KUTUZOV had, on the 1st of November, received from one of his spies information that showed the army he commanded to be in an almost hopeless position. The spy reported that the French, after crossing the bridge at Vienna, were moving in immense force on Kutuzov's line of communications with the reinforcements marching from Russia. If Kutuzov were to determine to remain at Krems, Napoleon's army of a hundred and fifty thousand men would cut him off from all communications, and would surround his exhausted army of forty thousand, and he would find himself in the position of Mack before Ulm. If Kutuzov decided to leave the road leading to a junction with the Russian reinforcements, he would have to make his way with no road through unknown country to the mountains of Bohemia, pursued by the cream of the enemy's forces, and to give up all hope of effecting a junction with Buxhevden. If Kutuzov decided to march by the road from Krems to Olm?tz to join the forces from Russia he ran the risk of finding the French, who had crossed the Vienna bridge, in advance of him on this road, and so being forced to give battle on the march, encumbered with all his stores and transport, with an enemy three times as numerous and hemming him in on both sides. Kutuzov chose the last course.

The French, after crossing the river, had, as the spy reported, set off at a quick march toward Znaim, which lay on Kutuzov's line of routes more than a hundred versts in front of him. To reach Znaim before the French offered the best hopes of saving the army. To allow the French to get to Znaim before him would mean exposing the whole army to a disgrace like that of the Austrians at Ulm, or to complete destruction. But to arrive there before the French with the whole army was impossible. The road of the French army from Vienna to Znaim was shorter and better than the Russians' road from Krems to Znaim.

On the night of receiving the news Kutuzov sent Bagration's advance guard of four thousand soldiers to the right over the mountains from the Krems-Znaim road to the Vienna and Znaim road. Bagration was to make a forced march, to halt facing towards Vienna and with his back to Znaim, and if he succeeded in getting on the road in advance of the French, he was to delay them as long as he could. Kutuzov himself with all the transport was making straight for Znaim.

Bagration marched forty-five versts, by night in stormy weather, through the mountains, with no road, and with hungry, barefoot soldiers. Leaving a third of his men straggling behind him, Bagration reached Hollabrunn, on the Vienna and Znaim road, a few hours before the French, who marched upon Hollabrunn from Vienna. Kutuzov needed fully another twenty-four hours to get to Znaim with all the transport, and so to save the army Bagration would have had, with his four thousand hungry and exhausted soldiers, to have kept at bay the whole army of the enemy confronting him at Hollabrunn for four-and-twenty hours, and this was obviously impossible. But a freak of fate made the impossible possible. The success of the trick that had given the Vienna bridge into the hands of the French encouraged Murat to try and take in Kutuzov too. Murat, on meeting Bagration's weak detachment on the Znaim road, supposed it to be the whole army of Kutuzov. To give this army a final and crushing defeat he waited for the troops still on the road from Vienna, and to that end he proposed a truce for three days, on the condition that neither army should change its position nor stir from where it was. Murat averred that negotiations for peace were now proceeding, and that he proposed a truce therefore to avoid useless bloodshed. The Austrian general, Nostits, who was in charge of the advance posts, believed the statements of Murat's messengers and retired, leaving Bagration's detachment unprotected. The other messengers rode off to the Russian line to make the same announcement about peace negotiations, and to propose a truce of three days, to the Russian troops. Bagration replied that he was not authorised to accept or to decline a truce, and sent his adjutant to Kutuzov with a report of the proposition made to him.

A truce gave Kutuzov the only possibility of gaining time, of letting Bagration's exhausted forces rest, and of getting the transport and heavy convoys (the movement of which was concealed from the French) a further stage on their journey. The offer of a truce gave the one—and totally unexpected—chance of saving the army. On receiving information of it, Kutuzov promptly despatched the general-adjutant, Winzengerode, who was with him, to the enemy's camp. Winzengerode was instructed not only to accept the truce, but to propose terms of capitulation, while Kutuzov meanwhile sent his adjutants back to hasten to the utmost the transport of the luggage of the whole army along the Krems and Znaim road. Bagration's hungry and exhausted detachment alone was to cover the movements of the transport and of the whole army, by remaining stationary in face of an enemy eight times stronger numerically.

Kutuzov's anticipations were correct both as to the proposals of capitulation, which bound him to nothing, giving time for part of the transport to reach Znaim, and as to Murat's blunder being very quickly discovered. As soon as Bonaparte, who was at Sch?nbrunn, only twenty-five versts from Hollabrunn, received Murat's despatch and projects of truce and capitulation, he detected the deception and despatched the following letter to Murat:

To Prince Murat.

Sch?nbrunn, 25 Brumaire, year 1805,

at 8 o'clock in the morning.

“It is impossible to find terms in which to express to you my displeasure. You only command my advance guard and you have no right to make any truce without my order. You are causing me to lose the results of a campaign. Break the truce immediately and march upon the enemy. You must make a declaration to them that the general who signed this capitulation had no right to do so, and that only the Emperor of Russia has that right.

“Whenever the Emperor of Russia ratifies the aforesaid convention, however, I will ratify it; but it is only a stratagem. March on, destroy the Russian army … you are in a position to take its baggage and artillery.

“The Emperor of Russia's aide-de-camp is a … Officers are nothing when they have not powers; this one had none. … The Austrians let themselves be tricked about the crossing of the bridge of Vienna, you are letting yourself be tricked by one of the Emperor's aides-de-camp.

“NAPOLEON.”

Bonaparte's adjutant dashed off at full gallop with this menacing letter to Murat. Not trusting his generals, Bonaparte himself advanced to the field of battle with his whole guard, fearful of letting the snared victim slip through his fingers. Meanwhile the four thousand men of Bagration's detachment, merrily lighting camp-fires, dried and warmed themselves, and cooked their porridge for the first time for three days, and not one among them knew or dreamed of what was in store for them.

十一月一日，库图佐夫从他的侦察兵那里得到了消息，这项消息可能使他率领的军队陷入走投无路的境地。侦察兵禀告：法国佬以其雄厚的兵力已越过维也纳大桥，向库图佐夫和俄国开来的军队的交通线挺进。如若库图佐夫下定决心留守克雷姆，拿破仑的十五万军队就要截断他的各条交通线，包围他的精疲力竭的四万军队，他就会处于乌尔姆战役中马克陷入的绝境。若是库图佐夫下定决心放弃他和俄国军队取得联络的道路，他就会无路可走，只得进入那人地生疏的无名的波希米亚山区，自我防卫，以免遭受拥有优势兵力的敌人的进犯，并且丧失他和布克斯格夫登取得联络的任何希望。若是库图佐夫下定决心沿途退却，从克雷姆斯撤退到奥尔米茨，同俄国军队汇合，那末在这条路上，那些越过维也纳大桥的法国人就要抢先一步，使库图佐夫遭受危险，这样一来，他就要被迫携带各种重型装备和辎重在行军中作战，同兵力优越二倍、从两面向他夹攻的敌人作战。

库图佐夫选择了后一条出路。

侦察兵禀告，法国人越过维也纳大桥，正以强行军的速度向库图佐夫撤退的道路上的茨奈姆推进，在库图佐夫前头走了一百多俄里。先于法国官兵抵达茨奈姆，意味着拯救全军的希望更大；让法国官兵抢先到达茨奈姆，就意味着一定会使全军遭受乌尔姆战役之类的奇耻大辱，或者使全军覆没。但是，率领全军赶到法国官兵前头去是不可能的。法国官兵从维也纳到茨奈姆的道路，比俄国官兵从克雷姆斯到茨奈姆的道路更短，更便于行走。

得到消息的晚上，库图佐夫派遣巴格拉季翁的四千人马的前卫队伍从克雷姆斯——茨索姆大道右侧翻越山峰向维也纳——茨奈姆大道推进。巴格拉季翁应当不停地走完这段行程，在面朝维也纳背向茨奈姆的地方扎下营盘。假如能赶到法国官兵前头，他就应当尽可能地阻止他们前进，库图佐夫本人携带各种重型装备起程前赴茨奈姆。

在暴风雨之夜，巴格拉季翁带着那些忍饥挨饿、不穿皮靴的士兵在无路径的山中走了四十五俄里，失去了三分之一的掉队的官兵。巴格拉季翁比法国官兵早几个钟头到达维也纳——茨奈姆大道上的霍拉布伦，这时法国官兵正向霍拉布伦附近推进。库图佐夫随带辎重还要再走一昼夜才能抵达茨奈姆；因此，为拯救军队巴格拉季翁就必须带领四千名饥饿而劳累的士兵花费一昼夜在霍拉布伦阻击相遇的全部敌军，这显然是办不到的事。但是奇特的命运却使办不到的事变成办得到的事。不战而将维也纳大桥交到法国官兵手中这一骗术的成功促使缪拉也试图欺骗一下库图佐夫。缪拉在茨奈姆大道上遇见巴格拉季翁的兵力薄弱的部队后，以为这就是库图佐夫的全军人马。为坚持粉碎这支部队，他要等候从维也纳动身后于途中掉队的官兵，为此目的他建议休战三天，条件是：双方的部队不得改变驻地，在原地不动。缪拉要人人相信，和谈正在进行中，为避免无益的流血，所以提议停战。

处于前哨部队中的奥国将军诺斯蒂茨伯爵相信缪拉军使的话，给巴格拉季翁的队伍开路，自己退却了。另一名军使向俄国散兵线上驶去，也宣布同样的和谈消息，建议俄国军队休战三天。巴格拉季翁回答，他不能决定是否接受停战建议一事，他于是派出他的副官携带建议休战的报告去晋谒库图佐夫。

停战对库图佐夫来说是唯一的赢取时间的办法，巴格拉季翁的疲惫不堪的部队可用以稍事休憩，即令他让辎重和重型装备得以向茨奈姆多推进一段路程也行（瞒着法国官兵运输辎重和重型装备）。这项停战建议为拯救全军造成了料想不到的唯一的良机。库图佐夫在得到消息之后，立即把他部下的侍从武官长温岑格罗德派往敌营。温岑格罗德不仅应该接受停战条款，而且应该提出投降条件；与此同时，库图佐夫还派出数名副官，尽量催促克雷姆斯——茨奈姆大道上全军的辎重向前推进。唯独巴格拉季翁的疲惫而饥馑的部队为掩护辎重和全军行进而在兵力强于七倍的敌人面前岸然不动地设营。

库图佐夫意料之事果然应验了，其一是，投降建议并不要求承担任何责任。它可使部分辎重赢得推进的时机；其二是，缪拉的错误很快会被揭露。波拿巴驻扎在申布鲁恩，离霍拉布伦有二十五俄里之遥，他一接到缪拉的情报和停战、投降的草案，便立刻看出这个骗局，于是给缪拉写了如下的一封信。

缪拉亲王：

我搜寻不到恰当的言词以表达我对您的不满。您只

能指挥我的前卫，如未接获我的命令，您无权擅自停战媾和。您使我丧失整个战役的成果。您立刻撕毁停战建议书，并且前去歼灭敌人。您对他宣布，签署这份降书的将军无权作出这一决定，除俄皇之外，谁也无权作出这一决定。

但是，如果俄皇同意这一条件，我也表示赞同，然

而这只是一种计谋而已。您要去消灭俄国军队……您定能夺取俄国军队的辎重和大炮。

俄皇的侍从武官长是个骗子手……军官们如未授予

全权，就不能发挥任何作用，他也没有这种权力……在越过维也纳大桥时，奥国人遭受欺骗，而您却遭受俄皇侍从武官的欺骗。

拿破仑

一八○五年雾月二十五日八时于申布鲁恩

波拿巴的副官携带这封令人恐怖的书函向缪拉处奔驰而来。波拿巴本人不信任将军，生怕放走现成的牺牲品，便率领御林军奔赴战场。巴格拉季翁的四千人马的队伍正在快活地点起篝火，烤干衣服、取暖，停战三天后第一次煮饭，队伍中谁也不知道，谁也不会想到目前将要发生什么事。