WHAT is the force that moves nations?

Biographical historians, and historians writing of separate nations, understand this force as a power residing in heroes and sovereigns. According to their narratives, the events were entirely due to the wills of Napoleons, of Alexanders, or, generally speaking, of those persons who form the subject of historical memoirs. The answers given by historians of this class to the question as to the force which brings about events are satisfactory, but only so long as there is only one historian for any event. But as soon as historians of different views and different nationalities begin describing the same event, the answers given by them immediately lose all their value, as this force is understood by them, not only differently, but often in absolutely opposite ways. One historian asserts that an event is due to the power of Napoleon; another maintains that it is produced by the power of Alexander; a third ascribes it to the influence of some third person. Moreover, historians of this class contradict one another even in their explanation of the force on which the influence of the same person is based. Thiers, a Bonapartist, says that Napoleon's power rested on his virtue and his genius; Lanfrey, a Republican, declares that it rested on his duplicity and deception of the people. So that historians of this class, mutually destroying each other's position, at the same time destroy the conception of the force producing events, and give no answer to the essential question of history.

Writers of universal history, who have to deal with all the nations at once, appear to recognise the incorrectness of the views of historians of separate countries as to the force that produces events. They do not recognise this force as a power pertaining to heroes and sovereigns, but regard it as the resultant of many forces working in different directions. In describing a war on the subjugation of a people, the writer of general history seeks the cause of the event, not in the power of one person, but in the mutual action on one another of many persons connected with the event.

The power of historical personages conceived as the product of several forces, according to this view, can hardly, one would have supposed, be regarded as a self-sufficient force independently producing events. Yet writers of general history do in the great majority of cases employ the conception of power again as a self-sufficient force producing events and standing in the relation of cause to them. According to their exposition now the historical personage is the product of his time, and his power is only the product of various forces, now his power is the force producing events. Gervinus, Schlosser, for instance, and others, in one place, explain that Napoleon is the product of the Revolution, of the ideas of 1789, and so on; and in another plainly state that the campaign of 1812 and other events not to their liking are simply the work of Napoleon's wrongly directed will, and that the very ideas of 1789 were arrested in their development by Napoleon's arbitrary rule. The ideas of the Revolution, the general temper of the age produced Napoleon's power. The power of Napoleon suppressed the ideas of the Revolution and the general temper of the age.

This strange inconsistency is not an accidental one. It confronts us at every turn, and, in fact, whole works upon universal history are made up of consecutive series of such inconsistencies. This inconsistency is due to the fact that after taking a few steps along the road of analysis, these historians have stopped short halfway.

To find the component forces that make up the composite or resultant force, it is essential that the sum of the component parts should equal the resultant. This condition is never observed by historical writers, and consequently, to explain the resultant force, they must inevitably admit, in addition to those insufficient contributory forces, some further unexplained force that affects also the resultant action.

The historian describing the campaign of 1813, or the restoration of the Bourbons, says bluntly that these events were produced by the will of Alexander. But the philosophic historian Gervinus, controverting the view of the special historian of those events, seeks to prove that the campaign of 1813 and the restoration of the Bourbons was due not only to Alexander, but also to the work of Stein, Metternich, Madame de Sta?l, Talleyrand, Fichte, Chateaubriand, and others. The historian obviously analyses the power of Alexander into component forces. Talleyrand, Chateaubriand, and so on, and the sum of these component forces, that is, the effect on one another of Chateaubriand, Talleyrand, Madame de Sta?l, and others is obviously not equal to the resultant effect, that is, the phenomenon of millions of Frenchmen submitting to the Bourbons. Such and such words being said to one another by Chateaubriand, Madame de Sta?l, and others, only affects their relation to one another, and does not account for the submission of millions. And therefore to explain how the submission of millions followed from their relation to one another, that is, how from component forces equal to a given quantity A, there followed a resultant equal to a thousand times A, the historian is inevitably bound to admit that force of power, which he has renounced, accepting it in the resultant force, that is, he is obliged to admit an unexplained force that acts on the resultant of those components. And this is just what the philosophic historians do. And consequently they not only contradict the writers of historical memoirs, but also contradict themselves.

Country people who have no clear idea of the cause of rain say: The wind has blown away the rain, or the wind is blowing up for rain, according as they are in want of rain or of fair weather. In the same way, philosophic historians at times, when they wish it to be so, when it fits in with their theory, say that power is the result of events; and at times, when they want to prove something else, they say power produces the events.

A third class of historians, the writers of the so-called history of culture, following on the lines laid down by the writers of universal history who sometimes accept writers and ladies as forces producing events, yet understand that force quite differently. They see that force in so-called culture, in intellectual activity. The historians of culture are quite consistent as regards their prototypes—the writers of universal history—for if historical events can be explained by certain persons having said certain things to one another, why not explain them by certain persons having written certain books? Out of all the immense number of tokens that accompany every living phenomenon, these historians select the symptom of intellectual activity, and assert that this symptom is the cause. But in spite of all their endeavours to prove that the cause of events lies in intellectual activity, it is only by a great stretch that one can agree that there is anything in common between intellectual activity and the movement of peoples. And it is altogether impossible to admit that intellectual activity has guided the actions of men, for such phenomena as the cruel murders of the French Revolution, resulting from the doctrine of the equality of man, and the most wicked wars and massacres arising from the Gospel of love, do not confirm this hypothesis.

But even admitting that all the cunningly woven arguments with which these histories abound are correct, admitting that nations are governed by some indefinite force called an idea—the essential question of history still remains unanswered; or to the power of monarchs and the influence of counsellors and other persons, introduced by the philosophic historian, another new force is now joined—the idea, the connection of which with the masses demands explanation. One can understand that Napoleon had power and so an event came to pass; with some effort one can even conceive that Napoleon together with other influences was the cause of an event. But in what fashion a book, Le Contrat Social, led the French to hack each other to pieces cannot be understood without an explanation of the causal connection of this new force with the event.

There undoubtedly exists a connection between all the people living at one time, and so it is possible to find some sort of connection between the intellectual activity of men and their historical movements, just as one may find a connection between the movements of humanity and commerce, handicrafts, gardening, and anything you like. But why intellectual activity should be conceived of by the historians of culture as the cause or the expression of a whole historical movement, it is hard to understand. Historians can only be led to such a conclusion by the following considerations: (1) That history is written by learned men; and so it is natural and agreeable to them to believe that the pursuit of their calling is the basis of the movement of the whole of humanity, just as a similar belief would be natural and agreeable to merchants, agriculturists, or soldiers (such a belief on their part does not find expression simply because merchants and soldiers don't write history); and (2) that spiritual activity, enlightenment, civilisation, culture, ideas are all vague, indefinite conceptions, under cover of which they can conveniently use phrases having less definite signification, and so easily brought under any theory.

But to say nothing of the inner dignity of histories of this kind (possibly they are of use for some one or for something), the histories of culture, towards which all general histories tend more and more to approximate, are noteworthy from the fact that though they give a serious and detailed analysis of various religious, philosophic, and political doctrines as causes of events, every time they have to describe an actual historical event, as, for instance, the campaign of 1812, they unconsciously describe it as the effect of the exercise of power, frankly saying that that campaign was the work of Napoleon's will. In saying this, the historians of culture unconsciously contradict themselves, to prove that the new force they have invented is not the expression of historical events, and that the sole means of explaining history is by that power which they had apparently rejected.

什么力量推动各民族前进？

有些传记史家和个别民族史的史学家认为这种力量乃是英雄和统治者天赋的权力。按照他们对历史的阐释，历史事件的发生完全是由拿破仑之流、亚历山大之流的意志所决定的。这类史学家对推动历史事件的力量这个问题的回答，只有当普天之下只有一位历史学家，而且只对每个历史事件加以阐述的时候，才算是令人满意的。可是，一旦不同国家不同观点的史学家论述同一历史事件的时候，他们的各种答案便顿然失去一切意义，因为他们对这种力量的理解不仅各不相同，而且常常是完全相反的。一位史学家说，某一事件是由拿破仑的权力造成的；另一位史家说，是由亚历山大的权力造成的；而第三位却说是由第三个某某人的权力造成的。此外，这类史学家甚至连解释某人权力所依据的力量的时候，也是彼此矛盾的。波拿巴派的梯也尔说，拿破仑的权力是建立在他的仁德和天才上的，共和派的朗弗里则说，他的权力是基于他的诡诈和对人民的欺骗。这类史学家互相攻讦，使人们无法理解产生历史事件的力量究竟何在，甚至连什么是历史的本质问题都提不出任何像样的答案。研究各国历史的通史家，似乎觉察到专题传记史家对造成历史事件的力量的观点有欠公允，他们不承认这种力量就是英雄和统治者的天赋的权力，而认为这种力量是各种各样不同倾向的力量相互作用的结果。因此，世界通史家，对描述一场战争或者征服一个民族的问题，他们不是从某一个人物的权力上寻找原因，而是从与事件有关联的许多人物的相互作用中寻求原因。

根据这种观点，历史人物的权力既然是由许多力量互相作用而产生的、似乎就不可能再把它当作造成事件的力量了。可是，世界通史家多半仍然把权力视为一种促成历史事件的力量并把它作为事件发生的原因来看待。根据他们表述的观点，历史人物是他那个时代的产物，他的权力只是不同力量相互作用的结果；而历史人物的权力是一种造成事件的力量。例如，革飞努斯①、斯罗萨②以及其他一些人，时而证明拿破仑是革命的产物，是一七八九年思想意识的产物，等等，时而又干脆地说，一八一二年的远征以及别的他们所不喜欢的事件只不过是拿破仑的错误意志的产物，而且，一七八九年的思想意识发展之所以受阻也是由于拿破仑的独断专行所致。革命思想，普遍的情绪产生了拿破仑的政权，而拿破仑的政权又压制了革命思想和公众的情绪。

①革飞努斯（1805～1871），十九世纪德国史学家、文学史家。

②斯罗萨（1776～1861），十九世纪德国史学家。

这种奇怪的自相矛盾并非偶然。这种情况不仅到处可以见到，而且世界通史家的论著从头到尾都是由这一系列矛盾构成的。这种矛盾之所以产生，是因为通史家一走上分析矛盾的道路，就半途而废了。

要把几种分力组成一个合力，则合力必须等于各分力的总和，世界上的通史家们从来就没有恪守这个基本条件，因此为了要说明合力，在找不到足够的分力的情况下，只得假设还有一种影响合力的不可解释的力量。

专题史学家在论述一八一三年远征或者波旁王朝的复辟时，很直率地指出，这些事件是由亚力山大的个人意志所造成的。但是通史家革飞努斯断然否定专题史学家的这种观点，他极力证明、一八一三年的远征和波旁王朝的复辟，除了由于亚历山大的意志外，还由于施泰因、梅特涅、斯塔埃尔夫人、塔列兰、费希特、谢多勃良以及其他诸人的行动造成的。

这位传记史学家显然把亚历山大的权力化为以下各分力部分：塔列兰、谢多勃良等等。这些分力的总和也就是谢多勃良、塔列兰、斯塔埃尔夫人以及其他诸人的作用，显然不等于整个合力，也就是说，并不等于千百万法国人顺从波旁王朝这一现象。因此，要说明这些分力是以何种方式变成千百万人屈服的原因，也就是说，等于一个A的那些分力是怎样得出等于一千个A的合力的，这位史学家又不得不回到他否定的那个力量——权力，并且承认权力是那些力量的合力，也就是说，他不得不承认一种无法解释的影响合力的力量。通史家们就是这样做的。其结果是他们不仅与专题史学家矛盾，而且自相矛盾。

乡下人不懂得下雨的原因，他们说“风吹乌云散”，还是说“风吹乌云来”，这要看他们需要雨还是需要晴天而定。世界通史家也是这样，有时候，当他们愿意这样说的时候，当这样说符合他们的理论的时候，他们就说，权力是事件的产物，而当他们需要证实其他论点时，他们就说：“权力造成事件。”

第三类史学家，就是所谓的文化史学家，他们遵循通史家开辟的道路，有时认为作家和女人是造成事件的力量。他们对这种力量的理解截然不同，他们认为所谓的文化、智力活动就是这种力量。

文化史学家完全追随着前辈通史学家走过的道路前进，因为，如果历史事件可以用某些人的相互关系来说明，那么，历史事件为什么不可以用某些人写了某些书来说明？文化史学家从伴随着每个重要现象的大量特征中选出智力活动这一特征，并且声言这一特征就是事件发生的原因。但是，尽管他们竭力证明事件发生的原因在于智力活动，而我们只有作出重大让步，才能承认智力活动与民族运动之间有某种共同之处。但是，无论如何我们不能承认是智力活动指导人们的行动，因为宣扬人人平等的学说，所引起的法国革命的残酷屠杀，宣扬博爱的学说所引起的罪恶的战争和执行死刑，这些现象同这种假定相矛盾。

但是，即使承认那些充斥于史书的荒诞离奇的论断都是正确的，承认各民族是受一种所谓观念的不明确的力量所支配的，而历史的主要问题仍然没有得到解答，或者，除了以前君王的权力，除了世界通史家所提出的顾问和其他人的影响，还要加上一种力量——观念，而观念同群众的关系则有待说明。如果说拿破仑拥有权力，所以事件就发生了，这还可以理解。退一步说，拿破仑与别的势力结合起来，成为发生事件的原因，这也可以理解。但是一本《民约论》①如何能使法国人互相残杀，如果不把这种力量和那个事件的因果关系说清楚，就无法理解了。

①《民约论》原文中用法语。

毫无疑问，同时存在的有生命力的事物之间都存在着联系，因此从人们的智力活动和他们的历史运动之间也可以找到某种联系，这就像在人类的活动和商业、手工业、园艺，或者任何哪一行业之间可以找到这种联系一样。但是，为什么文化史学家认为人类的智力活动是全部历史活动的原因或表现，这就令人费解了。史学家的这种结论只能用以下两点来说明：第一，历史是由学者来编写的，因此，他们自然乐于认为他们那个阶层的活动是全人类活动的基础，就像商人、农民和军人也会有同样的想法（只是由于商人和军人不写历史，所以没有以文字的形式表达出来）。第二，精神活动、教育、文明、文化、思想——这是一些模糊的、不明确的概念，在这些模糊概念的幌子下就更便于使用那些意义更加含混，因而可以随意编成理论的字句。

但是，我们姑且不说这类历史著作的内在价值（这类历史著作很可能对某个人或某件事是有用的），值得注意的是文化史越来越接近通史，这些历史学家仔细认真地分析各种宗教、哲学和政治学说，认为它们是产生历史事件的原因，每当历史学需要叙述某一实际历史事件（例如一八一二年的远征），这些历史学就不自觉地把这样的历史事件说成是权力的产物，开门见山地说，这次远征是拿破仑意志的产物。如果文化史学家这样说的话，他们就不由自主地陷于自相矛盾之境地。因为这种情况表明，他们杜撰出来的新力量并不能说明各种历史事件，而他们似乎不愿意承认的那种权力才是理解历史的唯一途径。