amelioration of morals.
The last means which States are wont1 to employ, in order to reform the moral condition of the nation correspondently with their design of maintaining security, is the influence of special laws and enactments2. But as these cannot be made to induce any direct disposition3 towards virtue4 and morality, it manifestly follows that special provisions of this nature can do nothing more than prohibit particular actions of the citizens, or mark out those which, without directly infringing5 on the rights of others, are either positively6 immoral7 or are likely to lead to immorality8.
To this class of institutions all sumptuary laws especially belong. For, it is evident, there is no such common and fruitful source of immoral, and even lawless actions, as an excessive propensity9 of the soul towards the sensual, or the disproportion subsisting11 between desires and impulses in general, and the powers of satisfaction which the external position affords. When there exists a general spirit of continence and moderation, which serves to reconcile men to their allotted12 sphere, they are not so strongly impelled13 to transgress14 its limits to the infraction15 of another’s rights, or, at least, to do anything likely to disturb their own happiness and contentment.
Hence it would seem to be strictly16 consistent with the true end of the State, to confine sensualism within due bounds, since it is the essential source from which all collisions between man and man proceed (for that in which the spiritual prevails can always, and in all cases, subsist10 in harmony); and further, because it would appear the simplest and easiest method of effecting that object, it might be argued that the State should endeavour, as far as possible, to suppress sensualism altogether.
Still, to adhere faithfully to the principle which has hitherto guided us in this investigation17—viz. first of all to regard any proposed means of State agency in the light of man’s true and unmistakable interests,—it becomes us to inquire into the influence of sensualism on human life, development, activity, and happiness, so far as concerns our present purpose; and while such an investigation will naturally lead us to portray18 the innermost nature of the acting19 and enjoying man, it will serve at the same time to illustrate20 more graphically21 the hurtful or beneficial consequences which flow in general from restrictions23 imposed on freedom. It is only after such a radical24 inquiry25 that we can be in a position to decide as to the State’s competence26 to act positively on morals, and so arrive at the solution of this part of the general question we have proposed.
The impressions, inclinations27, and passions which have their immediate29 source in the senses, are those which first and most violently manifest themselves in human nature. Wherever, before the refining influences of culture have imparted a new direction to the soul’s energies, these impressions, etc., do not show themselves, all seeds of power have perished, and nothing either good or great can take root and flourish. They constitute the great original source of all spontaneous activity, and first inspire a glowing, genial30 warmth in human nature. They infuse life and elastic31 vigour32 into the soul: when unsatisfied, they render it active, buoyant, ingenious in the invention of schemes, and courageous33 in their execution; when satisfied, they promote an easy and unhindered play of ideas. In general, they animate34 and quicken all conceptions with a greater and more varied35 activity, suggest new views, point out hitherto unnoticed aspects, and, according to the manner in which they are satisfied, intimately react on the physical organization, which in its turn acts upon the soul, although we only notice how from the results.
The influence, however, of these impressions and inclinations differs, not only in its intensity36, but in the manner of its operation. This is, to a certain extent, owing to their strength or weakness; but it is also partly to be attributed to their degree of affinity37 with the spiritual element in human nature, or from the difficulty or facility of raising them from mere38 animal gratifications to human pleasures. Thus, for instance, the eye imparts to the substance of its impressions that outline of form which is so full of enjoyment39 and fertile in ideas; while the ear lends to sound the proportionate succession of tones in the order of time. The nature of these impressions readily suggests many interesting reflections, if this were the proper place for such a topic, but I will only pause to notice their different importance as regards the culture of the soul.
The eye supplies the reason, so to speak, with a more prepared substance; and the inner part of our nature, with its own form and that of other things which stand in a relation to it, is thus presented to us in a single and distinct situation. If we conceive of the ear merely as an organ of sense, and in so far as it does not receive and communicate words, it conveys far less distinctness of impression. And it is for this reason that Kant assigns the preference to the plastic arts when compared with music. But he observes that the culture secured to the soul by the several arts, (and I would add, directly secured,) is presupposed as a scale for determining this preference.
The question, however, presents itself whether this scale of previous culture is the just standard of appreciation40. Energy appears to me to be the first and chiefest of human virtues41. Whatever exalts42 our energy is of greater worth than aught that merely puts materials into our hands for its exercise. Now, as it is characteristic of man’s nature to perceive only one thing at once, that will most affect it which represents only one object at one time; and as, in a series of successive sensations, each possesses a certain degree which is produced by all the preceding sensations, and acts upon all those which follow it, that series will have the greatest effect in which the single parts consist together in a perfectly44 similar relation. Now all this is true of music. The exact sequence of time, moreover, is its peculiar45 and essential property; this is all that is decided46 in it. The series which it presents but feebly impels47 us to any definite sensation. It gives us a theme, to which we can supply infinite texts; and that which the hearer really interweaves with this basis, in so far as he is, in general, congenially disposed, springs up freely and naturally from the very fulness of his soul; and the latter more readily and eagerly embraces it than anything else that is actually supplied or intruded48 on our sensations, which often engrosses49 us more from its being perceived rather than felt. As it does not belong to me to examine the nature and properties of music, I will not stay to observe its other striking characteristics, such as that it evokes50 tones from natural objects, and therein keeps closer to nature than painting, sculpture, or poetry. I only wished, in introducing it, to illustrate more clearly the different character of sensuous51 impressions.
But the manner of influence just described, is not peculiar to music alone. Kant1 observes it to be possible with a union of shifting colours, and it characterizes still more remarkably52 the impressions we receive from the sense of touch. Even in taste it is unmistakable. In taste, also, there are different gradations of satisfaction, which, as it were, long to be resolved, and disappear, after the solution, in a series of diminishing vibrations53. This influence may be least noticeable, perhaps, in the sense of smell. Now, as in the sensitive man it is the progress of sensation, its degree, its ranging increase and decrease, its pure and perfect harmony, which chiefly engage us, and indeed are more really attractive than the substance itself (forgetting, as we do, that the nature of the substance mainly determines the degree, and still more, the harmony of the progression); and further, as the sensitive man, like the image of spring teeming54 with blossoms, is the spectacle which is above all others the most fascinating; so also, in the fine arts, it is this image of his sensations which man especially strives to discover. And thus it is that painting and sculpture appropriate it to themselves. The eye of Guido Reni’s Madonna is not confined in its expression to the limits of a single, fleeting55 glance. The tense and straining muscles of the Borghisian Gladiator foretell56 the blow he is about to deal. In a still higher degree does poetry employ this image. And, to make my idea clearer, without wishing to direct especial attention to the comparative excellence57 of the fine arts, I would observe that they exercise their influence in two ways, and while these are shared by each, we find them combined in very different manner. They immediately convey ideas, or they excite sensations, thus attuning58 the soul to an internal harmony, and enriching and exalting59 its powers. Now, in proportion as one of these sources of influence borrows aid from the other, it weakens the force of its own peculiar impression. Poetry unites both in the highest degree, and it is therefore, in this respect, the most perfect of all the fine arts; but when we regard it in another light, it is also the most weak and imperfect. While it represents its objects less vividly60 than painting and sculpture, it does not address itself so impressively to sensation as song and music. But, not to speak of that many-sidedness which so especially characterizes poetry, we are ready to overlook this imperfection when we perceive that it is nearest to the true internal nature of man, since it clothes not only thought, but sensation, with the most delicate veil.
But to continue, the energizing61 sensuous impressions (for I only refer to the arts by way of illustrating62 these) act in different ways; this is partly owing to the fact that their progression is more rhythmically63 proportional, and partly that the elements of the impressions themselves, or their substance, as it were, more violently affects the soul. Thus it is that the human voice, of equal melodiousness64 and quality, affects us more powerfully than a lifeless instrument. For nothing is ever so near to us as the personal, physical feeling; and where this feeling is itself called into play, the effect produced is the greatest. But here, as always, the disproportionate power of the substance suppresses, as it were, the delicacy65 of the form; and there must always exist a just relation between these. Wherever there is such a misproportion, the proper equilibrium66 can be restored by increasing the power of the weaker, or diminishing that of the stronger element. But it is always wrong to effect anything by weakening or diminution67, unless the power reduced be not natural, but artificial; only when this is the case should any limitation be imposed. It is better that it should destroy itself than slowly die away. But I may not dwell longer on this subject. I hope to have sufficiently68 elucidated69 my idea, although I would fain avow70 the embarrassment71 under which I necessarily labour in this inquiry; for, as the interesting nature of the subject, and the impossibility of borrowing from other writers just those results which were necessary (as I know of none who proceed exactly from the same point of view), invited me, on the one hand, to expatiate72 at somewhat greater length; on the other, the reflection that these considerations do not strictly belong to this subject, but are only subordinate lemmas, served to recall me within my appropriate limits. I have only to request that such a difficulty be not forgotten, in regard to my subsequent observations.
Although it is impossible to abstract the subject completely, I have endeavoured hitherto to confine my remarks to sensuous impressions only as such. But the sensual and spiritual are linked together by a mysterious bond, of which our hearts are distinctly conscious, though it remains73 hidden from our eyes. To this double nature of the visible and invisible world—to the deep-implanted longing74 for the latter, coupled with the feeling of the sweet necessity of the former, we owe all sound and logical systems of philosophy, truly based on the immutable75 principles of our nature, just as to the same source we are able to trace the most visionary and incoherent reveries. A constant endeavour to unite these two elements, so that each may rob as little as possible from the other, has always seemed to me the true end of wisdom. This ?sthetic feeling, in virtue of which the sensuous is to us a veil of the spiritual, and the spiritual the living principle of the world of sense, is everywhere unmistakable. The continual contemplation of this “physiognomy” of nature forms the true man. For nothing exercises such a vast influence on the whole character, as the expression of the spiritual in the sensuous,—of the sublime76, the simple, the beautiful in all the works of nature and products of art which surround us. Here, too, we find the difference manifested between the energizing and other sensuous impressions. If the ultimate object of all our mortal striving is solely77 to discover, nourish, and re-create what truly exists in ourselves and others, although in its original for ever invisible,—if it is the intuitive anticipation78 of this which so endears and consecrates79 each of its symbols in our eyes, then the nearer do we approach to this original essence in contemplating80 the image of its restlessly-impellent energy. We commune with it in a language which is indeed difficult, and often misinterpreted, but which often startles us with the surest gleams and premonitions of truth, whilst the form and image of that energy are still more remote from that truth which we thus guess at.
This is the peculiar soil, moreover, on which the beautiful springs up and flourishes, and still more especially the sublime, which brings us yet nearer to Deity81. The necessity for some purer satisfaction, far removed in its objects from all preconceived design and without conception, points out to man his descent from the invisible; and the feeling of his utter inadequateness to the surpassing fulness of the object, blends together, in a union at once the most human and divine, infinite greatness with the most devoted83 humility84. Were it not for his feeling for the beautiful, man would cease to love things for their own sake; were it not for the sublime, he would lose that sense of dutiful submission85 which disdains86 every recompense, and ignores unworthy fear. The study of the beautiful bestows87 taste; that of the sublime (if it also may be studied, and the feeling and representation of it is not the fruit of genius) brings justly-balanced greatness. But taste alone, which must always repose88 on greatness as its basis (since it is only the great which requires measure, and only the powerful, composure), blends all the tones of a perfectly-adjusted being into exquisite89 harmony. It induces in all our impressions, even those which are purely90 spiritual, something so concordant, so composed, so concentrated into one focal point. Where taste is wanting, sensual desire is rude and unrestrained; and although without it, scientific inquiries91 may be both acute and profound, there is no refinement92, no polish, nothing fruitful in their application. In general, where there is no taste, the greatest depth of thought and the noblest treasures of wisdom are barren and lifeless, and even the sublime strength of the moral will is shorn of all its graceful93 and genial blessing94.
To inquire and to create;—these are the grand centres around which all human pursuits revolve95, or at least to these objects do they all more or less directly refer. Before inquiry can fathom96 the very essence of things, or penetrate97 to the limits of reason, it presupposes, in addition to profundity98, a rich diversity and genial warmth of soul—the harmonious99 exertion100 of all the human faculties101 combined. It is the analytical102 philosopher alone, perhaps, who is able to arrive at his results through the calm, but cold processes of reason. But real depth of thought and a mind which has found means to cultivate all its powers to an equal degree of perfection, are essentially103 necessary to discover the link which unites synthetical104 principles. Thus Kant, who, it may be truly said, was never surpassed in profoundness, will often be charged with a kind of dreamy enthusiasm when treating of morals or ?sthetics, and has indeed been so accused; but while I am willing to confess that there are passages (as, for example, his interpretation105 of the prismatic colours2 ) which, though rare, appear to indicate something of this nature, I am only led to deplore106 my own want of intellectual depth. To follow these ideas out, would naturally lead us to that difficult but interesting inquiry into the essential difference between the metaphysician and the poet. And if a thorough re-investigation of this were not to reverse, perhaps, my previous conclusions, I would limit my definition of the difference to this, that the philosopher concerns himself with perceptions alone, and the poet, on the contrary, with sensations; while both require the same measure and cultivation107 of mental power. But to establish this would lead me too far astray from my immediate subject, and I trust to have shown already, by my previous arguments, that, even to form the calmest thinker, the pleasures of sense and fancy must have often played around the soul. But to pass from transcendental to psychological inquiries (where man as he appears is the object of our studies), would not he explore most deeply the genus which is richest in forms, and represent it most truly and vividly, to whose own sensations the fewest of these forms are strange?
Hence it is that the man who is thus developed displays the full beauty of his character when he enters into practical life—when, externally and internally, he enriches with a thousand new creations that which he has received. The analogy between the laws of plastic nature and those of intellectual creation, has been already noticed by a mind3 of singular power of penetration108, and established by striking proofs. But perhaps his exposition would have been still more interesting, and psychology109 enriched with the results of a more extended knowledge, if, instead of inquiring into the inscrutable development of the germ, the process of intellectual creation had been shown to be, as it were, the more exquisite flower and ethereal beauty of the corporeal110.
To extend our remarks:—with respect to the moral life, to that which seems to be the especial province of cold, abstract reason, we would observe that the idea of the sublime alone enables us to obey absolute and unconditional111 laws, at once humanly, through the medium of feeling, and divinely and disinterestedly112, through the utter absence of all ulterior reference to happiness or misfortune. The feeling of the insufficiency of human strength to the full performance of the moral law, the profound consciousness that the most virtuous113 is he only who feels most inly how unattainably high the law is exalted114 above him, tend to inspire awe—a sensation which seems to be no more shrouded115 in a corporeal veil than is necessary not to dazzle our eyes by the full and immediate splendour. Now, when the moral law obliges us to regard every man as an end to himself, it becomes blended with that feeling for the beautiful which loves to animate the merest clay, that even in it, it may rejoice in an individual existence, and which receives and enfolds man all the more completely and lovingly in that it is independent of conception, and is not therefore limited to the few characteristics, which, though separate and single, are yet all that conception can embrace.
The union with the feeling for the beautiful seems as if it would impair116 the purity of the moral will, and it might, and indeed would, have this effect, if this feeling itself were to become the sole motive117 to morality. But it will only claim the duty of discovering those more varied applications of the moral law which would otherwise escape the cold, and hence in such cases, ruder processes of reason; and since we are not forbidden to receive happiness in such intimate union with virtue, but only to barter118 virtue for this happiness, it will also enjoy the privilege of bestowing119 on human nature its sweetest and dearest feelings. In general, the more I reflect on this subject, the less does this difference to which I refer appear to be either subtle or fanciful. However eagerly man may strive to grasp at enjoyment—however he may try to represent to himself a constant union subsisting between happiness and virtue, even under the most unfavourable circumstances, his soul still remains alive to the grandeur120 of the moral law. He cannot screen himself from the influence and authority of this imposing121 grandeur over his actions, and it is only from being penetrated122 with a sense of it, that he acts without reference to enjoyment; for he never loses the consciousness that no misfortune whatever would compel him to adopt another behaviour.
It is, however, true that the soul only acquires this strength in a way similar to that we before described—only by a mighty123 internal pressure, and a manifold external struggle. But strength properly branches out, like its substance, from man’s sensuous nature; and however seemingly remote, still reposes124 on that as its central stem. Now he who ceaselessly strives to exalt43 his faculties, and to infuse into them new youth and vigour by frequent enjoyment; who often calls in his strength of character to aid him in asserting his independence of sensualism, while he endeavours to combine this independence with the most exquisite susceptibility; whose deep unerring sense unweariedly searches after the truth; whose just and delicate feeling for the beautiful leaves no attractive form unnoticed; whose impulse to receive into himself his external perceptions, and to impregnate them with new issues—to transform all shapes of beauty into his own individuality, and fuse into each his entire being,—strives to generate new forms of beauty;—such a one may cherish the consoling consciousness that he is in the true path to approach that ideal which even the boldest flight of fancy has ventured to point out to human aspirations126.
I have in this brief sketch127 endeavoured to show how intimately sensualism, with all its beneficial consequences, is interwoven with the whole tissue of human life and pursuits. Although such a topic is in itself somewhat foreign to a political essay, it was appropriate and even necessary in the order of ideas adopted in this inquiry; and in these remarks on sensualism, I designed to advocate the justice of extending an ampler degree of freedom towards its manifestations128, and of regarding its important influences with greater respect. Still, I would not blind myself to the fact that sensualism is also the immediate source of innumerable physical and moral evils. Even morally speaking, it is only beneficial in its operation when it subsists129 in a just relationship with the exercise of the mental faculties; it acquires a hurtful preponderance with a dangerous facility. When once the equilibrium is destroyed, human pleasure becomes degraded to mere animal gratification, and taste disappears, or becomes distorted into unnatural130 directions. At the same time, I would make the reservation with regard to this last expression, and chiefly with reference to certain one-sided opinions, that we are not to condemn131 anything as unnatural which does not exactly fulfil this or that purpose of nature, but only whatever frustrates132 its general ultimate design with regard to man. Now this is, that his nature should always be developing itself to higher degrees of perfection, and hence, especially, that his thinking and susceptive powers should always be indissolubly united in just and proportionate degrees of strength. But again, a misrelation may arise between the process and order in which a man developes and manifests his powers, and the means of action and enjoyment afforded by his peculiar position; and this misrelation is a fresh source of evil. Now, according to our former principles, the State may not attempt to act upon the citizen’s peculiar condition with any reference to positive ends. Under such a negative policy, therefore, this condition of the citizen would not acquire so definite and constrained133 a form, and its greater freedom (coupled with the fact that it would be chiefly influenced and directed in that freedom by the citizen’s own ways of thinking and acting) would already operate to lessen134 and remove that misrelation. Still, the fact that, even under such a supposition, the original danger would remain—a danger which is far from being unimportant or imaginary—might suggest the necessity of checking and opposing the corruption135 of morals by laws and State institutions.
But even granting that such laws and institutions were effectual, their hurtfulness would keep pace with their activity. A State, in which the citizens were compelled or actuated by such means to obey even the best of laws, might be a tranquil136, peaceable, prosperous State; but it would always seem to me a multitude of well cared-for slaves, rather than a nation of free and independent men, with no restraint save such as was required to prevent any infringements137 on right. There are, doubtless, many methods of producing given actions and sentiments only; but none of these lead to true moral perfection. Sensual impulses, urging to the commission of certain actions, or the continuing necessity of refraining from these, gradually come to engender138 a habit; through the force of habit the satisfaction which was at first connected with these impulses alone, is transferred to the action itself; the inclination28, which at first only slumbered139 under the pressure of necessity, becomes wholly stifled140; and thus man may be led to keep his actions within the limits of virtue, and to a certain extent to entertain virtuous sentiments. But neither is his spiritual energy exalted by such a process, nor his views of his destination and his own worth made clearer, nor does his will gain greater power to conquer the dictates141 of his rebellious142 desires; and hence, he does not advance a single step towards true, actual perfection. They, therefore, who would pursue the task of developing man without any reference to external ends will never make use of such inadequate82 means. For, setting aside the fact that coercion143 and guidance can never succeed in producing virtue, they manifestly tend to weaken power; and what are tranquil order and outward morality without true moral strength and virtue? Moreover, however great an evil immorality may be, we must not forget that it is not without its beneficial consequences. It is only through extremes that men can arrive at the middle path of wisdom and virtue. Extremes, like large masses shining afar off, must operate at a distance. In order that blood be supplied to the most delicate ramifications144 of the arteries145, there must be copious146 sources in the larger vessels147. To wish to disturb the order of nature in these respects, is to acquiesce148 in a moral, in order to prevent a physical evil.
Moreover, I think we err125 in supposing that the danger of immorality is either so great or so urgent; and while much that I have said tends more or less to establish this, the following conclusions may serve to give it additional confirmation:—
Man is naturally more disposed to beneficent than selfish actions. This we learn even from the history of savages149. The domestic virtues have something in them so inviting150 and genial, and the public virtues of the citizen something so grand and inspiring, that even he who is barely uncorrupted, is seldom able to resist their charm.
Freedom exalts power; and, as is always the collateral151 effect of increasing strength, tends to induce a spirit of liberality. Coercion stifles152 power, and engenders153 all selfish desires, and all the mean artifices154 of weakness. Coercion may prevent many transgressions155; but it robs even actions which are legal of a portion of their beauty. Freedom may lead to many transgressions, but it lends even to vices156 a less ignoble157 form.
The man who is abandoned to himself arrives with greater difficulty at just principles; but they manifest themselves ineffaceably in his actions. He who is designedly guided, receives such principles with greater facility; but still they give way before his energies, however much enfeebled.
All political arrangements, in that they have to bring a variety of widely-discordant interests into unity158 and harmony, necessarily occasion manifold collisions. From these collisions spring misproportions between men’s desires and their powers; and from these, transgressions. The more active the State is, the greater is the number of these. If it were possible to make an accurate calculation of the evils which police regulations occasion, and of those which they prevent, the number of the former would, in all cases, exceed that of the latter.
How far the strictest search into crimes actually committed, the infliction159 of just, well-measured, but irremissible punishment, and the consequent rareness of moral impunity160, are really practicable, has never yet been duly tried.
I have now sufficiently shown, according to my views, how questionable161 is every effort of the State to oppose or even to prevent any dissoluteness of morals (in so far as it does not imply injury to individual rights); how few are the beneficial results to be expected from such attempts, as regards morality; and how the exercise of such an influence on the character of a nation, is not even necessary for the preservation162 of security.
If now, in addition to this, we bring forward the principles before unfolded, which disapprove163 of all State agency directed to positive aims, and which apply here with especial force, since it is precisely164 the moral man who feels every restriction22 most deeply; reflecting, further, that if there is one aspect of development more than any other which owes its highest beauty to freedom, this is precisely the culture of character and morals; then the justice of the following principle will be sufficiently manifest, viz. that the State must wholly refrain from every attempt to operate directly or indirectly165 on the morals and character of the nation, otherwise than as such a policy may become inevitable166 as a natural consequence of its other absolutely necessary measures; and that everything calculated to promote such a design, and particularly all special supervision167 of education, religion, sumptuary laws, etc., lies wholly outside the limits of its legitimate168 activity.
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wont
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adj.习惯于;v.习惯;n.习惯 | |
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enactments
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n.演出( enactment的名词复数 );展现;规定;通过 | |
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disposition
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n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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virtue
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n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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infringing
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v.违反(规章等)( infringe的现在分词 );侵犯(某人的权利);侵害(某人的自由、权益等) | |
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positively
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adv.明确地,断然,坚决地;实在,确实 | |
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immoral
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adj.不道德的,淫荡的,荒淫的,有伤风化的 | |
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immorality
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n. 不道德, 无道义 | |
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propensity
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n.倾向;习性 | |
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subsist
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vi.生存,存在,供养 | |
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subsisting
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v.(靠很少的钱或食物)维持生活,生存下去( subsist的现在分词 ) | |
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allotted
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分配,拨给,摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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impelled
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v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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transgress
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vt.违反,逾越 | |
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infraction
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n.违反;违法 | |
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strictly
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adv.严厉地,严格地;严密地 | |
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investigation
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n.调查,调查研究 | |
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portray
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v.描写,描述;画(人物、景象等) | |
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acting
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n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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illustrate
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v.举例说明,阐明;图解,加插图 | |
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graphically
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adv.通过图表;生动地,轮廓分明地 | |
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restriction
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n.限制,约束 | |
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restrictions
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约束( restriction的名词复数 ); 管制; 制约因素; 带限制性的条件(或规则) | |
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radical
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n.激进份子,原子团,根号;adj.根本的,激进的,彻底的 | |
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inquiry
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n.打听,询问,调查,查问 | |
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26
competence
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n.能力,胜任,称职 | |
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inclinations
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倾向( inclination的名词复数 ); 倾斜; 爱好; 斜坡 | |
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inclination
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n.倾斜;点头;弯腰;斜坡;倾度;倾向;爱好 | |
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immediate
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adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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30
genial
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adj.亲切的,和蔼的,愉快的,脾气好的 | |
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elastic
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n.橡皮圈,松紧带;adj.有弹性的;灵活的 | |
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vigour
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(=vigor)n.智力,体力,精力 | |
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33
courageous
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adj.勇敢的,有胆量的 | |
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animate
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v.赋于生命,鼓励;adj.有生命的,有生气的 | |
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varied
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adj.多样的,多变化的 | |
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36
intensity
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n.强烈,剧烈;强度;烈度 | |
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37
affinity
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n.亲和力,密切关系 | |
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mere
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adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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39
enjoyment
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n.乐趣;享有;享用 | |
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40
appreciation
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n.评价;欣赏;感谢;领会,理解;价格上涨 | |
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41
virtues
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美德( virtue的名词复数 ); 德行; 优点; 长处 | |
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42
exalts
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赞扬( exalt的第三人称单数 ); 歌颂; 提升; 提拔 | |
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43
exalt
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v.赞扬,歌颂,晋升,提升 | |
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44
perfectly
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adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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45
peculiar
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adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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decided
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adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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47
impels
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v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的第三人称单数 ) | |
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48
intruded
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n.侵入的,推进的v.侵入,侵扰,打扰( intrude的过去式和过去分词 );把…强加于 | |
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49
engrosses
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v.使全神贯注( engross的第三人称单数 ) | |
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50
evokes
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产生,引起,唤起( evoke的第三人称单数 ) | |
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51
sensuous
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adj.激发美感的;感官的,感觉上的 | |
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52
remarkably
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ad.不同寻常地,相当地 | |
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53
vibrations
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n.摆动( vibration的名词复数 );震动;感受;(偏离平衡位置的)一次性往复振动 | |
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54
teeming
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adj.丰富的v.充满( teem的现在分词 );到处都是;(指水、雨等)暴降;倾注 | |
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55
fleeting
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adj.短暂的,飞逝的 | |
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56
foretell
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v.预言,预告,预示 | |
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57
excellence
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n.优秀,杰出,(pl.)优点,美德 | |
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58
attuning
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v.使协调( attune的现在分词 );调音 | |
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59
exalting
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a.令人激动的,令人喜悦的 | |
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60
vividly
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adv.清楚地,鲜明地,生动地 | |
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61
energizing
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v.给予…精力,能量( energize的现在分词 );使通电 | |
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62
illustrating
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给…加插图( illustrate的现在分词 ); 说明; 表明; (用示例、图画等)说明 | |
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63
rhythmically
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adv.有节奏地 | |
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64
melodiousness
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n.melodious(音调悦耳的)的变形 | |
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65
delicacy
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n.精致,细微,微妙,精良;美味,佳肴 | |
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66
equilibrium
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n.平衡,均衡,相称,均势,平静 | |
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67
diminution
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n.减少;变小 | |
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68
sufficiently
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adv.足够地,充分地 | |
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69
elucidated
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v.阐明,解释( elucidate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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70
avow
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v.承认,公开宣称 | |
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71
embarrassment
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n.尴尬;使人为难的人(事物);障碍;窘迫 | |
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72
expatiate
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v.细说,详述 | |
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73
remains
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n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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74
longing
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n.(for)渴望 | |
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75
immutable
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adj.不可改变的,永恒的 | |
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76
sublime
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adj.崇高的,伟大的;极度的,不顾后果的 | |
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77
solely
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adv.仅仅,唯一地 | |
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78
anticipation
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n.预期,预料,期望 | |
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79
consecrates
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n.把…奉为神圣,给…祝圣( consecrate的名词复数 );奉献v.把…奉为神圣,给…祝圣( consecrate的第三人称单数 );奉献 | |
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80
contemplating
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深思,细想,仔细考虑( contemplate的现在分词 ); 注视,凝视; 考虑接受(发生某事的可能性); 深思熟虑,沉思,苦思冥想 | |
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81
deity
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n.神,神性;被奉若神明的人(或物) | |
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82
inadequate
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adj.(for,to)不充足的,不适当的 | |
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83
devoted
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adj.忠诚的,忠实的,热心的,献身于...的 | |
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84
humility
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n.谦逊,谦恭 | |
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85
submission
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n.服从,投降;温顺,谦虚;提出 | |
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86
disdains
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鄙视,轻蔑( disdain的名词复数 ) | |
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87
bestows
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赠给,授予( bestow的第三人称单数 ) | |
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88
repose
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v.(使)休息;n.安息 | |
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89
exquisite
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adj.精美的;敏锐的;剧烈的,感觉强烈的 | |
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90
purely
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adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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91
inquiries
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n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 );疑问;探究;打听 | |
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92
refinement
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n.文雅;高尚;精美;精制;精炼 | |
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93
graceful
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adj.优美的,优雅的;得体的 | |
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94
blessing
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n.祈神赐福;祷告;祝福,祝愿 | |
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95
revolve
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vi.(使)旋转;循环出现 | |
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96
fathom
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v.领悟,彻底了解 | |
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97
penetrate
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v.透(渗)入;刺入,刺穿;洞察,了解 | |
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98
profundity
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n.渊博;深奥,深刻 | |
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99
harmonious
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adj.和睦的,调和的,和谐的,协调的 | |
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100
exertion
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n.尽力,努力 | |
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101
faculties
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n.能力( faculty的名词复数 );全体教职员;技巧;院 | |
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102
analytical
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adj.分析的;用分析法的 | |
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103
essentially
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adv.本质上,实质上,基本上 | |
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104
synthetical
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adj.综合的,合成的 | |
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105
interpretation
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n.解释,说明,描述;艺术处理 | |
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106
deplore
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vt.哀叹,对...深感遗憾 | |
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107
cultivation
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n.耕作,培养,栽培(法),养成 | |
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108
penetration
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n.穿透,穿人,渗透 | |
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109
psychology
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n.心理,心理学,心理状态 | |
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110
corporeal
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adj.肉体的,身体的;物质的 | |
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111
unconditional
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adj.无条件的,无限制的,绝对的 | |
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112
disinterestedly
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113
virtuous
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adj.有品德的,善良的,贞洁的,有效力的 | |
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114
exalted
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adj.(地位等)高的,崇高的;尊贵的,高尚的 | |
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115
shrouded
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v.隐瞒( shroud的过去式和过去分词 );保密 | |
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116
impair
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v.损害,损伤;削弱,减少 | |
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117
motive
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n.动机,目的;adv.发动的,运动的 | |
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118
barter
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n.物物交换,以货易货,实物交易 | |
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119
bestowing
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砖窑中砖堆上层已烧透的砖 | |
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120
grandeur
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n.伟大,崇高,宏伟,庄严,豪华 | |
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121
imposing
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adj.使人难忘的,壮丽的,堂皇的,雄伟的 | |
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122
penetrated
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adj. 击穿的,鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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123
mighty
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adj.强有力的;巨大的 | |
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124
reposes
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v.将(手臂等)靠在某人(某物)上( repose的第三人称单数 ) | |
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125
err
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vi.犯错误,出差错 | |
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126
aspirations
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强烈的愿望( aspiration的名词复数 ); 志向; 发送气音; 发 h 音 | |
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127
sketch
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n.草图;梗概;素描;v.素描;概述 | |
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128
manifestations
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n.表示,显示(manifestation的复数形式) | |
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129
subsists
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v.(靠很少的钱或食物)维持生活,生存下去( subsist的第三人称单数 ) | |
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130
unnatural
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adj.不自然的;反常的 | |
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131
condemn
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vt.谴责,指责;宣判(罪犯),判刑 | |
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132
frustrates
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v.使不成功( frustrate的第三人称单数 );挫败;使受挫折;令人沮丧 | |
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133
constrained
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adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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134
lessen
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vt.减少,减轻;缩小 | |
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135
corruption
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n.腐败,堕落,贪污 | |
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136
tranquil
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adj. 安静的, 宁静的, 稳定的, 不变的 | |
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137
infringements
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n.违反( infringement的名词复数 );侵犯,伤害 | |
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138
engender
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v.产生,引起 | |
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139
slumbered
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微睡,睡眠(slumber的过去式与过去分词形式) | |
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140
stifled
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(使)窒息, (使)窒闷( stifle的过去式和过去分词 ); 镇压,遏制; 堵 | |
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141
dictates
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n.命令,规定,要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 );口授;支配;摆布 | |
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142
rebellious
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adj.造反的,反抗的,难控制的 | |
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143
coercion
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n.强制,高压统治 | |
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144
ramifications
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n.结果,后果( ramification的名词复数 ) | |
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145
arteries
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n.动脉( artery的名词复数 );干线,要道 | |
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146
copious
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adj.丰富的,大量的 | |
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147
vessels
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n.血管( vessel的名词复数 );船;容器;(具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的)人 | |
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148
acquiesce
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vi.默许,顺从,同意 | |
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149
savages
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未开化的人,野蛮人( savage的名词复数 ) | |
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150
inviting
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adj.诱人的,引人注目的 | |
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151
collateral
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adj.平行的;旁系的;n.担保品 | |
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152
stifles
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(使)窒息, (使)窒闷( stifle的第三人称单数 ); 镇压,遏制 | |
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153
engenders
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v.产生(某形势或状况),造成,引起( engender的第三人称单数 ) | |
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154
artifices
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n.灵巧( artifice的名词复数 );诡计;巧妙办法;虚伪行为 | |
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155
transgressions
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n.违反,违法,罪过( transgression的名词复数 ) | |
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156
vices
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缺陷( vice的名词复数 ); 恶习; 不道德行为; 台钳 | |
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157
ignoble
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adj.不光彩的,卑鄙的;可耻的 | |
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158
unity
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n.团结,联合,统一;和睦,协调 | |
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159
infliction
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n.(强加于人身的)痛苦,刑罚 | |
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160
impunity
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n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
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161
questionable
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adj.可疑的,有问题的 | |
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162
preservation
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n.保护,维护,保存,保留,保持 | |
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163
disapprove
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v.不赞成,不同意,不批准 | |
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164
precisely
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adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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165
indirectly
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adv.间接地,不直接了当地 | |
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166
inevitable
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adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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167
supervision
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n.监督,管理 | |
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168
legitimate
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adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
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