PRINCE ANDREY reached the headquarters of the army at the end of June. The first army, with which the Tsar was, was stationed in a fortified camp at Drissa. The second army was retreating, striving to effect a junction with the first army, from which—so it was said—it had been cut off by immense forces of the French. Every one was dissatisfied with the general course of events in the Russian army. But no one even dreamed of any danger of the Russian provinces being invaded, no one imagined the war could extend beyond the frontiers of the western Polish provinces.

Prince Andrey found Barclay de Tolly, to whom he was sent, on the bank of the Drissa. Since there was not one large village nor dwelling-place in the neighbourhood of the camp, the immense multitude of generals and courtiers accompanying the army were distributed about the neighborhood for ten versts round in the best houses of the village on both sides of the river. Barclay de Tolly was staying four versts away from the Tsar. He gave Bolkonsky a dry and frigid reception, and said in his German accent that he would mention him to the Tsar so that a definite appointment might be given him, and that meanwhile he begged him to remain on his staff. Anatole Kuragin, whom Prince Andrey had expected to find in the army, was not here. He was in Petersburg, and Bolkonsky was glad to hear it. He was absorbed in the interest of being at the centre of the immense war that was in progress, and he was relieved to be free for a time from the irritability produced in him by the idea of Kuragin. The first four days, during which he was not called upon to do anything, he spent in riding round the whole of the fortified camp, and by the aid of his experiences and his conversations with persons of greater experience, he tried to form a definite idea about it. But the question whether such a camp were of use at all or not remained an open one in his mind. He had already, from his own military experience, formed the conviction that in war the most deeply meditated plans are of no avail (as he had seen at Austerlitz), that everything depends on how unexpected actions of the enemy, actions that cannot possibly be foreseen, are met; that all depends on how, and by whom, the battle is led. In order to settle this last question to his own satisfaction, Prince Andrey took advantage of his position and his acquaintances to try to get an insight into the character of the persons and parties who had a hand in the organisation of the army. This was the general idea he gained of the position of affairs.

While the Tsar had been at Vilna, the army had been divided into three. The first army was under the command of Barclay de Tolly, the second under the command of Bagration, and the third under the command of Tormasov. The Tsar was with the first army, but not in the capacity of commander-in-chief. In the proclamations, it was announced that the Tsar would be with the army, but it was not announced that he would take the command. Moreover, there was in attendance on the Tsar personally not a commander-in-chief's staff, but the staff of the imperial headquarters. The chief officer of the imperial staff was General-Quartermaster Volkonsky, and it contained generals, aides-de-camp, diplomatic officials, and an immense number of foreigners, but it was not a military staff. The Tsar had also in attendance on him in no definite capacity, Araktcheev, the late minister of war; Count Bennigsen, by seniority the first of the generals; the Tsarevitch, Konstantin Pavlovitch; Count Rumyantsev, the chancellor; Stein, the former Prussian minister; Armfeldt, the Swedish general; Pfuhl, the chief organiser of the plan of the campaign; Paulucci, a Sardinian refugee, who had been made a general-adjutant; Woltzogen; and many others. Though those personages had no definite posts in the army, yet, from their position, they had influence, and often the commander of a corps, or even one of the commanders-in-chief, did not know in what capacity Bennigsen or the Tsarevitch or Araktcheev or Prince Volkonsky addressed some advice or inquiry to him, and could not tell whether some command in the form of advice came directly from the person who got it or through him from the Tsar, and whether he ought or ought not to obey it. But all this formed simply the external aspect of the situation; the inner import of the presence of the Tsar and all these great personages was, from a courtier's point of view (and in the presence of a monarch all men become courtiers), plain to all. All grasped the fact that though the Tsar was not formally assuming the position of commander-in-chief, he did, in fact, hold the supreme control of all the armies in his hands, and the persons about him were his councillors. Araktcheev was a trusty administrator, a stern upholder of discipline, and careful of the safety of the Tsar. Bennigsen was a land-holder in the neighbourhood, and seemed to feel it his function to entertain the Tsar there; while he was in reality, too, a good general, useful as an adviser, and useful to have in readiness to replace Barclay at any time. The Tsarevitch was there because he thought fit to be. The former Prussian minister, Stein, was there because his advice might be useful, and the Emperor Alexander had a high opinion of his personal qualities. Armfeldt was a bitter enemy of Napoleon, and had self-confidence, which never failed to have influence with Alexander. Paulucci was there because he was bold and decided in his utterances. The generals on the staff were there because they were always where the Emperor was; and the last and principal figure, Pfuhl, was there because he had created a plan of warfare against Napoleon, and having made Alexander believe in the consistency of this plan, was now conducting the plan of the whole campaign. Pfuhl was accompanied by Woltzogen, who put Pfuhl's ideas into a more easily comprehensible form than could be done by Pfuhl himself, who was a rigid theorist, with an implicit faith in his own views, and an absolute contempt for everything else.

The above-mentioned were the most prominent personages about the Tsar, and among them the foreigners were in the ascendant, and were every day making new and startling suggestions with the audacity characteristic of men who are acting in a sphere not their own. But, besides those, there were many more persons of secondary importance, who were with the army because their principals were there.

In this vast, brilliant, haughty, and uneasy world, among all these conflicting voices, Prince Andrey detected the following sharply opposed parties and differences of opinion.

The first party consisted of Pfuhl and his followers; military theorists, who believe in a science of war, having its invariable laws—laws of oblique movements, out-flanking, etc. Pfuhl and his adherents demanded that the army should retreat into the heart of the country in accordance with the exact principles laid down by their theory of war, and in every departure from this theory they saw nothing but barbarism, ignorance, or evil intention. To this party belonged Woltzogen, Wintzengerode, and others—principally Germans.

The second party was in direct opposition to the first. As is always the case where there is one extreme opinion, representatives had come forward of the opposite extreme. This party had urged an advance from Vilna into Poland regardless of all previous plans. This party, while advocating bold action, consisted of the representatives of nationalism, which made them even more one-sided in their views. They were Russians: Bagration, Yermolov, who was just beginning to make his mark, and some others. Yermolov's well-known joke was much quoted at the time—a supposed petition to the Tsar for promotion to be a “German.” The members of this party, recalling Suvorov, maintained that what was wanted was not reasoning and sticking pins into maps, but fighting, beating the enemy, preventing the enemy from getting into Russia, and keeping up the spirits of the army.

To the third party, in which the Tsar was disposed to place most confidence, belonged the courtiers, who tried to effect a compromise between the two contending sides. The members of this party—to which Araktcheev belonged—were mostly not military men, and they spoke and reasoned as men usually do who have no convictions, but wish to pass for having them. They admitted that a war with such a genius as Bonaparte (they called him Bonaparte again now) did undoubtedly call for the profoundest tactical considerations and thorough scientific knowledge, and that on that side Pfuhl was a genius. But, at the same time, they acknowledged that it could not be denied that theorists were often one-sided, and so one should not put implicit confidence in them, but should listen too to what Pfuhl's opponents urged, and also to the views of practical men who had experience, and should take a middle course. They advocated maintaining the camp at Drissa on Pfuhl's plan, but altering his disposition of the other two armies. Though by this course of action neither aim could be attained, this seemed to the party of compromise the best line to adopt.

Of the fourth section of opinions, the most prominent representative was the Grand Duke, and heir-apparent, who could not get over his rude awakening at Austerlitz. He had ridden out at the head of his guards in helmet and cuirass as though to a review, expecting gallantly to rout the French, and finding himself unexpectedly just in the line of the enemy's fire, had with difficulty escaped in the general disorder. The members of this party had at once the merit and the defect of sincerity in their convictions. They feared Napoleon; they saw his strength and their own weakness, and frankly admitted it. They said: “Nothing but a huge disgrace and ruin can come of the war! We have abandoned Vilna, and abandoned Vitebsk, and we are abandoning the Drissa too. The only sensible thing left for us to do is to conclude peace, and as soon as possible, before we have been driven out of Petersburg!”

This view was widely diffused in the higher military circles, and found adherents, too, in Petersburg—one of them being the chancellor Rumyantsev, who advocated peace on other political considerations.

A fifth section were the adherents of Barclay de Tolly, not so much from his qualities as a man, as a minister of war and commander-in-chief. “Whatever he may be,” they always began, “he is an honest, practical man, and there is nobody better. Let him have sole responsibility, since war can never be prosecuted successfully under divided authority and he will show what he can do, as he did in Finland. We owe it simply to Barclay that our army is strong and well organised, and has retreated to the Drissa without disaster. If Barclay is replaced by Bennigsen now, everything will be lost; for Bennigsen has proved his incapacity already in 1807.” Such was the line of argument of the fifth party.

The sixth party, the partisans of Bennigsen, maintained on the contrary that there was after all no one more capable and experienced than Bennigsen, and that whatever else were done they would have to come back to him. They maintained that the whole Russian retreat to Drissa had been an uninterrupted series of shameful disasters and blunders. “Let them blunder now if they will,” they said; “the more blunders the better, at least it will teach them all the sooner that we can't go on like this. And we want none of your Barclays, but a man like Bennigsen, who showed what he was in 1807, so that Napoleon himself had to do him justice, and a man, too, is needed to whom all would readily intrust authority, and Bennigsen is the only such man.”

The seventh class were persons such as are always found in courts, and especially in the courts of young sovereigns, and were particularly plentiful in the suite of Alexander—generals and adjutants, who were passionately devoted to the Tsar, not merely as an emperor, but sincerely and disinterestedly adored him as a man, as Rostov had adored him in 1805, and saw in him every virtue and good quality of humanity. These persons, while they were ecstatic over the modesty of the Tsar in declining the chief command of the army, deplored that excess of modesty, and desired and urged one thing only, that their adored Tsar, conquering his excessive diffidence, would openly proclaim that he put himself at the head of the army, would gather the staff of the commander-in-chief about him, and, consulting experienced theorists and practical men where necessary, would himself lead his forces, who would be excited to the highest pitch of enthusiasm by this step.

The eighth and largest group, numbering ninety-nine to every one of the others, consisted of people who were eager neither for peace nor for war, neither for offensive operations nor defensive camps, neither at Drissa nor anywhere else; who did not take the side of Barclay, nor of the Tsar, nor of Pfuhl, nor of Bennigsen, but cared only for the one thing most essential—their own greatest gain and enjoyment. In the troubled waters of those cross-currents of intrigue, eddying about the Tsar's headquarters, success could be attained in very many ways that would have been inconceivable at other times. One courtier, with the single-hearted motive of retaining a lucrative position, would agree today with Pfuhl, and to-morrow with his opponents, and the day after to-morrow would declare that he had no opinion on the subject in question, simply to avoid responsibility and to gratify the Tsar. Another, in the hope of bettering his position, would seek to attract the Tsar's attention by loudly clamouring a suggestion hinted at by the Tsar on the previous day, by quarrelling noisily at the council, striking himself on the chest and challenging opponents to a duel to prove his readiness to sacrifice himself for the common good. A third simply took advantage of the absence of enemies between two councils to beg a grant from the Single Assistance Fund for his faithful service, knowing there would be no time now for a refusal. A fourth took care to place himself where the Tsar might quite casually find him deeply engrossed in work. A fifth tried to reach the long-desired goal of his ambition—a dinner at the Tsar's table—by violently espousing one side or another and collecting more or less true and valid arguments in support of it.

All the members of this party were on the hunt after roubles, crosses, and promotions; and in that chase they simply followed the scent given them by the fluctuations of imperial favour. As soon as they saw the imperial weather-cock shifting to one quarter the whole swarm of these drones began buzzing away in the direction, making it more difficult for the Tsar to shift his course back again. In the uncertainty of the position, with the menace of serious danger, which gave a peculiarly intense character to everything, in this whirlpool of ambitions, of conflicting vanities, and views, and feelings, and different nationalities, this eighth and largest party, absorbed only in the pursuit of personal interests, greatly increased the complexity and confusion. Whatever question arose, the swarm of drones, still humming over the last subject, flew to the new one, and by their buzzing drowned and confused the voices of sincere disputants.

At the time when Prince Andrey reached the army yet another—a ninth party—was being formed out of all the rest, and was just making its voice heard. It consisted of sensible men of age and political experience, sharing none of the conflicting opinions, and able to take a general view of all that was being done at headquarters, and to consider means for escaping from the vagueness, uncertainty, confusion, and feebleness.

The members of this party thought and said that the whole evil was primarily due to the presence of the Tsar with his military court in the army; that it brought into the army that indefinite, conditional, and fluctuating uncertainty of relations which is in place in a court, but mischievous in an army; that it was for the Tsar to govern and not to lead his troops; that the only escape from the position was the departure of the Tsar and his court from the army; that the simple presence of the Tsar paralysed fifty thousand troops, which must be retained to secure his personal safety; that the worst commander-in-chief, acting independently, would be better than the best commander-in-chief with his hands tied by the presence and authority of the Tsar.

While Prince Andrey was staying, with nothing to do, at Drissa, Sishkov, the secretary of state, one of the leading representatives of this last group, wrote to the Tsar a letter to which Balashov and Araktcheev agreed to add their signatures. In this letter he took advantage of the Tsar's permitting him to offer his opinion on the general question, and respectfully suggested the sovereign's leaving the army, urging as a pretext for his doing so the absolute necessity of his presence to rouse public feeling in the capital.

To appeal to the people, and to rouse them in defence of their fatherland, was represented as urgently necessary to the Tsar, and was accepted by him as a sufficient reason for leaving. The outburst of patriotism that followed that appeal (so far indeed as it can be said to have been produced by the Tsar's visit to Moscow) was the principal cause of the subsequent triumph of Russia.

安德烈公爵是六月底来到总司令部的。皇帝所在的第一军在德里萨设置了防御工事；第二军在撤退，力图与第一军会合，据说他们被法军的强大力量切断了。所有的人都对俄罗斯军队的军事情势不满；但谁也未想到有入侵俄国各省的危险，谁也没估计到战争会越过波兰西部各省。

安德烈公爵在德里萨河岸找到他受命去其麾下任职的巴克思·德·托利。因为营地周围没有一个大村庄，大批的将军和随军宫廷大臣都安置在河两岸方圆十俄里的村中最好的宅院里。巴克思·德·托利住在离皇帝四俄里的地方。他冷淡地接待了博尔孔斯基，他操着德国口音说他将奏明圣上再确定他的职务，只有暂时请他留在他的司令部。安德烈公爵希望在军队中寻找到的阿纳托利·库拉金没在这里；他在彼得堡，这消息使博尔孔斯基很愉快。目前，安德烈公爵忙于正发生的大规模战争的核心问题，而他也很高兴有一些时间不再为一直萦绕于他内心的库拉金问题所烦恼。在头四天，他没被要求做什么事，安德烈公爵巡视所有设防的营地，借助自己的知识与有关人员谈话，是可能对每个营地有明确的概念。但问题在于这个营地的防卫是有效的还是无效的，对安德烈公爵来说却是一个未被解决的问题，从自己的军事经验中，他已经得出一个信念，在军事事务中，最深思熟虑的完善周到的计划没有任何意义（正如他在奥斯特利茨战役中见到的），一切都取决于如何处理突发的、不能预见的敌方行动，取决于如何和由谁来指挥整个战役。为了弄清楚这后一个问题，安德烈公爵利用自己的地位和熟人极力深入了解军队的指挥特点，参予其中的指挥员和派系，于是得出关于军事情势的如下概念。

当皇帝还在维尔纳时，军队就被分成三部分：第一军由巴克雷·德·托利统率，第二军由巴格拉季翁统率，第三军由托尔马索夫率领。皇帝在第一军，但却不是作为总司令。据通令称，皇帝将不指挥军队，而只是跟随军队。此外，没有皇帝御前总参谋部，只有一个皇帝的行辕参谋部。设有皇帝行辕参谋长，这就是负责军需的将军博尔孔斯基公爵，几个将军、侍从武官、外交官员和一大批外国人，但是这不是军队司令部。此外，在皇帝面前不带职务的人员还有：阿拉克切耶夫——前陆军大臣，贝尼格森伯爵——按官阶是老将军（大将），皇太子梁斯坦J·帕夫诺维哥大公，鲁缅采夫伯爵——一等文官，施泰因——前普鲁士部长，阿伦菲尔德——瑞典将军、普弗尔——作战计划的主要起草人，侍从武官巴沃鲁契——撒丁亡命者，沃尔佐根以及许多其他人。虽然这些人没有军职，但是由于其所处的地位都有影响，通常一个军团长甚至总司令不知道贝尼格森或者大公，或者阿拉克切耶夫，或者博尔孔斯基是以什么身分过问或建议那件事或其他事务，也不知道这种过问或建议是出自他们本人还是出自皇帝，应当或者不应当执行。但这仅仅是表面现象，皇帝和这些人从宫廷的观点出面的实质意义（皇帝在场，所有其他人都是宫廷侍臣）是大家都明了的。那种意义就是：皇帝没有承担总司令的名义，但是他却号令全军；他周围的人都是他的助手。阿拉克切耶夫是忠实的执行人，秩序的维持者，是皇帝的侍卫；贝尼格森是维尔纳省的地主，他仿佛在尽地主之谊Les　honneurs（法语：接待皇帝），而实际上是一个优秀的将军，能够出谋划策，随时可替代巴克雷。大公在那里是因为这是他乐意的事，前部长施泰因是因为他能提出有益的建议，因为亚历山大皇帝高度评价他的个人品质。阿伦菲尔德复拿破仑的死敌，是一位将军，自信总能影响亚历山大。巴沃鲁契是因为他直言和果断。侍从武官在那里是因为他们出现在皇帝所在的所有地方，最后，最主要的——普弗尔在那里是因为他起草拟定了反对拿破仑的军事计划，并使亚历山大相信这个计划的可行性，他掌管一切军务。与普弗尔一道的是沃尔佐根，一个比普弗尔本人更能用明了易懂的方式表达普弗尔的思想，因为普弗尔是一个尖刻的，自信到目空一切，书本上的理论家。

除前述的俄罗斯人和外国人外（特别是外国人，他们都具有在陌生人中活动或工作的人们所特有的大胆，每天都提出惊人的新思想），还有许多次要人物，他们在那里是因为那里有他们的上司。

在这个庞大、忙碌、辉煌和骄傲的集团中，安德烈公爵发现所有的思想和议论可明显分为以下派系和倾向。

第一派是：普弗尔及其追随者，那些军事理论家，他们相信存在军事科学，认为这门科学有自身不可更改的法则，运动战法则，迂回运动法则等。普弗尔及其追随者要求撤退到国家的内地，按伪军事理论所规定的精确的法则，对这个理论的所有偏离却只能被人们视为野蛮，不学无术或别有用心。属于该派的有德国亲王们、沃尔佐根、温岑格罗德和其他人，多半都是德国人。

第二派与第一派相反。正如惯常的情形，有一种极端，也就有另一种极端。这派的人要求从维尔纳攻入波兰，并摆脱所有预先制订的计划。这一派的代表除了是大胆行动的代表外，他们同时还是民族主义的代表，因此在辩论变得更加偏激了。这些人是俄罗斯人：巴格拉季翁、声望高涨的叶尔莫洛夫和其他一些人。此时传播着叶尔莫洛夫的笑话，似乎是他请求皇帝的恩宠——封他为德国人。这一派缅怀苏沃洛夫的人说，不应当认为，不用针刺破地图，而应去战斗，打击敌人，不放敌人进入俄罗斯，不要挫拆士气。

第三派最受皇帝信任，他们是介于两派间的宫廷侍臣们。这派人大多是军人，阿拉克切耶夫属于该派，他们所想所说的都是没有信念，但又希望像有信念的普通人所想和所说的。他们说，毫无疑问，战争，特别是同波拿巴（又称他叫波拿巴）这样的天才的战争，要求最深思熟虑的谋划和渊博的科学知识，在这方面普弗尔是一个英才；但同样不能不承认，理论家往往有其片面性，所以不能完全相信他们，应该听听反对派普弗尔的意见，听听在军事上有实践经验的人们的意见，然后加以折中。这一派主张按照普弗尔的计划守住德里萨营地，改变其他各军的行动。虽然这种变化不能达到其它任何目的，但该派却认为这样会好些。

第四派以大公皇太子为最著名的代表，他不能忘记自己在奥斯特利茨战役所遭受的失败，当时他头戴钢盔，身穿骑兵制服，就像去阅兵似的骑马行进在近卫军的前面，实指望干净利落地击溃法军，结果却陷入第一线，好不容易才在惊慌中逃出来。这一派人在自己的讨论中具有坦率的优点和缺点。他们害怕拿破仑，看到了他的力量和自己的软弱并直截了当地说出了这一点。他们说：“除了悲哀、耻辱和毁灭之外，不会有任何结果！我们丢掉了维尔纳，放弃了维捷布斯克，还要失掉德里萨。聪明的做法是趁现在还暂未把我们赶出彼得堡，尽快缔结和约。”

这个观点在军方上层相当普遍，在彼得堡也获得支持，一等文官鲁缅采夫为其他政治原因也同样赞成和解。

第五派是巴克雷·德·托利的信徒们。他们与其认为他是人，不如说把他当作陆军大臣和总司令。他们说：“不管他是什么人，（总是这样开始），但他的正直，精明，没有谁比他更好。请把实权交给他吧，因为战争中不可能没有统一的指挥，他将展示他可以做些什么，就像他在芬兰表现的那样。如果我们的军队秩序井然，有战斗力，撤退到德里萨而未遭受任何损失，那么这只能归功于巴克雷。如果现在用贝尼格森代替巴克雷，那么一切全完了，因为贝尼格森在一八○七年就表现出自己的碌碌无能。”这一派的人们这样说。

第六派是贝尼格森派。正好相反，他们说，“不管怎样，没有比贝尼格森更能干的，更有经验的人了，无论你怎样折腾，最终还是请教他。这一派的人证明说，我们全体退到德里萨是最可悲的失败和不间断一连串错误的结果。他们说：“错误犯得越多，越能尽快地使人们明白，不可以这样下去，不需要什么巴克雷，而是需要像贝尼格森这样的人。他在一八○七年已经显过身手，拿破仑自己曾给他作过公充的评价，这更让人心悦诚服地承认是权威的人，只有贝尼格森一个人。”

第七派是那些随时都随侍皇帝左右的人，特别是那些年轻的皇帝，而亚历山大皇帝身边的这种人特别多，他们是将军、侍从武官，他们对皇帝无限忠诚，就像罗斯托夫在一八○五年崇拜他一样。不是把他当作皇帝，而当作一个人，衷心而无私地崇拜他，在他身上不仅看出全部美德，而且具备人类的一切优秀品质。这些人虽然赞美皇帝拒绝统帅军队的谦虚品质，却指责这种过分的谦虚，他们仅希望一件事，而且坚持自己崇拜的皇帝丢弃对自身的过分的不信任、公开宣布做军队的统帅，属下组建一个总司令大本营，自己指挥军队，必要时可请有经验的理论家和实干家辅佐，这样更极大地鼓舞军心激昂士气。

第八派是人数最多的一派，以自己的众多数量与其他派别相比正如九十九比一，他们由那些既不希望和平，又不希望战争，既不赞成进攻，也不喜欢在德里萨营地和其他任何地方设防士卫。不支持巴克雷皇帝，也不支持普弗尔、贝尼格森，他们只谋机一件事，一件非常重要的事，那就是为自己最大的利益和愉快而行动，在那潭浑水里盘根错节，扑朔离迷的阴谋诡计充斥皇帝的行辕，从中可捞到在别的时候意想不到的好处。有人只是怕失掉自己的即得利益。于是就今天同意普弗尔，明天又同意普弗尔的反对派，后天又宣布他对某个问题毫无意见，目的是只要能逃避责任和讨好皇帝。另外那些人希望捞取某种好处，吸引皇帝的注意力，就大喊大叫，拥护皇帝前一天暗示过的某件事，在会议上捶胸顿足地争论和叫喊，向不同意的人要求决斗，以此表明他准备为公众的利益而牺牲。第三种人，在两次会议中间而反对派又缺席时便直截了当地请求给自己一次补助作为自己忠实服务的报偿，他知道此时没有时间拒绝他。第四种人千方百计地表示自己辛勤工作。第五种人则为了达到其久已梦寐以求的宿愿——陪皇帝吃饭，拼命地证明一个刚提出的意见的正确或不正确，并为此举出或多或少有些正确和充分的论据。

这一派的所有人都在捞取卢布、勋章和官位。在这种追逐中只随着帝王恩宠的风向标转动，只要一发现风向标指向那一方向，结果却更难把风向标扭向另一方。在这动荡不定的局势中，在这使一切都处在惊慌和不安的严重危险中，在这阴谋自私、互相冲突各种观点和感情的漩涡中，加之所有这些人的种族差异，这人数众多，未谋私利的第八派给共同的事业增加了极大的混乱和惊慌。无论发生什么问题，这群蜂子在前一个题目上还未嗡嗡完，就飞到那个新问题上，并以自己的嗡嗡声压倒和淹灭那些真诚的辩论。

正当安德烈公爵来到军队时，从所有这些派别中正聚起一派，正提高自己的声誉的第九派。这一派由年事已高，有治国经验、聪明干练的人组成，他们不赞成互相对立的任何一种意见，冷静地观察大卡里发生的一切，思考摆脱目前这种方向不明，意志不坚，混乱一团和软弱无力状况的出路。

这一派人所思所想的是，一切坏事源于皇帝及其军事顾问们进驻军队，各种关系不明确，互相制约，左右摇摆不定都带进军队，这在家庭里可行。在军队就有害了。皇帝应该治理国家，而不是指挥军队，摆脱这种状态的唯一出路是皇帝及其宫廷从军队中撤出去，仅皇帝在场，为保护他个人的安全就使五万军队瘫痪；这个最差的，但是却独立自主的总司令也比那个最好的，然而却因皇帝及其权威而束手束脚的总司令要好得多。

正当安德烈公爵在德里萨闲住无事的时候，曾为这一派主要代表之一的希代科夫给皇帝与了一封信，巴拉瑟夫和阿拉克切耶夫也同意在信上签名。信中，利用皇帝准许他议论大局之便，借口必须鼓舞首都人民的战斗精神，恭请皇帝离开军队。

由皇帝亲自鼓舞和号召人民保卫祖国——这正是（就皇帝亲自到莫斯科来说）俄罗斯胜利的主要原因。为了给皇帝离开军队找个借口，提出的这个建议，被皇帝所接受了。