AFTER this, though not many years later, we at length come to what has been already related, the affairs of Corcyra and Potidaea, and the events that served as a pretext1 for the present war. All these actions of the Hellenes against each other and the barbarian2 occurred in the fifty years’ interval4 between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of the present war. During this interval the Athenians succeeded in placing their empire on a firmer basis, and advanced their own home power to a very great height. The Lacedaemonians, though fully5 aware of it, opposed it only for a little while, but remained inactive during most of the period, being of old slow to go to war except under the pressure of necessity, and in the present instance being hampered6 by wars at home; until the growth of the Athenian power could be no longer ignored, and their own confederacy became the object of its encroachments. They then felt that they could endure it no longer, but that the time had come for them to throw themselves heart and soul upon the hostile power, and break it, if they could, by commencing the present war. And though the Lacedaemonians had made up their own minds on the fact of the breach7 of the treaty and the guilt8 of the Athenians, yet they sent to Delphi and inquired of the God whether it would be well with them if they went to war; and, as it is reported, received from him the answer that if they put their whole strength into the war, victory would be theirs, and the promise that he himself would be with them, whether invoked9 or uninvoked. Still they wished to summon their allies again, and to take their vote on the propriety10 of making war. After the ambassadors from the confederates had arrived and a congress had been convened11, they all spoke12 their minds, most of them denouncing the Athenians and demanding that the war should begin. In particular the Corinthians. They had before on their own account canvassed13 the cities in detail to induce them to vote for the war, in the fear that it might come too late to save Potidaea; they were present also on this occasion, and came forward the last, and made the following speech:
“Fellow allies, we can no longer accuse the Lacedaemonians of having failed in their duty: they have not only voted for war themselves, but have assembled us here for that purpose. We say their duty, for supremacy14 has its duties. Besides equitably15 administering private interests, leaders are required to show a special care for the common welfare in return for the special honours accorded to them by all in other ways. For ourselves, all who have already had dealings with the Athenians require no warning to be on their guard against them. The states more inland and out of the highway of communication should understand that, if they omit to support the coast powers, the result will be to injure the transit16 of their produce for exportation and the reception in exchange of their imports from the sea; and they must not be careless judges of what is now said, as if it had nothing to do with them, but must expect that the sacrifice of the powers on the coast will one day be followed by the extension of the danger to the interior, and must recognize that their own interests are deeply involved in this discussion. For these reasons they should not hesitate to exchange peace for war. If wise men remain quiet, while they are not injured, brave men abandon peace for war when they are injured, returning to an understanding on a favourable17 opportunity: in fact, they are neither intoxicated18 by their success in war, nor disposed to take an injury for the sake of the delightful19 tranquillity20 of peace. Indeed, to falter21 for the sake of such delights is, if you remain inactive, the quickest way of losing the sweets of repose22 to which you cling; while to conceive extravagant23 pretensions24 from success in war is to forget how hollow is the confidence by which you are elated. For if many ill-conceived plans have succeeded through the still greater fatuity25 of an opponent, many more, apparently26 well laid, have on the contrary ended in disgrace. The confidence with which we form our schemes is never completely justified27 in their execution; speculation28 is carried on in safety, but, when it comes to action, fear causes failure.
“To apply these rules to ourselves, if we are now kindling29 war it is under the pressure of injury, with adequate grounds of complaint; and after we have chastised30 the Athenians we will in season desist. We have many reasons to expect success — first, superiority in numbers and in military experience, and secondly31 our general and unvarying obedience32 in the execution of orders. The naval33 strength which they possess shall be raised by us from our respective antecedent resources, and from the moneys at Olympia and Delphi. A loan from these enables us to seduce34 their foreign sailors by the offer of higher pay. For the power of Athens is more mercenary than national; while ours will not be exposed to the same risk, as its strength lies more in men than in money. A single defeat at sea is in all likelihood their ruin: should they hold out, in that case there will be the more time for us to exercise ourselves in naval matters; and as soon as we have arrived at an equality in science, we need scarcely ask whether we shall be their superiors in courage. For the advantages that we have by nature they cannot acquire by education; while their superiority in science must be removed by our practice. The money required for these objects shall be provided by our contributions: nothing indeed could be more monstrous35 than the suggestion that, while their allies never tire of contributing for their own servitude, we should refuse to spend for vengeance36 and self-preservation the treasure which by such refusal we shall forfeit37 to Athenian rapacity38 and see employed for our own ruin.
“We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of their allies, the surest method of depriving them of their revenues, which are the source of their strength, and establishment of fortified39 positions in their country, and various operations which cannot be foreseen at present. For war of all things proceeds least upon definite rules, but draws principally upon itself for contrivances to meet an emergency; and in such cases the party who faces the struggle and keeps his temper best meets with most security, and he who loses his temper about it with correspondent disaster. Let us also reflect that if it was merely a number of disputes of territory between rival neighbours, it might be borne; but here we have an enemy in Athens that is a match for our whole coalition41, and more than a match for any of its members; so that unless as a body and as individual nationalities and individual cities we make an unanimous stand against her, she will easily conquer us divided and in detail. That conquest, terrible as it may sound, would, it must be known, have no other end than slavery pure and simple; a word which Peloponnese cannot even hear whispered without disgrace, or without disgrace see so many states abused by one. Meanwhile the opinion would be either that we were justly so used, or that we put up with it from cowardice42, and were proving degenerate43 sons in not even securing for ourselves the freedom which our fathers gave to Hellas; and in allowing the establishment in Hellas of a tyrant44 state, though in individual states we think it our duty to put down sole rulers. And we do not know how this conduct can be held free from three of the gravest failings, want of sense, of courage, or of vigilance. For we do not suppose that you have taken refuge in that contempt of an enemy which has proved so fatal in so many instances — a feeling which from the numbers that it has ruined has come to be called not contemptuous but contemptible45.
“There is, however, no advantage in reflections on the past further than may be of service to the present. For the future we must provide by maintaining what the present gives us and redoubling our efforts; it is hereditary46 to us to win virtue47 as the fruit of labour, and you must not change the habit, even though you should have a slight advantage in wealth and resources; for it is not right that what was won in want should be lost in plenty; no, we must boldly advance to the war for many reasons; the god has commanded it and promised to be with us, and the rest of Hellas will all join in the struggle, part from fear, part from interest. You will be the first to break a treaty which the god, in advising us to go to war, judges to be violated already, but rather to support a treaty that has been outraged48: indeed, treaties are broken not by resistance but by aggression49.
“Your position, therefore, from whatever quarter you may view it, will amply justify50 you in going to war; and this step we recommend in the interests of all, bearing in mind that identity of interest you have taken refuge in that contempt of an enemy which has proved so fatal in so many instances — a feeling which from the numbers that it has ruined has come to be called not contemptuous but contemptible.
“There is, however, no advantage in reflections on the past further than may be of service to the present. For the future we must provide by maintaining what the present gives us and redoubling our efforts; it is hereditary to us to win virtue as the fruit of labour, and you must not change the habit, even though you should have a slight advantage in wealth and resources; for it is not right that what was won in want should be lost in plenty; no, we must boldly advance to the war for many reasons; the god has commanded it and promised to be with us, and the rest of Hellas will all join in the struggle, part from fear, part from interest. You will be the first to break a treaty which the god, in advising us to go to war, judges to be violated already, but rather to support a treaty that has been outraged: indeed, treaties are broken not by resistance but by aggression.
“Your position, therefore, from whatever quarter you may view it, will amply justify you in going to war; and this step we recommend in the interests of all, bearing in mind that identity of interest you have taken refuge in that contempt of an enemy which has proved so fatal in so many instances — a feeling which from the numbers that it has ruined has come to be called not contemptuous but contemptible.
“There is, however, no advantage in reflections on the past further than may be of service to the present. For the future we must provide by maintaining what the present gives us and redoubling our efforts; it is hereditary to us to win virtue as the fruit of labour, and you must not change the habit, even though you should have a slight advantage in wealth and resources; for it is not right that what was won in want should be lost in plenty; no, we must boldly advance to the war for many reasons; the god has commanded it and promised to be with us, and the rest of Hellas will all join in the struggle, part from fear, part from interest. You will be the first to break a treaty which the god, in advising us to go to war, judges to be violated already, but rather to support a treaty that has been outraged: indeed, treaties are broken not by resistance but by aggression.
“Your position, therefore, from whatever quarter you may view it, will amply justify you in going to war; and this step we recommend in the interests of all, bearing in mind that identity of interest is the surest of bonds, whether between states or individuals. Delay not, therefore, to assist Potidaea, a Dorian city besieged51 by Ionians, which is quite a reversal of the order of things; nor to assert the freedom of the rest. It is impossible for us to wait any longer when waiting can only mean immediate52 disaster for some of us, and, if it comes to be known that we have conferred but do not venture to protect ourselves, like disaster in the near future for the rest. Delay not, fellow allies, but, convinced of the necessity of the crisis and the wisdom of this counsel, vote for the war, undeterred by its immediate terrors, but looking beyond to the lasting53 peace by which it will be succeeded. Out of war peace gains fresh stability, but to refuse to abandon repose for war is not so sure a method of avoiding danger. We must believe that the tyrant city that has been established in Hellas has been established against all alike, with a programme of universal empire, part fulfilled, part in contemplation; let us then attack and reduce it, and win future security for ourselves and freedom for the Hellenes who are now enslaved.”
Such were the words of the Corinthians. The Lacedaemonians, having now heard all, give their opinion, took the vote of all the allied54 states present in order, great and small alike; and the majority voted for war. This decided55, it was still impossible for them to commence at once, from their want of preparation; but it was resolved that the means requisite56 were to be procured57 by the different states, and that there was to be no delay. And indeed, in spite of the time occupied with the necessary arrangements, less than a year elapsed before Attica was invaded, and the war openly begun.
This interval was spent in sending embassies to Athens charged with complaints, in order to obtain as good a pretext for war as possible, in the event of her paying no attention to them. The first Lacedaemonian embassy was to order the Athenians to drive out the curse of the goddess; the history of which is as follows. In former generations there was an Athenian of the name of Cylon, a victor at the Olympic games, of good birth and powerful position, who had married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, at that time tyrant of Megara. Now this Cylon was inquiring at Delphi; when he was told by the god to seize the Acropolis of Athens on the grand festival of Zeus. Accordingly, procuring59 a force from Theagenes and persuading his friends to join him, when the Olympic festival in Peloponnese came, he seized the Acropolis, with the intention of making himself tyrant, thinking that this was the grand festival of Zeus, and also an occasion appropriate for a victor at the Olympic games. Whether the grand festival that was meant was in Attica or elsewhere was a question which he never thought of, and which the oracle60 did not offer to solve. For the Athenians also have a festival which is called the grand festival of Zeus Meilichios or Gracious, viz., the Diasia. It is celebrated61 outside the city, and the whole people sacrifice not real victims but a number of bloodless offerings peculiar62 to the country. However, fancying he had chosen the right time, he made the attempt. As soon as the Athenians perceived it, they flocked in, one and all, from the country, and sat down, and laid siege to the citadel63. But as time went on, weary of the labour of blockade, most of them departed; the responsibility of keeping guard being left to the nine archons, with plenary powers to arrange everything according to their good judgment64. It must be known that at that time most political functions were discharged by the nine archons. Meanwhile Cylon and his besieged companions were distressed65 for want of food and water. Accordingly Cylon and his brother made their escape; but the rest being hard pressed, and some even dying of famine, seated themselves as suppliants66 at the altar in the Acropolis. The Athenians who were charged with the duty of keeping guard, when they saw them at the point of death in the temple, raised them up on the understanding that no harm should be done to them, led them out, and slew68 them. Some who as they passed by took refuge at the altars of the awful goddesses were dispatched on the spot. From this deed the men who killed them were called accursed and guilty against the goddess, they and their descendants. Accordingly these cursed ones were driven out by the Athenians, driven out again by Cleomenes of Lacedaemon and an Athenian faction69; the living were driven out, and the bones of the dead were taken up; thus they were cast out. For all that, they came back afterwards, and their descendants are still in the city.
This, then was the curse that the Lacedaemonians ordered them to drive out. They were actuated primarily, as they pretended, by a care for the honour of the gods; but they also know that Pericles, son of Xanthippus, was connected with the curse on his mother’s side, and they thought that his banishment70 would materially advance their designs on Athens. Not that they really hoped to succeed in procuring this; they rather thought to create a prejudice against him in the eyes of his countrymen from the feeling that the war would be partly caused by his misfortune. For being the most powerful man of his time, and the leading Athenian statesman, he opposed the Lacedaemonians in everything, and would have no concessions72, but ever urged the Athenians on to war.
The Athenians retorted by ordering the Lacedaemonians to drive out the curse of Taenarus. The Lacedaemonians had once raised up some Helot suppliants from the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, led them away and slain73 them; for which they believe the great earthquake at Sparta to have been a retribution. The Athenians also ordered them to drive out the curse of the goddess of the Brazen74 House; the history of which is as follows. After Pausanias the Lacedaemonian had been recalled by the Spartans75 from his command in the Hellespont (this is his first recall), and had been tried by them and acquitted77, not being again sent out in a public capacity, he took a galley78 of Hermione on his own responsibility, without the authority of the Lacedaemonians, and arrived as a private person in the Hellespont. He came ostensibly for the Hellenic war, really to carry on his intrigues79 with the King, which he had begun before his recall, being ambitious of reigning80 over Hellas. The circumstance which first enabled him to lay the King under an obligation, and to make a beginning of the whole design, was this. Some connections and kinsmen81 of the King had been taken in Byzantium, on its capture from the Medes, when he was first there, after the return from Cyprus. These captives he sent off to the King without the knowledge of the rest of the allies, the account being that they had escaped from him. He managed this with the help of Gongylus, an Eretrian, whom he had placed in charge of Byzantium and the prisoners. He also gave Gongylus a letter for the King, the contents of which were as follows, as was afterwards discovered: “Pausanias, the general of Sparta, anxious to do you a favour, sends you these his prisoners of war. I propose also, with your approval, to marry your daughter, and to make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject to you. I may say that I think I am able to do this, with your co-operation. Accordingly if any of this please you, send a safe man to the sea through whom we may in future conduct our correspondence.”
This was all that was revealed in the writing, and Xerxes was pleased with the letter. He sent off Artabazus, son of Pharnaces, to the sea with orders to supersede82 Megabates, the previous governor in the satrapy of Daskylion, and to send over as quickly as possible to Pausanias at Byzantium a letter which he entrusted83 to him; to show him the royal signet, and to execute any commission which he might receive from Pausanias on the King’s matters with all care and fidelity84. Artabazus on his arrival carried the King’s orders into effect, and sent over the letter, which contained the following answer: “Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. For the men whom you have saved for me across sea from Byzantium, an obligation is laid up for you in our house, recorded for ever; and with your proposals I am well pleased. Let neither night nor day stop you from diligently85 performing any of your promises to me; neither for cost of gold nor of silver let them be hindered, nor yet for number of troops, wherever it may be that their presence is needed; but with Artabazus, an honourable86 man whom I send you, boldly advance my objects and yours, as may be most for the honour and interest of us both.”
Before held in high honour by the Hellenes as the hero of Plataea, Pausanias, after the receipt of this letter, became prouder than ever, and could no longer live in the usual style, but went out of Byzantium in a Median dress, was attended on his march through Thrace by a bodyguard87 of Medes and Egyptians, kept a Persian table, and was quite unable to contain his intentions, but betrayed by his conduct in trifles what his ambition looked one day to enact88 on a grander scale. He also made himself difficult of access, and displayed so violent a temper to every one without exception that no one could come near him. Indeed, this was the principal reason why the confederacy went over to the Athenians.
The above-mentioned conduct, coming to the ears of the Lacedaemonians, occasioned his first recall. And after his second voyage out in the ship of Hermione, without their orders, he gave proofs of similar behaviour. Besieged and expelled from Byzantium by the Athenians, he did not return to Sparta; but news came that he had settled at Colonae in the Troad, and was intriguing89 with the barbarians90, and that his stay there was for no good purpose; and the ephors, now no longer hesitating, sent him a herald91 and a scytale with orders to accompany the herald or be declared a public enemy. Anxious above everything to avoid suspicion, and confident that he could quash the charge by means of money, he returned a second time to Sparta. At first thrown into prison by the ephors (whose powers enable them to do this to the King), soon compromised the matter and came out again, and offered himself for trial to any who wished to institute an inquiry92 concerning him.
Now the Spartans had no tangible93 proof against him — neither his enemies nor the nation — of that indubitable kind required for the punishment of a member of the royal family, and at that moment in high office; he being regent for his first cousin King Pleistarchus, Leonidas’s son, who was still a minor94. But by his contempt of the laws and imitation of the barbarians, he gave grounds for much suspicion of his being discontented with things established; all the occasions on which he had in any way departed from the regular customs were passed in review, and it was remembered that he had taken upon himself to have inscribed95 on the tripod at Delphi, which was dedicated96 by the Hellenes as the first-fruits of the spoil of the Medes, the following couplet:
The Mede defeated, great Pausanias raised
This monument, that Phoebus might be praised.
At the time the Lacedaemonians had at once erased97 the couplet, and inscribed the names of the cities that had aided in the overthrow98 of the barbarian and dedicated the offering. Yet it was considered that Pausanias had here been guilty of a grave offence, which, interpreted by the light of the attitude which he had since assumed, gained a new significance, and seemed to be quite in keeping with his present schemes. Besides, they were informed that he was even intriguing with the Helots; and such indeed was the fact, for he promised them freedom and citizenship99 if they would join him in insurrection and would help him to carry out his plans to the end. Even now, mistrusting the evidence even of the Helots themselves, the ephors would not consent to take any decided step against him; in accordance with their regular custom towards themselves, namely, to be slow in taking any irrevocable resolve in the matter of a Spartan76 citizen without indisputable proof. At last, it is said, the person who was going to carry to Artabazus the last letter for the King, a man of Argilus, once the favourite and most trusty servant of Pausanias, turned informer. Alarmed by the reflection that none of the previous messengers had ever returned, having counterfeited100 the seal, in order that, if he found himself mistaken in his surmises101, or if Pausanias should ask to make some correction, he might not be discovered, he undid102 the letter, and found the postscript103 that he had suspected, viz., an order to put him to death.
On being shown the letter, the ephors now felt more certain. Still, they wished to hear Pausanias commit himself with their own ears. Accordingly the man went by appointment to Taenarus as a suppliant67, and there built himself a hut divided into two by a partition; within which he concealed104 some of the ephors and let them hear the whole matter plainly. For Pausanias came to him and asked him the reason of his suppliant position; and the man reproached him with the order that he had written concerning him, and one by one declared all the rest of the circumstances, how he who had never yet brought him into any danger, while employed as agent between him and the King, was yet just like the mass of his servants to be rewarded with death. Admitting all this, and telling him not to be angry about the matter, Pausanias gave him the pledge of raising him up from the temple, and begged him to set off as quickly as possible, and not to hinder the business in hand.
The ephors listened carefully, and then departed, taking no action for the moment, but, having at last attained105 to certainty, were preparing to arrest him in the city. It is reported that, as he was about to be arrested in the street, he saw from the face of one of the ephors what he was coming for; another, too, made him a secret signal, and betrayed it to him from kindness. Setting off with a run for the temple of the goddess of the Brazen House, the enclosure of which was near at hand, he succeeded in taking sanctuary106 before they took him, and entering into a small chamber107, which formed part of the temple, to avoid being exposed to the weather, lay still there. The ephors, for the moment distanced in the pursuit, afterwards took off the roof of the chamber, and having made sure that he was inside, shut him in, barricaded108 the doors, and staying before the place, reduced him by starvation. When they found that he was on the point of expiring, just as he was, in the chamber, they brought him out of the temple, while the breath was still in him, and as soon as he was brought out he died. They were going to throw him into the Kaiadas, where they cast criminals, but finally decided to inter3 him somewhere near. But the god at Delphi afterwards ordered the Lacedaemonians to remove the tomb to the place of his death — where he now lies in the consecrated109 ground, as an inscription110 on a monument declares — and, as what had been done was a curse to them, to give back two bodies instead of one to the goddess of the Brazen House. So they had two brazen statues made, and dedicated them as a substitute for Pausanias. the Athenians retorted by telling the Lacedaemonians to drive out what the god himself had pronounced to be a curse.
To return to the Medism of Pausanias. Matter was found in the course of the inquiry to implicate111 Themistocles; and the Lacedaemonians accordingly sent envoys112 to the Athenians and required them to punish him as they had punished Pausanias. The Athenians consented to do so. But he had, as it happened, been ostracized113, and, with a residence at Argos, was in the habit of visiting other parts of Peloponnese. So they sent with the Lacedaemonians, who were ready to join in the pursuit, persons with instructions to take him wherever they found him. But Themistocles got scent114 of their intentions, and fled from Peloponnese to Corcyra, which was under obligations towards him. But the Corcyraeans alleged115 that they could not venture to shelter him at the cost of offending Athens and Lacedaemon, and they conveyed him over to the continent opposite. Pursued by the officers who hung on the report of his movements, at a loss where to turn, he was compelled to stop at the house of Admetus, the Molossian king, though they were not on friendly terms. Admetus happened not to be indoors, but his wife, to whom he made himself a suppliant, instructed him to take their child in his arms and sit down by the hearth116. Soon afterwards Admetus came in, and Themistocles told him who he was, and begged him not to revenge on Themistocles in exile any opposition117 which his requests might have experienced from Themistocles at Athens. Indeed, he was now far too low for his revenge; retaliation118 was only honourable between equals. Besides, his opposition to the king had only affected119 the success of a request, not the safety of his person; if the king were to give him up to the pursuers that he mentioned, and the fate which they intended for him, he would just be consigning120 him to certain death.
The King listened to him and raised him up with his son, as he was sitting with him in his arms after the most effectual method of supplication121, and on the arrival of the Lacedaemonians not long afterwards, refused to give him up for anything they could say, but sent him off by land to the other sea to Pydna in Alexander’s dominions122, as he wished to go to the Persian king. There he met with a merchantman on the point of starting for Ionia. Going on board, he was carried by a storm to the Athenian squadron which was blockading Naxos. In his alarm — he was luckily unknown to the people in the vessel123 — he told the master who he was and what he was flying for, and said that, if he refused to save him, he would declare that he was taking him for a bribe124. Meanwhile their safety consisted in letting no one leave the ship until a favourable time for sailing should arise. If he complied with his wishes, he promised him a proper recompense. The master acted as he desired, and, after lying to for a day and a night out of reach of the squadron, at length arrived at Ephesus.
After having rewarded him with a present of money, as soon as he received some from his friends at Athens and from his secret hoards125 at Argos, Themistocles started inland with one of the coast Persians, and sent a letter to King Artaxerxes, Xerxes’s son, who had just come to the throne. Its contents were as follows: “I, Themistocles, am come to you, who did your house more harm than any of the Hellenes, when I was compelled to defend myself against your father’s invasion — harm, however, far surpassed by the good that I did him during his retreat, which brought no danger for me but much for him. For the past, you are a good turn in my debt”— here he mentioned the warning sent to Xerxes from Salamis to retreat, as well as his finding the bridges unbroken, which, as he falsely pretended, was due to him —“for the present, able to do you great service, I am here, pursued by the Hellenes for my friendship for you. However, I desire a year’s grace, when I shall be able to declare in person the objects of my coming.”
It is said that the King approved his intention, and told him to do as he said. He employed the interval in making what progress he could in the study of the Persian tongue, and of the customs of the country. Arrived at court at the end of the year, he attained to very high consideration there, such as no Hellene has ever possessed126 before or since; partly from his splendid antecedents, partly from the hopes which he held out of effecting for him the subjugation127 of Hellas, but principally by the proof which experience daily gave of his capacity. For Themistocles was a man who exhibited the most indubitable signs of genius; indeed, in this particular he has a claim on our admiration128 quite extraordinary and unparalleled. By his own native capacity, alike unformed and unsupplemented by study, he was at once the best judge in those sudden crises which admit of little or of no deliberation, and the best prophet of the future, even to its most distant possibilities. An able theoretical expositor of all that came within the sphere of his practice, he was not without the power of passing an adequate judgment in matters in which he had no experience. He could also excellently divine the good and evil which lay hid in the unseen future. In fine, whether we consider the extent of his natural powers, or the slightness of his application, this extraordinary man must be allowed to have surpassed all others in the faculty129 of intuitively meeting an emergency. Disease was the real cause of his death; though there is a story of his having ended his life by poison, on finding himself unable to fulfil his promises to the king. However this may be, there is a monument to him in the marketplace of Asiatic Magnesia. He was governor of the district, the King having given him Magnesia, which brought in fifty talents a year, for bread, Lampsacus, which was considered to be the richest wine country, for wine, and Myos for other provisions. His bones, it is said, were conveyed home by his relatives in accordance with his wishes, and interred130 in Attic58 ground. This was done without the knowledge of the Athenians; as it is against the law to bury in Attica an outlaw131 for treason. So ends the history of Pausanias and Themistocles, the Lacedaemonian and the Athenian, the most famous men of their time in Hellas.
To return to the Lacedaemonians. The history of their first embassy, the injunctions which it conveyed, and the rejoinder which it provoked, concerning the expulsion of the accursed persons, have been related already. It was followed by a second, which ordered Athens to raise the siege of Potidaea, and to respect the independence of Aegina. Above all, it gave her most distinctly to understand that war might be prevented by the revocation132 of the Megara decree, excluding the Megarians from the use of Athenian harbours and of the market of Athens. But Athens was not inclined either to revoke133 the decree, or to entertain their other proposals; she accused the Megarians of pushing their cultivation134 into the consecrated ground and the unenclosed land on the border, and of harbouring her runaway135 slaves. At last an embassy arrived with the Lacedaemonian ultimatum136. The ambassadors were Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander. Not a word was said on any of the old subjects; there was simply this: “Lacedaemon wishes the peace to continue, and there is no reason why it should not, if you would leave the Hellenes independent.” Upon this the Athenians held an assembly, and laid the matter before their consideration. It was resolved to deliberate once for all on all their demands, and to give them an answer. There were many speakers who came forward and gave their support to one side or the other, urging the necessity of war, or the revocation of the decree and the folly137 of allowing it to stand in the way of peace. Among them came forward Pericles, son of Xanthippus, the first man of his time at Athens, ablest alike in counsel and in action, and gave the following advice:
“There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold to through everything, and that is the principle of no concession71 to the Peloponnesians. I know that the spirit which inspires men while they are being persuaded to make war is not always retained in action; that as circumstances change, resolutions change. Yet I see that now as before the same, almost literally138 the same, counsel is demanded of me; and I put it to those of you who are allowing yourselves to be persuaded, to support the national resolves even in the case of reverses, or to forfeit all credit for their wisdom in the event of success. For sometimes the course of things is as arbitrary as the plans of man; indeed this is why we usually blame chance for whatever does not happen as we expected. Now it was clear before that Lacedaemon entertained designs against us; it is still more clear now. The treaty provides that we shall mutually submit our differences to legal settlement, and that we shall meanwhile each keep what we have. Yet the Lacedaemonians never yet made us any such offer, never yet would accept from us any such offer; on the contrary, they wish complaints to be settled by war instead of by negotiation140; and in the end we find them here dropping the tone of expostulation and adopting that of command. They order us to raise the siege of Potidaea, to let Aegina be independent, to revoke the Megara decree; and they conclude with an ultimatum warning us to leave the Hellenes independent. I hope that you will none of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megara decree, which appears in front of their complaints, and the revocation of which is to save us from war, or let any feeling of self-reproach linger in your minds, as if you went to war for slight cause. Why, this trifle contains the whole seal and trial of your resolution. If you give way, you will instantly have to meet some greater demand, as having been frightened into obedience in the first instance; while a firm refusal will make them clearly understand that they must treat you more as equals. Make your decision therefore at once, either to submit before you are harmed, or if we are to go to war, as I for one think we ought, to do so without caring whether the ostensible141 cause be great or small, resolved against making concessions or consenting to a precarious142 tenure143 of our possessions. For all claims from an equal, urged upon a neighbour as commands before any attempt at legal settlement, be they great or be they small, have only one meaning, and that is slavery.
“As to the war and the resources of either party, a detailed144 comparison will not show you the inferiority of Athens. Personally engaged in the cultivation of their land, without funds either private or public, the Peloponnesians are also without experience in long wars across sea, from the strict limit which poverty imposes on their attacks upon each other. Powers of this description are quite incapable145 of often manning a fleet or often sending out an army: they cannot afford the absence from their homes, the expenditure146 from their own funds; and besides, they have not command of the sea. Capital, it must be remembered, maintains a war more than forced contributions. Farmers are a class of men that are always more ready to serve in person than in purse. Confident that the former will survive the dangers, they are by no means so sure that the latter will not be prematurely147 exhausted148, especially if the war last longer than they expect, which it very likely will. In a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies may be able to defy all Hellas, but they are incapacitated from carrying on a war against a power different in character from their own, by the want of the single council-chamber requisite to prompt and vigorous action, and the substitution of a diet composed of various races, in which every state possesses an equal vote, and each presses its own ends, a condition of things which generally results in no action at all. The great wish of some is to avenge149 themselves on some particular enemy, the great wish of others to save their own pocket. Slow in assembling, they devote a very small fraction of the time to the consideration of any public object, most of it to the prosecution150 of their own objects. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come of his neglect, that it is the business of somebody else to look after this or that for him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by all separately, the common cause imperceptibly decays.
“But the principal point is the hindrance151 that they will experience from want of money. The slowness with which it comes in will cause delay; but the opportunities of war wait for no man. Again, we need not be alarmed either at the possibility of their raising fortifications in Attica, or at their navy. It would be difficult for any system of fortifications to establish a rival city, even in time of peace, much more, surely, in an enemy’s country, with Athens just as much fortified against it as it against Athens; while a mere40 post might be able to do some harm to the country by incursions and by the facilities which it would afford for desertion, but can never prevent our sailing into their country and raising fortifications there, and making reprisals152 with our powerful fleet. For our naval skill is of more use to us for service on land, than their military skill for service at sea. Familiarity with the sea they will not find an easy acquisition. If you who have been practising at it ever since the Median invasion have not yet brought it to perfection, is there any chance of anything considerable being effected by an agricultural, unseafaring population, who will besides be prevented from practising by the constant presence of strong squadrons of observation from Athens? With a small squadron they might hazard an engagement, encouraging their ignorance by numbers; but the restraint of a strong force will prevent their moving, and through want of practice they will grow more clumsy, and consequently more timid. It must be kept in mind that seamanship, just like anything else, is a matter of art, and will not admit of being taken up occasionally as an occupation for times of leisure; on the contrary, it is so exacting153 as to leave leisure for nothing else.
“Even if they were to touch the moneys at Olympia or Delphi, and try to seduce our foreign sailors by the temptation of higher pay, that would only be a serious danger if we could not still be a match for them by embarking154 our own citizens and the aliens resident among us. But in fact by this means we are always a match for them; and, best of all, we have a larger and higher class of native coxswains and sailors among our own citizens than all the rest of Hellas. And to say nothing of the danger of such a step, none of our foreign sailors would consent to become an outlaw from his country, and to take service with them and their hopes, for the sake of a few days’ high pay.
“This, I think, is a tolerably fair account of the position of the Peloponnesians; that of Athens is free from the defects that I have criticized in them, and has other advantages of its own, which they can show nothing to equal. If they march against our country we will sail against theirs, and it will then be found that the desolation of the whole of Attica is not the same as that of even a fraction of Peloponnese; for they will not be able to supply the deficiency except by a battle, while we have plenty of land both on the islands and the continent. The rule of the sea is indeed a great matter. Consider for a moment. Suppose that we were islanders; can you conceive a more impregnable position? Well, this in future should, as far as possible, be our conception of our position. Dismissing all thought of our land and houses, we must vigilantly155 guard the sea and the city. No irritation156 that we may feel for the former must provoke us to a battle with the numerical superiority of the Peloponnesians. A victory would only be succeeded by another battle against the same superiority: a reverse involves the loss of our allies, the source of our strength, who will not remain quiet a day after we become unable to march against them. We must cry not over the loss of houses and land but of men’s lives; since houses and land do not gain men, but men them. And if I had thought that I could persuade you, I would have bid you go out and lay them waste with your own hands, and show the Peloponnesians that this at any rate will not make you submit.
“I have many other reasons to hope for a favourable issue, if you can consent not to combine schemes of fresh conquest with the conduct of the war, and will abstain157 from wilfully158 involving yourselves in other dangers; indeed, I am more afraid of our own blunders than of the enemy’s devices. But these matters shall be explained in another speech, as events require; for the present dismiss these men with the answer that we will allow Megara the use of our market and harbours, when the Lacedaemonians suspend their alien acts in favour of us and our allies, there being nothing in the treaty to prevent either one or the other: that we will leave the cities independent, if independent we found them when we made the treaty, and when the Lacedaemonians grant to their cities an independence not involving subservience159 to Lacedaemonian interests, but such as each severally may desire: that we are willing to give the legal satisfaction which our agreements specify160, and that we shall not commence hostilities161, but shall resist those who do commence them. This is an answer agreeable at once to the rights and the dignity of Athens. It must be thoroughly162 understood that war is a necessity; but that the more readily we accept it, the less will be the ardour of our opponents, and that out of the greatest dangers communities and individuals acquire the greatest glory. Did not our fathers resist the Medes not only with resources far different from ours, but even when those resources had been abandoned; and more by wisdom than by fortune, more by daring than by strength, did not they beat off the barbarian and advance their affairs to their present height? We must not fall behind them, but must resist our enemies in any way and in every way, and attempt to hand down our power to our posterity163 unimpaired.”
Such were the words of Pericles. The Athenians, persuaded of the wisdom of his advice, voted as he desired, and answered the Lacedaemonians as he recommended, both on the separate points and in the general; they would do nothing on dictation, but were ready to have the complaints settled in a fair and impartial164 manner by the legal method, which the terms of the truce165 prescribed. So the envoys departed home and did not return again.
These were the charges and differences existing between the rival powers before the war, arising immediately from the affair at Epidamnus and Corcyra. Still intercourse166 continued in spite of them, and mutual139 communication. It was carried on without heralds167, but not without suspicion, as events were occurring which were equivalent to a breach of the treaty and matter for war.
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pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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barbarian
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| n.野蛮人；adj.野蛮(人)的；未开化的 | |
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inter
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| v.埋葬 | |
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interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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hampered
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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guilt
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| n.犯罪；内疚；过失，罪责 | |
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invoked
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| v.援引( invoke的过去式和过去分词 )；行使（权利等）；祈求救助；恳求 | |
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propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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convened
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| 召开( convene的过去式 )； 召集； （为正式会议而）聚集； 集合 | |
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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canvassed
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| v.（在政治方面）游说( canvass的过去式和过去分词 )；调查（如选举前选民的）意见；为讨论而提出（意见等）；详细检查 | |
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supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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equitably
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| 公平地 | |
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transit
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| n.经过，运输；vt.穿越，旋转；vi.越过 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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intoxicated
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| 喝醉的，极其兴奋的 | |
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delightful
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| adj.令人高兴的，使人快乐的 | |
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tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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falter
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| vi.(嗓音)颤抖，结巴地说；犹豫；蹒跚 | |
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repose
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| v.(使)休息；n.安息 | |
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extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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pretensions
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| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
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fatuity
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| n.愚蠢，愚昧 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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kindling
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| n. 点火, 可燃物 动词kindle的现在分词形式 | |
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chastised
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| v.严惩（某人）（尤指责打）( chastise的过去式 ) | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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seduce
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| vt.勾引，诱奸，诱惑，引诱 | |
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monstrous
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| adj.巨大的；恐怖的；可耻的，丢脸的 | |
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vengeance
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| n.报复，报仇，复仇 | |
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forfeit
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| vt.丧失；n.罚金，罚款，没收物 | |
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rapacity
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| n.贪婪，贪心，劫掠的欲望 | |
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fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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coalition
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| n.结合体，同盟，结合，联合 | |
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cowardice
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| n.胆小，怯懦 | |
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degenerate
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| v.退步，堕落；adj.退步的，堕落的；n.堕落者 | |
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tyrant
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| n.暴君，专制的君主，残暴的人 | |
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contemptible
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| adj.可鄙的，可轻视的，卑劣的 | |
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hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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outraged
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| a.震惊的，义愤填膺的 | |
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aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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besieged
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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lasting
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| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
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allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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attic
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| n.顶楼，屋顶室 | |
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procuring
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的现在分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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oracle
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| n.神谕，神谕处，预言 | |
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celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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citadel
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| n.城堡；堡垒；避难所 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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distressed
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| 痛苦的 | |
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suppliants
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| n.恳求者，哀求者( suppliant的名词复数 ) | |
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suppliant
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| adj.哀恳的；n.恳求者，哀求者 | |
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slew
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| v.（使）旋转；n.大量，许多 | |
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faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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banishment
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| n.放逐，驱逐 | |
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concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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concessions
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| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
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slain
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| 杀死，宰杀，杀戮( slay的过去分词 )； (slay的过去分词) | |
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brazen
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| adj.厚脸皮的，无耻的，坚硬的 | |
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spartans
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| n.斯巴达（spartan的复数形式） | |
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spartan
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| adj.简朴的，刻苦的；n.斯巴达；斯巴达式的人 | |
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acquitted
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| 宣判…无罪( acquit的过去式和过去分词 )； 使（自己）作出某种表现 | |
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galley
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| n.（飞机或船上的）厨房单层甲板大帆船；军舰舰长用的大划艇； | |
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79
intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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80
reigning
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| adj.统治的，起支配作用的 | |
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81
kinsmen
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| n.家属，亲属( kinsman的名词复数 ) | |
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82
supersede
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| v.替代；充任 | |
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83
entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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84
fidelity
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| n.忠诚，忠实；精确 | |
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85
diligently
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| ad.industriously;carefully | |
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86
honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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87
bodyguard
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| n.护卫，保镖 | |
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88
enact
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| vt.制定(法律)；上演，扮演 | |
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89
intriguing
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| adj.有趣的；迷人的v.搞阴谋诡计(intrigue的现在分词)；激起…的好奇心 | |
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90
barbarians
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| n.野蛮人( barbarian的名词复数 )；外国人；粗野的人；无教养的人 | |
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91
herald
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| vt.预示...的来临，预告，宣布，欢迎 | |
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92
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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93
tangible
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| adj.有形的，可触摸的，确凿的，实际的 | |
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94
minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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95
inscribed
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| v.写，刻( inscribe的过去式和过去分词 )；内接 | |
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96
dedicated
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| adj.一心一意的；献身的；热诚的 | |
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97
erased
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| v.擦掉( erase的过去式和过去分词 )；抹去；清除 | |
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98
overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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99
citizenship
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| n.市民权，公民权，国民的义务(身份) | |
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100
counterfeited
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| v.仿制，造假( counterfeit的过去分词 ) | |
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101
surmises
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| v.臆测，推断( surmise的第三人称单数 )；揣测；猜想 | |
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102
Undid
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| v. 解开, 复原 | |
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103
postscript
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| n.附言，又及；(正文后的)补充说明 | |
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104
concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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105
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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106
sanctuary
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| n.圣所，圣堂，寺庙；禁猎区，保护区 | |
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107
chamber
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| n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所 | |
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108
barricaded
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| 设路障于，以障碍物阻塞( barricade的过去式和过去分词 )； 设路障[防御工事]保卫或固守 | |
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109
consecrated
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| adj.神圣的，被视为神圣的v.把…奉为神圣，给…祝圣( consecrate的过去式和过去分词 )；奉献 | |
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110
inscription
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| n.（尤指石块上的）刻印文字，铭文，碑文 | |
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111
implicate
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| vt.使牵连其中，涉嫌 | |
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112
envoys
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| 使节( envoy的名词复数 )； 公使； 谈判代表； 使节身份 | |
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113
ostracized
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| v.放逐( ostracize的过去式和过去分词 )；流放；摈弃；排斥 | |
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114
scent
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| n.气味，香味，香水，线索，嗅觉；v.嗅，发觉 | |
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115
alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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116
hearth
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| n.壁炉炉床，壁炉地面 | |
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117
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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118
retaliation
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| n.报复，反击 | |
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119
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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120
consigning
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| v.把…置于（令人不快的境地）( consign的现在分词 )；把…托付给；把…托人代售；丟弃 | |
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121
supplication
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| n.恳求，祈愿，哀求 | |
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122
dominions
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| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
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123
vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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124
bribe
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| n.贿赂；v.向…行贿，买通 | |
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125
hoards
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| n.（钱财、食物或其他珍贵物品的）储藏，积存( hoard的名词复数 )v.积蓄并储藏（某物）( hoard的第三人称单数 ) | |
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126
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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127
subjugation
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| n.镇压，平息，征服 | |
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128
admiration
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| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
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129
faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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130
interred
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| v.埋，葬( inter的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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131
outlaw
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| n.歹徒，亡命之徒；vt.宣布…为不合法 | |
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132
revocation
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| n.废止，撤回 | |
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133
revoke
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| v.废除，取消，撤回 | |
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134
cultivation
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| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
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135
runaway
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| n.逃走的人，逃亡，亡命者；adj.逃亡的，逃走的 | |
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136
ultimatum
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| n.最后通牒 | |
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137
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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138
literally
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| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
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139
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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140
negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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141
ostensible
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| adj.(指理由)表面的，假装的 | |
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142
precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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143
tenure
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| n.终身职位；任期；(土地)保有权，保有期 | |
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144
detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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145
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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146
expenditure
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| n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出；使用，消耗 | |
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147
prematurely
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| adv.过早地，贸然地 | |
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148
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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149
avenge
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| v.为...复仇，为...报仇 | |
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150
prosecution
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| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
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151
hindrance
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| n.妨碍，障碍 | |
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152
reprisals
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| n.报复（行为）( reprisal的名词复数 ) | |
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153
exacting
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| adj.苛求的，要求严格的 | |
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154
embarking
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| 乘船( embark的现在分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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155
vigilantly
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| adv.警觉地，警惕地 | |
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156
irritation
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| n.激怒，恼怒，生气 | |
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157
abstain
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| v.自制，戒绝，弃权，避免 | |
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158
wilfully
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| adv.任性固执地；蓄意地 | |
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159
subservience
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| n.有利，有益；从属（地位），附属性；屈从，恭顺；媚态 | |
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160
specify
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| vt.指定，详细说明 | |
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161
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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162
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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163
posterity
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| n.后裔，子孙，后代 | |
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164
impartial
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| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
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165
truce
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| n.休战，(争执，烦恼等的)缓和；v.以停战结束 | |
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166
intercourse
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| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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167
heralds
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| n.使者( herald的名词复数 )；预报者；预兆；传令官v.预示( herald的第三人称单数 )；宣布（好或重要） | |
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