THE Athenians and Peloponnesians had these antecedent grounds of complaint against each other: the complaint of Corinth was that her colony of Potidaea, and Corinthian and Peloponnesian citizens within it, were being besieged1; that of Athens against the Peloponnesians that they had incited2 a town of hers, a member of her alliance and a contributor to her revenue, to revolt, and had come and were openly fighting against her on the side of the Potidaeans. For all this, war had not yet broken out: there was still truce3 for a while; for this was a private enterprise on the part of Corinth.
But the siege of Potidaea put an end to her inaction; she had men inside it: besides, she feared for the place. Immediately summoning the allies to Lacedaemon, she came and loudly accused Athens of breach5 of the treaty and aggression6 on the rights of Peloponnese. With her, the Aeginetans, formally unrepresented from fear of Athens, in secret proved not the least urgent of the advocates for war, asserting that they had not the independence guaranteed to them by the treaty. After extending the summons to any of their allies and others who might have complaints to make of Athenian aggression, the Lacedaemonians held their ordinary assembly, and invited them to speak. There were many who came forward and made their several accusations8; among them the Megarians, in a long list of grievances9, called special attention to the fact of their exclusion10 from the ports of the Athenian empire and the market of Athens, in defiance11 of the treaty. Last of all the Corinthians came forward, and having let those who preceded them inflame12 the Lacedaemonians, now followed with a speech to this effect:
“Lacedaemonians! the confidence which you feel in your constitution and social order, inclines you to receive any reflections of ours on other powers with a certain scepticism. Hence springs your moderation, but hence also the rather limited knowledge which you betray in dealing13 with foreign politics. Time after time was our voice raised to warn you of the blows about to be dealt us by Athens, and time after time, instead of taking the trouble to ascertain14 the worth of our communications, you contented15 yourselves with suspecting the speakers of being inspired by private interest. And so, instead of calling these allies together before the blow fell, you have delayed to do so till we are smarting under it; allies among whom we have not the worst title to speak, as having the greatest complaints to make, complaints of Athenian outrage16 and Lacedaemonian neglect. Now if these assaults on the rights of Hellas had been made in the dark, you might be unacquainted with the facts, and it would be our duty to enlighten you. As it is, long speeches are not needed where you see servitude accomplished17 for some of us, meditated18 for others — in particular for our allies — and prolonged preparations in the aggressor against the hour of war. Or what, pray, is the meaning of their reception of Corcyra by fraud, and their holding it against us by force? what of the siege of Potidaea?— places one of which lies most conveniently for any action against the Thracian towns; while the other would have contributed a very large navy to the Peloponnesians?
“For all this you are responsible. You it was who first allowed them to fortify19 their city after the Median war, and afterwards to erect20 the long walls — you who, then and now, are always depriving of freedom not only those whom they have enslaved, but also those who have as yet been your allies. For the true author of the subjugation21 of a people is not so much the immediate4 agent, as the power which permits it having the means to prevent it; particularly if that power aspires22 to the glory of being the liberator23 of Hellas. We are at last assembled. It has not been easy to assemble, nor even now are our objects defined. We ought not to be still inquiring into the fact of our wrongs, but into the means of our defence. For the aggressors with matured plans to oppose to our indecision have cast threats aside and betaken themselves to action. And we know what are the paths by which Athenian aggression travels, and how insidious24 is its progress. A degree of confidence she may feel from the idea that your bluntness of perception prevents your noticing her; but it is nothing to the impulse which her advance will receive from the knowledge that you see, but do not care to interfere25. You, Lacedaemonians, of all the Hellenes are alone inactive, and defend yourselves not by doing anything but by looking as if you would do something; you alone wait till the power of an enemy is becoming twice its original size, instead of crushing it in its infancy26. And yet the world used to say that you were to be depended upon; but in your case, we fear, it said more than the truth. The Mede, we ourselves know, had time to come from the ends of the earth to Peloponnese, without any force of yours worthy27 of the name advancing to meet him. But this was a distant enemy. Well, Athens at all events is a near neighbour, and yet Athens you utterly28 disregard; against Athens you prefer to act on the defensive29 instead of on the offensive, and to make it an affair of chances by deferring30 the struggle till she has grown far stronger than at first. And yet you know that on the whole the rock on which the barbarian31 was wrecked32 was himself, and that if our present enemy Athens has not again and again annihilated33 us, we owe it more to her blunders than to your protection; Indeed, expectations from you have before now been the ruin of some, whose faith induced them to omit preparation.
“We hope that none of you will consider these words of remonstrance34 to be rather words of hostility35; men remonstrate36 with friends who are in error, accusations they reserve for enemies who have wronged them. Besides, we consider that we have as good a right as any one to point out a neighbour’s faults, particularly when we contemplate37 the great contrast between the two national characters; a contrast of which, as far as we can see, you have little perception, having never yet considered what sort of antagonists39 you will encounter in the Athenians, how widely, how absolutely different from yourselves. The Athenians are addicted40 to innovation, and their designs are characterized by swiftness alike in conception and execution; you have a genius for keeping what you have got, accompanied by a total want of invention, and when forced to act you never go far enough. Again, they are adventurous41 beyond their power, and daring beyond their judgment42, and in danger they are sanguine43; your wont44 is to attempt less than is justified45 by your power, to mistrust even what is sanctioned by your judgment, and to fancy that from danger there is no release. Further, there is promptitude on their side against procrastination46 on yours; they are never at home, you are never from it: for they hope by their absence to extend their acquisitions, you fear by your advance to endanger what you have left behind. They are swift to follow up a success, and slow to recoil47 from a reverse. Their bodies they spend ungrudgingly in their country’s cause; their intellect they jealously husband to be employed in her service. A scheme unexecuted is with them a positive loss, a successful enterprise a comparative failure. The deficiency created by the miscarriage48 of an undertaking49 is soon filled up by fresh hopes; for they alone are enabled to call a thing hoped for a thing got, by the speed with which they act upon their resolutions. Thus they toil50 on in trouble and danger all the days of their life, with little opportunity for enjoying, being ever engaged in getting: their only idea of a holiday is to do what the occasion demands, and to them laborious51 occupation is less of a misfortune than the peace of a quiet life. To describe their character in a word, one might truly say that they were born into the world to take no rest themselves and to give none to others.
“Such is Athens, your antagonist38. And yet, Lacedaemonians, you still delay, and fail to see that peace stays longest with those, who are not more careful to use their power justly than to show their determination not to submit to injustice52. On the contrary, your ideal of fair dealing is based on the principle that, if you do not injure others, you need not risk your own fortunes in preventing others from injuring you. Now you could scarcely have succeeded in such a policy even with a neighbour like yourselves; but in the present instance, as we have just shown, your habits are old-fashioned as compared with theirs. It is the law as in art, so in politics, that improvements ever prevail; and though fixed53 usages may be best for undisturbed communities, constant necessities of action must be accompanied by the constant improvement of methods. Thus it happens that the vast experience of Athens has carried her further than you on the path of innovation.
“Here, at least, let your procrastination end. For the present, assist your allies and Potidaea in particular, as you promised, by a speedy invasion of Attica, and do not sacrifice friends and kindred to their bitterest enemies, and drive the rest of us in despair to some other alliance. Such a step would not be condemned55 either by the Gods who received our oaths, or by the men who witnessed them. The breach of a treaty cannot be laid to the people whom desertion compels to seek new relations, but to the power that fails to assist its confederate. But if you will only act, we will stand by you; it would be unnatural56 for us to change, and never should we meet with such a congenial ally. For these reasons choose the right course, and endeavour not to let Peloponnese under your supremacy57 degenerate58 from the prestige that it enjoyed under that of your ancestors.”
Such were the words of the Corinthians. There happened to be Athenian envoys59 present at Lacedaemon on other business. On hearing the speeches they thought themselves called upon to come before the Lacedaemonians. Their intention was not to offer a defence on any of the charges which the cities brought against them, but to show on a comprehensive view that it was not a matter to be hastily decided60 on, but one that demanded further consideration. There was also a wish to call attention to the great power of Athens, and to refresh the memory of the old and enlighten the ignorance of the young, from a notion that their words might have the effect of inducing them to prefer tranquillity62 to war. So they came to the Lacedaemonians and said that they too, if there was no objection, wished to speak to their assembly. They replied by inviting63 them to come forward. The Athenians advanced, and spoke64 as follows:
“The object of our mission here was not to argue with your allies, but to attend to the matters on which our state dispatched us. However, the vehemence65 of the outcry that we hear against us has prevailed on us to come forward. It is not to combat the accusations of the cities (indeed you are not the judges before whom either we or they can plead), but to prevent your taking the wrong course on matters of great importance by yielding too readily to the persuasions66 of your allies. We also wish to show on a review of the whole indictment67 that we have a fair title to our possessions, and that our country has claims to consideration. We need not refer to remote antiquity68: there we could appeal to the voice of tradition, but not to the experience of our audience. But to the Median War and contemporary history we must refer, although we are rather tired of continually bringing this subject forward. In our action during that war we ran great risk to obtain certain advantages: you had your share in the solid results, do not try to rob us of all share in the good that the glory may do us. However, the story shall be told not so much to deprecate hostility as to testify against it, and to show, if you are so ill advised as to enter into a struggle with Athens, what sort of an antagonist she is likely to prove. We assert that at Marathon we were at the front, and faced the barbarian single-handed. That when he came the second time, unable to cope with him by land we went on board our ships with all our people, and joined in the action at Salamis. This prevented his taking the Peloponnesian states in detail, and ravaging69 them with his fleet; when the multitude of his vessels70 would have made any combination for self-defence impossible. The best proof of this was furnished by the invader71 himself. Defeated at sea, he considered his power to be no longer what it had been, and retired72 as speedily as possible with the greater part of his army.
“Such, then, was the result of the matter, and it was clearly proved that it was on the fleet of Hellas that her cause depended. Well, to this result we contributed three very useful elements, viz., the largest number of ships, the ablest commander, and the most unhesitating patriotism73. Our contingent74 of ships was little less than two-thirds of the whole four hundred; the commander was Themistocles, through whom chiefly it was that the battle took place in the straits, the acknowledged salvation75 of our cause. Indeed, this was the reason of your receiving him with honours such as had never been accorded to any foreign visitor. While for daring patriotism we had no competitors. Receiving no reinforcements from behind, seeing everything in front of us already subjugated76, we had the spirit, after abandoning our city, after sacrificing our property (instead of deserting the remainder of the league or depriving them of our services by dispersing), to throw ourselves into our ships and meet the danger, without a thought of resenting your neglect to assist us. We assert, therefore, that we conferred on you quite as much as we received. For you had a stake to fight for; the cities which you had left were still filled with your homes, and you had the prospect77 of enjoying them again; and your coming was prompted quite as much by fear for yourselves as for us; at all events, you never appeared till we had nothing left to lose. But we left behind us a city that was a city no longer, and staked our lives for a city that had an existence only in desperate hope, and so bore our full share in your deliverance and in ours. But if we had copied others, and allowed fears for our territory to make us give in our adhesion to the Mede before you came, or if we had suffered our ruin to break our spirit and prevent us embarking78 in our ships, your naval79 inferiority would have made a sea-fight unnecessary, and his objects would have been peaceably attained80.
“Surely, Lacedaemonians, neither by the patriotism that we displayed at that crisis, nor by the wisdom of our counsels, do we merit our extreme unpopularity with the Hellenes, not at least unpopularity for our empire. That empire we acquired by no violent means, but because you were unwilling81 to prosecute82 to its conclusion the war against the barbarian, and because the allies attached themselves to us and spontaneously asked us to assume the command. And the nature of the case first compelled us to advance our empire to its present height; fear being our principal motive83, though honour and interest afterwards came in. And at last, when almost all hated us, when some had already revolted and had been subdued84, when you had ceased to be the friends that you once were, and had become objects of suspicion and dislike, it appeared no longer safe to give up our empire; especially as all who left us would fall to you. And no one can quarrel with a people for making, in matters of tremendous risk, the best provision that it can for its interest.
“You, at all events, Lacedaemonians, have used your supremacy to settle the states in Peloponnese as is agreeable to you. And if at the period of which we were speaking you had persevered85 to the end of the matter, and had incurred86 hatred87 in your command, we are sure that you would have made yourselves just as galling88 to the allies, and would have been forced to choose between a strong government and danger to yourselves. It follows that it was not a very wonderful action, or contrary to the common practice of mankind, if we did accept an empire that was offered to us, and refused to give it up under the pressure of three of the strongest motives89, fear, honour, and interest. And it was not we who set the example, for it has always been law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger. Besides, we believed ourselves to be worthy of our position, and so you thought us till now, when calculations of interest have made you take up the cry of justice — a consideration which no one ever yet brought forward to hinder his ambition when he had a chance of gaining anything by might. And praise is due to all who, if not so superior to human nature as to refuse dominion90, yet respect justice more than their position compels them to do.
“We imagine that our moderation would be best demonstrated by the conduct of others who should be placed in our position; but even our equity91 has very unreasonably92 subjected us to condemnation93 instead of approval. Our abatement94 of our rights in the contract trials with our allies, and our causing them to be decided by impartial95 laws at Athens, have gained us the character of being litigious. And none care to inquire why this reproach is not brought against other imperial powers, who treat their subjects with less moderation than we do; the secret being that where force can be used, law is not needed. But our subjects are so habituated to associate with us as equals that any defeat whatever that clashes with their notions of justice, whether it proceeds from a legal judgment or from the power which our empire gives us, makes them forget to be grateful for being allowed to retain most of their possessions, and more vexed96 at a part being taken, than if we had from the first cast law aside and openly gratified our covetousness97. If we had done so, not even would they have disputed that the weaker must give way to the stronger. Men’s indignation, it seems, is more excited by legal wrong than by violent wrong; the first looks like being cheated by an equal, the second like being compelled by a superior. At all events they contrived98 to put up with much worse treatment than this from the Mede, yet they think our rule severe, and this is to be expected, for the present always weighs heavy on the conquered. This at least is certain. If you were to succeed in overthrowing99 us and in taking our place, you would speedily lose the popularity with which fear of us has invested you, if your policy of to-day is at all to tally100 with the sample that you gave of it during the brief period of your command against the Mede. Not only is your life at home regulated by rules and institutions incompatible101 with those of others, but your citizens abroad act neither on these rules nor on those which are recognized by the rest of Hellas.
“Take time then in forming your resolution, as the matter is of great importance; and do not be persuaded by the opinions and complaints of others to bring trouble on yourselves, but consider the vast influence of accident in war, before you are engaged in it. As it continues, it generally becomes an affair of chances, chances from which neither of us is exempt102, and whose event we must risk in the dark. It is a common mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong end, to act first, and wait for disaster to discuss the matter. But we are not yet by any means so misguided, nor, so far as we can see, are you; accordingly, while it is still open to us both to choose aright, we bid you not to dissolve the treaty, or to break your oaths, but to have our differences settled by arbitration103 according to our agreement. Or else we take the gods who heard the oaths to witness, and if you begin hostilities104, whatever line of action you choose, we will try not to be behindhand in repelling105 you.”
Such were the words of the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had heard the complaints of the allies against the Athenians, and the observations of the latter, they made all withdraw, and consulted by themselves on the question before them. The opinions of the majority all led to the same conclusion; the Athenians were open aggressors, and war must be declared at once. But Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king, came forward, who had the reputation of being at once a wise and a moderate man, and made the following speech:
“I have not lived so long, Lacedaemonians, without having had the experience of many wars, and I see those among you of the same age as myself, who will not fall into the common misfortune of longing106 for war from inexperience or from a belief in its advantage and its safety. This, the war on which you are now debating, would be one of the greatest magnitude, on a sober consideration of the matter. In a struggle with Peloponnesians and neighbours our strength is of the same character, and it is possible to move swiftly on the different points. But a struggle with a people who live in a distant land, who have also an extraordinary familiarity with the sea, and who are in the highest state of preparation in every other department; with wealth private and public, with ships, and horses, and heavy infantry107, and a population such as no one other Hellenic place can equal, and lastly a number of tributary108 allies — what can justify109 us in rashly beginning such a struggle? wherein is our trust that we should rush on it unprepared? Is it in our ships? There we are inferior; while if we are to practise and become a match for them, time must intervene. Is it in our money? There we have a far greater deficiency. We neither have it in our treasury110, nor are we ready to contribute it from our private funds. Confidence might possibly be felt in our superiority in heavy infantry and population, which will enable us to invade and devastate111 their lands. But the Athenians have plenty of other land in their empire, and can import what they want by sea. Again, if we are to attempt an insurrection of their allies, these will have to be supported with a fleet, most of them being islanders. What then is to be our war? For unless we can either beat them at sea, or deprive them of the revenues which feed their navy, we shall meet with little but disaster. Meanwhile our honour will be pledged to keeping on, particularly if it be the opinion that we began the quarrel. For let us never be elated by the fatal hope of the war being quickly ended by the devastation112 of their lands. I fear rather that we may leave it as a legacy113 to our children; so improbable is it that the Athenian spirit will be the slave of their land, or Athenian experience be cowed by war.
“Not that I would bid you be so unfeeling as to suffer them to injure your allies, and to refrain from unmasking their intrigues114; but I do bid you not to take up arms at once, but to send and remonstrate with them in a tone not too suggestive of war, nor again too suggestive of submission115, and to employ the interval116 in perfecting our own preparations. The means will be, first, the acquisition of allies, Hellenic or barbarian it matters not, so long as they are an accession to our strength naval or pecuniary117 — I say Hellenic or barbarian, because the odium of such an accession to all who like us are the objects of the designs of the Athenians is taken away by the law of self-preservation — and secondly118 the development of our home resources. If they listen to our embassy, so much the better; but if not, after the lapse119 of two or three years our position will have become materially strengthened, and we can then attack them if we think proper. Perhaps by that time the sight of our preparations, backed by language equally significant, will have disposed them to submission, while their land is still untouched, and while their counsels may be directed to the retention120 of advantages as yet undestroyed. For the only light in which you can view their land is that of a hostage in your hands, a hostage the more valuable the better it is cultivated. This you ought to spare as long as possible, and not make them desperate, and so increase the difficulty of dealing with them. For if while still unprepared, hurried away by the complaints of our allies, we are induced to lay it waste, have a care that we do not bring deep disgrace and deep perplexity upon Peloponnese. Complaints, whether of communities or individuals, it is possible to adjust; but war undertaken by a coalition121 for sectional interests, whose progress there is no means of foreseeing, does not easily admit of creditable settlement.
“And none need think it cowardice122 for a number of confederates to pause before they attack a single city. The Athenians have allies as numerous as our own, and allies that pay tribute, and war is a matter not so much of arms as of money, which makes arms of use. And this is more than ever true in a struggle between a continental123 and a maritime124 power. First, then, let us provide money, and not allow ourselves to be carried away by the talk of our allies before we have done so: as we shall have the largest share of responsibility for the consequences be they good or bad, we have also a right to a tranquil61 inquiry125 respecting them.
“And the slowness and procrastination, the parts of our character that are most assailed127 by their criticism, need not make you blush. If we undertake the war without preparation, we should by hastening its commencement only delay its conclusion: further, a free and a famous city has through all time been ours. The quality which they condemn54 is really nothing but a wise moderation; thanks to its possession, we alone do not become insolent128 in success and give way less than others in misfortune; we are not carried away by the pleasure of hearing ourselves cheered on to risks which our judgment condemns129; nor, if annoyed, are we any the more convinced by attempts to exasperate130 us by accusation7. We are both warlike and wise, and it is our sense of order that makes us so. We are warlike, because self-control contains honour as a chief constituent131, and honour bravery. And we are wise, because we are educated with too little learning to despise the laws, and with too severe a self-control to disobey them, and are brought up not to be too knowing in useless matters — such as the knowledge which can give a specious132 criticism of an enemy’s plans in theory, but fails to assail126 them with equal success in practice — but are taught to consider that the schemes of our enemies are not dissimilar to our own, and that the freaks of chance are not determinable by calculation. In practice we always base our preparations against an enemy on the assumption that his plans are good; indeed, it is right to rest our hopes not on a belief in his blunders, but on the soundness of our provisions. Nor ought we to believe that there is much difference between man and man, but to think that the superiority lies with him who is reared in the severest school. These practices, then, which our ancestors have delivered to us, and by whose maintenance we have always profited, must not be given up. And we must not be hurried into deciding in a day’s brief space a question which concerns many lives and fortunes and many cities, and in which honour is deeply involved — but we must decide calmly. This our strength peculiarly enables us to do. As for the Athenians, send to them on the matter of Potidaea, send on the matter of the alleged133 wrongs of the allies, particularly as they are prepared with legal satisfaction; and to proceed against one who offers arbitration as against a wrongdoer, law forbids. Meanwhile do not omit preparation for war. This decision will be the best for yourselves, the most terrible to your opponents.”
Such were the words of Archidamus. Last came forward Sthenelaidas, one of the ephors for that year, and spoke to the Lacedaemonians as follows:
“The long speech of the Athenians I do not pretend to understand. They said a good deal in praise of themselves, but nowhere denied that they are injuring our allies and Peloponnese. And yet if they behaved well against the Mede then, but ill towards us now, they deserve double punishment for having ceased to be good and for having become bad. We meanwhile are the same then and now, and shall not, if we are wise, disregard the wrongs of our allies, or put off till to-morrow the duty of assisting those who must suffer to-day. Others have much money and ships and horses, but we have good allies whom we must not give up to the Athenians, nor by lawsuits134 and words decide the matter, as it is anything but in word that we are harmed, but render instant and powerful help. And let us not be told that it is fitting for us to deliberate under injustice; long deliberation is rather fitting for those who have injustice in contemplation. Vote therefore, Lacedaemonians, for war, as the honour of Sparta demands, and neither allow the further aggrandizement135 of Athens, nor betray our allies to ruin, but with the gods let us advance against the aggressors.”
With these words he, as ephor, himself put the question to the assembly of the Lacedaemonians. He said that he could not determine which was the loudest acclamation (their mode of decision is by acclamation not by voting); the fact being that he wished to make them declare their opinion openly and thus to increase their ardour for war. Accordingly he said: “All Lacedaemonians who are of opinion that the treaty has been broken, and that Athens is guilty, leave your seats and go there,” pointing out a certain place; “all who are of the opposite opinion, there.” They accordingly stood up and divided; and those who held that the treaty had been broken were in a decided majority. Summoning the allies, they told them that their opinion was that Athens had been guilty of injustice, but that they wished to convoke136 all the allies and put it to the vote; in order that they might make war, if they decided to do so, on a common resolution. Having thus gained their point, the delegates returned home at once; the Athenian envoys a little later, when they had dispatched the objects of their mission. This decision of the assembly, judging that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year of the thirty years’ truce, which was entered into after the affair of Euboea.
The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that the war must be declared, not so much because they were persuaded by the arguments of the allies, as because they feared the growth of the power of the Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to them.
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besieged
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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incited
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| 刺激，激励，煽动( incite的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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truce
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| n.休战，(争执，烦恼等的)缓和；v.以停战结束 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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accusation
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| n.控告，指责，谴责 | |
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accusations
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| n.指责( accusation的名词复数 )；指控；控告；（被告发、控告的）罪名 | |
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grievances
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| n.委屈( grievance的名词复数 )；苦衷；不满；牢骚 | |
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exclusion
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| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
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defiance
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| n.挑战，挑衅，蔑视，违抗 | |
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inflame
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| v.使燃烧；使极度激动；使发炎 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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outrage
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| n.暴行，侮辱，愤怒；vt.凌辱，激怒 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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meditated
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| 深思，沉思，冥想( meditate的过去式和过去分词 )； 内心策划，考虑 | |
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fortify
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| v.强化防御，为…设防；加强，强化 | |
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erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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subjugation
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| n.镇压，平息，征服 | |
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aspires
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| v.渴望，追求( aspire的第三人称单数 ) | |
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liberator
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| 解放者 | |
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insidious
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| adj.阴险的，隐匿的，暗中为害的，（疾病）不知不觉之间加剧 | |
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interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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26
infancy
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| n.婴儿期；幼年期；初期 | |
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27
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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28
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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29
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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deferring
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| v.拖延，延缓，推迟( defer的现在分词 )；服从某人的意愿，遵从 | |
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31
barbarian
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| n.野蛮人；adj.野蛮(人)的；未开化的 | |
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wrecked
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| adj.失事的，遇难的 | |
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33
annihilated
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| v.（彻底）消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 )；使无效；废止；彻底击溃 | |
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34
remonstrance
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| n抗议，抱怨 | |
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35
hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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36
remonstrate
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| v.抗议，规劝 | |
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37
contemplate
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| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
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38
antagonist
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| n.敌人，对抗者，对手 | |
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39
antagonists
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| 对立[对抗] 者，对手，敌手( antagonist的名词复数 )； 对抗肌； 对抗药 | |
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40
addicted
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| adj.沉溺于....的，对...上瘾的 | |
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41
adventurous
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| adj.爱冒险的；惊心动魄的，惊险的，刺激的 | |
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42
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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43
sanguine
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| adj.充满希望的，乐观的，血红色的 | |
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44
wont
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| adj.习惯于；v.习惯；n.习惯 | |
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45
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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46
procrastination
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| n.拖延，耽搁 | |
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47
recoil
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| vi.退却，退缩，畏缩 | |
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48
miscarriage
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| n.失败，未达到预期的结果；流产 | |
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49
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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50
toil
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| vi.辛劳工作，艰难地行动；n.苦工，难事 | |
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51
laborious
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| adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅 | |
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52
injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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53
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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54
condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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55
condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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56
unnatural
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| adj.不自然的；反常的 | |
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57
supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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58
degenerate
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| v.退步，堕落；adj.退步的，堕落的；n.堕落者 | |
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59
envoys
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| 使节( envoy的名词复数 )； 公使； 谈判代表； 使节身份 | |
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60
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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61
tranquil
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| adj. 安静的, 宁静的, 稳定的, 不变的 | |
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62
tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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63
inviting
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| adj.诱人的，引人注目的 | |
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64
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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65
vehemence
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| n.热切；激烈；愤怒 | |
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66
persuasions
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| n.劝说，说服（力）( persuasion的名词复数 )；信仰 | |
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67
indictment
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| n.起诉；诉状 | |
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68
antiquity
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| n.古老；高龄；古物，古迹 | |
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69
ravaging
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| 毁坏( ravage的现在分词 )； 蹂躏； 劫掠； 抢劫 | |
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70
vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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71
invader
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| n.侵略者，侵犯者，入侵者 | |
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72
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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73
patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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74
contingent
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| adj.视条件而定的；n.一组，代表团，分遣队 | |
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75
salvation
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| n.（尤指基督）救世，超度，拯救，解困 | |
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76
subjugated
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| v.征服，降伏( subjugate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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77
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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78
embarking
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| 乘船( embark的现在分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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79
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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80
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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81
unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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82
prosecute
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| vt.告发；进行；vi.告发，起诉，作检察官 | |
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83
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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84
subdued
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| adj. 屈服的，柔和的，减弱的 动词subdue的过去式和过去分词 | |
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85
persevered
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| v.坚忍，坚持( persevere的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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86
incurred
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| [医]招致的，遭受的； incur的过去式 | |
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87
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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88
galling
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| adj.难堪的,使烦恼的,使焦躁的 | |
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89
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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90
dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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91
equity
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| n.公正，公平，（无固定利息的）股票 | |
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92
unreasonably
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| adv. 不合理地 | |
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93
condemnation
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| n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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94
abatement
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| n.减(免)税，打折扣，冲销 | |
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95
impartial
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| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
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96
vexed
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| adj.争论不休的；（指问题等）棘手的；争论不休的问题；烦恼的v.使烦恼( vex的过去式和过去分词 )；使苦恼；使生气；详细讨论 | |
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97
covetousness
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98
contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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99
overthrowing
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| v.打倒，推翻( overthrow的现在分词 )；使终止 | |
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100
tally
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| n.计数器，记分，一致，测量；vt.计算，记录，使一致；vi.计算，记分，一致 | |
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101
incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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102
exempt
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| adj.免除的；v.使免除；n.免税者，被免除义务者 | |
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103
arbitration
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| n.调停，仲裁 | |
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104
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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105
repelling
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| v.击退( repel的现在分词 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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106
longing
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| n.（for）渴望 | |
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107
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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108
tributary
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| n.支流；纳贡国；adj.附庸的；辅助的；支流的 | |
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109
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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110
treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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111
devastate
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| v.使荒芜，破坏，压倒 | |
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112
devastation
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| n.毁坏；荒废；极度震惊或悲伤 | |
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113
legacy
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| n.遗产，遗赠；先人(或过去)留下的东西 | |
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114
intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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115
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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116
interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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117
pecuniary
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| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
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118
secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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119
lapse
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| n.过失，流逝，失效，抛弃信仰，间隔；vi.堕落，停止，失效，流逝；vt.使失效 | |
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120
retention
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| n.保留，保持，保持力，记忆力 | |
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121
coalition
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| n.结合体，同盟，结合，联合 | |
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122
cowardice
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| n.胆小，怯懦 | |
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123
continental
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| adj.大陆的，大陆性的，欧洲大陆的 | |
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124
maritime
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| adj.海的，海事的，航海的，近海的，沿海的 | |
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125
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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126
assail
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| v.猛烈攻击，抨击，痛斥 | |
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127
assailed
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| v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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128
insolent
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| adj.傲慢的，无理的 | |
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129
condemns
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| v.（通常因道义上的原因而）谴责( condemn的第三人称单数 )；宣判；宣布…不能使用；迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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130
exasperate
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| v.激怒，使（疾病）加剧，使恶化 | |
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131
constituent
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| n.选民；成分，组分；adj.组成的，构成的 | |
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132
specious
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| adj.似是而非的；adv.似是而非地 | |
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133
alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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134
lawsuits
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| n.诉讼( lawsuit的名词复数 ) | |
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135
aggrandizement
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| n.增大，强化，扩大 | |
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136
convoke
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| v.召集会议 | |
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