Book 13 Chapter 1

THE COMBINATION of causes of phenomena is beyond the grasp of the human intellect. But the impulse to seek causes is innate in the soul of man. And the human intellect, with no inkling of the immense variety and complexity of circumstances conditioning a phenomenon, any one of which may be separately conceived of as the cause of it, snatches at the first and most easily understood approximation, and says here is the cause. In historical events, where the actions of men form the subject of observation, the most primitive conception of a cause was the will of the gods, succeeded later on by the will of those men who stand in the historical foreground—the heroes of history. But one had but to look below the surface of any historical event, to look, that is, into the movement of the whole mass of men taking part in that event, to be convinced that the will of the hero of history, so far from controlling the actions of the multitude, is continually controlled by them. It may be thought that it is a matter of no importance whether historical events are interpreted in one way or in another. But between the man who says that the peoples of the West marched into the East, because Napoleon willed they should do so, and the man who says that that movement came to pass because it was bound to come to pass, there exists the same difference as between the men who maintained that the earth was stationary and the planets revolved about it, and the men who said that they did not know what holds the earth in its place, but they did know that there were laws controlling its motions and the motions of the other planets. Causes of historical events—there are not and cannot be, save the one cause of all causes. But there are laws controlling these events; laws partly unknown, partly accessible to us. The discovery of these laws is only possible when we entirely give up looking for a cause in the will of one man, just as the discovery of the laws of the motions of the planets has only become possible since men have given up the conception of the earth being stationary.

After the battle of Borodino, and the taking and burning of Moscow, historians consider the most important episode of the war of 1812 to be the movement of the Russian army from the Ryazan to the Kaluga road and to the Tarutino camp, the so-called oblique march behind Krasnaya Pahra. Historians ascribe the credit of this stroke of genius to various persons, and dispute to whom it is rightfully due. Even foreign, even French historians, admit the genius of the Russian generals when they mention this flank march. But why military writers, and others following their lead, assume this oblique movement to be a project profoundly planned by some one person for the deliverance of Russia and the overthrow of Napoleon it is very difficult to see. It is difficult in the first place to see wherein the profound wisdom and genius of this march lies; for no great intellectual effort is needed to guess that the best position for an army, when not being attacked, is where supplies are most plentiful. And every one, even a stupid boy of thirteen, could have guessed that the most advantageous position for the army in 1812, after the retreat from Moscow, would be on the Kaluga road. And so one cannot understand, in the first place, what conclusions led the historians to see some deep wisdom in this man?uvre. Secondly, it is even more difficult to understand why the historians ascribe to this man?uvre the deliverance of Russia and the overthrow of the French; for, had other circumstances preceded, accompanied, or followed it, this flank movement might as well have led to the destruction of the Russian army and the deliverance of the French. If the position of the Russian army did, in fact, begin to improve from the time of that march, it does not at all follow that the improvement was caused by it.

That oblique march might have been not simply of no use; it might have led to the destruction of the Russian army, but for the conjunction of other circumstances. What would have happened if Moscow had not been burnt? If Murat had not lost sight of the Russians? If Napoleon had not remained inactive? If, as Bennigsen and Barclay advised, the Russians had given battle near Krasnaya Pahra? What would have happened if the French had attacked the Russians when they were marching behind Pahra? What would have happened if later on Napoleon, on reaching Tarutino, had attacked the Russians with one-tenth of the energy with which he had attacked them at Smolensk? What would have happened if the French had marched to Petersburg? … On any of these hypotheses, the oblique march might have led to ruin instead of to safety.

The third point, most difficult of all to understand, is that students of history seem intentionally to refuse to see that this march cannot be ascribed to any one man, that no one foresaw it at any time, that, like the retreat to Fili, the man?uvre was, in reality, never conceived of by any one in its entirety, but arose step by step, incident by incident, moment by moment from a countless multitude of the most diverse circumstances, and is only conceived of in its entirety, when it is an accomplished fact, and has become the past.

At the council at Fili the accepted idea among the Russians—the course taken for granted in fact—was retreat in a direct line back, that is, along the Nizhni road. Evidence of this is that the majority of votes at the council were for adopting this course, and the commander-in-chief's famous conversation after the council with Lansky, the head of the commissariat department, is an even more striking proof of it. Lansky submitted to the commander-in-chief that the chief supplies for the army were stored along the Oka, in the Tula and Kazan provinces, and that if they retreated along the Nizhni road, the army would be cut off from its supplies by the broad river Oka, across which transport in the early winter was impossible. This was the first proof of the necessity of departing from the course that had at first seemed the most natural one, the retreat along the Nizhni road. The army kept more to the south along the Ryazan road, closer to its supplies. Later on the inactivity of the French, who positively lost sight of the Russian army, anxiety for the defence of the Tula arsenal, and above all, the advantage of being near their supplies led the army to turn even more to the south, to the Tula road. After crossing by a forced march behind Pahra to the Tula road, the generals of the Russian army intended to remain at Podolsk, and had no idea of the Tarutino position. But an infinite number of circumstances, among them the reappearance of French troops on the scene, and plans for giving battle, and most of all, the abundance of supplies in Kaluga, led our army to turn even more to the south, and to pass from the Tula to the Kaluga road to Tarutino, a central position between their lines of communication with their supplies. Just as it is impossible to answer the question what date Moscow was abandoned, it is impossible too to say precisely when and by whom it was decided to move the army to Tarutino. It was only after the army, through the action of innumerable infinitesimally small forces, had been brought to Tarutino, that people began to protest to themselves that that was the course they had desired, and had long foreseen as the right one.

人的智力难以理解产生各种现象的根本原因。但是人的内心感到需要寻找这些原因，人的智力不深入剖析产生各种现象的无数的复杂的各种条件，而这些条件中每一条单独来看都能被说成是原因，只抓住首先碰到的最容易理解的一个近似的条件，于是说：这就是原因。在许多历史事件中（在这些历史事件中人的行动是观察对象）上帝的意志是最原始的近似条件，其次是站在最显著的历史地位的人的意志，即是历史上的英雄的意志。但是，只要深入剖析每一个历史事件的实质，也就是深入剖析参加这些事件的全体人民群众的活动，就会完全弄清，历史上的英雄的意志非但没有支配人民群众的行动，而且他们的意志总是被人民群众的意志所支配。不管是这样或那样去理解历史事件的意义似乎都完全一样。然而，一些人说，西方人向东方推进，那是因为拿破仑要这样做，另一些人说，这件事之所以发生是因为它必然要发生，这两种人的说法和另两种人的说法的差别完全一样，一些人说，地球是不转动的，行星都围绕着地球转，另一些人说，他们不知道是什么东西支撑着地球，但是他们知道，地球和其他行星的运动是受某些法则所支配着的。除了所有原因中的一种原因之外，一个历史事件没有也不可能有多种原因。但是有某一些法则支配着各种事件，这些法则有些尚不清楚，有些已被我们探索出来了。只有当我们完全抛弃在一个人的意志中去寻找原因的时候，才能发现这些法则；与此相同的是，只有当人们抛掉那些有关地球的一切成见，才能揭示行星运动的法则。

历史学家认为，在波罗底诺战役和莫斯科被敌人占领并焚毁之后，在一八一二年的战争中最重要的插曲就是俄国军队从梁赞大路进入卡卢日斯卡雅大路，然后直趋塔鲁丁诺营地的运动——即所谓的越过红帕赫拉的侧翼进军。历史学家把这一天才功勋的荣誉归功于各种不同的人，并且争论，荣誉究竟属于谁。甚至外国的历史学家，甚至法国的历史学家在谈及这次侧翼进军的时候，都承认俄国统帅的天才。但是，为什么军事著作家及其追随者都认为，这次拯救了俄国和击败拿破仑的侧翼进军，是某个人深思熟虑的创举——这实在太难以令人理解。首先，令人难以理解的是，这一军事行动的深思熟虑和英明在什么地方，因为要知道军队所处的最佳位置（当它不受攻击的时候），是在粮草多的地方——这不需要动什么脑筋。每一个人，就是一个愚笨的十三岁的小孩也不用费力就会知道，在撤出莫斯科之后，一八一二年军队最有利的位置是在卡卢日斯卡雅大路。因而，第一，不能理解，历史学家们为了弄清这次军队运动的奥秘之处，使用了什么样的推理方法。第二，尤其令人难以理解的是，历史学家们究竟是怎样看出这次军事行动使俄国得救而使法国失败；因为这次侧翼进举，如果在此之前，或与此同时和在此之后发生另外的情况，就可能对俄国军队来说是毁灭性的，而对法国军队来说则是幸运的。如果说，自从完成这次军事运动之后，俄国军队的军事地位改善了，那么，无论如何也不能由此得出这次军事运动是那个原因。

这次侧翼进军，假如没有其他一些条件的巧合，不仅不会给俄国军队带来任何好处，而且可能把俄国军队毁灭掉。如果莫斯科没有被焚毁，那将会怎样呢？如果缪拉不知俄国军队的行踪，那将会怎样呢？如果不是拿破仑按兵不动，那将会怎样呢？如果按照贝尼格森和巴克莱的建议在红帕赫拉附近打一仗，那将会怎样呢？如果法国人在俄国军队渡帕赫拉河的时候发动进攻，那将会怎样呢？如果拿破仑在到达塔鲁丁诺的时候，立即只用他进攻斯摩棱斯克的十分之一的兵力进攻俄国军队，那将会怎样呢？如果法国人进攻彼得堡，那将会怎样呢？……在所有这些假设中，只要任何一条成为事实的话，侧翼进军的结局就不是拯救而是毁灭。

第三，令人最难以理解的是，研究历史的人故意不愿看见，这次侧翼进举不能归功于任何一个人，在任何时候都没有任何一个人对它有所预见，从菲利的撤退也和它完全一样，在任何时候都没有任何一个人看清楚它的全貌，它是由无数的各种各样的条件一步一步地、一个事件接着一个事件、随着时间的推移逐渐显露出来的，只有当它已经完成和已经成为过去的时候，它的全貌才呈现出来。

菲利的军事会议上俄军将领们多数认为理所当然应当沿着下城大路径直往后退却。以下事实可以证明：与会者多数意见都赞成这样撤退，特别是会后总司令和管理粮秣的兰斯科伊那场有名的谈话。兰斯科伊向总司令报告说，军队给养主要集中在奥卡河沿岸的图拉和卡卢加省，如果向下城撤退，给养存放地就被宽阔的奥卡河隔断，而初冬季节河运是不可能的。这是必须撇开那个最自然的直趋下城的想法的第一个迹象。军队沿梁赞大路向南行进，离给养更接近了。后来，甚至不知俄国军队去向的法国军队按兵不动，并且保护图拉的兵工厂，主要的，要接近给养存放地点，使军队向南移动，进入图拉大路。冒险渡过帕赫拉河向图拉大路运动时，俄国军队的司令官们曾打算在波多尔斯克停留下来，并没有考虑塔鲁丁诺阵地，但是，无数的情况和先前不知俄国军队踪迹的法国军队的再次出现、作战计划、主要是卡卢加的粮秣充足，迫使俄军向南移动，向给养所在地的交叉路口转移，从图拉大路转到卡卢日斯卡雅大路，直趋塔鲁丁诺。正如无法回答莫斯科是何时撤退的一样，无法回答，到底是谁决定转移到塔鲁丁诺的。只有当军队由于无数的千差万别的力量相互作用的结果抵达塔鲁丁诺之后，人们才自信地说，他们本来就是这样想的，早就预见到这一点了。