commercial link between the Kunar Valley and Badakshan. It is 186open from July to September, and has been crossed as late as early in November.
Chitral is an important state by reason of its situation at the extremity15 of the country over which the Government of India exerts its influence. Sir Francis Younghusband has described this state as “one of the chinks in the wall of defence. Not a very large one, but certainly capable of being made into a considerable one if we do not look after it, and in time; for not only is there a chink just here, but the wall is thinner too. Practicable roads across the mountains, especially those by the Baroghil and Dorah passes, lead into Chitral; while the width of the mountains from the plains on the south to the plains on the north, as the crow flies, is 400 miles by the Pamirs and Gilgit, but through Chitral only 200. So Chitral is a place to be looked after and efficiently16 guarded.”
Importance of Chitral
Gilgit and Chitral seemed to the Government of India to afford good watch-towers whence the country south of the Hindu Kush might be guarded and controlled, since the northern passes provide a difficult but by no means impracticable route for the incursion of a hostile force large enough to cause trouble, or at least excitement, upon this portion of the Border. But our occupation of Chitral is not universally approved. Sir Thomas Holdich[80] has said that “the retention17 of Chitral may well be regarded as a doubtful advantage.... As an outpost to keep watch and ward18 for an advance from the north, Chitral is useless, 187for no serious menace is possible from the north. As a safeguard otherwise, it is hard to say from what it will protect us. It is in short the outcome of political, not of military, strategy. As a political centre it must be remembered that it possesses an outlook westwards over the hills and valleys through which the Amir’s great commercial roads have been projected, as well as northwards to the Hindu Kush passes. But it is at best an expensive and burdensome outpost, and is, on the whole, the least satisfactory of all the forward positions that we have recently occupied.”
Elsewhere,[81] however, Sir Thomas Holdich seems in some degree to qualify these opinions. Writing of these northern mountain approaches to India, he says, “We cannot altogether leave them alone. They have to be watched by the official guardians20 of our frontier, and all the gathered threads of them converging21 on Leh or Gilgit must be held by hands that are alert and strong. It is just as dangerous an error to regard such approaches to India as negligible quantities in the military and political field of Indian defence, as to take a serious view of their practicability for purposes of invasion.... The Dorah Pass ... is the one gateway22 which is normally open from year to year, and its existence renders necessary an advanced watchtower at Chitral.”
The country is divided into the nine districts of Laspur, Mastuj, Torikho, Mulrikho, Kosht, Owir, Khuzara, Chitral and Drosh. The population totals something over seventy thousand, and the fighting 188strength is estimated at six thousand men, armed for the most part with matchlocks of local manufacture or imported from Badakshan. There are also in the country under a thousand Sniders and muzzle-loading Enfield rifles, presented at different times to the Mehtar or ruler by the Indian Government.
The Chitralis are the only non-Pathan tribe described in this book and are a mixed race of Aryan type, of whose origin little is known: the language of the country is Chitrali, and Persian is also spoken by some of the upper classes. The people are all Muhammadans, mostly Sunnis, but by no means of a particularly strict or fanatical type; and while the priests have a certain amount of influence, they are unable to work their flocks up into any high degree of religious frenzy23 as is possible with certain Pathans. The people of Chitral are splendid mountaineers with great powers of endurance, and have fought well on occasion. Sir George Robertson has thus described their characteristics:[82] “There are few more treacherous24 people than the Chitralis, and they have a wonderful capacity for cold-blooded cruelty; yet none are kinder to little children, or have stronger affection for blood or foster-relations when cupidity25 or jealousy26 do not intervene. All have pleasant manners and engaging light-heartedness, free from all trace of boisterous27 behaviour, a great fondness for music, dancing and singing, a passion for simple-minded ostentation28, and an instinctive29 yearning30 for softness and luxury, which is the mainspring of their intense cupidity and avarice31. 189No race is more untruthful, or has greater power of keeping a collective secret. Their vanity is easily injured, they are revengeful and venal32, but they are charmingly picturesque33 and admirable companions. Perhaps the most convenient trait they possess, as far as we are concerned, is a complete absence of religious fanaticism34.... Sensuality of the grossest kind, murder, abominable35 cruelty, treachery or violent death, are never long absent from the thoughts of a people than whom none in the world are of simpler, gentler appearance.”
Early History
The early history of Chitral is a record of intrigue36, civil war and assassination—“a monotonous37 tale of murder and perfidy—the slaying38 of brother by brother, of son by father,” and each successive Mehtar appears to have waded39 to the throne through seas of blood. The founder40 of the Chitral Royal Family was Shah Katur, whose descendants, dividing into two branches, parcelled the mountainous country from Kafiristan to Gilgit between them—the Khushwakt branch ruling the eastern portion, while the Katur branch governed in the west, or Lower Chitral. At the time of the British occupation of the Punjab, one Gauhar Aman reigned41 in the Khushwakt district, while Shah Afzul II. ruled in Lower Chitral. About 1854 the Kashmir State, having long suffered from the encroachments of the ruler of Upper Chitral, appealed to Shah Afzul for assistance, and he, induced thereto far more by hatred42 of his kinsman43 than by any wish to oblige the Kashmir authorities, seized, in 1855, Mastuj, then the headquarters of the Khushwaktia chief. Possession was, however, regained44 190in the year following, but the place was again captured by the Chitralis in 1857.
In this year Shah Afzul II. died quietly in his bed—the demise45 of a ruler from natural causes was almost unprecedented46 in this country—and was succeeded by his second son, Aman-ul-Mulk, known as “the great Mehtar.” In 1860 the eastern chief also died, being succeeded in the Mehtarship of Khushwaktia by Mir Wali, who was deposed47 and slain48 by his own brother; while in 1880 Aman-ul-Mulk invaded and possessed49 himself of the eastern portion of Chitral, uniting the whole country under his sovereignty. Not long after this, during the viceroyalty of Lord Lytton, it was decided50 that the policy of the Government of India should be so extended as to control the external affairs of Chitral in a direction friendly to our interests; so as to secure an effective guardianship51 over the northern passes, and to keep watch over what goes on beyond them. To initiate52 and carry out this policy, Major Biddulph was sent to Gilgit in 1877 and spent some years there, succeeding in entering into relations with Aman-ul-Mulk, then Mehtar of Chitral. No very definite arrangement was come to at this time, the position was considered rather too isolated53, and Major Biddulph was withdrawn54. Then in 1885 Lord Dufferin despatched the late General Sir William Lockhart at the head of an important mission, to enter into more definite and closer relations with the Mehtar of Chitral, and to report upon the defences of the country. Colonel Lockhart, as he then was, spent 191more than a year in Chitral; he wintered at Gilgit, traversed the State of Hunza, crossed the Hindu Kush, passed through Wakhan down the southernmost branch of the Oxus, and travelled over Chitral territory from one end of the country to the other. Similar visits were paid to Chitral by Colonel Durand in 1888 and 1889, and in this latter year the Agency at Gilgit, withdrawn in 1881, was re-established, and certain allowances, doubled in 1891, were granted to the Mehtar, Aman-ul-Mulk.
Beginning of Trouble
In the following year the thirty-two years’ reign of “the great Mehtar” came to an end, he dying suddenly of heart failure while in durbar. His eldest56 son, Nizam-ul-Mulk, was away in Yasin at the time, and the second brother, Afzul-ul-Mulk, seized the fort at Chitral with its arsenal57 and treasure, and sent off urgent demands to the Agent at Gilgit that he might at once be recognized as Mehtar. Nothing was to be feared from Nizam, who was no fighter and fled to Gilgit, leaving Afzul to return triumphant58 to Chitral. Afzul had, however, apparently59 overlooked or disregarded the fact that there was another candidate for the Mehtarship in one Sher Afzul, fourth son of Shah Afzul II., and consequently a younger brother of Aman-ul-Mulk and uncle to Afzul-ul-Mulk. Sher Afzul seems to have left Kabul, where he had been living, directly he heard of his brother’s death, crossed the Dorah Pass from Badakshan at the head of a handful of followers60, and, marching rapidly, surprised the fort at Chitral, Afzul-ul-Mulk being shot down in the ensuing mêlée.
192Sher Afzul, who seemed to have many adherents61 in the country, was now proclaimed Mehtar, but his reign was a very short one. Nizam-ul-Mulk, plucking up courage, determined62 to proceed to Chitral and turn out the new pretender. He was joined by a Hunza chief of considerable military capacity and force of character, while his advance appears to have been preceded by extravagant63 rumours64 that his candidature was supported by the British authorities; and Sher Afzul then, losing heart, fled back to Kabul by way of the Kunar Valley.
Nizam-ul-Mulk was now formally recognised as Mehtar by the British Government, and two of the political officers of the Gilgit Agency visited the new ruler in Chitral and promised him that, under certain conditions, the same allowances and support would be given to him as had been afforded to his father, Aman-ul-Mulk. So far as could be seen, it appeared that the new ruler was in the way to be fairly well established on the throne.
It is now necessary to revert65 to Umra Khan of Jandol, of whom some mention has already been made in the last chapter, and whose actions and aggressions were largely responsible for the troubles which now arose upon this part of the frontier.
At the end of 1894 the situation here was as follows: Umra Khan had at last made friends with his old enemy, the Khan of Nawagai; he had established his authority over a considerable portion of Swat, the greater part of Bajaur, and the whole of Dir; while he had possessed himself of the strip 193of country known as Narsat, hitherto claimed alike by Chitral, Dir and Asmar. He had attacked some villages in the Bashgul Valley, claimed by Chitral; had commenced to build forts at Arnawai and Birkot, in the Kunar Valley; and had encroached upon Chitral territory, and demanded the payment of tribute from Chitral villages. The ex-Khan of Dir was at this time a refugee in Upper Swat. Nizam-ul-Mulk was proving himself a fairly efficient and popular, though not a strong, ruler; Sher Afzul was believed to be safely interned66 at Kabul; and Nizam’s younger brother, Amir-ul-Mulk, who had at first fled from Chitral, had now returned there and been well received by the new Mehtar.
Murder of Nizam
On the 1st January, 1895, Nizam-ul-Mulk was shot dead while out hawking67 by one of the servants, and at the instigation, of Amir-ul-Mulk, who at once caused himself to be proclaimed Mehtar, but his recognition was delayed for reference to Simla. There can be little doubt that this fresh murder was the outcome of a conspiracy68 between Amir-ul-Mulk, Sher Afzul and Umra Khan, and that the object was to remove Nizam and cause him to be temporarily succeeded by Amir, who was then to resign in favour of Sher Afzul. Umra Khan was to be called in merely to help the furtherance of the schemes of the other two: but Umra Khan had his own personal interests to consult, and on hearing news of the murder he at once crossed the Lowari Pass with between 3000 and 4000 men, and occupied the southern Chitral Valley. He sent on letters stating that he had come to wage 194a holy war against the Kafirs of the Bashgul Valley, that he had no hostile designs against Chitral, and that if Amir-ul-Mulk did not join and help him he must take the consequences. Umra Khan now advanced on Kila Drosh, twenty-five miles below Chitral fort.
At this date there were rather over 3000 troops garrisoning70 posts in the Upper Indus, Gilgit and Chitral Valleys, and of these roughly one-third were regular troops of the Indian Army, the remainder belonging to regiments73 of the Kashmir Durbar. When the murder of Nizam took place, Lieutenant74 Gurdon was in political charge at Chitral, accompanied by no more than eight men of the 14th Sikhs, drawn55 from a detachment of 103 posted at Mastuj under Lieutenant Harley. There were no other troops of any kind in Chitral, and the nearest garrison71 was at Gupis, far on the eastern side of the Shandur Pass. The nearest regular troops were ninety-nine men of the 14th Sikhs at Gilgit, while the 32nd Pioneers, rather over 800 strong, were employed on the Bunji-Chilas road. Gurdon at once drew upon Mastuj for fifty Sikhs of its garrison, and these reached him unhindered and unmolested on the 7th January. In anticipation75 of possible trouble, the following moves then took place: Mastuj was reinforced by 100 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles from Gupis, 200 men of the same regiment72 moved up to Ghizr, while Gupis was strengthened by 150 men of the 6th Kashmir Light Infantry76 from Gilgit.
Shortly before this Surgeon-Major Robertson—now 195Sir George Robertson—had relieved Colonel Bruce in charge of the Gilgit Agency, and he now at once left for Chitral, taking with him some of the 4th Kashmir Rifles under Captain Townsend, Central India Horse, and the remainder of the 14th Sikhs from Mastuj—100 in all. Before he reached there, however, the Chitralis, who had at first evinced some intention of opposing Umra Khan, had been driven from a position they had taken up in front of Kila Drosh; while a fortnight later—on the 9th February—the fort of Drosh was surrendered, without any pretence77 of resistance, to Umra Khan, with all its rifles and stores. About the 18th the situation, already sufficiently78 complicated, was rendered even more so by the news that Sher Afzul, probably the most generally popular of all the claimants to the throne, had arrived at Drosh. He was at once joined by some of the lower class Chitralis, and by the end of February nearly all the Adamzadas (members of clans79 descended80 from the founder of the ruling family) had also gone over to him. On the 1st March the British Agent withdrew his escort—now numbering 100 of the 14th Sikhs and 320 of the 4th Kashmir Rifles—into the fort at Chitral; and on the following day in durbar, it being patent that Amir-ul-Mulk, listening to the promptings of ill-advisers, had been intriguing81 with Umra Khan, Amir was placed under surveillance, and his young brother, Shuja-ul-Mulk, was formally recognised as Mehtar, subject to the approval of the Government of India.
The New Mehtar
The number of followers with which Umra Khan 196had entered Chitral territory had been gradually increasing, as his star appeared to be in the ascendant, and his total strength was now estimated at between 5000 and 8000 men. On the afternoon of the 3rd March Sher Afzul reached the neighbourhood of Chitral at the head of an armed force, and took up a position in some villages about two miles to the south-west of the fort. At 4.15 two hundred men of the Kashmir Rifles were sent out, under Captains Campbell, Townsend and Baird, to check the enemy’s advance.
Captain Campbell proposed to attack the position in front, while fifty men under Captain Baird made a flank attack along some high ground to the west. The enemy were found to be well armed and strongly posted; the Kashmir troops were met with a very heavy fire, and the attempts to carry the position by assault failed. It was rapidly getting dark, and Captain Campbell commenced to retire, being followed up closely by the enemy. The main body sustained heavy losses, but gained the fort under cover of the fire of a party of the 14th Sikhs; Captain Baird’s detachment became, however, isolated, Baird himself was mortally wounded, being carried back by Surgeon Captain Whitchurch, and this party only made its way back to the fort after desperate fighting, in which several were killed and many wounded. On this day, out of 150 men actually engaged, twenty-five were killed and thirty wounded. Captain Campbell was severely83 wounded, and the command of the troops in Chitral fort now devolved upon Captain Townsend. 197On this day the siege of Chitral fort may be said to have commenced, and for many weeks no news of the garrison reached the outer world.
The Chitral-Gilgit Line
Events on the Chitral-Gilgit Line.—We may now conveniently describe the events which took place on the line of communications between Chitral and Mastuj, and all that befell the small bodies of reinforcing troops and the convoys84, which were struggling westward19 through a very difficult and actively85 hostile country.
On the 26th February the following instructions had issued from the British Agent: “Lieutenant Edwardes, commanding at Ghizr, to hand over that garrison to Lieutenant Gough, and to come on to Chitral, there to take command of the Puniali levies86 which had been ordered up from Gilgit; Lieutenant Moberley, commanding at Mastuj, was directed to order Lieutenant Fowler, R.E. (expected shortly to reach Mastuj with a party of Bengal Sappers and Miners), to continue his march to Chitral; and to send on a supply of Snider ammunition87 to Chitral by a suitable escort making ordinary marches.” These two last-mentioned orders were received at Mastuj on the 28th February, and on the following day the ammunition was sent off to Chitral under escort of forty of the Kashmir Rifles. On the 2nd March, however, disquieting88 news reaching Mastuj as to the state of affairs on the road, Lieutenant Moberley was in doubt as to whether he should not recall the ammunition escort, but it was ultimately permitted to proceed. On this date Captain Ross was expected 198at Laspur with 100 of the 14th Sikhs, and Lieutenant Moberley wrote asking him to come straight through to Mastuj in a single stage; this Captain Ross did, reaching Mastuj on the 3rd.
He marched on again the following day to support the ammunition escort, which had been obliged to halt at Buni owing to the onward89 road having been broken down; and on the 5th the force at Buni was further strengthened by the arrival there of twenty men of the Bengal Sappers and Miners, accompanied by Lieutenants90 Fowler and Edwardes.
The possibility of the road being designedly broken had been foreseen by the British Agent, who had caused certain orders to be issued to meet such an eventuality; but as these never reached Lieutenant Moberley, to whom they had been addressed at Mastuj, it seems unnecessary here to recapitulate91 them.
The Fighting at Reshun
On the 5th March Captain Ross returned with his Sikhs to Mastuj, while on the next day the combined detachment—two British officers, twenty Bengal Sappers and forty of the 4th Kashmir Rifles—marched on to Reshun, a large, straggling village situated92 on a sloping plain on the left bank of the Chitral River. Here news came in of fighting at Chitral, but the night passed quietly, and at noon on the 7th the two officers, with the twenty sappers, ten rifles and a number of coolies, moved off to repair a break reported about three miles distant. Reaching a narrow defile93 near Parpish, sangars were noticed on the high cliffs; these were at once occupied by the tribesmen, firing became general, four of the little 199party were hit, one being killed, and a retirement94 on Reshun was now ordered.
Eight more men were hit during this retirement. On arrival at an entrenchment96 which had been thrown up by the rest of the party near the village, the position was found too exposed, and a cluster of houses—affording better cover—was seized, and the work of improving the defences was at once proceeded with.
A fierce but unsuccessful attack was made just before dawn, and firing was kept up during the 8th from a large number of Martini and Snider rifles; at the end of the day the total losses of the defence—including the casualties near Parpish—amounted to seven killed or died of wounds and sixteen wounded. For the next five days the little garrison defended its post with conspicuous98 gallantry against heavy odds99 and repeated attacks from the enemy, who had succeeded in establishing themselves under cover close up to the walls. Lieutenant Fowler specially4 distinguished100 himself in making several successful sorties to obtain water. On the 13th the enemy opened negotiations101, stating that all fighting at Chitral had ceased, and that Sher Afzul was engaged in friendly correspondence with the British Government. By the 15th, it seeming that matters were in course of arrangement, the two officers were persuaded to leave their defences, and were then treacherously102 seized, while the Chitralis succeeded in rushing the defences. Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler were now taken in charge by some of Umra Khan’s men, 200and proceeding103 by Chitral and Drosh to Jandol, were eventually released and sent in to Sir Robert Low’s camp at Sado in April.
When, on the 6th March, Lieutenant Edwardes heard of the gathering104 below Reshun, he had at once sent back news to Mastuj, where it arrived the same evening, and Captain Ross thereupon started next morning with his party—two British officers, one native officer and ninety-three of other ranks—to bring Lieutenant Edwardes’ detachment back to Buni. Reaching Buni late on the night of the 7th, he there left his native officer with thirty-three rank and file, and pushed on next morning for Reshun with the remainder of his party. At 1 p.m. the Koragh Defile was reached; as described by Robertson, “the defile is the result of the river cutting its winding105 course through terrible cliffs. A goat, scuttling106 along the high ridges8, might start a thunderous avalanche107 of boulders down the unstable108 slopes. At the lower end of this frightful109 gorge110 the pathway begins to ascend82 from the river above some caves, and then zigzags111 upwards112. There the ‘point’ of the advance guard was fired upon, and hundreds of men disclosed themselves and set the very hillsides rolling down.” The small party were in a trap. Several men were at once hit, and Captain Ross then decided to occupy some caves in the river bank. He made several attempts to scale the cliffs and to force his way back to Buni, but was everywhere met by a heavy fire from both banks of the river, and by a deadly hail of rocks from the cliffs above. Captain 201Ross was killed, and eventually his subaltern, Lieutenant Jones, with only fourteen men, ten of the party being wounded, reached Buni on the evening of the 10th. Here he occupied a house and held it until the 17th, when Lieutenant Moberley marched out from Mastuj with 150 men of the Kashmir troops, and relieved and brought in the remnants of Captain Ross’ party.
From the 22nd March until the 9th April Mastuj was invested by the enemy, but on this latter date they began to retire owing to the advance of the Gilgit column under Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly. The Mastuj garrison had only one man wounded.
The Gilgit Column
Advance of the Gilgit Column.—During the first week in March reports of the serious state of affairs in the Chitral Valley began to reach Gilgit, whence a few days later the Assistant British Agent sent down a request to Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly to bring to Gilgit a wing of the 32nd Pioneers, then engaged in road-making between Bunji and Chilas. In peace time this officer commanded no more than his own regiment, but on hostilities113 occurring he automatically became the military head of the whole district, and all military responsibility rested on him alone. The message reached Colonel Kelly on the 14th, and by the 22nd the wing (strength 403) had arrived at Gilgit; on the same day Colonel Kelly was informed by telegraph from the Adjutant General that he was in military command in the Gilgit Agency, and was also Chief Political Officer so long as communications with Chitral were 202interrupted; in regard to operations he was to use his own judgment114 but was to run no unnecessary risks. He was also informed of the advance of a relief force via Swat about the 1st April. Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly now issued the following orders: 200 men to start early on the 23rd for Chitral, followed on the next day by the remainder of the wing, accompanied by two guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery. Of the other half battalion115 200 were called up to Gilgit from the Indus Valley, while the remainder of the regiment (242) was to proceed to Chilas.
At this time the various happenings on the Gilgit-Chitral road were known, except that no tidings had come in of the disaster to the party under Lieutenant Edwardes. Colonel Kelly’s command now extended from Astor to Chitral, and contained, exclusive of the troops in the Mastuj and Chitral districts, four mountain guns, 845 of the 32nd Pioneers, about 1250 Rifles of the Kashmir Infantry, and 160 Kashmir Sappers. But in deciding upon the numbers of which the Relief Column was to be composed, with which he intended to force his way to Chitral, it was necessary also to provide for the safety of Gilgit and for keeping open the line of communications. There was nothing to be feared from the people of Hunza and Nagar, whose chiefs at once furnished 1000 men for employment as levies; but the people of Chilas required watching, though apparently submissive, while those of Yasin were sure to be in sympathy with their near neighbours of Chitral. From Gilgit to Chitral was 220 miles, and between the two posts 203was the Shandur Pass (12,250 feet), at this season deep in snow. As far as Gupis there was a made mule116 road, but thence forward the road was a mere69 track; while throughout its length there were many places where it might be easily blocked, and where an enemy might take up an almost impregnable position. The supply question was further one of great anxiety, especially should the country prove hostile, but it was known that reserve supplies were stored at Gupis, Ghizr and Mastuj. Bearing all these points in mind, Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly decided to limit the strength of the Relief Column to 400 men of the 32nd Pioneers, two guns of the Kashmir Mountain Battery, 40 Kashmir Sappers and 100 of the Hunza and Nagar levies. The column started in two parties. As far as Gupis, which was reached on the 26th and 27th, mule transport was used, but this was here exchanged for coolies and ponies117; owing, however, to desertions among the coolies the loads had to be reduced—there were no tents and each man had an allowance of 15 lbs. of baggage—while only six days’ supplies could be taken with the column.
Crossing the Shandur
Ghizr was reached on the 30th and 31st March, and the march to the Shandur Pass was commenced. The snow was now so deep that the battery mules118 and the ponies could not proceed; Colonel Kelly therefore withdrew 200 of his men under Captain Borradaile to Teru and returned himself with the rest of the column to Ghizr where the supply question did not present such difficulties. Borradaile was next day to attempt to cross the Shandur Pass, 204reach and entrench95 himself at Laspur, return the transport, and try and open communications with Mastuj.
Snow fell heavily during the next twenty-four hours and no start could be made until 11 a.m. on the 3rd, by which time the guns and a detachment of the Kashmir Rifles had joined Borradaile. The pass was crossed under extraordinary difficulties, the infantry reaching Laspur on the night of the 4th, and the guns and Kashmir Infantry the following afternoon. A reconnaissance on the 6th revealed the presence in the neighbourhood of the enemy, who were reported also to be entrenched119 near the Chakalwat defile some thirteen miles further on. On this day Colonel Kelly arrived with fifty Nagar levies, and next day fifty Puniali levies also came in. Some idea of the severity of the climate may be gathered from the fact that among the troops there were sixty-three cases of snow blindness and forty-three of frost-bite.
The second part of the column, delayed at Ghizr, was unable to reach Laspur until the 9th, but Colonel Kelly, considering it inadvisable to wait, pushed on to Gasht with the remainder of his party, and after reconnoitring the enemy’s position, determined to attack. The enemy’s position was naturally very strong and the sangars well placed; these blocked the valley on either side of the river and were continued up to the snow line, while the right of the position was further protected by a mass of fallen snow descending120 into the water. On the 9th Colonel 205Kelly advanced towards the enemy’s position at Chakalwat; the Hunza levies were sent up the heights on one side to get above and fire into the sangars; while the Puniali men ascended121 on the other flank to drive the enemy from their stone shoots on the slopes above the river.
The force deployed122 on a gentle slope facing the right-hand sangars, and the two guns opened fire at 800 yards range. This shell-fire and the volleys of the infantry cleared the enemy out of the right sangar, while the Hunza levies had already driven them from those higher up. The next line of sangars was attacked in the same manner, and the enemy now began to give way and were soon in full flight, having lost between fifty and sixty killed. Our casualties were only four men wounded.
Forcing the Nisa Gol
Colonel Kelly now moved on to Mastuj, where the rest of his column closed up on the 11th, and the three days spent here were occupied in the collection of transport and supplies and in pushing out reconnaissances. These disclosed the presence of the enemy in a strong and well-fortified position, where the Chitral River Valley is cleft123 by a deep ravine known as the Nisa Gol, 200 or 300 feet deep, with precipitous sides. The defence was prepared on much the same lines as at Chakalwat, but the sangars were of better construction, being provided with head cover, while their front was covered by the precipices124 of the Nisa Gol.
It was decided to attack on the 13th and to try and turn the enemy’s left. Colonel Kelly pursued 206the same tactics as in the earlier action, bringing his artillery125 fire to bear on the sangars while keeping up a heavy rifle fire, his levies climbing the precipitous hillsides and turning the flank. The guns silenced sangar after sangar, gradually moving in closer; a place was discovered where the ravine could be crossed, and a party reached the opposite side just as the levies had turned the position. The enemy now evacuated126 their defences and fled, fired on by the guns and the infantry. Our loss was seven killed and thirteen wounded.
There was no further opposition127 to the advance of the Gilgit column, beyond such as was experienced from broken bridges and roads, and on the 20th April Colonel Kelly’s force marched into Chitral and joined the garrison.
Siege of Chitral Fort
The Siege of Chitral Fort.—This commenced, as has been said, on the 3rd March, after the action of that date wherein the British troops had suffered many casualties; and when, in consequence of Captain Campbell having been severely wounded, the command of the troops devolved upon Captain Townsend. The garrison of the fort consisted of six British officers, of whom five only were fit for duty, ninety-nine men of the 14th Sikhs, and 301 of all ranks of the 4th Kashmir Rifles. There were in addition fifty-two Chitralis—men whose loyalty128 was at best dubious—and eighty-five followers. The supplies, on half-rations, could be made to last two and a half months, while of ammunition there were 300 rounds per Martini-Henri rifle of the Sikhs and 280 rounds per 207Snider of the Kashmir troops. The fort was about seventy yards square with a tower at each corner, and a fifth guarded the path to the river; the walls of the fort were some twenty-five feet in height and from eight to ten feet thick; it was practically commanded on all sides, and surrounded on three by houses, walls, and all kinds of cover. The number of British officers was so small and the Kashmir troops, who composed three-fourths of the fort-garrison, were so shaken by their losses on the 3rd, that Captain Townsend resolved to remain as far as possible on the defensive129. He confined his energies, therefore, to devising measures of defence, to the provision of cover within and the demolition130 of cover without the walls, to arranging a system for quickly extinguishing fires, and to providing as far as possible for proper sanitation131.
The garrison was therefore engaged in real fighting on two occasions only during the forty-eight days that the siege lasted, and the losses incurred132 in the passive defence of the fort were not heavy; there was, however, much sickness, and at the end of the first week only eighty Sikhs and 240 of the Kashmir Rifles remained fit for duty. From the 16th to the 23rd there was a truce133, during which Sher Afzul did his best to persuade the British Agent to agree to withdraw the garrison to Mastuj, or to India by way of Jandol. During the suspension of hostilities Captain Townsend effected many improvements in the defences. The guard duties were very heavy, half the effectives being on duty at a time, and the 208defenders were harassed135 day and night by a desultory136 rifle fire.
On the 7th, under cover of a heavy rifle fire, a party of the enemy crept up to the tower at the south-eastern corner and managed to set it on fire. A strong wind was blowing, and for some time matters looked very serious, as the tower, being largely composed of wood, burned fiercely. No sooner did the fire seem to be mastered than it blazed up again; the enemy, occupying the high ground, were able to fire upon men going in and out of the tower with water and earth; the British Agent and a Sikh soldier were here wounded, while a sentry137 of the Kashmir Rifles was killed. On the 10th an attack was made on the waterway, and on the morning of the 17th the enemy could distinctly be heard at work upon a mine, leading to the same tower as that attacked on the 7th. It was clear that the entrance of the mine was in a summer-house about a hundred and fifty feet from the tower, and which there had been no time to demolish138; while from the distinctness with which the sound of digging could be heard, the mine had evidently reached within a few feet of the base of the tower. It was decided to make a sortie, carry the summer-house where it was thought the mine shaft139 would be found, and destroy the mine, since matters had gone too far to counter-mine.
Harley’s Sortie
For this duty forty men of the 14th Sikhs, with their jemadar, and sixty of the Kashmir Rifles, with a native officer, were placed under command of Lieutenant 209H. K. Harley, 14th Sikhs, with orders to leave the fort at 4 p.m. by the east gate, rush the summer-house, and hold it on the enemy’s side, while the rest of the party destroyed or blew in the mine gallery. The summer-house was taken with a loss of two men killed, the defenders134—some thirty Pathans—bolting to the cover of a wall and opening fire from thence upon Harley’s party. Leaving some men to keep these in check, Harley led the remainder to the mine shaft, just outside the summer-house. Thirty-five Chitralis, armed with swords, came out and were at once bayoneted. Harley now cleared the mine, arranged powder and fuse, but it was untamped and the charge exploded prematurely140; none the less the effect was excellent, the mine being burst open right up to the foot of the tower, and lying exposed like a trench97. Two prisoners were brought in, two of the enemy were killed in the mine by the explosion, two Pathans were shot in the summer-house, and many of the enemy were shot down by the covering fire from the walls of the fort. Harley’s party had eight men killed and thirteen wounded.
The enemy now seemed to have made their last effort; they had learnt that the defenders were still able to assume a vigorous offensive, and they knew that help was drawing nearer from the direction of Gilgit. On the night of the 18th–19th the investing force quietly withdrew and abandoned the siege; Sher Afzul and the Jandol chiefs fled that night to Bashkar and Asmar, and on the afternoon of the 20th the Gilgit force marched in.
210During the siege the loss of the garrison of Chitral fort amounted, exclusive of the casualties on the 3rd March, to seventeen killed and thirty-two wounded.
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1
dominions
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| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
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reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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watershed
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| n.转折点，分水岭，分界线 | |
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4
specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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cultivation
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| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
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6
bribes
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| n.贿赂( bribe的名词复数 )；向（某人）行贿，贿赂v.贿赂( bribe的第三人称单数 )；向（某人）行贿，贿赂 | |
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glacier
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| n.冰川，冰河 | |
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ridges
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| n.脊( ridge的名词复数 )；山脊；脊状突起；大气层的)高压脊 | |
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cantilever
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| n.悬梁臂；adj.采用伸臂建成的 | |
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placid
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| adj.安静的，平和的 | |
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boulders
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| n.卵石( boulder的名词复数 )；巨砾；（受水或天气侵蚀而成的）巨石；漂砾 | |
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12
devious
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| adj.不坦率的，狡猾的；迂回的，曲折的 | |
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13
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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14
laden
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| adj.装满了的；充满了的；负了重担的；苦恼的 | |
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15
extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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16
efficiently
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| adv.高效率地，有能力地 | |
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17
retention
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| n.保留，保持，保持力，记忆力 | |
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18
ward
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| n.守卫，监护，病房，行政区，由监护人或法院保护的人（尤指儿童）；vt.守护，躲开 | |
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19
westward
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| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
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20
guardians
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| 监护人( guardian的名词复数 )； 保护者，维护者 | |
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21
converging
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| adj.收敛[缩]的，会聚的，趋同的v.（线条、运动的物体等）会于一点( converge的现在分词 )；（趋于）相似或相同；人或车辆汇集；聚集 | |
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22
gateway
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| n.大门口，出入口，途径，方法 | |
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23
frenzy
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| n.疯狂，狂热，极度的激动 | |
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24
treacherous
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| adj.不可靠的，有暗藏的危险的；adj.背叛的，背信弃义的 | |
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25
cupidity
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| n.贪心，贪财 | |
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26
jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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27
boisterous
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| adj.喧闹的，欢闹的 | |
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28
ostentation
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| n.夸耀，卖弄 | |
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29
instinctive
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| adj.(出于)本能的；直觉的；(出于)天性的 | |
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30
yearning
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| a.渴望的；向往的；怀念的 | |
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31
avarice
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| n.贪婪；贪心 | |
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32
venal
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| adj.唯利是图的，贪脏枉法的 | |
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33
picturesque
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| adj.美丽如画的，（语言）生动的，绘声绘色的 | |
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34
fanaticism
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| n.狂热，盲信 | |
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35
abominable
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| adj.可厌的，令人憎恶的 | |
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36
intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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37
monotonous
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| adj.单调的，一成不变的，使人厌倦的 | |
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38
slaying
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| 杀戮。 | |
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39
waded
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| （从水、泥等）蹚，走过，跋( wade的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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40
Founder
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| n.创始者，缔造者 | |
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41
reigned
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| vi.当政，统治（reign的过去式形式） | |
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42
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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43
kinsman
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| n.男亲属 | |
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44
regained
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| 复得( regain的过去式和过去分词 )； 赢回； 重回； 复至某地 | |
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45
demise
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| n.死亡；v.让渡，遗赠，转让 | |
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46
unprecedented
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| adj.无前例的，新奇的 | |
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47
deposed
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| v.罢免( depose的过去式和过去分词 )；（在法庭上）宣誓作证 | |
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48
slain
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| 杀死，宰杀，杀戮( slay的过去分词 )； (slay的过去分词) | |
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49
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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50
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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51
guardianship
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| n. 监护, 保护, 守护 | |
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52
initiate
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| vt.开始，创始，发动；启蒙，使入门；引入 | |
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53
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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54
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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55
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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56
eldest
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| adj.最年长的，最年老的 | |
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57
arsenal
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| n.兵工厂，军械库 | |
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58
triumphant
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| adj.胜利的，成功的；狂欢的，喜悦的 | |
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59
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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60
followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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61
adherents
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| n.支持者，拥护者( adherent的名词复数 )；党羽；徒子徒孙 | |
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62
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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63
extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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64
rumours
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| n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 )；风闻；谣言；谣传 | |
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65
revert
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| v.恢复，复归，回到 | |
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66
interned
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| v.拘留，关押( intern的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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67
hawking
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| 利用鹰行猎 | |
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68
conspiracy
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| n.阴谋，密谋，共谋 | |
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69
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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70
garrisoning
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的现在分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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71
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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72
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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73
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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74
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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75
anticipation
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| n.预期，预料，期望 | |
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76
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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77
pretence
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| n.假装，作假；借口，口实；虚伪；虚饰 | |
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78
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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79
clans
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| 宗族( clan的名词复数 )； 氏族； 庞大的家族； 宗派 | |
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80
descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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81
intriguing
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| adj.有趣的；迷人的v.搞阴谋诡计(intrigue的现在分词)；激起…的好奇心 | |
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82
ascend
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| vi.渐渐上升，升高；vt.攀登，登上 | |
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83
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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84
convoys
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| n.（有护航的）船队( convoy的名词复数 )；车队；护航（队）；护送队 | |
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85
actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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86
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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87
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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88
disquieting
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| adj.令人不安的，令人不平静的v.使不安，使忧虑，使烦恼( disquiet的现在分词 ) | |
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89
onward
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| adj.向前的，前进的；adv.向前，前进，在先 | |
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90
lieutenants
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| n.陆军中尉( lieutenant的名词复数 )；副职官员；空军；仅低于…官阶的官员 | |
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91
recapitulate
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| v.节述要旨，择要说明 | |
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92
situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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93
defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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94
retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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95
entrench
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| v.使根深蒂固；n.壕沟；防御设施 | |
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96
entrenchment
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| n.壕沟，防御设施 | |
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97
trench
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| n./v.(挖)沟，(挖)战壕 | |
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98
conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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99
odds
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| n.让步，机率，可能性，比率；胜败优劣之别 | |
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100
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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101
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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102
treacherously
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| 背信弃义地； 背叛地； 靠不住地； 危险地 | |
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103
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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104
gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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105
winding
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| n.绕，缠，绕组，线圈 | |
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106
scuttling
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| n.船底穿孔，打开通海阀（沉船用）v.使船沉没( scuttle的现在分词 )；快跑，急走 | |
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avalanche
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| n.雪崩，大量涌来 | |
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unstable
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| adj.不稳定的，易变的 | |
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frightful
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| adj.可怕的；讨厌的 | |
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gorge
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| n.咽喉，胃，暴食，山峡；v.塞饱，狼吞虎咽地吃 | |
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111
zigzags
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| n.锯齿形的线条、小径等( zigzag的名词复数 )v.弯弯曲曲地走路，曲折地前进( zigzag的第三人称单数 ) | |
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upwards
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| adv.向上，在更高处...以上 | |
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hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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mule
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| n.骡子，杂种，执拗的人 | |
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ponies
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| 矮种马，小型马( pony的名词复数 )； ￡25 25 英镑 | |
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mules
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| 骡( mule的名词复数 )； 拖鞋； 顽固的人； 越境运毒者 | |
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entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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descending
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| n. 下行 adj. 下降的 | |
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ascended
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| v.上升，攀登( ascend的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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deployed
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| （尤指军事行动）使展开( deploy的过去式和过去分词 )； 施展； 部署； 有效地利用 | |
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cleft
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| n.裂缝；adj.裂开的 | |
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precipices
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| n.悬崖，峭壁( precipice的名词复数 ) | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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demolition
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| n.破坏,毁坏,毁坏之遗迹 | |
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sanitation
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| n.公共卫生，环境卫生，卫生设备 | |
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incurred
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| [医]招致的，遭受的； incur的过去式 | |
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truce
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| n.休战，(争执，烦恼等的)缓和；v.以停战结束 | |
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defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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desultory
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| adj.散漫的，无方法的 | |
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sentry
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| n.哨兵，警卫 | |
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demolish
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| v.拆毁(建筑物等)，推翻(计划、制度等) | |
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shaft
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| n.(工具的)柄，杆状物 | |
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prematurely
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| adv.过早地，贸然地 | |
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