THE WHOLE of that day, the 25th of August, Napoleon spent, so his historians relate, on horseback, inspecting the locality, criticising the plans submitted to him by his marshals, and giving commands in person to his generals.
The original line of the Russian disposition, along the Kolotcha, had been broken through, and, in consequence of the taking of the Shevardino redoubt on the previous day, part of that line—the left flank—had been drawn further back. That part of the line had not been strengthened, was no longer protected by the river, and more open and level ground lay before it. It was obvious to any man, military or non-military, that it was that part of the line that the French should attack. One would have thought that no great deliberation would be necessary to reach this conclusion; that all the care and anxiety of the Emperor and his marshals were unnecessary, and that there was absolutely no need of that peculiar high degree of talent called genius, which they are so fond of ascribing to Napoleon. But the historians, who described the battle afterwards, and the men surrounding Napoleon at the time, and he himself, thought otherwise.
Napoleon rode about the field, gazing with a profound air at the country, wagging his head approvingly or dubiously to himself, and without communicating to the generals around him the profound chain of reasoning that guided him in his decisions, conveyed to them merely the final conclusions in the form of commands. Upon the suggestion being made by Davoust, now styled Duke of Eckmühl, for turning the Russian left flank, Napoleon said there was no need to do this, without explaining why there was no need. But to the proposal of General Compans (who was to attack the advanced earthworks), to lead his division through the forest, Napoleon signified his assent, although the so-called Duke of Elchingen, that is, Ney, ventured to observe that to move troops through woodland is risky, and might break up the formation of the division.
After examining the nature of the country opposite the Shevardino redoubt, Napoleon pondered a little while in silence and pointed to the spots where two batteries were to be placed by the morrow for action against the Russian fortifications, and the spots where, in a line with them, the field artillery was to be arranged.
After giving these and other commands, he went back to his quarters, and the disposition of the troops was written down from his dictation.
This disposition, of which the French speak with enthusiasm, and other historians with profound respect, consisted of the following instructions:
“Two new batteries, to be placed during the night on the plain occupied by the Duke of Eckmühl, will open fire at dawn on the two opposite batteries of the enemy.
“At the same time General Pernetti, in command of the artillery of the 1st corps, with thirty cannons of Compans's division, and all the howitzers of Desaix and Friant's division, will move forward, open fire, and shower shells on the enemy's battery, against which there will be at once in action:
24 cannons of the artillery of the Guards,
30 cannons of Compans's division, and
8 cannons of Friant and Desaix's division
—
In all 62 cannons.
“General Fouché, in command of the artillery of the 3rd corps, will place all the sixteen howitzers of the 3rd and 8th corps at the flanks of the battery, told off to bombard the left fortification, making forty guns in all aimed against it.
“General Sorbier is to be in readiness to advance on the word being given, with all the howitzers of the artillery of the Guards against either of the enemy's fortifications.
“During the cannonade Prince Poniatovsky is to advance to the village in the wood, and to turn the enemy's position.
“General Compans will cross the wood to gain possession of the first fortification.
“After the attack has begun on these lines, further commands will be given in accordance with the enemy's movements.
“The cannonade on the left flank will begin as soon as the cannons of the right wing are heard. The sharpshooters of Morand's division and of the viceroy's division will open a hot fire on seeing the beginning of the attack of the right wing.
“The viceroy will take possession of the village of Borodino, and cross by its three bridges, advancing to the same height with Morand's and Gérard's divisions, which under his leadership will advance to the redoubt and come into line with the other troops of the army.
“All this is to be done in good order (le tout se fera avec ordre et méthode), preserving as far as possible troops in reserve.
“The imperial camp, near Mozhaisk, September 6, 1812.”
These instructions—which strike one as exceedingly confused and obscure, if one ventures to throw off the superstitious awe for Napoleon's genius in treating of his disposition of his troops—may be condensed into four points—four commands. Not one of those instructions was or could be carried out.
In the first place the instruction is given: That the batteries placed on the spot selected by Napoleon, with the cannons of Pernetti and Fouché, which were to join them, in all one hundred and two cannons, were to open fire and shell the Russian earthworks and redoubts. This could not be done, since from the spots fixed on by Napoleon the shells did not carry so far as the Russian earthworks, and these one hundred and two cannons fired in the air till such time as the nearest officer in command ordered them to advance, in opposition to Napoleon's instructions.
The second instruction given is that Poniatovsky, advancing to the village in the wood, should turn the Russian left flank. This was not, and could not be done, as Poniatovsky, on advancing to the village in the wood, found Tutchkov there barring his way, and did not, and could not, turn the Russian position.
The third instruction is: General Compans will move into the wood to take possession of the first Russian fortification. Compans's division did not take the first fortification, but was beaten back, because, as it came out of the wood, it had to form under a fire of grapeshot, of which Napoleon knew nothing.
The fourth instruction is: That the viceroy will take possession of the village (Borodino), and cross by its three bridges, following to the same high ground as Morand's and Friant's divisions (nothing is said of whence and when they were to advance), which under his leadership will advance to the redoubt and form in a line with the other troops. As far as one can make out, not so much from this confused paragraph, as from the attempts made by the viceroy to carry out the orders given him, he was to advance through Borodino from the left to the redoubt, and the divisions of Morand and Friant were to advance simultaneously from the front. All this, like the other instructions, was impossible to carry out. After passing through Borodino the viceroy was beaten back at the Kolotcha, and could advance no further. The divisions of Morand and Friant did not take the redoubt, but were driven back, and at the end of the day the redoubt was captured by cavalry (in an action probably unforeseen by Napoleon; and not heard of by him).
And not one of the instructions given was, or could be, carried into effect. But in the disposition was the statement, that after the battle had begun, further instructions would be given in accordance with the enemy's movements; and so it might be supposed that all necessary instructions had been given by Napoleon during the battle. But this was not, and could not be, the case, because, during the whole battle Napoleon was so far from the scene of action that (as it turned out later) he knew nothing of the course of the battle, and not a single instruction given by him during the fight could possibly be executed.
八月二十五日这一整天，正如拿破仑的史学家所说，拿破仑是在马上度过的：他观察地形，研究元帅们递上来的计划，亲自给将军们发布命令。
俄军原先沿着科洛恰河的战线被突破了，部分战线——俄军的左翼，由于二十四日舍瓦尔金诺多面堡的失守，向后撤了，这部分新战线没设防御工事，也无河可守，它面对一片广阔的平面。不论是军人还是非军人都很清楚，法国人正应当进攻这部分战线。对这个问题，似乎无须多加考虑，也无须皇帝和他的将军们那么操心和奔忙，尤其无须特别突出的能力——也就是人们喜欢加在拿破仑身上的所谓天才；但是后来描述这一事件的史学家们，当时在拿破仑身边的人们，以及拿破仑本人，却另有想法。
拿破仑骑着马在战场上巡视，带着深思熟虑的神情观察地形，他点点头或摇摇头，以表示同意或者怀疑，他只是把最后的结论以命令的形式传达给跟随他左右的将军们，但他作出这些决定经过什么深谋远虑的指导思想，却不对他们讲。拿破仑听了那个被称为埃克米尔公爵的达乌①关于迂回俄军左翼的建议后，说不需那样做，但是不说明为什么不需要。康庞将军（他负责进攻多角堡）要率领他那一师穿过树林，拿破仑对这个建议表示同意。虽然那个所谓埃尔欣根公爵内伊②斗胆指出，在树林里行动是危险的，可能弄乱全师的队形。
①达乌·路易（1770～1823），法国元帅，曾在一八○五年奥斯特利茨战役和一八○六年奥尔施泰特战役建立功勋。
②内伊，米歇尔（1769～1815），法国元帅，拿破仑一世最亲密的战友之一。一八一二年法国军队从俄国撤退时，负责法军后卫部队的指挥。
拿破仑观察过舍瓦尔金诺多面堡对面的地形之后，思索了一会儿，指出要在明天天亮以前布置两个炮兵阵地的地点，以攻打俄军的防御工事，又指出与炮兵阵地并列的地点安置野战炮。
他发出这些命令以及别的命名之后，就回到大本营，按照他的日授写下了战斗部署。
曾为法国史学家得意洋洋和别的史学家满怀敬意叙述的战斗部署如下：
在埃克米尔公爵据守的平原上夜间新建的两个炮兵阵地，拂晓要向对面两个敌人的炮兵阵地开火。
同时，第一团炮队司令佩尔涅提将军率领康庞的三十尊大炮以及德塞和弗里昂两师的全部榴弹炮，向前推进，开火，用榴弹压倒敌人的炮兵阵地，参加战斗的有：
二十四尊近卫军炮队的炮
三十尊康庞师的炮
八尊弗里昂和德塞两师的炮
共计六十二尊炮。
第三兵团炮兵司令富歇将军要把第三、第八兵团的榴弹炮，共计十六尊，安置在担任轰击敌人左方工事的炮兵阵地两侧，此处共有炮四十尊。
索尔比埃将军应作好准备，一接到命令，立即用近卫军的全部榴弹炮轰击敌人的任何一处防御工事。
在炮击中间，波尼亚托夫斯基公爵直趋那个村子，通过树林迂回敌人的阵地。
康庞将军通过树林夺取第一个堡垒。
照此进入战斗后，将视敌人行动随时发布命令。
一听见右翼炮声，左翼立即开始炮击，莫朗师和总督①师的狙击兵，一见右翼开始进攻，立即猛烈开火。
总督要占领那个村子，然后越过三座桥，协同莫朗和热拉尔两师直趋高地，总督率领这两个师进攻打多角堡，并与其他部队投入战斗。
这一切都要有条不紊地完成（le tout se fera avec ordre et méthode②），尽可能保留后备部队。
莫扎伊斯克附近御营，一八一二年九月六日③。
①总督指副元帅缪拉，拿破仑已经封他为那不勒斯王。
②法语：一切要按次序和方案进行。
③此处的日期是公历，相当俄国旧历八月二十五日。
假如我们对拿破仑天才不抱有宗教的敬畏之感来看这些命令的话，那么，战斗部署是极端模糊和混乱的，它包括四点，即四项命名。这四项命令没有一项是能够实现的，实际上也没有实现。
这个部署的第一项说：·在拿破仑所选定的地点上的炮队，连同与其并列的佩尔涅提和富歇的大炮，共计一百零二尊，对俄国的凸角堡和多面堡开火并发射榴弹。这是办不到的，因为在拿破仑所指定的地点，炮弹射不到俄国的工事，除非就近的司令官违反拿破仑的命令把大炮向前移动，不然那一百零二尊大炮只能放空。
第二项命令是：波尼亚托夫斯基通过树林向那个村子进军，迂回到俄军的左翼。这是不可能的，实际上也没有做到，因为波尼亚托夫斯基向那个村子进军的时候，在那儿遭遇到图奇科夫的阻击，不可能也未曾迂回到俄国的阵地。
第三项命令：康庞将军通过树林夺取第一座堡垒。康庞那一师并没占领第一座堡垒，因为从树林里一出来，该师就不得不在拿破仑意想不到的霰弹的火力攻击下整理队伍。
第四项：总督要占领那个村子（波罗底诺），然后越过三座桥，协同莫朗和热拉尔两师直趋高地（对他们的行动方向和时间并未发出指示），总督率领两个师进攻多角堡，并与其他部队进入战斗。
只可能这样理解——不是由于这个复杂的句子含混不清，就是由于总督在执行他所接受的命令时另有企图——他从左方通过波罗底诺向多面堡进攻，而莫朗和弗里昂两师同时正面进攻。
所有这一切以及部署中的其他各点，不曾也不可能执行。总督越过波罗底诺，在科洛恰被打退了，不能再前进了，多面堡没有被莫朗和弗里昂两师占领，只是在战斗结束时才被骑兵攻下（拿破仑大概未料到也未听到）。这么一来，部署中的那些命令没有一项是被执行了的，也不可能被执行。部署中又说，战斗照这样开始后，将按照敌人的行动随时发布命令，因此，好像是在战斗中，拿破仑将发出一切必要的命令；但实际并非如此，也不可能做到，因为在战斗时拿破仑离战场很远，战斗过程他不可能知道（这在后来才知道的）他的命令没有一项是在战斗中切实可行的。
欢迎访问英文小说网http://novel.tingroom.com