WHAT RUSSIAN READER has not known an irksome feeling of annoyance, dissatisfaction, and perplexity, when he reads the accounts of the latter period of the campaign of 1812? Who has not asked himself: How was it all the French were not captured or cut to pieces, when all the three Russian armies were surrounding them in superior numbers, when the French were a disorderly, starving, and freezing rabble, and the whole aim of the Russians (so history tells us) was to check, to cut off, and to capture all the French?
How was it that the Russian army, that with inferior numbers had fought the battle of Borodino, failed in its aim of capturing the French, when the latter were surrounded on three sides? Can the French be so immensely superior to us that we are not equal to beating them, when we have surrounded them with forces numerically superior? How could that have come to pass? History (what passes by that name) answers these questions by saying that that came to pass because Kutuzov, and Tormasov, and Tchitchagov, and this general and that failed to carry out certain man?uvres.
But why did they fail to carry them out? And how was it, if they really were responsible for not attaining the aim set before them, that they were not tried and punished for their shortcomings? But even if we admit that Kutuzov and Tchitchagov and the others were responsible for the non-success of the Russians, it is still impossible to understand why, in the position the Russian troops were in at Krasnoe and the Berezina, on both occasions with numerically superior forces, the French army and marshals were not taken prisoners, if that really was the aim of the Russians.
The explanation of this phenomenon given by the Russian military historians—that Kutuzov hindered the attack—is insufficient, because we know that Kutuzov was not able to restrain the troops from attacking at Vyazma and Tarutino. Why was it that the Russian army, that with inferior forces gained a victory at Borodino over the enemy in full strength, was unsuccessful at Krasnoe and the Berezina, when fighting in superior numbers against the undisciplined crowds of the French?
If the aim of the Russians really was to cut off Napoleon and his marshals, and to take them prisoners, and that aim was not only frustrated, but all attempts at attaining it were every time defeated in the most shameful way, this last period of the war is quite correctly represented by the French as a series of victories for them, and quite incorrectly represented by the Russians as redounding to our glory.
The Russian military historians, so far as they recognise the claims of logic, are forced to this conclusion, and in spite of their lyric eulogies of Russian gallantry and devotion, and all the rest of it, they are reluctantly obliged to admit that the retreat of the French from Moscow was a series of victories for Napoleon and of defeats for Kutuzov.
But putting patriotic vanity entirely aside, one cannot but feel that there is an inherent discrepancy in this conclusion, seeing that the series of French victories led to their complete annihilation, while the series of Russian defeats was followed by the destruction of their enemy, and the deliverance of their country.
The source of this discrepancy lies in the fact that historians, studying events in the light of the letters of the sovereigns and of generals, of narratives, reports, projects, and so on, have assumed quite falsely that the plan of that period of the campaign of 1812 was to cut off and capture Napoleon and his marshals and his army.
Such a plan never was, and could not have been, the aim of the Russian army, because it had no meaning, and its attainment was utterly out of the question.
There was no object in such a plan. In the first place, because Napoleon's army was flying in disorder at its utmost possible speed out of Russia; that is to say, doing the very thing that every Russian most desired. What object was there in conducting all sorts of operations against the French when they were running away as fast as they could already? Secondly, it would have been idle to stop men on the road, whose whole energies were bent on flight. Thirdly, it would have been absurd to lose men in destroying the French army when it was already, without external interference, perishing at such a rate that, without any obstruction of their road, not more than one hundredth of its original number succeeded in crossing the frontier in December.
Fourthly, it was absurd to desire to take prisoners the Emperor, kings, and dukes, since the possession of such prisoners would have greatly enhanced the difficulty of the Russian position, as was recognised by the most clear-sighted diplomatists of the time (J. Maistre and others). Still more absurd would have been the desire to capture the French army when it had dwindled to one-half before reaching Krasnoe, and a division of convoys had to be given up to guard a corps of prisoners, while the Russian soldiers themselves had not always full rations, and the prisoners they did take died of hunger.
Any plan of cutting off and capturing Napoleon and his army, however carefully thought out, would have been like the action of a gardener who, after driving out a herd of cattle that had been trampling his beds, should run out to belabour the cattle about the head. The only thing that could be said in justification of his proceeding would be that he was greatly incensed. But the authors of this supposed plan cannot plead even this excuse, since theirs were not the gardens that had been trampled.
And, besides being absurd, to cut off the retreat of Napoleon's army was also impossible.
It was impossible, in the first place, because, since experience shows that the movement of columns in a single battlefield at five versts' distance never coincides with the plan of their movements, the probability that Tchitchagov, Kutuzov, and Wittgenstein would all reach an appointed spot in time was so remote that it practically amounted to impossibility. As Kutuzov in fact regarded it when he said that man?uvres planned at great distances do not produce the results expected of them.
Secondly, it was impossible, because to paralyse the force of inertia with which Napoleon's army was rebounding back along its track, incomparably greater forces were needed than those the Russians had at their command.
Thirdly, it was impossible, because the military expression, to cut off, was really no meaning. One may cut off a slice of bread, but not an army. To cut off an army—that is, to bar its road—is impossible, because there are always many places by which the men can make a circuit to get out, and there is always the night, during which nothing can be done; a fact of which the military strategists might have been convinced by the examples of Krasnoe and Berezina. One can never take a prisoner unless he agrees to be taken, just as one can never catch a swallow, though of course it is possible if it settles on one's hand. One can take a prisoner who will surrender, as the Germans did, in accordance with the rules of strategy and tactics. But the French soldiers very wisely did not feel it incumbent on them to do so, since death from cold and hunger awaited them as much if taken prisoner, as if persisting in their flight.
The fourth and chief reason why it was impossible is that war was waged in 1812 under conditions more terrible than ever since the world has existed; and the Russian troops strained every nerve in the pursuit of the French, and could not have done more without perishing themselves.
The Russian army lost in its march from Tarutino to Krasnoe fifty thousand sick or stragglers, that is, a number equal to the population of a large provincial town. Half of the army was lost without a battle.
At this period of the campaign the soldiers were without boots or fur-lined coats, on half rations, without vodka, camping out at night for months in the snow with fifteen degrees of frost; while there were only seven or eight hours of daylight, and the rest was night; where discipline could not exert the same influence, and men were put in peril of death, not for a few hours, as on the field of battle, but for whole months together were keeping up a struggle every moment with death from cold and hunger. And of this period of the campaign, when half the army perished in one month, the historians tell us that Miloradovitch ought to have made an oblique march in one direction, and Tormasov in another, and Tchitchagov ought to have advanced to this point (the men advancing knee-deep in the snow), and that so and so pushed through and cut the French off, and so on, and so on.
The Russian soldiers did all that could or ought to have been done to attain an end worthy of the people, and half of them died in doing it. They are not to blame because other Russians, sitting in warm rooms at home, proposed that they should do the impossible.
All this strange discrepancy between the facts and the accounts of historians, so difficult to understand to-day, arises simply from this, that the historians wrote the history of the noble sentiments and fine speeches of various generals, and not the history of the events themselves.
They attach great consequence to the words of Miloradovitch, to the honours bestowed on this general or that, and the proposals made by them. But the question of the fifty thousand men who lay in the hospitals and graveyards does not even interest them, for it does not come within the scope of their researches.
And yet we have but to turn away from researches among the reports and plans of the generals, and to look into the movements of those hundred thousand men who took direct immediate part in the events; and all the questions that seemed insoluble before can be readily and certainly explained with extraordinary ease and simplicity.
The plan of cutting off Napoleon and his army never existed save in the imagination of some dozen men. It could not have existed because it was absurd and could not be carried out.
The people had a single aim: to clear their country of the invaders. That aim was effected primarily of itself, since the French were flying, and all that was necessary was not to check their flight. It was promoted, too, by the irregular warfare kept up by the people destroying the French army piecemeal; and thirdly, by the great Russian army following in the rear of the French, ready to use force in case there were any pause in their retreat.
The Russian army had to act as a whip urging on a fleeing animal. And the experienced driver knew that it was better to keep the whip raised as a menace than to bring it down on the creature's back.
每当读到关于一八一二年战争最后阶段的记述的时候，有哪一个俄国人不感觉到十二万分的遗憾、不安和难于理解的呢？有谁又不向自己提出这样一个问题：既然，所有三路大军以优势兵力包围了法国军队，既然溃逃的法国人又饿又冻，成群地投降，既然（历史这样告诉我们）俄国人的计划就是要阻截、活捉全部法国人，那么，为什么又没有俘获和消灭全部法国人呢？
数量上少于法国人的俄国军队，何以打了一场波罗底诺战役？何以能从三面包围法国军队，其目的就是全部俘获他们，而又未能达到这一目的呢？难道法国人就比我们强那么多，在已经被我们的优势兵力包围以后，也不能够消灭他们？
怎么会发生这种事情呢？
历史（所谓的历史）在回答这些问题时说，发生这种情况，是因为库图佐夫、托尔马索夫、奇恰戈夫，以及某某人，某某人，他们没有执行这样的或那样的策略。
但是他们为什么不执行这些策略呢？如果说，他们的罪过在于未能达到预期的目的，那么他们为什么没有受到审判，没有被处决呢？然而，退一万步来说，让我们假定，俄国人的失误是库图佐夫和奇恰戈夫等人的罪过。然而仍然难于理解的是，为什么俄国军队在克拉斯诺耶和在别列济纳拥有那些条件（俄国军队在这两处均占据优势），而法国军队及其元帅们、王侯们和皇帝没有被俘获，而这又正是俄国人的目的，这又是什么原因呢？
以库图佐夫阻碍进攻的说法来解释这个怪现象（俄国军史学家就是这样说的），是没有根据的，因为，我们知道，在维亚济马和在塔鲁丁诺，库图佐夫的意志已阻挡不了进攻的军队了。
为什么俄国军队以微弱的兵力在波罗底诺战胜了拥有强大兵力的敌人，而在克拉斯诺耶和别列济纳处于优势兵力情况下，却败给了法国的一群乌合之众呢？
如果俄国人的目的是切断和生擒拿破仑和元帅们，那么，这个目的不仅没有达到，而且为达到这个目的的一切企图，没有哪一次不遭受可耻的破坏。那么，法国人认为，战争最后阶段是法国人获得了一连串的胜利是完全对的，而俄国历史学家说，是俄国人获得了胜利，这就完全错了。
俄国的军史家们，只要他们愿意遵循逻辑，自然而然就能得出这一结论，不管他们怎么满腔热情地歌颂过勇敢、忠忱等等，应当不得不承认，法国人从莫斯科撤退是拿破仑得到一连串的胜利，是库图佐夫的失败。
但是，完全把民族自尊心放到一边，就可以知道，这个结论本身自相矛盾，因为，法国人一连串的胜利导致了他们彻底灭亡，俄国人的一连串失败却导致他们消灭了敌人，把法国人全部赶出国境。
这个矛盾的根源在于，历史学家们是根据两国皇帝和将军们的信函、战斗报告、报告等类似文件来研究当时的事件，他们说，一八一二年战争最后阶段的目的，是要切断法国军队退路，活捉拿破仑及其元帅们和军队，这样一个目的从来就不存在，完全是他们虚构出来的。
这一目的从来就不曾有过，而且也不可能有，因为这样的目的没有任何意义，要实现这个目的也是绝对不可能的。
这一目的没有任何意义，因为，
第一，溃逃的拿破仑军队竭尽全力逃跑，要尽快逃离俄国，这也正是每个俄国人所期望的事情。对于逃得如此之快的法国人，再去组织若干战役，这有什么意义呢？
第二，截断那些一心只顾逃跑的人的道路，是没有意义的。
第三，之所以没有意义还在于为了消灭法国军队，要损失自己的军队，而法国军队没有外在原因，在这一阶段也在自行消灭，在所有道路上没有任何阻碍，也不可能把十二月间所实存的军队的百分之一，带领逃越国境，
第四，要俘获皇帝、王侯和公爵们是没有意义的，当时最老练的外交家（如梅斯特等人）已经认识到，俘虏了这些人，会使俄国人十分为难。要俘获整个军团更加没有意义，因为俄国自己的军队抵达克拉斯诺耶时，就减少了一半，而押解这些俘虏需要一整个师，而自己的给养已很困难，口粮都不足了，捉到的俘虏大都快要饿死。
所有关于切断和生擒拿破仑及其军队的高深计划，好像是一个种菜园子的人制定的计划，他在驱赶践踏菜园的牲口时，却跑到菜园门口，迎头痛击那头畜牲。唯一可以替他辩护的理由，那就是他太生气了。然而，对于那些制定那个计划的人来说，就连这个理由也不能成立，因为菜园遭受践踏之害并不属于他们。
然而，除了切断拿破仑的军队毫无意义之外，这也是不可能做到的。
这件事之所以不可能做到，是因为：
第一，经验证明，在一次战役中，各个纵队的战线延伸到五俄里的距离，任何时候都不可能使部队的行动与作战计划相符合，若要奇恰戈夫、库图佐夫和维特根施泰因准时在指定地点会师的可能性非常之小，可以说，没有这种可能，库图佐夫正是这样想的，他在接到这个计划时就说过，这距离牵制作战不能达到预期的目的。
第二，之所以不可能还因为，拿破仑军队不要命的狂逃有一股巨大的惯性力，要阻挡住，使其瘫痪，这就必须要有比现有的俄军数量多得多的军队。
第三，之所以不可能还因为，“切断”这个军事学中的术语没有任何意义。面包可以切断，而军队则切不断。切断军队——堵住它的去路——怎样都办不到，因为周围总有很多地方可以绕过去，还有伸手不见五指的黑夜，军事学家可以从克拉斯诺耶和别列济纳的例子来证明这一点。只要敌人宁死也不投降，就很难俘获他们，这就像一只小燕子落在你的手上，好像是可以捉住，但就是捉不住一样。只有像德国人那样按照战略战术规则投降的人，才能俘虏他们。然而对法国军队来说，他们完全认为，这样做对他们是不适合的了，因为无论是逃跑还是被俘虏，等待着他们的是死亡，不是冻死，就是饿死。
第四，之所以不可能，还有一点是最主要的，从古至今，没有任何一次战争像一八一二年的战争所处的条件那么可怕，俄国军队追击法国人已经用尽了一切力量，以致于再多做一点事情，必将自取灭亡。
俄国军队在从塔鲁丁诺到克拉斯诺耶的行军途中，因生病和掉队，减少了五万人，这相当于一个大省省会的人口数目。没有打仗部队就减去了一半人员。
在战役的这一阶段，军队没有靴子和皮衣，给养不足、没有伏特加酒，一连数月夜间都露宿在零下十五度的严寒中。那时白天只有七、八小时，其余时间是无法维持纪律的黑夜，那时，作战时，人们进入不讲纪律的死亡边缘只有几个小时，而当时一连数月每分钟都害怕被冻死或饿死；那时一个月时间军队要死去一半的人，——历史学家在讲到这一阶段战役时，他们说，米洛拉多维奇应当向侧翼某地进军，托尔马索夫应当向某地进军，奇恰戈夫应该向某地转移（在没膝的雪地里转移），某某应当击退和切断敌军，等等，等等。
俄国军队有一半的人死掉了，但是，他们做了自己所能够做的和应当做的一切事情，为了达到人民所期望的目的。至于另一些坐在暖和的房间里的俄国人，他们提出过一些不可能办到的事情，那就不应当属于俄国军队的过错了。
事实和历史的记载出现了这一切奇怪的和现在令人难以理解的矛盾，这是因为写这个事件的历史学家所写的是各位将军的高尚情操和动听的言辞，而不是历史事件。
最使他们感兴趣的是米洛拉多维奇的言辞，是这个或那个将军所受的奖赏和他们所作的推断；但是关于留在医院和坟墓里的五万人的问题，甚至不能引起他们的兴趣，因为这不属于他们所研究的范围。
其实，只要不去研究那些报告和将军们的计划，而是深入研究直接参加当时事件的千百万人的行动，那些原先以为很难解决的问题，就能够轻而易举地很简单地得到确切无疑的答案。
切断拿破仑军队的这一目的，除了在十来位将军的想象中存在过，而事实上从来就不曾有过。这个目的也不可能有，因为他既没有任何意义，而要想达到这个目的，也是绝不可能的。
人民的目的只有一个：要把侵略者从自己的国土上清除出去。这个目的是达到了，第一，它是顺其自然而达到的，因为法国人逃跑了，只要你不去阻挡他们逃跑就行了。第二，这个目的的达到，靠的是消灭法国人的人民战争，第三，一支强大的俄国军队在法国人后面紧追不舍，只要法国人一停下来，就使用这支力量。
俄国军队的作用，就像驱赶跑动的畜牲的鞭子。经验丰富的放牧人知道，对奔跑中的牲口最好是扬鞭吓唬它，而不是迎头抽打它。
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