TOWARDS THE END of the year 1811, there began to be greater activity in levying troops and in concentrating the forces of Western Europe, and in 1812 these forces—millions of men, reckoning those engaged in the transport and feeding of the army— moved from the west eastward, towards the frontiers of Russia, where, since 1811, the Russian forces were being in like manner concentrated.

On the 12th of June the forces of Western Europe crossed the frontier, and the war began, that is, an event took place opposed to human reason and all human nature. Millions of men perpetrated against one another so great a mass of crime—fraud, swindling, robbery, forgery, issue of counterfeit money, plunder, incendiarism, and murder—that the annals of all the criminal courts of the world could not muster such a sum of wickedness in whole centuries, though the men who committed those deeds did not at that time look on them as crimes.

What led to this extraordinary event? What were its causes? Historians, with simple-hearted conviction, tell us that the causes of this event were the insult offered to the Duke of Oldenburg, the failure to maintain the continental system, the ambition of Napoleon, the firmness of Alexander, the mistakes of the diplomatists, and so on.

According to them, if only Metternich, Rumyantsev, or Talleyrand had, in the interval between a levée and a court ball, really taken pains and written a more judicious diplomatic note, or if only Napoleon had written to Alexander, “I consent to restore the duchy to the Duke of Oldenburg,” there would have been no war.

We can readily understand that being the conception of the war that presented itself to contemporaries. We can understand Napoleon's supposing the cause of the war to be the intrigues of England (as he said, indeed, in St. Helena); we can understand how to the members of the English House of Commons the cause of the war seemed to be Napoleon's ambition; how to the Duke of Oldenburg the war seemed due to the outrage done him; how to the trading class the war seemed due to the continental system that was ruining Europe; to the old soldiers and generals the chief reason for it seemed their need of active service; to the regiments of the period, the necessity of re-establishing les bons principes; while the diplomatists of the time set it down to the alliance of Russia with Austria in 1809 not having been with sufficient care concealed from Napoleon, and the memorandum, No. 178, having been awkwardly worded. We may well understand contemporaries believing in those causes, and in a countless, endless number more, the multiplicity of which is due to the infinite variety of men's points of view. But to us of a later generation, contemplating in all its vastness the immensity of the accomplished fact, and seeking to penetrate its simple and fearful significance, those explanations must appear insufficient. To us it is inconceivable that millions of Christian men should have killed and tortured each other, because Napoleon was ambitious, Alexander firm, English policy crafty, and the Duke of Oldenburg hardly treated. We cannot grasp the connection between these circumstances and the bare fact of murder and violence, nor why the duke's wrongs should induce thousands of men from the other side of Europe to pillage and murder the inhabitants of the Smolensk and Moscow provinces and to be slaughtered by them.

For us of a later generation, who are not historians led away by the process of research, and so can look at the facts with common-sense unobscured, the causes of this war appear innumerable in their multiplicity. The more deeply we search out the causes the more of them we discover; and every cause, and even a whole class of causes taken separately, strikes us as being equally true in itself, and equally deceptive through its insignificance in comparison with the immensity of the result, and its inability to produce (without all the other causes that concurred with it) the effect that followed. Such a cause, for instance, occurs to us as Napoleon's refusal to withdraw his troops beyond the Vistula, and to restore the duchy of Oldenburg; and then again we remember the readiness or the reluctance of the first chance French corporal to serve on a second campaign; for had he been unwilling to serve, and a second and a third, and thousands of corporals and soldiers had shared that reluctance, Napoleon's army would have been short of so many men, and the war could not have taken place.

If Napoleon had not taken offence at the request to withdraw beyond the Vistula, and had not commanded his troops to advance, there would have been no war. But if all the sergeants had been unwilling to serve on another campaign, there could have been no war either.

And the war would not have been had there been no intrigues on the part of England, no Duke of Oldenburg, no resentment on the part of Alexander; nor had there been no autocracy in Russia, no French Revolution and consequent dictatorship and empire, nor all that led to the French Revolution, and so on further back: without any one of those causes, nothing could have happened. And so all those causes—myriads of causes—coincided to bring about what happened. And consequently nothing was exclusively the cause of the war, and the war was bound to happen, simply because it was bound to happen. Millions of men, repudiating their common-sense and their human feelings, were bound to move from west to east, and to slaughter their fellows, just as some centuries before hordes of men had moved from east to west to slaughter their fellows.

The acts of Napoleon and Alexander, on whose words it seemed to depend whether this should be done or not, were as little voluntary as the act of each soldier, forced to march out by the drawing of a lot or by conscription. This could not be otherwise, for in order that the will of Napoleon and Alexander (on whom the whole decision appeared to rest) should be effective, a combination of innumerable circumstances was essential, without any one of which the effect could not have followed. It was essential that the millions of men in whose hands the real power lay—the soldiers who fired guns and transported provisions and cannons—should consent to carry out the will of those feeble and isolated persons, and that they should have been brought to this acquiescence by an infinite number of varied and complicated causes.

We are forced to fall back upon fatalism in history to explain irrational events (that is those of which we cannot comprehend the reason). The more we try to explain those events in history rationally, the more irrational and incomprehensible they seem to us. Every man lives for himself, making use of his free-will for attainment of his own objects, and feels in his whole being that he can do or not do any action. But as soon as he does anything, that act, committed at a certain moment in time, becomes irrevocable and is the property of history, in which it has a significance, predestined and not subject to free choice.

There are two aspects to the life of every man: the personal life, which is free in proportion as its interests are abstract, and the elemental life of the swarm, in which a man must inevitably follow the laws laid down for him.

Consciously a man lives on his own account in freedom of will, but he serves as an unconscious instrument in bringing about the historical ends of humanity. An act he has once committed is irrevocable, and that act of his, coinciding in time with millions of acts of others, has an historical value. The higher a man's place in the social scale, the more connections he has with others, and the more power he has over them, the more conspicuous is the inevitability and predestination of every act he commits. “The hearts of kings are in the hand of God.” The king is the slave of history.

History—that is the unconscious life of humanity in the swarm, in the community—makes every minute of the life of kings its own, as an instrument for attaining its ends.

Although in that year, 1812, Napoleon believed more than ever that to shed or not to shed the blood of his peoples depended entirely on his will (as Alexander said in his last letter to him), yet then, and more than at any time, he was in bondage to those laws which forced him, while to himself he seemed to be acting freely, to do what was bound to be his share in the common edifice of humanity, in history.

The people of the west moved to the east for men to kill one another. And by the law of the coincidence of causes, thousands of petty causes backed one another up and coincided with that event to bring about that movement and that war: resentment at the non-observance of the continental system, and the Duke of Oldenburg, and the massing of troops in Prussia—a measure undertaken, as Napoleon supposed, with the object of securing armed peace—and the French Emperor's love of war, to which he had grown accustomed, in conjunction with the inclinations of his people, who were carried away by the grandiose scale of the preparations, and the expenditure on those preparations, and the necessity of recouping that expenditure. Then there was the intoxicating effect of the honours paid to the French Emperor in Dresden, and the negotiations too of the diplomatists, who were supposed by contemporaries to be guided by a genuine desire to secure peace, though they only inflamed the amour-propre of both sides; and millions upon millions of other causes, chiming in with the fated event and coincident with it.

When the apple is ripe and falls—why does it fall? Is it because it is drawn by gravitation to the earth, because its stalk is withered, because it is dried by the sun, because it grows heavier, because the wind shakes it, or because the boy standing under the tree wants to eat it?

Not one of those is the cause. All that simply makes up the conjunction of conditions under which every living, organic, elemental event takes place. And the botanist who says that the apple has fallen because the cells are decomposing, and so on, will be just as right as the boy standing under the tree who says the apple has fallen because he wanted to eat it and prayed for it to fall. The historian, who says that Napoleon went to Moscow because he wanted to, and was ruined because Alexander desired his ruin, will be just as right and as wrong as the man who says that the mountain of millions of tons, tottering and undermined, has been felled by the last stroke of the last workingman's pick-axe. In historical events great men—so called—are but the labels that serve to give a name to an event, and like labels, they have the least possible connection with the event itself.

Every action of theirs, that seems to them an act of their own free-will, is in an historical sense not free at all, but in bondage to the whole course of previous history, and predestined from all eternity.

从一八一一年底起，西欧的军队开始加强军备并集结力量。一八一二年，这些武装力量——数百万人（包括那些运送和保障供应的部队）由西向东朝俄罗斯边境运动。而从一八一一年起俄罗斯的军队也同样向其边境集结。六月十二日，西欧军队越过了俄罗斯的边界，战争开始了。也就是说，一个违反人类理性和全部人类本性的事件发生了。数百万人互相对立，犯下了难以计数的罪恶，欺骗、背叛、盗窃、作伪、生产伪钞、抢劫、纵火、杀人。世界的法庭编年史用几个世纪也搜集不完这些罪行。而对此，当时那些干这些事的人却并未把它作为罪行来看待。

是什么引起了这场不平常的事件呢？其原因有哪些呢？满怀天真的自信的历史学家们说：这个事件的原因是，奥尔登堡公爵所受的欺侮、违反大陆体系、拿破仑的贪权、亚历山大的强硬态度、外交家们的错误等等。

因此，只要在皇帝出朝和招待晚会时，梅特涅·鲁缅采夫好好作一番努力，把公文写得更巧妙些，或者拿破仑给亚历山大写上一封信：Monsieur，mon　frère，je　consens　à　rendre　le　duché　au　due　d'Oldenbourg①，战争就不会发生了。

显然，对那个时代的人来说，就是这样看待此事的；当然，拿破仑认为，英国的阴谋是战争的原因（他在神圣的圣勒拿岛上，就这样说过）；英国议院的议员们认为，战争的原因是拿破仑的野心；奥尔登堡公爵认为对他的暴行是战争的原因；商人们认为，使欧洲毁灭的大陆体系是发生战争的原因；对老兵和将军们来说，使他有事可做是战争的主要原因；那时的正统主义者认为，Les　bons　principes②必须恢复；而对当时的外交官来说，其所以产生这一切，是因为一八○九年的俄罗斯和奥地利同盟未能十分巧妙地瞒过拿破仑，178号备忘录的措词拙劣。显然，那个时代的人都认为除了这些原因，还有许许多多原因都取决于难以计数的不同的观点；但对我们——观察了这一事件的全过程和了解了其简单而又可怕的意义的后代人——来说，这些原因还不够充分。我们不理解的是，数百万基督徒互相残杀和虐待，就因为拿破仑是野心家，亚历山大态度强硬，英国的政策狡猾和奥尔登堡公爵受侮辱。无法理解，这些情况与屠杀和暴行事实本身有何联系；为什么由于公爵受辱，来自欧洲另一边的数以千计的人们就来屠杀和毁灭斯摩棱斯克和莫斯科的人们，反过来又被这些人所杀。

①法语：陛下，我的兄弟，我同意把公国还给奥尔登堡公爵。

②法语：好原则。

对我们——不是史学家，不迷恋于考察探索过程，因而拥有观察事件的清醒健全的思想——来说，战争的原因多不胜数。在探索战争原因时我们愈是深入，发现也愈多，获取的每一孤立原因或是一系列原因就其本身来说都是正确的，但就其与事件的重大比较所显出的微不足道而言，这些原因又同样都是错误的，就这些原因不足以引起事件的发生来说（如果没有其他各种原因巧合的话），也同样是不真实的。如同拿破仑拒绝将自己的军队撤回到维斯拉和归还奥尔登堡公国一样，我们同样可认为一个法国军士愿不愿服第二次兵役是这类原因：因为，如果他不愿服役，第二个，第三个，第一千个军士和士兵都不愿服役，拿破仑的军队就少了一千个人，那么，战争也就不可能发生了。

如果拿破仑不因人们要求他撤回到维斯拉后而感到受侮辱，不命令军队进攻，就不会有战争；但是，如果所有军士不愿服第二次兵役，战争也不能发生，如果英国不玩弄阴谋，如果没有奥尔登堡公爵，如果没有亚历山大受辱的感觉，如果在俄罗斯没有专制政权，如果没有法国革命和随之而来的个人独裁和帝制以及引起法国革命的所有因素等等，也同样不能爆发战争，这些原因中只要缺少任何一个，就什么也不会发生。由此可见，所有这些原因——数十亿个原因——巧合在一起，导致了已发生的事。所以说，没有哪个事件的原因是独一无二的，而事件应该发生只不过是因为它不得不发生。数百万放弃人类感情和自身理智的人们由西向东去屠杀自己的同类，正如几个世纪前，由东向西去屠杀自己同类的成群的人们一样。

事件发生与否，似乎取决于拿破仑和亚历山大的某一句话——而他们二人的行为如同以抽签或者以招募方式出征的每个士兵的行为一样，都是不由自主的。这不能不是这样，因为拿破仑和亚历山大（仿佛他们是决定事件的人）的意志能实现，必须有无数个（缺其一事件就不能发生）事件的巧合。必须有数百万手中握有实力的人，他们是能射击、运输给养和枪炮的士兵们，他们必须同意执行这个别软弱的人的意志，并且无数复杂的、各式各样的原因使他们不得不这样干。

为了解释这些不合理的现象（也就是说，我们不理解其合理性），必然得出历史上的宿命论。我们越是试图合理地解释这些历史现象，它们对我们来说却越是不合理和不可理解。

每个人都为自己而活着，他利用自由以达到其个人的目的，并以全部身心去感受，现在他可以或不可以采取某种行为；但他一旦做出这种事，那么，在某一特定时刻所完成的行为，就成为不可挽回的事了，同时也就成为历史的一部分，在历史中他不是自主的，这是预先注定了的。

每个人都有两种生活：一种是私人生活，这种生活的意义越抽象，它就越自由；另一种生活是天然的群体生活，在这里每个人必然遵守给他规定的各种法则。

人自觉地为自己而生活，但却作为不自觉的工具，以达到历史的、全人类的目的。我们无法去挽回一个已完成的行为，而且一个人的行为在一定时间里与千百万其他人的行为巧合在一起，就具有历史的意义了。一个人在社会的舞台上站得越高，所涉及的人越多，则其每一个行为的注定结局和必然性也越明显。

“国王的心握在上帝手里。”

国王——历史的奴隶。

历史，也就是人类不自觉的共同的集体生活，它把国王们每时每刻的生活都作为达到自己目的的工具。

现在，一八一二年，尽管拿破仑比以往任何时候都更感到Verser或者不Verser　le　sang　de　ses　peuples①取决于他（就像亚历山大写给他的最后一封信中所写的那样），其实拿破仑任何时候也不像现在这样更服从必然的法则，该法则使他不得不为共同的事业、为历史去完成必须完成的事业（而对他自己而言，他却觉得自己是随心所欲行动的）。

①法语：使本国各族人民流血，或者不使本国各族人民流血。

西方的人们向东方进发与东方人撕杀。而按各种原因偶合的法则，千百个细小原因与这次事件合在一起导致了这次进军和战争：对不遵从大陆体系的指责，奥尔登堡公爵，向普鲁士进军（就像拿破仑感觉的那样）仅为通过进军达到和平，法国皇帝对战争的癖好和习惯正好与他的人民的愿望一致，以及他对准备工作宏大场面的迷恋，用于准备工作的开支，要求获取抵偿这些开支的利益、他在德累斯顿的令人陶醉的荣誉；当代人认为是诚心求和却只伤了双方自尊心的外交谈判，以及与现有事件相呼应，并同事件巧合的数以千万计的原因。

当苹果成熟时，就从树上掉下来——它为什么掉下来呢？是因为受地球引力的吸引吗？是因为苹果茎干枯了吗？是因为由于太阳晒或是自身太重，或是风吹了它吗？还是因为站在树下的小孩想吃苹果吗？

什么原因也不是。这一切只是各种条件的巧合，在这些条件下各种与生命有关的、有机地联系、自然的事件得到实现。找到苹果降落是由于诸如细胞组织分解等原因，植物学家是对的、就像那个站在树下面的小孩一样是对的。那小孩说，苹果掉落是因为他想吃苹果并为此做了祈祷。拿破仑去莫斯科是因为他想去，他毁灭是因为亚历山大希望他毁灭。这样说又对又不对，这就像说一座重一百万普特，下面被挖空的山之所以崩塌是因为最后一个工人用十字镐在山下最后的一击一样，又对又不对。在许多历史事件中，那些所谓的伟人只是以事件命名的标签、而同样像这个标签一样，他们很少与事件本身有联系。

他们的每一个行为，他们觉得是自身独断专横所为的，其实从历史的意义来看，他们是不能随心所欲的。他们每一个行动都是与历史的进程相联系的，是预先确定了的。