THE Peloponnesians now determined1 to sail to Rhodes, upon the invitation of some of the principal men there, hoping to gain an island powerful by the number of its seamen2 and by its land forces, and also thinking that they would be able to maintain their fleet from their own confederacy, without having to ask for money from Tissaphernes. They accordingly at once set sail that same winter from Cnidus, and first put in with ninety-four ships at Camirus in the Rhodian country, to the great alarm of the mass of the inhabitants, who were not privy3 to the intrigue4, and who consequently fled, especially as the town was unfortified. They were afterwards, however, assembled by the Lacedaemonians together with the inhabitants of the two other towns of Lindus and Ialysus; and the Rhodians were persuaded to revolt from the Athenians and the island went over to the Peloponnesians. Meanwhile the Athenians had received the alarm and set sail with the fleet from Samos to forestall7 them, and came within sight of the island, but being a little too late sailed off for the moment to Chalce, and from thence to Samos, and subsequently waged war against Rhodes, issuing from Chalce, Cos, and Samos.
The Peloponnesians now levied8 a contribution of thirty-two talents from the Rhodians, after which they hauled their ships ashore9 and for eighty days remained inactive. During this time, and even earlier, before they removed to Rhodes, the following intrigues10 took place. After the death of Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus, Alcibiades began to be suspected by the Peloponnesians; and Astyochus received from Lacedaemon an order from them to put him to death, he being the personal enemy of Agis, and in other respects thought unworthy of confidence. Alcibiades in his alarm first withdrew to Tissaphernes, and immediately began to do all he could with him to injure the Peloponnesian cause. Henceforth becoming his adviser11 in everything, he cut down the pay from an Attic12 drachma to three obols a day, and even this not paid too regularly; and told Tissaphernes to say to the Peloponnesians that the Athenians, whose maritime13 experience was of an older date than their own, only gave their men three obols, not so much from poverty as to prevent their seamen being corrupted14 by being too well off, and injuring their condition by spending money upon enervating15 indulgences, and also paid their crews irregularly in order to have a security against their deserting in the arrears16 which they would leave behind them. He also told Tissaphernes to bribe17 the captains and generals of the cities, and so to obtain their connivance18 — an expedient19 which succeeded with all except the Syracusans, Hermocrates alone opposing him on behalf of the whole confederacy. Meanwhile the cities asking for money Alcibiades sent off, by roundly telling them in the name of Tissaphernes that it was great impudence20 in the Chians, the richest people in Hellas, not content with being defended by a foreign force, to expect others to risk not only their lives but their money as well in behalf of their freedom; while the other cities, he said, had had to pay largely to Athens before their rebellion, and could not justly refuse to contribute as much or even more now for their own selves. He also pointed22 out that Tissaphernes was at present carrying on the war at his own charges, and had good cause for economy, but that as soon as he received remittances23 from the king he would give them their pay in full and do what was reasonable for the cities.
Alcibiades further advised Tissaphernes not to be in too great a hurry to end the war, or to let himself be persuaded to bring up the Phoenician fleet which he was equipping, or to provide pay for more Hellenes, and thus put the power by land and sea into the same hands; but to leave each of the contending parties in possession of one element, thus enabling the king when he found one troublesome to call in the other. For if the command of the sea and land were united in one hand, he would not know where to turn for help to overthrow24 the dominant25 power; unless he at last chose to stand up himself, and go through with the struggle at great expense and hazard. The cheapest plan was to let the Hellenes wear each other out, at a small share of the expense and without risk to himself. Besides, he would find the Athenians the most convenient partners in empire as they did not aim at conquests on shore, and carried on the war upon principles and with a practice most advantageous26 to the King; being prepared to combine to conquer the sea for Athens, and for the King all the Hellenes inhabiting his country, whom the Peloponnesians, on the contrary, had come to liberate27. Now it was not likely that the Lacedaemonians would free the Hellenes from the Hellenic Athenians, without freeing them also from the barbarian28 Mede, unless overthrown29 by him in the meanwhile. Alcibiades therefore urged him to wear them both out at first, and, after docking the Athenian power as much as he could, forthwith to rid the country of the Peloponnesians. In the main Tissaphernes approved of this policy, so far at least as could be conjectured30 from his behaviour; since he now gave his confidence to Alcibiades in recognition of his good advice, and kept the Peloponnesians short of money, and would not let them fight at sea, but ruined their cause by pretending that the Phoenician fleet would arrive, and that they would thus be enabled to contend with the odds31 in their favour, and so made their navy lose its efficiency, which had been very remarkable32, and generally betrayed a coolness in the war that was too plain to be mistaken.
Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes and the King, with whom he then was, not merely because he thought it really the best, but because he was studying means to effect his restoration to his country, well knowing that if he did not destroy it he might one day hope to persuade the Athenians to recall him, and thinking that his best chance of persuading them lay in letting them see that he possessed34 the favour of Tissaphernes. The event proved him to be right. When the Athenians at Samos found that he had influence with Tissaphernes, principally of their own motion (though partly also through Alcibiades himself sending word to their chief men to tell the best men in the army that, if there were only an oligarchy35 in the place of the rascally36 democracy that had banished38 him, he would be glad to return to his country and to make Tissaphernes their friend), the captains and chief men in the armament at once embraced the idea of subverting39 the democracy.
The design was first mooted40 in the camp, and afterwards from thence reached the city. Some persons crossed over from Samos and had an interview with Alcibiades, who immediately offered to make first Tissaphernes, and afterwards the King, their friend, if they would give up the democracy and make it possible for the King to trust them. The higher class, who also suffered most severely41 from the war, now conceived great hopes of getting the government into their own hands, and of triumphing over the enemy. Upon their return to Samos the emissaries formed their partisans42 into a club, and openly told the mass of the armament that the King would be their friend, and would provide them with money, if Alcibiades were restored and the democracy abolished. The multitude, if at first irritated by these intrigues, were nevertheless kept quiet by the advantageous prospect43 of the pay from the King; and the oligarchical44 conspirators45, after making this communication to the people, now re-examined the proposals of Alcibiades among themselves, with most of their associates. Unlike the rest, who thought them advantageous and trustworthy, Phrynichus, who was still general, by no means approved of the proposals. Alcibiades, he rightly thought, cared no more for an oligarchy than for a democracy, and only sought to change the institutions of his country in order to get himself recalled by his associates; while for themselves their one object should be to avoid civil discord46. It was not the King’s interest, when the Peloponnesians were now their equals at sea, and in possession of some of the chief cities in his empire, to go out of his way to side with the Athenians whom he did not trust, when he might make friends of the Peloponnesians who had never injured him. And as for the allied47 states to whom oligarchy was now offered, because the democracy was to be put down at Athens, he well knew that this would not make the rebels come in any the sooner, or confirm the loyal in their allegiance; as the allies would never prefer servitude with an oligarchy or democracy to freedom with the constitution which they actually enjoyed, to whichever type it belonged. Besides, the cities thought that the so-called better classes would prove just as oppressive as the commons, as being those who originated, proposed, and for the most part benefited from the acts of the commons injurious to the confederates. Indeed, if it depended on the better classes, the confederates would be put to death without trial and with violence; while the commons were their refuge and the chastiser48 of these men. This he positively49 knew that the cities had learned by experience, and that such was their opinion. The propositions of Alcibiades, and the intrigues now in progress, could therefore never meet with his approval.
However, the members of the club assembled, agreeably to their original determination, accepted what was proposed, and prepared to send Pisander and others on an embassy to Athens to treat for the restoration of Alcibiades and the abolition50 of the democracy in the city, and thus to make Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians.
Phrynichus now saw that there would be a proposal to restore Alcibiades, and that the Athenians would consent to it; and fearing after what he had said against it that Alcibiades, if restored, would revenge himself upon him for his opposition51, had recourse to the following expedient. He sent a secret letter to the Lacedaemonian admiral Astyochus, who was still in the neighbourhood of Miletus, to tell him that Alcibiades was ruining their cause by making Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians, and containing an express revelation of the rest of the intrigue, desiring to be excused if he sought to harm his enemy even at the expense of the interests of his country. However, Astyochus, instead of thinking of punishing Alcibiades, who, besides, no longer ventured within his reach as formerly52, went up to him and Tissaphernes at Magnesia, communicated to them the letter from Samos, and turned informer, and, if report may be trusted, became the paid creature of Tissaphernes, undertaking53 to inform him as to this and all other matters; which was also the reason why he did not remonstrate54 more strongly against the pay not being given in full. Upon this Alcibiades instantly sent to the authorities at Samos a letter against Phrynichus, stating what he had done, and requiring that he should be put to death. Phrynichus distracted, and placed in the utmost peril55 by the denunciation, sent again to Astyochus, reproaching him with having so ill kept the secret of his previous letter, and saying that he was now prepared to give them an opportunity of destroying the whole Athenian armament at Samos; giving a detailed56 account of the means which he should employ, Samos being unfortified, and pleading that, being in danger of his life on their account, he could not now be blamed for doing this or anything else to escape being destroyed by his mortal enemies. This also Astyochus revealed to Alcibiades.
Meanwhile Phrynichus having had timely notice that he was playing him false, and that a letter on the subject was on the point of arriving from Alcibiades, himself anticipated the news, and told the army that the enemy, seeing that Samos was unfortified and the fleet not all stationed within the harbour, meant to attack the camp, that he could be certain of this intelligence, and that they must fortify57 Samos as quickly as possible, and generally look to their defences. It will be remembered that he was general, and had himself authority to carry out these measures. Accordingly they addressed themselves to the work of fortification, and Samos was thus fortified5 sooner than it would otherwise have been. Not long afterwards came the letter from Alcibiades, saying that the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and the enemy about to attack it. Alcibiades, however, gained no credit, it being thought that he was in the secret of the enemy’s designs, and had tried to fasten them upon Phrynichus, and to make out that he was their accomplice58, out of hatred59; and consequently far from hurting him he rather bore witness to what he had said by this intelligence.
After this Alcibiades set to work to persuade Tissaphernes to become the friend of the Athenians. Tissaphernes, although afraid of the Peloponnesians because they had more ships in Asia than the Athenians, was yet disposed to be persuaded if he could, especially after his quarrel with the Peloponnesians at Cnidus about the treaty of Therimenes. The quarrel had already taken place, as the Peloponnesians were by this time actually at Rhodes; and in it the original argument of Alcibiades touching60 the liberation of all the towns by the Lacedaemonians had been verified by the declaration of Lichas that it was impossible to submit to a convention which made the King master of all the states at any former time ruled by himself or by his fathers.
While Alcibiades was besieging61 the favour of Tissaphernes with an earnestness proportioned to the greatness of the issue, the Athenian envoys62 who had been dispatched from Samos with Pisander arrived at Athens, and made a speech before the people, giving a brief summary of their views, and particularly insisting that, if Alcibiades were recalled and the democratic constitution changed, they could have the King as their ally, and would be able to overcome the Peloponnesians. A number of speakers opposed them on the question of the democracy, the enemies of Alcibiades cried out against the scandal of a restoration to be effected by a violation63 of the constitution, and the Eumolpidae and Ceryces protested in behalf of the mysteries, the cause of his banishment64, and called upon the gods to avert65 his recall; when Pisander, in the midst of much opposition and abuse, came forward, and taking each of his opponents aside asked him the following question: In the face of the fact that the Peloponnesians had as many ships as their own confronting them at sea, more cities in alliance with them, and the King and Tissaphernes to supply them with money, of which the Athenians had none left, had he any hope of saving the state, unless someone could induce the King to come over to their side? Upon their replying that they had not, he then plainly said to them: “This we cannot have unless we have a more moderate form of government, and put the offices into fewer hands, and so gain the King’s confidence, and forthwith restore Alcibiades, who is the only man living that can bring this about. The safety of the state, not the form of its government, is for the moment the most pressing question, as we can always change afterwards whatever we do not like.”
The people were at first highly irritated at the mention of an oligarchy, but upon understanding clearly from Pisander that this was the only resource left, they took counsel of their fears, and promised themselves some day to change the government again, and gave way. They accordingly voted that Pisander should sail with ten others and make the best arrangement that they could with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. At the same time the people, upon a false accusation66 of Pisander, dismissed Phrynichus from his post together with his colleague Scironides, sending Diomedon and Leon to replace them in the command of the fleet. The accusation was that Phrynichus had betrayed Iasus and Amorges; and Pisander brought it because he thought him a man unfit for the business now in hand with Alcibiades. Pisander also went the round of all the clubs already existing in the city for help in lawsuits67 and elections, and urged them to draw together and to unite their efforts for the overthrow of the democracy; and after taking all other measures required by the circumstances, so that no time might be lost, set off with his ten companions on his voyage to Tissaphernes.
In the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had by this time joined the fleet, made an attack upon Rhodes. The ships of the Peloponnesians they found hauled up on shore, and, after making a descent upon the coast and defeating the Rhodians who appeared in the field against them, withdrew to Chalce and made that place their base of operations instead of Cos, as they could better observe from thence if the Peloponnesian fleet put out to sea. Meanwhile Xenophantes, a Laconian, came to Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios, with the news that the fortification of the Athenians was now finished, and that, unless the whole Peloponnesian fleet came to the rescue, the cause in Chios must be lost. Upon this they resolved to go to his relief. In the meantime Pedaritus, with the mercenaries that he had with him and the whole force of the Chians, made an assault upon the work round the Athenian ships and took a portion of it, and got possession of some vessels69 that were hauled up on shore, when the Athenians sallied out to the rescue, and first routing the Chians, next defeated the remainder of the force round Pedaritus, who was himself killed, with many of the Chians, a great number of arms being also taken.
After this the Chians were besieged70 even more straitly than before by land and sea, and the famine in the place was great. Meanwhile the Athenian envoys with Pisander arrived at the court of Tissaphernes, and conferred with him about the proposed agreement. However, Alcibiades, not being altogether sure of Tissaphernes (who feared the Peloponnesians more than the Athenians, and besides wished to wear out both parties, as Alcibiades himself had recommended), had recourse to the following stratagem71 to make the treaty between the Athenians and Tissaphernes miscarry by reason of the magnitude of his demands. In my opinion Tissaphernes desired this result, fear being his motive72; while Alcibiades, who now saw that Tissaphernes was determined not to treat on any terms, wished the Athenians to think, not that he was unable to persuade Tissaphernes, but that after the latter had been persuaded and was willing to join them, they had not conceded enough to him. For the demands of Alcibiades, speaking for Tissaphernes, who was present, were so extravagant73 that the Athenians, although for a long while they agreed to whatever he asked, yet had to bear the blame of failure: he required the cession74 of the whole of Ionia, next of the islands adjacent, besides other concessions75, and these passed without opposition; at last, in the third interview, Alcibiades, who now feared a complete discovery of his inability, required them to allow the King to build ships and sail along his own coast wherever and with as many as he pleased. Upon this the Athenians would yield no further, and concluding that there was nothing to be done, but that they had been deceived by Alcibiades, went away in a passion and proceeded to Samos.
Tissaphernes immediately after this, in the same winter, proceeded along shore to Caunus, desiring to bring the Peloponnesian fleet back to Miletus, and to supply them with pay, making a fresh convention upon such terms as he could get, in order not to bring matters to an absolute breach76 between them. He was afraid that if many of their ships were left without pay they would be compelled to engage and be defeated, or that their vessels being left without hands the Athenians would attain77 their objects without his assistance. Still more he feared that the Peloponnesians might ravage78 the continent in search of supplies. Having calculated and considered all this, agreeably to his plan of keeping the two sides equal, he now sent for the Peloponnesians and gave them pay, and concluded with them a third treaty in words following:
In the thirteenth year of the reign21 of Darius, while Alexippidas was ephor at Lacedaemon, a convention was concluded in the plain of the Maeander by the Lacedaemonians and their allies with Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces, concerning the affairs of the King and of the Lacedaemonians and their allies.
1. The country of the King in Asia shall be the King’s, and the King shall treat his own country as he pleases.
2. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not invade or injure the King’s country: neither shall the King invade or injure that of the Lacedaemonians or of their allies. If any of the Lacedaemonians or of their allies invade or injure the King’s country, the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall prevent it: and if any from the King’s country invade or injure the country of the Lacedaemonians or of their allies, the King shall prevent it.
3. Tissaphernes shall provide pay for the ships now present, according to the agreement, until the arrival of the King’s vessels: but after the arrival of the King’s vessels the Lacedaemonians and their allies may pay their own ships if they wish it. If, however, they choose to receive the pay from Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes shall furnish it: and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall repay him at the end of the war such moneys as they shall have received.
4. After the vessels have arrived, the ships of the Lacedaemonians and of their allies and those of the King shall carry on the war jointly79, according as Tissaphernes and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall think best. If they wish to make peace with the Athenians, they shall make peace also jointly.
This was the treaty. After this Tissaphernes prepared to bring up the Phoenician fleet according to agreement, and to make good his other promises, or at all events wished to make it appear that he was so preparing.
Winter was now drawing towards its close, when the Boeotians took Oropus by treachery, though held by an Athenian garrison80. Their accomplices81 in this were some of the Eretrians and of the Oropians themselves, who were plotting the revolt of Euboea, as the place was exactly opposite Eretria, and while in Athenian hands was necessarily a source of great annoyance82 to Eretria and the rest of Euboea. Oropus being in their hands, the Eretrians now came to Rhodes to invite the Peloponnesians into Euboea. The latter, however, were rather bent83 on the relief of the distressed84 Chians, and accordingly put out to sea and sailed with all their ships from Rhodes. Off Triopium they sighted the Athenian fleet out at sea sailing from Chalce, and, neither attacking the other, arrived, the latter at Samos, the Peloponnesians at Miletus, seeing that it was no longer possible to relieve Chios without a battle. And this winter ended, and with it ended the twentieth year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian.
Early in the spring of the summer following, Dercyllidas, a Spartan85, was sent with a small force by land to the Hellespont to effect the revolt of Abydos, which is a Milesian colony; and the Chians, while Astyochus was at a loss how to help them, were compelled to fight at sea by the pressure of the siege. While Astyochus was still at Rhodes they had received from Miletus, as their commander after the death of Pedaritus, a Spartan named Leon, who had come out with Antisthenes, and twelve vessels which had been on guard at Miletus, five of which were Thurian, four Syracusans, one from Anaia, one Milesian, and one Leon’s own. Accordingly the Chians marched out in mass and took up a strong position, while thirty-six of their ships put out and engaged thirty-two of the Athenians; and after a tough fight, in which the Chians and their allies had rather the best of it, as it was now late, retired86 to their city.
Immediately after this Dercyllidas arrived by land from Miletus; and Abydos in the Hellespont revolted to him and Pharnabazus, and Lampsacus two days later. Upon receipt of this news Strombichides hastily sailed from Chios with twenty-four Athenian ships, some transports carrying heavy infantry87 being of the number, and defeating the Lampsacenes who came out against him, took Lampsacus, which was unfortified, at the first assault, and making prize of the slaves and goods restored the freemen to their homes, and went on to Abydos. The inhabitants, however, refusing to capitulate, and his assaults failing to take the place, he sailed over to the coast opposite, and appointed Sestos, the town in the Chersonese held by the Medes at a former period in this history, as the centre for the defence of the whole Hellespont.
In the meantime the Chians commanded the sea more than before; and the Peloponnesians at Miletus and Astyochus, hearing of the sea-fight and of the departure of the squadron with Strombichides, took fresh courage. Coasting along with two vessels to Chios, Astyochus took the ships from that place, and now moved with the whole fleet upon Samos, from whence, however, he sailed back to Miletus, as the Athenians did not put out against him, owing to their suspicions of one another. For it was about this time, or even before, that the democracy was put down at Athens. When Pisander and the envoys returned from Tissaphernes to Samos they at once strengthened still further their interest in the army itself, and instigated88 the upper class in Samos to join them in establishing an oligarchy, the very form of government which a party of them had lately risen to avoid. At the same time the Athenians at Samos, after a consultation89 among themselves, determined to let Alcibiades alone, since he refused to join them, and besides was not the man for an oligarchy; and now that they were once embarked90, to see for themselves how they could best prevent the ruin of their cause, and meanwhile to sustain the war, and to contribute without stint91 money and all else that might be required from their own private estates, as they would henceforth labour for themselves alone.
After encouraging each other in these resolutions, they now at once sent off half the envoys and Pisander to do what was necessary at Athens (with instructions to establish oligarchies92 on their way in all the subject cities which they might touch at), and dispatched the other half in different directions to the other dependencies. Diitrephes also, who was in the neighbourhood of Chios, and had been elected to the command of the Thracian towns, was sent off to his government, and arriving at Thasos abolished the democracy there. Two months, however, had not elapsed after his departure before the Thasians began to fortify their town, being already tired of an aristocracy with Athens, and in daily expectation of freedom from Lacedaemon. Indeed there was a party of them (whom the Athenians had banished), with the Peloponnesians, who with their friends in the town were already making every exertion93 to bring a squadron, and to effect the revolt of Thasos; and this party thus saw exactly what they most wanted done, that is to say, the reformation of the government without risk, and the abolition of the democracy which would have opposed them. Things at Thasos thus turned out just the contrary to what the oligarchical conspirators at Athens expected; and the same in my opinion was the case in many of the other dependencies; as the cities no sooner got a moderate government and liberty of action, than they went on to absolute freedom without being at all seduced94 by the show of reform offered by the Athenians.
Pisander and his colleagues on their voyage alongshore abolished, as had been determined, the democracies in the cities, and also took some heavy infantry from certain places as their allies, and so came to Athens. Here they found most of the work already done by their associates. Some of the younger men had banded together, and secretly assassinated95 one Androcles, the chief leader of the commons, and mainly responsible for the banishment of Alcibiades; Androcles being singled out both because he was a popular leader and because they sought by his death to recommend themselves to Alcibiades, who was, as they supposed, to be recalled, and to make Tissaphernes their friend. There were also some other obnoxious96 persons whom they secretly did away with in the same manner. Meanwhile their cry in public was that no pay should be given except to persons serving in the war, and that not more than five thousand should share in the government, and those such as were most able to serve the state in person and in purse.
But this was a mere33 catchword for the multitude, as the authors of the revolution were really to govern. However, the Assembly and the Council of the Bean still met notwithstanding, although they discussed nothing that was not approved of by the conspirators, who both supplied the speakers and reviewed in advance what they were to say. Fear, and the sight of the numbers of the conspirators, closed the mouths of the rest; or if any ventured to rise in opposition, he was presently put to death in some convenient way, and there was neither search for the murderers nor justice to be had against them if suspected; but the people remained motionless, being so thoroughly97 cowed that men thought themselves lucky to escape violence, even when they held their tongues. An exaggerated belief in the numbers of the conspirators also demoralized the people, rendered helpless by the magnitude of the city, and by their want of intelligence with each other, and being without means of finding out what those numbers really were. For the same reason it was impossible for any one to open his grief to a neighbour and to concert measures to defend himself, as he would have had to speak either to one whom he did not know, or whom he knew but did not trust. Indeed all the popular party approached each other with suspicion, each thinking his neighbour concerned in what was going on, the conspirators having in their ranks persons whom no one could ever have believed capable of joining an oligarchy; and these it was who made the many so suspicious, and so helped to procure98 impunity99 for the few, by confirming the commons in their mistrust of one another.
At this juncture100 arrived Pisander and his colleagues, who lost no time in doing the rest. First they assembled the people, and moved to elect ten commissioners101 with full powers to frame a constitution, and that when this was done they should on an appointed day lay before the people their opinion as to the best mode of governing the city. Afterwards, when the day arrived, the conspirators enclosed the assembly in Colonus, a temple of Poseidon, a little more than a mile outside the city; when the commissioners simply brought forward this single motion, that any Athenian might propose with impunity whatever measure he pleased, heavy penalties being imposed upon any who should indict102 for illegality, or otherwise molest103 him for so doing. The way thus cleared, it was now plainly declared that all tenure104 of office and receipt of pay under the existing institutions were at an end, and that five men must be elected as presidents, who should in their turn elect one hundred, and each of the hundred three apiece; and that this body thus made up to four hundred should enter the council chamber105 with full powers and govern as they judged best, and should convene106 the five thousand whenever they pleased.
The man who moved this resolution was Pisander, who was throughout the chief ostensible107 agent in putting down the democracy. But he who concerted the whole affair, and prepared the way for the catastrophe108, and who had given the greatest thought to the matter, was Antiphon, one of the best men of his day in Athens; who, with a head to contrive109 measures and a tongue to recommend them, did not willingly come forward in the assembly or upon any public scene, being ill looked upon by the multitude owing to his reputation for talent; and who yet was the one man best able to aid in the courts, or before the assembly, the suitors who required his opinion. Indeed, when he was afterwards himself tried for his life on the charge of having been concerned in setting up this very government, when the Four Hundred were overthrown and hardly dealt with by the commons, he made what would seem to be the best defence of any known up to my time. Phrynichus also went beyond all others in his zeal110 for the oligarchy. Afraid of Alcibiades, and assured that he was no stranger to his intrigues with Astyochus at Samos, he held that no oligarchy was ever likely to restore him, and once embarked in the enterprise, proved, where danger was to be faced, by far the staunchest of them all. Theramenes, son of Hagnon, was also one of the foremost of the subverters of the democracy — a man as able in council as in debate. Conducted by so many and by such sagacious heads, the enterprise, great as it was, not unnaturally111 went forward; although it was no light matter to deprive the Athenian people of its freedom, almost a hundred years after the deposition112 of the tyrants113, when it had been not only not subject to any during the whole of that period, but accustomed during more than half of it to rule over subjects of its own.
The assembly ratified114 the proposed constitution, without a single opposing voice, and was then dissolved; after which the Four Hundred were brought into the council chamber in the following way. On account of the enemy at Decelea, all the Athenians were constantly on the wall or in the ranks at the various military posts. On that day the persons not in the secret were allowed to go home as usual, while orders were given to the accomplices of the conspirators to hang about, without making any demonstration115, at some little distance from the posts, and in case of any opposition to what was being done, to seize the arms and put it down. There were also some Andrians and Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and some of the settlers in Aegina come with their own arms for this very purpose, who had received similar instructions. These dispositions116 completed, the Four Hundred went, each with a dagger117 concealed118 about his person, accompanied by one hundred and twenty Hellenic youths, whom they employed wherever violence was needed, and appeared before the Councillors of the Bean in the council chamber, and told them to take their pay and be gone; themselves bringing it for the whole of the residue119 of their term of office, and giving it to them as they went out.
Upon the Council withdrawing in this way without venturing any objection, and the rest of the citizens making no movement, the Four Hundred entered the council chamber, and for the present contented120 themselves with drawing lots for their Prytanes, and making their prayers and sacrifices to the gods upon entering office, but afterwards departed widely from the democratic system of government, and except that on account of Alcibiades they did not recall the exiles, ruled the city by force; putting to death some men, though not many, whom they thought it convenient to remove, and imprisoning121 and banishing122 others. They also sent to Agis, the Lacedaemonian king, at Decelea, to say that they desired to make peace, and that he might reasonably be more disposed to treat now that he had them to deal with instead of the inconstant commons.
Agis, however, did not believe in the tranquillity123 of the city, or that the commons would thus in a moment give up their ancient liberty, but thought that the sight of a large Lacedaemonian force would be sufficient to excite them if they were not already in commotion124, of which he was by no means certain. He accordingly gave to the envoys of the Four Hundred an answer which held out no hopes of an accommodation, and sending for large reinforcements from Peloponnese, not long afterwards, with these and his garrison from Decelea, descended125 to the very walls of Athens; hoping either that civil disturbances126 might help to subdue128 them to his terms, or that, in the confusion to be expected within and without the city, they might even surrender without a blow being struck; at all events he thought he would succeed in seizing the Long Walls, bared of their defenders129. However, the Athenians saw him come close up, without making the least disturbance127 within the city; and sending out their cavalry130, and a number of their heavy infantry, light troops, and archers131, shot down some of his soldiers who approached too near, and got possession of some arms and dead. Upon this Agis, at last convinced, led his army back again and, remaining with his own troops in the old position at Decelea, sent the reinforcement back home, after a few days’ stay in Attica. After this the Four Hundred persevering132 sent another embassy to Agis, and now meeting with a better reception, at his suggestion dispatched envoys to Lacedaemon to negotiate a treaty, being desirous of making peace.
They also sent ten men to Samos to reassure133 the army, and to explain that the oligarchy was not established for the hurt of the city or the citizens, but for the salvation134 of the country at large; and that there were five thousand, not four hundred only, concerned; although, what with their expeditions and employments abroad, the Athenians had never yet assembled to discuss a question important enough to bring five thousand of them together. The emissaries were also told what to say upon all other points, and were so sent off immediately after the establishment of the new government, which feared, as it turned out justly, that the mass of seamen would not be willing to remain under the oligarchical constitution, and, the evil beginning there, might be the means of their overthrow.
Indeed at Samos the question of the oligarchy had already entered upon a new phase, the following events having taken place just at the time that the Four Hundred were conspiring135. That part of the Samian population which has been mentioned as rising against the upper class, and as being the democratic party, had now turned round, and yielding to the solicitations of Pisander during his visit, and of the Athenians in the conspiracy136 at Samos, had bound themselves by oaths to the number of three hundred, and were about to fall upon the rest of their fellow citizens, whom they now in their turn regarded as the democratic party. Meanwhile they put to death one Hyperbolus, an Athenian, a pestilent fellow that had been ostracized137, not from fear of his influence or position, but because he was a rascal37 and a disgrace to the city; being aided in this by Charminus, one of the generals, and by some of the Athenians with them, to whom they had sworn friendship, and with whom they perpetrated other acts of the kind, and now determined to attack the people. The latter got wind of what was coming, and told two of the generals, Leon and Diomedon, who, on account of the credit which they enjoyed with the commons, were unwilling138 supporters of the oligarchy; and also Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the former a captain of a galley139, the latter serving with the heavy infantry, besides certain others who had ever been thought most opposed to the conspirators, entreating140 them not to look on and see them destroyed, and Samos, the sole remaining stay of their empire, lost to the Athenians. Upon hearing this, the persons whom they addressed now went round the soldiers one by one, and urged them to resist, especially the crew of the Paralus, which was made up entirely141 of Athenians and freemen, and had from time out of mind been enemies of oligarchy, even when there was no such thing existing; and Leon and Diomedon left behind some ships for their protection in case of their sailing away anywhere themselves. Accordingly, when the Three Hundred attacked the people, all these came to the rescue, and foremost of all the crew of the Paralus; and the Samian commons gained the victory, and putting to death some thirty of the Three Hundred, and banishing three others of the ringleaders, accorded an amnesty to the rest. and lived together under a democratic government for the future.
The ship Paralus, with Chaereas, son of Archestratus, on board, an Athenian who had taken an active part in the revolution, was now without loss of time sent off by the Samians and the army to Athens to report what had occurred; the fact that the Four Hundred were in power not being yet known. When they sailed into harbour the Four Hundred immediately arrested two or three of the Parali and, taking the vessel68 from the rest, shifted them into a troopship and set them to keep guard round Euboea. Chaereas, however, managed to secrete142 himself as soon as he saw how things stood, and returning to Samos, drew a picture to the soldiers of the horrors enacting143 at Athens, in which everything was exaggerated; saying that all were punished with stripes, that no one could say a word against the holders144 of power, that the soldiers’ wives and children were outraged145, and that it was intended to seize and shut up the relatives of all in the army at Samos who were not of the government’s way of thinking, to be put to death in case of their disobedience; besides a host of other injurious inventions.
On hearing this the first thought of the army was to fall upon the chief authors of the oligarchy and upon all the rest concerned. Eventually, however, they desisted from this idea upon the men of moderate views opposing it and warning them against ruining their cause, with the enemy close at hand and ready for battle. After this, Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, the chief leaders in the revolution, now wishing in the most public manner to change the government at Samos to a democracy, bound all the soldiers by the most tremendous oaths, and those of the oligarchical party more than any, to accept a democratic government, to be united, to prosecute146 actively147 the war with the Peloponnesians, and to be enemies of the Four Hundred, and to hold no communication with them. The same oath was also taken by all the Samians of full age; and the soldiers associated the Samians in all their affairs and in the fruits of their dangers, having the conviction that there was no way of escape for themselves or for them, but that the success of the Four Hundred or of the enemy at Miletus must be their ruin.
The struggle now was between the army trying to force a democracy upon the city, and the Four Hundred an oligarchy upon the camp. Meanwhile the soldiers forthwith held an assembly, in which they deposed148 the former generals and any of the captains whom they suspected, and chose new captains and generals to replace them, besides Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, whom they had already. They also stood up and encouraged one another, and among other things urged that they ought not to lose heart because the city had revolted from them, as the party seceding149 was smaller and in every way poorer in resources than themselves. They had the whole fleet with which to compel the other cities in their empire to give them money just as if they had their base in the capital, having a city in Samos which, so far from wanting strength, had when at war been within an ace6 of depriving the Athenians of the command of the sea, while as far as the enemy was concerned they had the same base of operations as before. Indeed, with the fleet in their hands, they were better able to provide themselves with supplies than the government at home. It was their advanced position at Samos which had throughout enabled the home authorities to command the entrance into Piraeus; and if they refused to give them back the constitution, they would now find that the army was more in a position to exclude them from the sea than they were to exclude the army. Besides, the city was of little or no use towards enabling them to overcome the enemy; and they had lost nothing in losing those who had no longer either money to send them (the soldiers having to find this for themselves), or good counsel, which entitles cities to direct armies. On the contrary, even in this the home government had done wrong in abolishing the institutions of their ancestors, while the army maintained the said institutions, and would try to force the home government to do so likewise. So that even in point of good counsel the camp had as good counsellors as the city. Moreover, they had but to grant him security for his person and his recall, and Alcibiades would be only too glad to procure them the alliance of the King. And above all if they failed altogether, with the navy which they possessed, they had numbers of places to retire to in which they would find cities and lands.
Debating together and comforting themselves after this manner, they pushed on their war measures as actively as ever; and the ten envoys sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, learning how matters stood while they were still at Delos, stayed quiet there.
About this time a cry arose among the soldiers in the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus that Astyochus and Tissaphernes were ruining their cause. Astyochus had not been willing to fight at sea — either before, while they were still in full vigour150 and the fleet of the Athenians small, or now, when the enemy was, as they were informed, in a state of sedition151 and his ships not yet united — but kept them waiting for the Phoenician fleet from Tissaphernes, which had only a nominal152 existence, at the risk of wasting away in inactivity. While Tissaphernes not only did not bring up the fleet in question, but was ruining their navy by payments made irregularly, and even then not made in full. They must therefore, they insisted, delay no longer, but fight a decisive naval153 engagement. The Syracusans were the most urgent of any.
The confederates and Astyochus, aware of these murmurs154, had already decided155 in council to fight a decisive battle; and when the news reached them of the disturbance at Samos, they put to sea with all their ships, one hundred and ten in number, and, ordering the Milesians to move by land upon Mycale, set sail thither156. The Athenians with the eighty-two ships from Samos were at the moment lying at Glauce in Mycale, a point where Samos approaches near to the continent; and, seeing the Peloponnesian fleet sailing against them, retired into Samos, not thinking themselves numerically strong enough to stake their all upon a battle. Besides, they had notice from Miletus of the wish of the enemy to engage, and were expecting to be joined from the Hellespont by Strombichides, to whom a messenger had been already dispatched, with the ships that had gone from Chios to Abydos. The Athenians accordingly withdrew to Samos, and the Peloponnesians put in at Mycale, and encamped with the land forces of the Milesians and the people of the neighbourhood. The next day they were about to sail against Samos, when tidings reached them of the arrival of Strombichides with the squadron from the Hellespont, upon which they immediately sailed back to Miletus. The Athenians, thus reinforced, now in their turn sailed against Miletus with a hundred and eight ships, wishing to fight a decisive battle, but, as no one put out to meet them, sailed back to Samos.
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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seamen
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| n.海员 | |
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privy
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| adj.私用的；隐密的 | |
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intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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ace
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| n.A牌；发球得分；佼佼者；adj.杰出的 | |
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forestall
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| vt.抢在…之前采取行动；预先阻止 | |
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levied
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| 征（兵）( levy的过去式和过去分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税 | |
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ashore
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| adv.在(向)岸上，上岸 | |
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intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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adviser
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| n.劝告者，顾问 | |
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attic
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| n.顶楼，屋顶室 | |
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maritime
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| adj.海的，海事的，航海的，近海的，沿海的 | |
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corrupted
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| （使）败坏( corrupt的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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enervating
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| v.使衰弱，使失去活力( enervate的现在分词 ) | |
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arrears
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| n.到期未付之债，拖欠的款项；待做的工作 | |
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bribe
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| n.贿赂；v.向…行贿，买通 | |
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connivance
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| n.纵容；默许 | |
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expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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impudence
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| n.厚颜无耻；冒失；无礼 | |
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reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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remittances
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| n.汇寄( remittance的名词复数 )；汇款，汇款额 | |
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overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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liberate
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| v.解放，使获得自由，释出，放出；vt.解放，使获自由 | |
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barbarian
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| n.野蛮人；adj.野蛮(人)的；未开化的 | |
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overthrown
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| adj. 打翻的，推倒的，倾覆的 动词overthrow的过去分词 | |
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conjectured
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| 推测，猜测，猜想( conjecture的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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odds
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| n.让步，机率，可能性，比率；胜败优劣之别 | |
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remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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oligarchy
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| n.寡头政治 | |
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rascally
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| adj. 无赖的，恶棍的 adv. 无赖地，卑鄙地 | |
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rascal
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| n.流氓；不诚实的人 | |
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banished
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| v.放逐，驱逐( banish的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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subverting
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| v.颠覆，破坏（政治制度、宗教信仰等）( subvert的现在分词 )；使（某人）道德败坏或不忠 | |
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mooted
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| adj.未决定的，有争议的，有疑问的v.提出…供讨论( moot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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partisans
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| 游击队员( partisan的名词复数 )； 党人； 党羽； 帮伙 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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oligarchical
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| adj.寡头政治的，主张寡头政治的 | |
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conspirators
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| n.共谋者，阴谋家( conspirator的名词复数 ) | |
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discord
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| n.不和，意见不合，争论，（音乐）不和谐 | |
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allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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chastiser
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| n.惩罚者，儆戒者 | |
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positively
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| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
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abolition
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| n.废除，取消 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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52
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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remonstrate
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| v.抗议，规劝 | |
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peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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57
fortify
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| v.强化防御，为…设防；加强，强化 | |
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accomplice
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| n.从犯，帮凶，同谋 | |
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hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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touching
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| adj.动人的，使人感伤的 | |
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besieging
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的现在分词 ) | |
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envoys
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| 使节( envoy的名词复数 )； 公使； 谈判代表； 使节身份 | |
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violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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banishment
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| n.放逐，驱逐 | |
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avert
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| v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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accusation
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| n.控告，指责，谴责 | |
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lawsuits
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| n.诉讼( lawsuit的名词复数 ) | |
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vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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besieged
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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stratagem
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| n.诡计，计谋 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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cession
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| n.割让，转让 | |
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concessions
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| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
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breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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ravage
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| vt.使...荒废，破坏...；n.破坏，掠夺，荒废 | |
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jointly
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| ad.联合地，共同地 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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81
accomplices
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| 从犯，帮凶，同谋( accomplice的名词复数 ) | |
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82
annoyance
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| n.恼怒，生气，烦恼 | |
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83
bent
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| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
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84
distressed
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| 痛苦的 | |
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85
spartan
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| adj.简朴的，刻苦的；n.斯巴达；斯巴达式的人 | |
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86
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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87
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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88
instigated
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| v.使（某事物）开始或发生，鼓动( instigate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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89
consultation
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| n.咨询；商量；商议；会议 | |
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90
embarked
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| 乘船( embark的过去式和过去分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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91
stint
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| v.节省，限制，停止；n.舍不得化，节约，限制；连续不断的一段时间从事某件事 | |
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92
oligarchies
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| n.寡头统治的政府( oligarchy的名词复数 )；寡头政治的执政集团；寡头统治的国家 | |
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93
exertion
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| n.尽力，努力 | |
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94
seduced
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| 诱奸( seduce的过去式和过去分词 )； 勾引； 诱使堕落； 使入迷 | |
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95
assassinated
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| v.暗杀( assassinate的过去式和过去分词 )；中伤；诋毁；破坏 | |
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obnoxious
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| adj.极恼人的，讨人厌的，可憎的 | |
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97
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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98
procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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99
impunity
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| n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
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100
juncture
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| n.时刻，关键时刻，紧要关头 | |
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101
commissioners
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| n.专员( commissioner的名词复数 )；长官；委员；政府部门的长官 | |
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102
indict
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| v.起诉，控告，指控 | |
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103
molest
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| vt.骚扰，干扰，调戏 | |
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104
tenure
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| n.终身职位；任期；(土地)保有权，保有期 | |
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chamber
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| n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所 | |
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convene
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| v.集合，召集，召唤，聚集，集合 | |
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107
ostensible
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| adj.(指理由)表面的，假装的 | |
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108
catastrophe
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| n.大灾难，大祸 | |
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109
contrive
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| vt.谋划，策划；设法做到；设计，想出 | |
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zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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unnaturally
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| adv.违反习俗地；不自然地；勉强地；不近人情地 | |
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112
deposition
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| n.免职，罢官；作证；沉淀；沉淀物 | |
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113
tyrants
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| 专制统治者( tyrant的名词复数 )； 暴君似的人； （古希腊的）僭主； 严酷的事物 | |
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114
ratified
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| v.批准，签认（合约等）( ratify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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115
demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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116
dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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117
dagger
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| n.匕首，短剑，剑号 | |
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118
concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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119
residue
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| n.残余，剩余，残渣 | |
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120
contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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imprisoning
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| v.下狱，监禁( imprison的现在分词 ) | |
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122
banishing
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| v.放逐，驱逐( banish的现在分词 ) | |
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123
tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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124
commotion
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| n.骚动，动乱 | |
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125
descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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126
disturbances
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| n.骚乱( disturbance的名词复数 )；打扰；困扰；障碍 | |
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127
disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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128
subdue
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| vt.制服，使顺从，征服；抑制，克制 | |
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129
defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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130
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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131
archers
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| n.弓箭手，射箭运动员( archer的名词复数 ) | |
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132
persevering
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| a.坚忍不拔的 | |
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133
reassure
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| v.使放心，使消除疑虑 | |
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134
salvation
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| n.（尤指基督）救世，超度，拯救，解困 | |
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135
conspiring
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| 密谋( conspire的现在分词 )； 搞阴谋； （事件等）巧合； 共同导致 | |
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136
conspiracy
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| n.阴谋，密谋，共谋 | |
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137
ostracized
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| v.放逐( ostracize的过去式和过去分词 )；流放；摈弃；排斥 | |
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138
unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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139
galley
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| n.（飞机或船上的）厨房单层甲板大帆船；军舰舰长用的大划艇； | |
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140
entreating
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| 恳求，乞求( entreat的现在分词 ) | |
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141
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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142
secrete
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| vt.分泌；隐匿，使隐秘 | |
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143
enacting
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| 制定（法律），通过（法案）( enact的现在分词 ) | |
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144
holders
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| 支持物( holder的名词复数 )； 持有者； （支票等）持有人； 支托（或握持）…之物 | |
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145
outraged
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| a.震惊的，义愤填膺的 | |
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146
prosecute
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| vt.告发；进行；vi.告发，起诉，作检察官 | |
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147
actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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148
deposed
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| v.罢免( depose的过去式和过去分词 )；（在法庭上）宣誓作证 | |
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149
seceding
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| v.脱离，退出( secede的现在分词 ) | |
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150
vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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151
sedition
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| n.煽动叛乱 | |
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152
nominal
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| adj.名义上的；(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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153
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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154
murmurs
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| n.低沉、连续而不清的声音( murmur的名词复数 )；低语声；怨言；嘀咕 | |
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155
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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156
thither
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| adv.向那里；adj.在那边的，对岸的 | |
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