AFTER THE ENGAGEMENT at Vyazma, where Kutuzov could not restrain his troops in their desire to break through, to cut off and all the rest of it, the further march of the flying French, and of the Russians flying after them, continued as far as Krasnoe without a battle. The flight was so rapid that the Russian army racing after the French could not catch them up; the horses of the cavalry and artillery broke down, and information as to the movements of the French was always very uncertain.

The Russian soldiers were so exhausted by this unbroken march at the rate of forty versts a day that they were unable to quicken their pace.

To form an idea of the degree of exhaustion of the Russian army, one need only grasp clearly what is meant by the fact that while losing no more than five thousand killed and wounded, and not a hundred prisoners, the Russian army, which had left Tarutino a hundred thousand strong, numbered only fifty thousand on reaching Krasnoe.

The rapidity of the Russian pursuit had as disintegrating an effect on the Russian army as the flight of the French had on their army. The only difference was that the Russian army moved at its own will, free from the menace of annihilation that hung over the French, and that the sick and stragglers of the French were left in the hands of their enemy, while Russian stragglers were at home among their own people. The chief cause of the wasting of Napoleon's army was the rapidity of its movements, and an indubitable proof of that is to be seen in the corresponding dwindling of the Russian army.

Just as at Tarutino and at Vyazma, all Kutuzov's energies were directed to preventing—so far as it lay in his power—any arrest of the fatal flight of the French from being checked (as the Russian generals in Petersburg, and also in the army, wished it to be). He did all he could to urge on the flight of the French, and to slacken the speed of his own army.

In addition to the exhaustion of the men, and the immense losses due to the rapidity of their movements, Kutuzov saw another reason for slackening the pace, and not being in a hurry. The object of the Russian army was the pursuit of the French. The route of the French was uncertain, and therefore the more closely our soldiers followed the heels of the French, the greater the distances they had to traverse. It was only by following at a considerable distance that they could take advantage of short cuts across the zig-zags made by the French in their course. All the skilful man?uvres suggested by the generals were based on forced marches at accelerated speed, while the only rational object to be aimed at was the diminution of the strain put on the men. And this was the object to which all Kutuzov's efforts were directed during the whole campaign from Moscow to Vilna,—not casually, not fitfully, but so consistently that he never once lost sight of it.

Not through reason, not by science, but with all his Russian heart and soul, Kutuzov felt and knew, as every Russian soldier felt it, that the French were vanquished, that their foes were in flight, and that they must see them off. But at the same time he felt with his soldiers, as one man, all the sufferings of that march, unheard of at such speed and in such weather.

But the generals, especially those not Russian, burning to distinguish themselves, to dazzle people, to take some duke or king prisoner for some incomprehensible reason—those generals thought that then, when any battle was sickening and meaningless, was the very time for fighting battles and conquering somebody. Kutuzov simply shrugged his shoulders when they came to him one after another with projects of man?uvres with the ill-shod, half-clothed, and half-starved soldiers, whose numbers had in one month dwindled to one-half without a battle, and who would even, under the most favourable circumstances, have a longer distance to traverse before they reached the frontier than they had come already.

This desire on the part of the generals to distinguish themselves, to execute man?uvres, to attack, and to cut off the enemy, was particularly conspicuous whenever the Russian army did come into contact with the French.

So it was at Krasnoe, where they had expected to find one of the three columns of the French, and stumbled upon Napoleon himself with sixteen thousand troops. In spite of all Kutuzov's efforts to avoid this disastrous engagement, and to keep his men safe for three days at Krasnoe, there was a slaughter of the disordered bands of the French by the exhausted soldiers of the Russian army.

Toll wrote out a disposition: first column to advance to this spot, and so on. And as always, what was done was not at all in accordance with that disposition. Prince Eugene of Würtemberg kept up a fire from the hills on the mob of French as they raced by, and asked for reinforcements, which did not come. In the nights the French dispersed to get round the Russians, hid themselves in the woods, and all that could struggled on again.

Miloradovitch, who declared that he had no wish to know anything about the commissariat arrangements of his detachment, who could never be found when he was wanted, that chevalier sans peur et sans reproche, as he called himself, always eager for parleys with the French, sent messengers to demand their surrender, wasted time, and did not carry out the orders given him.

“I make you a present of that column, lads,” he said to his men, pointing out the French to his cavalry. And the cavalry, with spur and sabre, urged their broken-down horses into a trot, and with immense effort reached the column he had bestowed on them, that is to say, a mob of frozen, numb, and starving Frenchmen. And the column laid down their weapons and surrendered, which was what they had been longing to do for weeks past.

At Krasnoe there were taken twenty-six thousand prisoners, a hundred cannons, a stick of some sort, which was promptly dubbed a “marshal's baton.” And the generals disputed among themselves who had gained most distinction in the action, and were delighted at it, though they were full of regret at not having captured Napoleon or some marshal and hero, and blamed one another, and above all Kutuzov, for failing to do so.

These men, drawn on by their own passions, were but the blind instruments of the most melancholy law of necessity; but they believed themselves heroes, and imagined that what they were doing was the noblest and most honourable achievement. They blamed Kutuzov, and declared from the very beginning of the campaign he had prevented them from conquering Napoleon; that he thought of nothing but his own sensual gratifications, and would not advance out of Polotnyany Zavody because he was comfortable there; that he had checked the advance at Krasnoe; that he had completely lost his head when he heard Napoleon was near; that one might really suppose he had a secret understanding with Napoleon, that he had been bought over by him, and so on and so on.

And not only contemporaries, misled by their own passions, have spoken thus. Posterity and history have accepted Napoleon as grand, while foreign writers have called Kutuzov a crafty, dissolute, weak, intriguing old man; and Russians have seen in him a nondescript being, a sort of puppet, only of use owing to his Russian name …

在维亚济马战役之后，库图佐夫已遏止不了自己的军队要打败、切断……敌人的愿望，逃命的法国人和在后面穷追的俄国人都继续向前方运动，在抵达克拉斯诺耶之前，再没有打过仗。法国人逃跑速度是如此之快，以至于在其后穷追的俄国军队怎么也追赶不上。就连炮兵和骑的马匹都累得跑不动了，关于法军行动的情报总也弄不准确。

俄国军队一昼夜强行军四十俄里，被这种连续不停的行动累得人困马乏，要想再快一点点都不可能办到。

要了解俄军消耗的程度，只要了解以下事实的意义就足够了：在塔鲁丁诺作战的整个期间，俄军伤亡没有超过五千人，被俘的不到一百人。但是，从塔鲁丁诺出发时有十万俄国军队，到达克拉斯诺耶就只剩下五万人了。

俄国人穷追法国人的强行军和法国人的亡命奔逃，都给自己造成巨大损失。其差别仅仅在于，俄军的追击行动是自由的，没有高悬在法军头上的死亡的威胁；还在于法军掉了队的伤病员落入敌方手中，而掉队的俄国兵却留在自己的乡土上。拿破仑军队减员的主要原因是行动速度过快，俄国军队的减员毫无疑问地证实了也是同样的原因。

库图佐夫在塔鲁丁诺和维亚济马的全部活动都放在（尽其所能）不去阻挡法国自取灭亡的这种行动（彼得堡方面和俄国军队的将军们却想阻挡它），而是促成这种行动，同时减慢自己的行军速度。

但是，除了军队疲惫不堪已十分明显和由于行动过快而造成严重减员之外，另一个原因就是库图佐夫要减缓追击速度，等待更有利的时机。俄军的目的是跟踪法国人。而法军溃逃路线又捉摸不定，因此，跟的愈紧，跑的路就愈多。只有保持一定距离，才能抄近路截击法军所走的之字形路线。我们的将军提出的一切巧妙战术，就是频繁调动军队，加大行军里程。而唯一合理的目标是缩减行军里程。在从莫斯科到维尔纳的整个战役中，库图佐夫的行动就是为此目的——不是偶而地、一时地、而是始终如一，丝毫也未改变这一目的。

库图佐夫不凭借智慧或科学，而是凭他作为一名俄罗斯人，他和每一个士兵都息息相通，即：法国人败了，正在逃命，把他们赶出去；他和士兵们都知道，以那么空前的速度和在那样的季节行军的全部艰难。

但是，将军们，特别是外籍将军们想表现自己，一鸣惊人，为了不可告人的目的去俘虏某个公爵或国王，而目前任何战斗不但令人厌恶而且毫无意义，可这些将军们却认为正是打几仗，战胜某人的时机。当库图佐夫接到一个接一个的这种拙劣的作战计划时，他只耸耸肩：要执行这些计划，就要使用那些穿着破鞋、没有皮衣、饿得半死，在一个月中没有打仗就减少了一半的士兵，而且即便在最好的条件下继续追赶到边境。前面的路程比已经走过的还要远。

当俄军和法军遭遇时，想出风头，打运动战，打跨、切断敌人的这些愿望都特别明显地表现出来了。

在克拉斯诺耶发生过这样的情况，他们想在这个地方找到法国人的三个纵队中的一个中队，而碰上了拿破仑本人亲自率领的一万六千名军队，尽管库图佐夫为了保存自己的部队，竭尽全力避免那次毁灭性的遭遇战。然而疲惫不堪的俄国军队一连三天屠杀溃不成军的法国军队。

托尔拟了一道作战命令：dieersteColonnemarshierst，①等等。然而，像往常一样，一切行动都没有遵照命令进行。符腾堡的叶夫根尼亲王从山上射击，他要求援军，援军尚未赶到。一到夜间，法国人就躲避开俄国人，分散地逃进森林，凡能够逃脱的人就继续向前逃命。

米洛拉多维奇，这位自己说他完全不想知道部队的给养情况，他自命为“chevaliersanspeuretsansreproche”②，凡有事需要找的时候，总也找不到他。可他却热中于和法国人谈判，他派人去法军中要求法国人投降，他白白地浪费了时间，他做了并非命令他去做的事情。

①法语：第一纵队向某地前进。

②法语：无畏和无可指摘的骑士。

“弟兄们，我把这个纵队交给你们了，”他骑着马来到部队跟前，他指着法国人对骑兵们说。于是，骑兵们跨上几乎跑不动的马，他们用马刺和战刀抽打座骑，追上这支送到他们嘴边的纵队，追上了这一群行将冻僵、饿死了的法国人；于是这支送到嘴边的纵队放下了武器投降了，其实，这群法国人早就希望这样做了。

在克拉斯诺耶活捉了两万六千名俘虏，缴获了数百门大炮和一根据称是“元帅杖”的棍子，接着人们就争论谁谁立了功，对这一仗都很高兴，但十分遗憾的是没捉到拿破仑，连一个英雄或一个元帅也没捉到，他们为此互相指责，尤其责备库图佐夫。

这群被胜利冲昏头脑的人，不过是最可悲的必然规律的盲目执行者，却当自己是英雄，自以为做了最可敬、最崇高的事情。他们指责库图佐夫，说他从一开始就妨碍他们战胜拿破仑，说他只知道满足私欲，在亚麻布厂①止步不前贪图安逸；说他在克拉斯诺耶按兵不动，因为他知道拿破仑在那里，就惊慌失措；说他和拿破仑有默契，被收买了，等等，等等。

不但当时被冲昏头脑的人那么说，甚至后代和历史都承认拿破仑grand②，至于库图佐夫外国人说他狡猾、好色、是软弱的老官僚；俄国人说他难以捉摸、是个傀儡，他有点用处，只不过因为他有个俄国人的名字而已……③

①亚麻布厂，村镇地名，位于卡卢加至维亚济马之间。库图佐夫在卡卢加至维亚济马一带休整，不去追击逃跑的法国人。

②法语：伟大。

③见威尔逊日记。——托夫斯泰注。（罗勃特·托马斯·威尔逊〔1774～1849〕，曾于一八一二至一八一四年在俄军司令部任英国军事委员。他的日记于一八六一年出版。）