Book 10 Chapter 33

THE CHIEF ACTION of the battle of Borodino was fought on the space seven thousand feet in width between Borodino and Bagration's flèches. Outside that region, on one side there was the action on the part of Uvarov's cavalry in the middle of the day; on the other side, behind Utitsa, there was the skirmish between Poniatovsky and Tutchkov; but those two actions were detached and of little importance in comparison with what took place in the centre of the battlefield. The chief action of the day was fought in the simplest and the most artless fashion on the open space, visible from both sides, between Borodino and the flèches by the copse.

The battle began with a cannonade from several hundreds of guns on both sides. Then, when the whole plain was covered with smoke, on the French side the two divisions of Desaix and Compans advanced on the right upon the flèches, and on the left the viceroy's regiments advanced upon Borodino. The flèches were a verst from the Shevardino redoubt, where Napoleon was standing; but Borodino was more than two versts further, in a straight line, and therefore Napoleon could not see what was passing there, especially as the smoke, mingling with the fog, completely hid the whole of that part of the plain. The soldiers of Desaix's division, advancing upon the flèches, were in sight till they disappeared from view in the hollow that lay between them and the flèches. As soon as they dropped down into the hollow, the smoke of the cannon and muskets on the flèches became so thick that it concealed the whole slope of that side of the hollow. Through the smoke could be caught glimpses of something black, probably men, and sometimes the gleam of bayonets. But whether they were stationary or moving, whether they were French or Russian, could not be seen from Shevardino.

The sun had risen brightly, and its slanting rays shone straight in Napoleon's face as he looked from under his hand towards the flèches. The smoke hung over the flèches, and at one moment it seemed as though it were the smoke that was moving, at the next, the troops moving in the smoke. Sometimes cries could be heard through the firing; but it was impossible to tell what was being done there.

Napoleon, standing on the redoubt, was looking through a field-glass, and in the tiny circle of the glass saw smoke and men, sometimes his own, sometimes Russians. But where what he had seen was, he could not tell when he looked again with the naked eye.

He came down from the redoubt, and began walking up and down before it.

At intervals he stood still, listening to the firing and looking intently at the battlefield.

It was not simply impossible from below, where he was standing, and from the redoubt above, where several of his generals were standing, to make out what was passing at the flèches; but on the flèches themselves, occupied now together, now alternately by French and Russians, living, dead, and wounded, the frightened and frantic soldiers had no idea what they were doing. For several hours together, in the midst of incessant cannon and musket fire, Russians and French, infantry and cavalry, had captured the place in turn; they rushed upon it, fell, fired, came into collision, did not know what to do with each other, screamed, and ran back again.

From the battlefield adjutants were continually galloping up to Napoleon with reports from his marshals of the progress of the action. But all those reports were deceptive; both because in the heat of battle it is impossible to say what is happening at any given moment, and because many of the adjutants never reached the actual battlefield, but simply repeated what they heard from others, and also because, while the adjutant was galloping the two or three versts to Napoleon, circumstances had changed, and the news he brought had already become untrue. Thus an adjutant came galloping from the viceroy with the news that Borodino had been taken and the bridge on the Kolotcha was in the hands of the French. The adjutant asked Napoleon should the troops cross the bridge. Napoleon's command was to form on the further side and wait; but long before he gave that command, when the adjutant indeed had only just started from Borodino, the bridge had been broken down and burnt by the Russians in the very skirmish Pierre had taken part in at the beginning of the day.

An adjutant, galloping up from the flèches with a pale and frightened face, brought Napoleon word that the attack had been repulsed, and Compans wounded and Davoust killed; while meantime the flèches had been captured by another division of the troops, and Davoust was alive and well, except for a slight bruise. Upon such inevitably misleading reports Napoleon based his instructions, which had mostly been carried out before he made them, or else were never, and could never, be carried out at all.

The marshals and generals who were closer to the scene of action, but, like Napoleon, not actually taking part in it, and only at intervals riding within bullet range, made their plans without asking Napoleon, and gave their orders from where and in what direction to fire, and where the cavalry were to gallop and the infantry to run. But even their orders, like Napoleon's, were but rarely, and to a slight extent, carried out.

For the most part what happened was the opposite of what they commanded to be done. The soldiers ordered to advance found themselves under grapeshot fire, and ran back. The soldiers commanded to stand still in one place seeing the Russians appear suddenly before them, either ran away or rushed upon them; and the cavalry unbidden galloped in after the flying Russians. In this way two cavalry regiments galloped across the Semyonovskoye hollow, and as soon as they reached the top of the hill, turned and galloped headlong back again. The infantry, in the same way, moved sometimes in the direction opposite to that in which they were commanded to move.

All decisions as to when and where to move the cannons, when to send infantry to fire, when to send cavalry to trample down the Russian infantry—all such decisions were made by the nearest officers in the ranks, without any reference to Ney, Davoust, and Murat, far less to Napoleon himself. They did not dread getting into trouble for nonfulfilment of orders, nor for assuming responsibility, because in battle what is at stake is what is most precious to every man—his own life; and at one time it seems as though safety is to be found in flying back, sometimes in flying forward; and these men placed in the very thick of the fray acted in accordance with the temper of the moment.

In reality all these movements forward and back again hardly improved or affected the position of the troops. All their onslaughts on one another did little harm; the harm, the death and disablement was the work of the cannon balls and bullets, that were flying all about the open space, where those men ran to and fro. As soon as they got out of that exposed space, over which the balls and bullets were flying, their superior officer promptly formed them in good order, and restored discipline, and under the influence of that discipline led them back under fire again; and there again, under the influence of the terror of death, they lost all discipline, and dashed to and fro at the chance promptings of the crowd.

波罗底诺战役的主要一仗是在波罗底诺和巴格拉季翁的凸角堡之间一千俄丈的地带进行的。（在这个地带以外，一边有俄军的乌瓦洛夫的骑兵在中午进行佯攻，另一边，在乌季察后面有波尼亚托夫斯基与图奇科夫的接触，但是与战场中央的情况比起来，这两处是孤立的小战斗。）在波罗底诺和凸角堡之间的战场上，在树林附近，在两边都看得见的空地上，主要的战斗是用最简单，最普通的方式进行的。

战斗在双方几百门大炮的轰击声中打响了。

此后，当硝烟笼罩着整个战场的时候，法军德塞和康庞两个师从右方进攻凸角堡，总督缪拉的几个团从左方进攻波罗底诺。

拿破仑站在舍瓦尔金诺多面堡上，这儿离凸角堡有一俄里远，离波罗底诺直线距离总在两俄里以上，因此拿破仑不可能看见那里的情况，何况烟雾弥漫，遮蔽了整个地区。攻打凸角堡的德塞师的士兵，直到他们进入横在他们和凸角堡之间的冲沟，才被发现。他们一进入冲沟，凸角堡上的大炮和步枪就一齐发射，浓烟遮蔽了冲沟对面的高坡。在烟雾中有黑影在闪动——大概是人，有时还可以看见刺刀的闪光。但，他们是在走动还是站着，是法国人还是俄国人，从舍瓦尔金诺多面堡却看不清楚。

太阳已经照得明晃晃的了，倾斜的光线射到拿破仑的脸上，他用手遮住眼睛看凸角堡。烟雾在凸角堡前面蔓延开来。时而似乎烟雾在动，时而似乎队伍在动。有时从射击声中可以听出人们的呐喊声，但是无法知道他们在那儿做什么。

拿破仑站在土岗上用望远镜观望，在小小的圆筒里他看见了烟雾和人。有时是自己人，有时是俄国人；但一用肉眼看，他就认不出刚才看见的东西在什么地方了。

他走下土岗，在土岗前徘徊着。

他有时停下来，听听枪炮声，看看战场的情况。

不论从土岗下面他所站的地方，还是从土岗上面他的将军们现在所站的地方，甚至从那些凸角堡上——那儿有俄国兵，有法国兵，他们时而同时出现，时而轮流出现，其中有死的、伤的、活的、受惊的、发狂的，——都无法看清楚战场上发生的事。一连几个小时，这个地区，在枪炮不停的射击声中，忽而出现步兵，忽而出现骑兵，其中有俄国的，有法国的，他们出现、倒下、射击、相遇，彼此都不知道怎么办，只叫喊着，往回逃跑。

拿破仑派出的副官以及他的元帅们的传令兵不停地从战场上向他驰来，向他报告战斗的情况；但是所有这些报告都是假的，因为在战斗进行得正激烈的时候，无法说出在一定时刻发生了什么事，还因为许多副官并没有到真正战斗的地点，只是转述他们从别人口中听到了东西；还因为副官从西、三俄里外跑到拿破仑这儿，其间情况已经变了，带来的消息已经不真实了。譬如说，从总督那儿驰来一名副官，带来消息说，波罗底诺已经被占领，科洛恰河大桥也落入法国人手中，一名副官问拿破仑，是否命令军队渡河？拿破仑命令说，军队到河对岸整队待命；但是，在拿破仑发出命令时，甚至当那个副官刚刚离开波罗底诺时，也就是战役刚开始，在皮埃尔参加的那次搏斗中，那座桥就已被俄军夺回，而且烧掉了。

从凸角堡驰来一个面色苍白、神色惊慌的副官，向拿破仑报告说，进军的进攻被打退，康庞受伤，达乌阵亡，而实际上，就在那个副官说法军被打退的时候，凸角堡已经被法军另一支部队占领，达乌还活着，只不过受点震伤。拿破仑就是根据这些不可避免的谎报发布命令的，那些命令不是他未发布之前就已执行了，就是不能执行或未被执行。

元帅们和将军们离战场较近，但也和拿破仑一样，没有参加战斗，只是偶尔走到步枪射程以内，并不向拿破仑请示，自己就发出了命令，指示向哪儿、从哪儿射击，骑兵向哪儿去，步兵往哪儿跑。但是甚至他们的命令也和拿破仑的命令一样，以最小限度，偶尔才被执行，并且常常出现与他们的命令相斥的情况。奉命前进的士兵，一遇见霰弹就往回跑；奉命坚守一个地点的士兵，一看见对面突然出现俄国人，有时往后跑，有时扑向前去，骑兵也不等命令就去追击逃跑的俄国人。又譬如，两团骑兵越过谢苗诺夫斯科耶冲沟，刚登上山坡，就勒马回头，拼命往后跑。步兵的行动也是这样，有时朝着完全不是命令他们去的方向跑。所有的命令：何时向何地移动大炮，何时派步兵去射击，何时派骑兵去冲杀俄国步兵，——所有这些命令都是在队伍里最接近士兵的军官发出的，不仅没有请示拿破仑，甚至没有请示内伊、达乌和缪拉。他们不怕因为未执行命令或擅自行动而受处分，因为在战斗中涉及个人最宝贵的东西——个人的生命。有时觉得往回跑能够得救，有时觉得往前跑能够得救，这些置身于最火热的战斗的人们都是按照一时的心情而行动的。实际上，向前进或向后退都没有改善或改变军队的处境。他们互相追赶几乎没造成什么损害，而造成损害和伤亡的是那些炮弹和枪弹，人们在枪林弹雨中乱窜。这些人一离开这炮弹和枪弹横飞的空间，驻在后方的长官就立刻整顿他们，使他们服从纪律，然后在这种纪律影响下，又把他们送到炮火连天的战场，由于对死亡的恐怖，他们又失去纪律，由于众人偶然的情绪又乱窜起来。