FROM THAT TIME up to the end of the campaign, all Kutuzov's activity was limited to trying by the exercise of authority, by guile and by entreaties, to hold his army back from useless attacks, man?uvres, and skirmishes with the perishing enemy. Dohturov marched to Maley Yaroslavets, but Kutuzov lingered with the main army, and gave orders for the clearing of the Kaluga, retreat beyond which seemed to Kutuzov quite possible.

Everywhere Kutuzov retreated, but the enemy, without waiting for him to retire, fled back in the opposite direction.

Napoleon's historians describe to us his skilful man?uvres at Tarutino, and at Maley Yaroslavets, and discuss what would have happened if Napoleon had succeeded in making his way to the wealthy provinces of the south.

But to say nothing of the fact that nothing hindered Napoleon from marching into these southern provinces (since the Russian army left the road open), the historians forget that nothing could have saved Napoleon's army, because it carried within itself at that time the inevitable germs of ruin. Why should that army, which found abundant provisions in Moscow and could not keep them, but trampled them underfoot, that army which could not store supplies on entering Smolensk, but plundered at random, why should that army have mended its ways in the Kaluga province, where the inhabitants were of the same Russian race as in Moscow, and where fire had the same aptitude for destroying whatever they set fire to.

The army could not have recovered itself any way. From the battle of Borodino and the sacking of Moscow it bore within itself, as it were, the chemical elements of dissolution.

The men of what had been an army fled with their leaders, not knowing whither they went, Napoleon and every soldier with him filled with one desire: to make his own escape as quickly as might be from the hopeless position of which all were dimly aware.

At the council in Maley Yaroslavets, when the French generals, affecting to be deliberating, gave various opinions as to what was to be done, the opinion of the blunt soldier, Mouton, who said what all were thinking, that the only thing to do was to get away as quickly as possible, closed every one's mouth; and no one, not even Napoleon, could say anything in opposition to this truth that all recognised.

But though everybody knew that they must go, there was still a feeling of shame left at acknowledging they must fly. And some external shock was necessary to overcome that shame. And that shock came when it was needed. It was le Hourra de l'Empereur, as the French called it.

On the day after the council, Napoleon, on the pretext of inspecting the troops and the field of a past and of a future battle, rode out early in the morning in the midst of the lines of his army with a suite of marshals and an escort. The Cossacks, who were in search of booty, swept down on the Emperor, and all but took him prisoner. What saved Napoleon from the Cossacks that day was just what was the ruin of the French army, the booty, which here as well as at Tarutino tempted the Cossacks to let their prey slip. Without taking any notice of Napoleon, they dashed at the booty, and Napoleon succeeded in getting away.

When les enfants du Don might positively capture the Emperor himself in the middle of his army, it was evident that there was nothing else to do but to fly with all possible haste by the nearest and the familiar road. Napoleon, with his forty years and his corpulence, had not all his old resourcefulness and courage, and he quite took the hint; and under the influence of the fright the Cossacks had given him, he agreed at once with Mouton, and gave, as the historians tell us, the order to retreat along the Smolensk road.

The fact that Napoleon agreed with Mouton, and that the army did not retreat in that direction, does not prove that his command decided that retreat, but that the forces acting on the whole army and driving it along the Mozhaisk road were simultaneously acting upon Napoleon too.

自从获悉法国人撤出莫斯科直至战役结束，库图佐夫的全部活动是：用权力、计谋、劝告来阻止军队打无益的进攻、运动战、与行将灭亡的敌人冲突。多赫图罗夫去小雅罗斯拉维茨，库图佐夫率全军按兵不动，并下令撤离卡卢加，他觉得退出卡卢加是可行的。

库图佐夫到处都在退却，但是敌人不等他退却，就向相反的方向逃跑。

拿破仑的史学家向我们描绘他向塔鲁丁诺和小雅罗斯拉维茨巧妙的运动，并断言，如果拿破仑深入富庶的南方各省，就会怎样怎样。

但是，且不说没有什么妨碍他进入南方各省（因为俄军给他让路），史学家忘记了什么也救不了拿破仑军队，因为它本身已具备了不可避免的灭亡条件。这支军队在莫斯科能得到充足补给而不保住它，却任意践踏，在斯摩棱斯克不是征集而是抢劫给养，那么在卡卢加省——这里住着和莫斯科同样的俄国人，有同样可以放火的东西，为什么就能恢复元气呢？

这支军队在任何地方都不能恢复元气了，自波罗底诺战役和莫斯科抢劫之后，它本身已给含有腐败的化学特性了。

曾经作为这支军队的军人，跟随头目逃跑，不知道逃向何方，只有一个愿望（拿破仑和每个士兵都是这样），尽快逃离这个虽然尚不明确，然而谁都意识到的绝境。

正因为这样，在小雅罗斯拉维茨会次上，将军们假装正经地商议，发表各种意见，憨直的军人穆顿说出了大家想说的话——只有尽快逃跑，他这个最后的意见一下堵住了大家的嘴，没有人，甚至拿破仑，都说不出什么来反对这个大家都已经意识到了的真理。

虽然大家都知道应该逃走，但是仍羞于承认这一点。还需要一个外界的推力来克服这种羞辱感。这一推力适时出现了。就是法国人所谓的leHourradeI'empereur①。

①法语：皇帝，乌拉！（指俄国军队冲锋时的喊声。）

会后的第二天，拿破仑佯装视察军队和先前的与未来的战场，大早率领一群元帅和卫队，骑着马穿行于军中。到处寻找战利品的哥萨克碰上了这位皇帝，差一点捉住他。如果说哥萨克这次没有捉住拿破仑，救了他同时也是毁了他的那个东西——战利品，在塔鲁丁诺和在这里，哥萨克不去抓人，都扑向战利品。他们没有注意拿破仑，扑向战利品，他逃脱了。

LesenfantsduDon①在拿破仑的军队中差点把皇帝本人捉住，事情已很明显，除了沿最近的熟悉的道路逃跑之外，已别无他法。拿破仑这个四十岁的人，已经没有昔日的灵活和勇敢了，他知道这一苗头。在他受到哥萨克的惊吓之后，立刻就同意了穆顿的意见，如史学家所说，发生了向斯摩棱斯克大路撤退的命令。

①法语：顿河的儿子们（指哥萨克）。

拿破仑同意了穆顿的意见，军队退却了，并不证明他曾下令这样做，而是证明了对全军起作用的那种力量，即促使全军取道莫扎伊斯克大路的那种力量，同时也在拿破仑身上起了作用。