To discover the legitimate1 objects to which the energies of State organizations should be directed, and define the limits within which those energies should be exercised, is the design of the following pages. That the solution of this prime question of political philosophy must be pregnant with interest and high practical importance is sufficiently2 evident; and if we compare the most remarkable3 political constitutions with each other, and with the opinions of the most eminent4 philosophers, we shall, with reason, be surprised to find it so insufficiently5 discussed and vaguely6 answered; and agree, that any attempt to prosecute7 the inquiry8 with more success, is far from being a vain and superfluous9 labour.
Those who have either themselves remodelled10 the framework of State constitutions, or proposed schemes of political reform, seem mostly to have studied how to apportion11 the respective provinces which the nation, and any of its separate elements, should justly share in the administration,—to assign the due functions of each in the governmental plan,—and to adopt the precautions necessary for preserving the integrity of the several interests at stake. But in every attempt to frame or reorganize a political constitution, there are two grand objects, it seems to me, to be distinctly kept in view, neither of which can be overlooked or made subordinate without serious injury to the common design; these are—first, to determine, as regards the nation in question, who shall govern, who shall be governed, and to arrange the actual working of the constituted power; and secondly12, to prescribe the exact sphere to which the government, once constructed, should extend or confine its operations. The latter object, which more immediately embraces the private life of the citizen, and more especially determines the limits of his free, spontaneous activity, is, strictly13 speaking, the true ultimate purpose; the former is only a necessary means for arriving at this important end. And yet, however strange it may appear, it is to the attainment14 of the first of these ends that man directs his most earnest attention; and, as it becomes us to show, this exclusive pursuit of one definite purpose only coincides with the usual manifestation16 of human activity. It is in the prosecution17 of some single object, and in striving to reach its accomplishment18 by the combined application of his moral and physical energies, that the true happiness of man, in his full vigour19 and development, consists. Possession, it is true, crowns exertion20 with repose21; but it is only in the illusions of fancy that it has power to charm our eyes. If we consider the position of man in the universe,—if we remember the constant tendency of his energies towards some definite activity, and recognize the influence of surrounding nature, which is ever provoking him to exertion, we shall be ready to acknowledge that repose and possession do not indeed exist but in imagination. Now the partial or one-sided man finds repose in the discontinuance of one line of action; and in him whose powers are wholly undeveloped, one single object only serves to elicit22 a few manifestations23 of energy. It may be well to observe, before deriving24 inferences from these general considerations on the usual tendency of man’s activity, that the dissatisfaction we notice as attendant on possession, does not at all apply to that ideal of human perfection which is conceivable by imagination; but it is true, in the fullest sense, of the wholly uncultured man, and proportionately true of every intermediate gradation between this utter want of culture and that ideal standard above mentioned. It would appear then, from these general characteristics of human nature, that to the conqueror25 his triumph affords a more exquisite26 sense of enjoyment27 than the actual occupation of the territory he has won, and that the perilous29 commotion30 of reformation itself is dearer to the reformer than the calm enjoyment of the fruits which crown its successful issue. And thus it is true, in general, that the exercise of dominion31 has something in it more immediately agreeable to human nature than the mere32 reposeful33 sense of freedom; or, at least, that the solicitude34 to secure freedom is a dearer satisfaction than that which is afforded by its actual possession. Freedom is but the possibility of a various and indefinite activity; while government, or the exercise of dominion, is a single, but yet real activity. The ardent35 desire for freedom, therefore, is at first only too frequently suggested by the deep-felt consciousness of its absence.
But whatever the natural course of political development may be, and whatever the relation between the desire for freedom and the excessive tendency to governmental activity, it is still evident that the inquiry into the proper aims and limits of State agency must be of the highest importance—nay, that it is perhaps more vitally momentous36 than any other political question. That such an investigation37 comprises the ultimate object of all political science, has been already pointed38 out; but it is a truth that admits also of extensive practical application. Real State revolutions, or fresh organizations of the governing power, are always attended in their progress with many concurrent39 and fortuitous circumstances, and necessarily entail40 more or less injury to different interests; whereas a sovereign power that is actually existing—whether it be democratic, aristocratic, or monarchical—can extend or restrict its sphere of action in silence and secresy, and, in general, attains41 its ends more surely, in proportion as it avoids startling innovations. Those processes of human agency advance most happily to their consummation, which most faithfully resemble the operations of the natural world. The tiny seed, for example, which drops into the awaiting soil, unseen and unheeded, brings forth42 a far richer and more genial43 blessing44 in its growth and germination45 than the violent eruption46 of a volcano, which, however necessary, is always attended with destruction; and, if we justly pride ourselves on our superior culture and enlightenment, there is no other system of reform so happily adapted, by its spirit of calm and consistent progression, to the capacities and requirements of our own times.
It may easily be foreseen, therefore, that the important inquiry into the due limits of State agency must conduct us to an ampler range of freedom for human forces, and a richer diversity of circumstances and situations. Now the possibility of any higher degree of freedom presupposes a proportionate advancement47 in civilization,—a decreasing necessity of acting48 in large, compacted masses,—a richer variety of resources in the individual agents. If, then, the present age in reality possesses this increased culture and this power and diversity of resources, the freedom of which these are the precious conditions should unquestionably be accorded it. And so its methods of reform would be happily correspondent with a progressive civilization—if we do not err28 in supposing this to be its favourable49 characteristic. Generally speaking, it is the drawn50 sword of the nation which checks and overawes the physical strength of its rulers; but in our case, culture and enlightenment serve no less effectually to sway their thoughts and subdue51 their will, so that the actual concessions52 of reform seem rather ascribable to them than to the nation. If even to behold53 a people breaking their fetters54 asunder55, in the full consciousness of their rights as men and citizens, is a beautiful and ennobling spectacle: it must be still more fair, and full of uplifting hope, to witness a prince himself unloosing the bonds of thraldom56 and granting freedom to his people,—nor this as the mere bounty57 of his gracious condescension58, but as the discharge of his first and most indispensable duty; for it is nobler to see an object effected through a reverent59 regard for law and order, than conceded to the imperious demands of absolute necessity; and the more so, when we consider that the freedom which a nation strives to attain15 through the overthrow60 of existing institutions, is but as hope to enjoyment, as preparation to perfection, when compared with that which a State, once constituted, can bestow61.
If we cast a glance at the history of political organizations, we shall find it difficult to decide, in the case of any one of them, the exact limits to which its activity was conformed, because we discover in none the systematic62 working out of any deliberate scheme, grounded on a certain basis of principle. We shall observe, that the freedom of the citizen has been limited from two points of view; that is, either from the necessity of organizing or securing the constitution, or from the expediency63 of providing for the moral and physical condition of the nation. These considerations have prevailed alternately, according as the constitution, in itself powerful, has required additional support, or as the views of the legislators have been more or less expanded. Often indeed both of these causes may be found operating conjointly. In the ancient States, almost all the institutions relating to the private life of the citizens were of a strictly political character. Possessed64, as it was, of but little absolute authority, the constitution was mainly dependent for its duration on the will of the nation, and hence it was necessary to discover or propose means by which due harmony might be preserved between the character of established institutions and this tendency of national feeling. The same policy is still observable in small republican States; and if we were to regard it in the light of these circumstances alone, we might accept it as true, that the freedom of private life always increases in exact proportion as public freedom declines; whereas security always keeps pace with the latter. It is true the ancient legislators very often, and the ancient philosophers invariably, directed their attention to the inner life of the individual; and, in their eyes, the moral worth of human nature seemed to deserve the highest regard: of this we have an illustration in Plato’s Republic, of which Rousseau has very truly observed that it has more the character of an educational than a political treatise65. Now if we compare the example of the most modern States, with regard to this tendency, we shall find the design of acting for the individual citizen, and of providing for his welfare, to be clear and unmistakable from the number of laws and institutions directed to this end, and which often give a very determinate form to private life. The superior internal consistency66 of our constitutions,—their greater independence of national character and feeling,—the deeper influence of mere thinkers, who are naturally disposed to more expanded views,—the multitude of inventions which teach us to follow out and improve the common objects of national activity; and lastly, and before all, certain ideas of religion which represent the governing power as responsible, to a certain extent, for the moral and future welfare of the citizens, have all contributed to introduce this change and develope this positive solicitude. But if we examine into the origin of particular institutions and police-laws, we find that they frequently originate in the real or pretended necessity of imposing67 taxes on the subject, and in this we may trace the example, it is true, to the political characteristics of the ancient States, inasmuch as such institutions grow out of the same desire of securing the constitution which we noticed in them. With respect to those limitations of freedom, however, which do not so much affect the State as the individuals who compose it, we are led to notice a vast difference between ancient and modern governments. The ancients devoted68 their attention more exclusively to the harmonious69 development of the individual man, as man; the moderns are chiefly solicitous70 about his comfort, his prosperity, his productiveness. The former looked to virtue71; the latter seek for happiness. And hence it follows, that the restrictions72 imposed on freedom in the ancient States were, in some important respects, more oppressive and dangerous than those which characterize our times. For they directly attacked that inner life of the soul, in which the individuality of human being essentially73 consists; and hence all the ancient nations betray a character of uniformity, which is not so much to be attributed to their want of higher refinement74 and more limited intercommunication, as to the systematic education of their youth in common (almost universal among them), and the designedly collective life of the citizens. But, in another point of view, it will be allowed that these ancient institutions contributed especially to preserve and elevate the vigorous activity of the individual man. The very desire which still animated75 all their political efforts, to train up temperate76 and nobleminded citizens, imparted a higher impulse to their whole spirit and character. With us, it is true, man is individually less restricted; but the influence of surrounding circumstances only the more operates to produce and continue a limiting agency,—a position, however, which does not preclude77 the possibility of beginning a conflict against these external hindrances78, with our own internal antagonistic79 strength. And yet the peculiar80 nature of the limitations imposed on freedom in our States; the fact that they regard rather what man possesses than what he really is, and that with respect to the latter they do not cultivate, even to uniformity, the physical, intellectual, and moral faculties81; and lastly and especially, the prevalence of certain determining ideas, more binding82 than laws, suppress those energies which are the source of every active virtue, and the indispensable condition of any higher and more various culture. With the ancients, moreover, the increase of force served to compensate83 for their uniformity; but with the moderns uniformity is aggravated84 by the evil of diminished energy. This difference between the States of antiquity85 and those of our own times, is in general thoroughly86 evident. Whilst in these later centuries, the rapid strides of progress, the number and dissemination87 of artistic88 inventions, and the enduring grandeur89 of establishments, especially attract our attention; antiquity captivates us above all by that inherent greatness which is comprised in the life of the individual, and perishes along with him,—the bloom of fancy, the depth of thought, the strength of will, the perfect oneness of the entire being, which alone confer true worth on human nature. Their strong consciousness of this essential worth of human nature, of its powers and their consistent development, was to them the quick impulse to every manifestation of activity; but these seem to us but as abstractions, in which the sense of the individual is lost, or at least in which his inner life is not so much regarded as his ease, his material comfort, his happiness. The ancients sought for happiness in virtue; the moderns have too long been endeavouring to develope the latter from the former;1 and even he2 who could conceive and portray90 morality in its purest form, thinks himself bound to supply happiness to his ideal of human nature through the medium of a highly artificial machinery91, and this rather as a reward from without, than as a boon92 obtained by man’s own exertions93. I need not trace any further the features of this striking difference, but will draw these hints to a conclusion with an illustrative passage from Aristotle’s Ethics:—“For that which peculiarly belongs to each by nature, is best and most pleasant to every one; and consequently, to man, the life according to intellect (is most pleasant), if intellect especially constitutes Man. This life therefore is the most happy3
It has been from time to time disputed by publicists, whether the State should provide for the security only, or for the whole physical and moral well-being94 of the nation. The vigilant95 solicitude for the freedom of private life has in general led to the former proposition; while the idea that the State can bestow something more than mere security, and that the injurious limitation of liberty, although a possible, is not an essential, consequence of such a policy, has disposed many to the latter opinion. And this belief has undoubtedly96 prevailed, not only in political theory, but in actual practice. Ample evidence of this is to be found in most of the systems of political jurisprudence, in the more recent philosophical97 codes, and in the history of Constitutions generally. The introduction of these principles has given a new form to the study of politics (as is shown for instance by so many recent financial and legislative98 theories), and has produced many new departments of administration, as boards of trade, finance, and national economy. But, however generally these principles may be accepted, they still appear to me to require a more radical99 investigation; and this can only proceed from a view of human nature in the abstract, and of the highest ends of human existence.
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legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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eminent
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| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
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insufficiently
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| adv.不够地，不能胜任地 | |
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vaguely
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| adv.含糊地，暖昧地 | |
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prosecute
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| vt.告发；进行；vi.告发，起诉，作检察官 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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remodelled
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| v.改变…的结构[形状]( remodel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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apportion
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| vt.（按比例或计划）分配 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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attainment
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| n.达到，到达；［常pl.］成就，造诣 | |
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attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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manifestation
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| n.表现形式；表明；现象 | |
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prosecution
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| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
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accomplishment
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| n.完成，成就，（pl.）造诣，技能 | |
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vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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exertion
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| n.尽力，努力 | |
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repose
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| v.(使)休息；n.安息 | |
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elicit
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| v.引出,抽出,引起 | |
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manifestations
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| n.表示，显示（manifestation的复数形式） | |
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deriving
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| v.得到( derive的现在分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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conqueror
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| n.征服者，胜利者 | |
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exquisite
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| adj.精美的；敏锐的；剧烈的，感觉强烈的 | |
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enjoyment
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| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
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err
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| vi.犯错误，出差错 | |
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perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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commotion
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| n.骚动，动乱 | |
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dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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reposeful
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| adj.平稳的，沉着的 | |
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solicitude
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| n.焦虑 | |
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ardent
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，强烈的，烈性的 | |
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momentous
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| adj.重要的，重大的 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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concurrent
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| adj.同时发生的，一致的 | |
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entail
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| vt.使承担，使成为必要，需要 | |
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attains
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的第三人称单数 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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genial
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| adj.亲切的，和蔼的，愉快的，脾气好的 | |
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blessing
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| n.祈神赐福；祷告；祝福，祝愿 | |
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germination
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| n.萌芽，发生；萌发；生芽；催芽 | |
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eruption
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| n.火山爆发；（战争等）爆发；（疾病等）发作 | |
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advancement
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| n.前进，促进，提升 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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subdue
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| vt.制服，使顺从，征服；抑制，克制 | |
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concessions
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| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
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behold
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| v.看，注视，看到 | |
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fetters
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| n.脚镣( fetter的名词复数 )；束缚v.给…上脚镣，束缚( fetter的第三人称单数 ) | |
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asunder
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| adj.分离的，化为碎片 | |
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thraldom
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| n.奴隶的身份，奴役，束缚 | |
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bounty
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| n.慷慨的赠予物，奖金；慷慨，大方；施与 | |
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condescension
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| n.自以为高人一等，贬低(别人) | |
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reverent
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| adj.恭敬的，虔诚的 | |
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overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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bestow
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| v.把…赠与，把…授予；花费 | |
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systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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expediency
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| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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consistency
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| n.一贯性，前后一致，稳定性；(液体的)浓度 | |
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imposing
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| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
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devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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harmonious
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| adj.和睦的，调和的，和谐的，协调的 | |
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solicitous
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| adj.热切的，挂念的 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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refinement
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| n.文雅；高尚；精美；精制；精炼 | |
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animated
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| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
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temperate
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| adj.温和的，温带的，自我克制的，不过分的 | |
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preclude
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| vt.阻止，排除，防止；妨碍 | |
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hindrances
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| 阻碍者( hindrance的名词复数 )； 障碍物； 受到妨碍的状态 | |
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antagonistic
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| adj.敌对的 | |
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80
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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81
faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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compensate
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| vt.补偿，赔偿；酬报 vi.弥补；补偿；抵消 | |
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84
aggravated
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| 使恶化( aggravate的过去式和过去分词 )； 使更严重； 激怒； 使恼火 | |
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85
antiquity
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| n.古老；高龄；古物，古迹 | |
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86
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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87
dissemination
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| 传播,宣传,传染(病毒) | |
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88
artistic
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| adj.艺术(家)的，美术(家)的；善于艺术创作的 | |
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89
grandeur
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| n.伟大，崇高，宏伟，庄严，豪华 | |
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portray
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| v.描写，描述；画(人物、景象等) | |
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machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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boon
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| n.恩赐，恩物，恩惠 | |
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exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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94
well-being
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| n.安康，安乐，幸福 | |
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95
vigilant
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| adj.警觉的，警戒的，警惕的 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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98
legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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