MEANWHILE, in an event of even greater importance than the retreat of the army without a battle, in the abandonment and burning of Moscow, Count Rastoptchin, whom we conceive as taking the lead in that event, was acting in a very different manner from Kutuzov.

This event—the abandonment and burning of Moscow—was, after the battle of Borodino, as inevitable as the retreat of the army without fighting.

Every Russian could have foretold what happened, not as a result of any train of intellectual deductions, but from the feeling that lies at the bottom of our hearts, and lay at the bottom of our fathers'!

In every town and village on Russian soil, from Smolensk onwards, without the assistance of Count Rastoptchin and his placards, the same thing took place as happened in Moscow. The people awaited the coming of the enemy without disturbance; did not display excitement; tore nobody to pieces, but calmly awaited their fate, feeling in themselves the power to find what they must do in the moment of difficulty.

And as soon as the enemy came near, the wealthier elements of the population went away, leaving their property behind; the poorer remained, and burnt and destroyed all that was left.

The sense that this would be so, and always would be so, lay, and lies at the bottom of every Russian's heart. And a sense of this, and more, a foreboding that Moscow would be taken by the enemy, lay in the Russian society of Moscow in 1812. Those who had begun leaving Moscow in July and the beginning of August had shown that they expected it. Those who left the city with what they could carry away, abandoning their houses and half their property, did so in consequence of that latent patriotism, which finds expression, not in phrases, not in giving one's children to death for the sake of the fatherland, and such unnatural exploits, but expresses itself imperceptibly in the most simple, organic way, and so always produces the most powerful results.

“It's a disgrace to fly from danger; only the cowards are flying from Moscow,” they were told. Rastoptchin, in his placards, urged upon them that it was base to leave Moscow. They were ashamed at hearing themselves called cowards; they were ashamed of going away; but still they went away, knowing that it must be so. Why did they go away? It cannot be supposed that Rastoptchin had scared them with tales of the atrocities perpetrated by Napoleon in the countries he conquered. The first to leave were the wealthy, educated people, who knew very well that Vienna and Berlin remained uninjured, and that the inhabitants of those cities, when Napoleon was in occupation of them, had spent their time gaily with the fascinating Frenchmen, of whom all Russians, and especially the ladies, had at that period been so fond.

They went away because to Russians the question whether they would be comfortable or not under the government of the French in Moscow could never occur. To be under the government of the French was out of the question; it was worse than anything. They were going away even before Borodino, and still more rapidly after Borodino; regardless of the calls to defend the city, regardless of the proclamations of the governor of Moscow; of his intention of going with the Iversky Virgin into battle, and of the air-balloons which were to demolish the French, and all the nonsense with which Rastoptchin filled his placards. They knew that it was for the army to fight, and if the army could not, it would be of no use to rush out with young ladies and house-serfs to fight Napoleon on the Three Hills, and so they must make haste and get away, sorry as they were to leave their possessions to destruction. They drove away without a thought of the vast consequences of this immense wealthy city being abandoned by its inhabitants, and being inevitably thereby consigned to the flames. To abstain from destroying and burning empty houses would never occur to the Russian peasantry. They drove away, each on his own account, and yet it was only in consequence of their action that the grand event came to pass that is the highest glory of the Russian people. The lady who in June set off with her Negroes and her buffoons from Moscow for her Saratov estates, with a vague feeling that she was not going to be a servant of Bonaparte's, and a vague dread that she might be hindered from going by Rastoptchin's orders, was simply and genuinely doing the great deed that saved Russia.

Count Rastoptchin at one time cried shame on those who were going, then removed all the public offices, then served out useless weapons to the drunken rabble, then brought out the holy images, and prevented Father Augustin from removing the holy relics and images, then got hold of all the private conveyances that were in Moscow, then in one hundred and thirty-six carts carried out the air-balloon made by Leppich, at one time hinted that he should set fire to Moscow, at one time described how he had burnt his own house, and wrote a proclamation to the French in which he solemnly reproached them for destroying the home of his childhood. He claimed the credit of having set fire to Moscow, then disavowed it; he commanded the people to capture all spies, and bring them to him, then blamed the people for doing so; he sent all the French residents out of Moscow, and then let Madame Aubert-Chalmey, who formed the centre of French society in Moscow, remain. For no particular reason he ordered the respected old postmaster, Klucharov, to be seized and banished. He got the people together on the Three Hills to fight the French, and then, to get rid of them, handed a man over to them to murder, and escaped himself by the back door. He vowed he would never survive the disaster of Moscow, and later on wrote French verses in albums on his share in the affair.

This man had no inkling of the import of what was happening. All he wanted was to do something himself, to astonish people, to perform some heroic feat of patriotism, and, like a child, he frolicked about the grand and inevitable event of the abandonment and burning of Moscow, trying with his puny hand first to urge on, and then to hold back, the tide of the vast popular current that was bearing him along with it.

当时与库图佐夫意见相悖的拉斯托普钦，在比不战而退更重要的事件上，即是在放弃莫斯科与火烧莫斯科的问题上与库图佐夫对立的拉斯托普钦（他便是事件的领导者），采取了完全相反的行动。

这一事件——放弃和烧毁莫斯科——与波罗底诺战役后不战而撤离莫斯科一样，都是不可避免的。

每个俄国人，不是凭理智，而是凭祖先传下来的感情，便能预见到所发生后切。

从斯摩棱斯克起，这片俄国大地上的所有城市乡村，没有拉斯托普钦伯爵的参与和他的传单，也曾发生过在莫斯科所发生的同样事情。人民漠然地等待着敌人，没有惹事生非，没有骚动，没有把谁撕成碎片，而是平静地听天由命，感觉到自身有力量在艰难时刻到来时找到该做的事情。所以，在敌人快要抵达时，最殷实的居民才出走，撇下财产不顾；最贫穷的没有离开，却烧掉和摧毁了留下来的东西。

对将要发生、也的确总会发生的事的预感，在俄国人心灵里代代相传。这种预感，尤其是对莫斯科将被占领的预感，在一八一二年，即存在于俄国的、莫斯科的社交界。那些还在六月份和八月初就开始离开莫斯科的人，表明他们料到了这一步。那些驾车离开的人带着拿得走的财物，留下房屋和一半财产，他们这样做是由于隐而不显的（latent）爱国主义，它无须用言辞表达，不是用那献出子女以图救国等类似的违反自然的方式来表现，而是不知不觉地，简单地，有生机地表示出来的，所以，总是产生出最有力的效果。

“躲避危险可耻；从莫斯科逃跑的是懦夫。”他们被告知。拉斯托普钦在通告上向他们灌输，离开莫斯科是耻辱的。背懦夫之名于他们有愧，出走有愧，但他们仍然在走，知道就得这样。为什么他们走呢？切不可以为，是拉斯托普钦用拿破仑在被占领土制造的暴行吓坏了他们。他们都出走，首先走掉的是富有的受过教育的人们，他们很清楚，维也纳和柏林保存完整，在拿破仑占领期间，那里的居民与迷人的法国人度着好时光，当时的俄国爷们，尤其是女士们，是很爱法国人的。

他们走，是因为俄国人根本不会去想，莫斯科在法国人统治下是好呢还是坏。受法国人统治绝对不行：这是最坏不过的。他们在波罗底诺战役之前就在离开，其后走得更快，不顾守城的号召，无视莫斯科卫戍司令打算抬着伊韦尔圣母像去作战的声明，无视定能摧毁法军的空中气球的存在，并且，也无视拉斯托普钦在通告上写的昏话。他们知道：军队是应该作战的；如果军队不作战，带着太太小姐和家奴则更不能到三座山去抗击拿破仑；应该走，无论毁掉财产有多么痛心。他们走了，不去想富丽堂皇的大都的巨大价值，它已被弃置，被付之于大火（偌大的一撤而空的木头城，必然有人会纵火焚毁）；他们都走了，人人为自己，也正是因为他们走掉了，才造成一个伟大的事件，永远成为俄国人民的殊荣。那位在六月就带着黑奴和女伴从莫斯科登程去萨拉托夫乡下的贵妇人，模糊地意识到她不是侍候波拿巴的，而且害怕会按伯爵的命令被人留下，作的就是拯救俄国的大事，做得简单，真诚。拉斯托普钦伯爵呢，他时而羞辱逃跑的人，时而疏散政府机关，时而把那儿都不能用的武器发给一群醉鬼，时而抬圣像游行，时而禁止奥古斯丁大主数运走圣骸和圣像，时而扣押莫斯科全部私人车辆，时而用一百三十六辆车拉走列比赫正在制造的气球，时而暗示他将烧毁莫斯科，时而讲述他已烧毁了自己的房屋，并向法国人发了一篇宣言，庄严地谴责他们焚毁了他的孤儿院；时而认为火烧莫斯科的光荣归于他自己，又时而否认其光荣，时而命令民众捉住所有奸细并押去见他，时而又为此责备民众，时而遣散全部法国人，叫他们离开莫斯科，时而留下奥贝尔—夏尔姆夫人，使她成为所有法裔居民的核心，但又罚不当罪地下令把年高德劭的邮政局长克柳恰廖夫逮捕并送去流放；时而征召民众去三座山以便同法军打仗，时而为摆脱这些民众，吩咐他们去杀人，自己反而从后门溜走；时而说他忍受不了莫斯科的不幸，时而在纪念册上用法文题咏自己对这件大事的同情①，——此人并不理解正在发生的事件的意义，只想干点什么，要一鸣惊人，完成某种爱国主义的英雄行为，面对伟大的不可避免的莫斯科撤退和大火事件，像孩子一样嬉戏，吃力地用他的小手时而推进，时而阻滞那股连他一起卷走的民众的洪流。

①大意是：我生而为鞑靼人，想做罗马人，法国人叫我野蛮人，俄国人叫我乔治·当丹，（当丹为莫里哀《乔治·当丹》中的主人公）。