It has not been necessary, for our purpose, to dwell on these civilised religions. Granting our hypothesis of an early Supreme Being among savages16, obscured later by ancestor-worship and ghost-gods, but not often absolutely lost to religious tradition, the barbaric and the civilised polytheisms easily take their position in line, and are easily intelligible18. Space forbids a discussion of all known religions; only typical specimens19 have been selected. Thus, nothing has been said of the religion of the great Chinese empire. It appears to consist, on its higher plane, of the worship of Heaven as a great fetish-god — a worship which may well have begun in days, as Dr. Brinton says, ‘long ere man had asked himself, “Are the heavens material and God spiritual?”’ — perhaps, for all we know, before the idea of ‘spirit’ had been evolved. Thus, if it contains nothing more august, the Chinese religion is, so far, beneath that of the Zu?is, or the creed3 in Taa-roa, in Beings who are eternal, who were before earth was or sky was. The Chinese religion of Heaven is also coloured by Chinese political conditions; Heaven (Tien) corresponds to the Emperor, and tends to be confounded with Shang-ti, the Emperor above. ‘Dr. Legge charges Confucius,’ says Mr. Tylor, ‘with an inclination20 to substitute, in his religious teaching, the name of Tien, Heaven, for that known to more ancient religion, and used in more ancient books — Shang-ti, the personal ruling deity.’ If so, China too has its ancient Supreme Being, who is not a divinised aspect of nature.
But Mr. Tylor’s reading, in harmony with his general theory, is different:
‘It seems, rather, that the sage12 was, in fact, upholding the tradition of the ancient faith, thus acting21 according to the character on which he prided himself — that of a transmitter, not a maker22, a preserver of old knowledge, not a new revealer.’1
This, of course, is purely23 a question of evidence, to be settled by Sinologists. If the personal Supreme Being, Shang-ti, occupies in older documents the situation held by Tien (Heaven) in Confucius’s later system, why are we to say that Confucius, by putting forward Heaven in place of Shang-ti, was restoring an older conception? Mr. Tylor’s affection for his theory leads him, perhaps, to that opinion; while my affection for my theory leads me to prefer documentary evidence in its favour.
The question can only be settled by specialists. As matters stand, it seems to me probable that ancient China possessed24 a Supreme Personal Being, more remote and original than Heaven, just as the Zu?is do. On the lower plane, Chinese religion is overrun, as everyone knows, by Animism and ancestor-worship. This is so powerful that it has given rise to a native theory of Euhemerism. The departmental deities25 of Chinese polytheism are explained by the Chinese on Euhemeristic principles:
‘According to legend, the War God, or Military Sage, was once, in human life, a distinguished26 soldier; the Swine God was a hog-breeder who lost his pigs and died of sorrow; the God of Gamblers was un décavé.’2
These are not statements of fact, but of Chinese Euhemeristic theory. On that hypothesis, Confucius should now be a god; but of course he is not; his spirit is merely localised in his temple, where the Emperor worships him twice a year as ancestral spirits are worshipped.
Every theorist will force facts into harmony with his system, but I do not see that the Chinese facts are contrary to mine. On the highest plane is either a personal Supreme Being, Shang-ti, or there is Tien, Heaven (with Earth, parent of men), neither of them necessarily owing, in origin, anything to Animism. Then there is the political reflection of the Emperor on Religion (which cannot exist where there is no Emperor, King, or Chief, and therefore must be late), there is the animistic rabble28 of spirits ancestral or not, and there is departmental polytheism. The spirits are, of course, fed and furnished by men in the usual symbolical29 way. Nothing shows or hints that Shang-ti is merely an imaginary idealised first ancestor. Indeed, about all such explanations of the Supreme Being (say among the Kurnai) as an idealised imaginary first ancestor, M. Réville justly observes as follows: ‘Not only have we seen that, in wide regions of the uncivilised world, the worship of ancestors has invaded a domain30 previously31 occupied by “Naturism” and Animism properly so called, that it is, therefore, posterior to these; but, farther, we do not understand, in Mr. Spencer’s system, why, in so many places, the first ancestor is the Maker, if not the Creator of the world, Master of life and death, and possessor of divine powers, not held by any of his descendants. This proves that it was not the first ancestor who became God, in the belief of his descendants, but much rather the Divine Maker and Beginner of all, who, in the creed of his adorers, became the first ancestor.’3
Our task has been limited, in this way, mainly to examination of the religion of some of the very lowest races, and of the highest world-religions, such as Judaism. The historical aspect of Christianity, as arising in the Life, Death, and Resurrection of our Lord, would demand a separate treatise32. This would, in part, be concerned with the attempts to find in the narratives33 concerning our Lord, a large admixture of the mythology34 and ritual connected with the sacrificed Rex Nemorensis, and whatever else survives in peasant folk-lore of spring and harvest.4
After these apologies for the limitations of this essay, we may survey the backward track. We began by showing that savages may stumble, and have stumbled, on theories not inconsistent with science, but not till recently discovered by science. The electric origin of the Aurora35 Borealis (whether absolutely certain or not) was an example; another was the efficacy of ‘suggestion,’ especially for curative purposes. It was, therefore, hinted that, if savages blundered (if you please) into a belief in God and the Soul, however obscurely envisaged, these beliefs were not therefore necessarily and essentially36 false. We then stated our purpose of examining the alleged37 supernormal phenomena38, savage17 or civilised, which, on Mr. Tylor’s hypothesis, help to originate the conception of ‘spirits.’ We defended the nature of our evidence, as before anthropologists, by showing that, for the savage belief in the supernormal phenomena, we have exactly the kind of evidence on which all anthropological39 science reposes41. The relative weakness of that evidence, our need of more and better evidence, we would be the very last to deny, indeed it is part of our case. Our existing evidence will hardly support any theory of religion. Anyone who is in doubt on that head has only to read M. Réville’s ‘Les Religions des Peuples Non–Civilisés,’ under the heads ‘Mélanésiens,’ ‘Mincopies,’ ‘Les Australiens’ (ii. 116–143), when he will observe that this eminent42 French authority is ignorant of the facts about these races here produced. In 1883 they had not come within his ken43. Such minute and careful inquiries44 by men closely intimate with the peoples concerned, as Dr. Codrington’s, Mr. Hewitt’s, Mr. Man’s, and the authorities compiled by Mr. Brough Smyth, were unfamiliar45 to M. Réville, Thus, in turn, new facts, or facts unknown to us, may upset my theory. This peril46 is of the essence of scientific theorising on the history of religion.
Having thus justified47 our evidence for the savage belief in supernormal phenomena, as before anthropologists, we turned to a court of psychologists in defence of our evidence for the fact of exactly the same supernormal phenomena in civilised experience. We pointed48 out that for subjective49 psychological experiences, say of telepathy, we had precisely50 the same evidence as all non-experimental psychology51 must and does rest upon. Nay52, we have even experimental evidence, in experiments in thought-transference. We have chiefly, however, statements of subjective experience. For the coincidence of such experience with unknown events we have such evidence as, in practical life, is admitted by courts of law.
Experimental psychology, of course, relies on experiments conducted under the eyes of the expert, for example, by hypnotism or otherwise, under Dr. Hack53 Tuke, Professor James, M. Richet, M. Janet. The evidence is the conduct rather than the statements of the subject. There is also physiological54 experiment, by vivisection (I regret to say) and post-mortem dissection55. But non-experimental psychology reposes on the self-examination of the student, and on the statements of psychological experiences made to him by persons whom he thinks he can trust. The psychologist, however, if he be, as Mr. Galton says, ‘unimaginative in the strict but unusual sense of that ambiguous word,’ needs Mr. Galton’s ‘word of warning.’ He is asked ‘to resist a too frequent tendency to assume that the minds of every other sane56 and healthy person must be like his own. The psychologist should inquire into the minds of others as he should into those of animals of different races, and be prepared to find much to which his own experience can afford little if any clue.’5 Mr. Galton had to warn the unimaginative psychologist in this way, because he was about to unfold his discovery of the faculty57 which presents numbers to some minds as visualised coloured numerals, ‘so vivid as to be undistinguishable from reality, except by the aid of accidental circumstances.’
Mr. Galton also found in his inquiries that occasional hallucinations of the sane are much more prevalent than he had supposed, or than science had ever taken into account. All this was entirely58 new to psychologists, many of whom still (at least many popular psychologists of the press) appear to be unacquainted with the circumstances. One of them informed me, quite gravely, that ‘he never had an hallucination,’ therefore — his mind being sane and healthy — the inference seemed to be that no sane and healthy mind was ever hallucinated. Mr. Galton has replied to that argument! His reply covers, logically, the whole field of psychological faculties59 little regarded, for example, by Mr. Sully, who is not exactly an imaginative psychologist.
It covers the whole field of automatism (as in automatic writing) perhaps of the divining rod, certainly of crystal visions and of occasional hallucinations, as Mr. Galton, in this last case, expressly declares. Psychologists at least need not be told that such faculties cannot, any more than other human faculties, be always evoked60 for study and experiment. Our evidence for these faculties and experiences, then, is usually of the class on which the psychologist relies. But, when the psychologist, following Leibnitz, Sir William Hamilton, and Kant, discusses the Subconscious61 (for example, knowledge, often complex and abundant, unconsciously acquired) we demonstrated by examples that the psychologist will contentedly63 repose40 on evidence which is not evidence at all. He will swallow an undated, unlocalised legend of Coleridge, reaching Coleridge on the testimony64 of rumour65, and told at least twenty years after the unverified occurrences. Nay, the psychologist will never dream of procuring66 contemporary evidence for such a monstrous67 statement as that an ignorant German wench unconsciously acquired and afterwards subconsciously68 reproduced huge cantles of dead languages, by virtue69 of having casually70 heard a former master recite or read aloud from Hebrew and Greek books. This legend do psychologists accept on no evidence at all, because it illustrates71 a theory which is, doubtless, a very good theory, though, in this case, carried to an extent ‘imagination boggles at.’
Here the psychologist may reply that much less evidence will content him for a fact to which he possesses, at least, analogies in accredited72 experience, than for a fact (say telepathic crystal-gazing) to which he knows, in experience, nothing analogous73. Thus, for the mythical74 German handmaid, he has the analogy of languages learned in childhood, or passages got up by rote75, being forgotten and brought back to ordinary conscious memory, or delirious76 memory, during an illness, or shortly before death. Strong in these analogies, the psychologist will venture to accept a case of language not learned, but reproduced in delirious memory, on no evidence at all. But, not possessing analogies for telepathic crystal-gazing, he will probably decline to examine ours.
I would first draw his attention to the difference between revived memory of a language once known (Breton and Welsh in known examples), or learned by rote (as Greek, in an anecdote77 of Goethe’s), and verbal reproduction of a language not known or learned by rote but overheard — each passage probably but once — as somebody recited fragments. In this instance (that of the mythical maid) ‘the difficulty . . . is that the original impressions had not the strength — that is, the distinctness — of the reproduction. An unknown language overheard is a mere27 sound. . . . ’6
The distinction here drawn78 is so great and obvious that for proof of the German girl’s case we need better evidence than Coleridge’s rumour of a rumour, cited, as it is, by Hamilton, Maudsley, Carpenter, Du Prel, and the common run of manuals.
Not that I deny, a priori, the possibility of Coleridge’s story. As Mr. Huxley says, ‘strictly speaking, I am unaware79 of anything that has a right to the title of an “impossibility,” except a contradiction in terms.’7 To the horror of some of his admirers, Mr. Huxley would not call the existence of demons62 and demoniacal possession ‘impossible.’8 Mr. Huxley was no blind follower80 of Hume. I, too, do not call Coleridge’s tale ‘impossible,’ but, unlike the psychologists, I refuse to accept it on ‘Bardolph’s security.’ And I contrast their conduct, in swallowing Coleridge’s legend, with their refusal (if they do refuse) to accept the evidence for the automatic writing of not-consciously-known languages (as of eleventh-century French poetry and prose by Mr. Schiller), or their refusal (if they do refuse) to look at the evidence for telepathic crystal-gazing, or any other supernormal exhibitions of faculty, attested81 by living and honourable82 persons.
I wish I saw a way for orthodox unimaginative psychology out of its dilemma83.
After offering to anthropologists and psychologists these considerations, which I purposely reiterate84, we examined historically the relations of science to ‘the marvellous,’ showing for example how Hume, following his a priori theory of the impossible, would have declined to investigate, because they were ‘miraculous,’ certain occurrences which, to Charcot, were ordinary incidents in medical experience.
We next took up and criticised the anthropological theory of religion as expounded85 by Mr. Tylor. We then collected from his work a series of alleged supernormal phenomena in savage belief, all making for the foundation of animistic religion. Through several chapters we pursued the study of these phenomena, choosing savage instances, and setting beside them civilised testimony to facts of experience. Our conclusion was that such civilised experiences, if they occurred, as they are universally said to do, among savages, would help to originate, and would very strongly support the savage doctrine86 of souls, the base of religion in the theory of English anthropologists. But apart from the savage doctrine of ‘spirits’ (whether they exist or not), the evidence points to the existence of human faculties not allowed for in the current systems of materialism87.
We next turned from the subject of supernormal experiences to the admitted facts about early religion. Granting the belief in souls and ghosts and spirits, however attained88, how was the idea of a Supreme Being to be evolved out of that belief? We showed that, taking the creed as found in the lowest races, the processes put forward by anthropologists could not account for its evolution. The facts would not fit into, but contradicted, the anthropological theory. The necessary social conditions postulated89 were not found in places where the belief is found. Nay, the necessary social conditions for the evolution even of ancestor-worship were confessedly not found where the supposed ultimate result of ancestor-worship, the belief in a Supreme Being, flourished abundantly.
Again, the belief in a Supreme Being, ex hypothesi the latest in evolution, therefore the most potent90, was often shelved and half forgotten, or neglected, or ridiculed91, where the belief in Animism (ex hypothesi the earlier) was in full vigour92. We demonstrated by facts that Anthropology93 had simplified her task by ignoring that essential feature, the prevalent alliance of ethics94 with religion, in the creed of the lowest and least developed races. Here, happily, we have not only the evidence of an earnest animist, Mr. Im Thurn, on our side, but that of a distinguished Semitic scholar, the late Mr. Robertson Smith. ‘We see that even in its rudest forms Religion was a moral force, the powers that man reveres95 were on the side of social order and moral law; and the fear of the gods was a motive96 to enforce the laws of society, which were also the laws of morality.’9 Wellhausen has already been cited to the same effect.
However, the facts proving that truth, and unselfishness, surely a large element of Christian8 ethics, are divinely sanctioned in savage religion are more potent than the most learned opinion on that side.
Our next step was to examine in detail several religions of the most remote and backward races, of races least contaminated with Christian or Islamite teaching. Our evidence, when possible, was derived97 from ancient and secret tribal98 mysteries, and sacred native hymns99. We found a relatively100 Supreme Being, a Maker, sanctioning morality, and unpropitiated by sacrifice, among peoples who go in dread102 of ghosts and wizards, but do not always worship ancestors. We showed that the anthropological theory of the evolution of God out of ghosts in no way explains the facts in the savage conception of a Supreme Being. We then argued that the notion of ‘spirit,’ derived from ghost-belief, was not logically needed for the conception of a Supreme Being in its earliest form, was detrimental103 to the conception, and, by much evidence, was denied to be part of the conception. The Supreme Being, thus regarded, may be (though he cannot historically be shown to be) prior to the first notion of ghost and separable souls.
We then traced the idea of such a Supreme Being through the creeds of races rising in the scale of material culture, demonstrating that he was thrust aside by the competition of ravenous104 but serviceable ghosts, ghost-gods, and shades of kingly ancestors, with their magic and their bloody105 rites106. These rites and the animistic conception behind them were next, in rare cases, reflected or refracted back on the Supreme Eternal. Aristocratic institutions fostered polytheism with the old Supreme Being obscured, or superseded107, or enthroned as Emperor–God, or King–God. We saw how, and in what sense, the old degeneration theory could be defined and defended. We observed traces of degeneration in certain archaic108 aspects of the faith in Jehovah; and we proved that (given a tolerably pure low savage belief in a Supreme Being) that belief must degenerate109, under social conditions, as civilisation110 advanced. Next, studying what we may call the restoration of Jehovah, under the great Prophets of Israel, we noted111 that they, and Israel generally, were strangely indifferent to that priceless aspect of Animism, the care for the future happiness, as conditioned by the conduct of the individual soul. That aspect had been neglected neither by the popular instinct nor the priestly and philosophic reflection of Egypt, Greece, and Rome. Christianity, last, combined what was good in Animism, the care for the individual soul as an immortal9 spirit under eternal responsibilities, with the One righteous Eternal of prophetic Israel, and so ended the long, intricate, and mysterious theological education of humanity. Such is our theory, which does not, to us, appear to lack evidence, nor to be inconsistent (as the anthropological theory is apparently112 inconsistent) with the hypothesis of evolution.
All this, it must be emphatically insisted on, is propounded113 ‘under all reserves.’ While these four stages, say (1) the Australian unpropitiated Moral Being, (2) the African neglected Being, still somewhat moral, (3) the relatively Supreme Being involved in human sacrifice, as in Polynesia, and (4) the Moral Being reinstated philosophically114, as in Israel, do suggest steps in evolution, we desire to base no hard-and-fast system of ascending115 and descending116 degrees upon our present evidence. The real object is to show that facts may be regarded in this light, as well as in the light thrown by the anthropological theory, in the hands whether of Mr. Tylor, Mr. Spencer, M. Réville, or Mr. Jevons, whose interesting work comes nearest to our provisional hypothesis.
We only ask for suspense117 of judgment118, and for hesitation119 in accepting the dogmas of modern manual makers120. An exception to them certainly appears to be Mr. Clodd, if we may safely attribute to him a review (signed C.) of Mr. Grant Allen’s ‘Evolution of the Idea of God.’
‘We fear that all our speculations121 will remain summaries of probabilities. No documents are extant to enlighten us; we have only mobile, complex and confused ideas, incarnate122 in eccentric, often contradictory123 theories. That this character attaches to such ideas should keep us on guard against framing theories whose symmetry is sometimes their condemnation’ (‘Daily Chronicle,’ December 10, 1897).
Nothing excites my own suspicion of my provisional hypothesis more than its symmetry. It really seems to fit the facts, as they appear to me, too neatly124. I would suggest, however, that ancient savage sacred hymns, and practices in the mysteries, are really rather of the nature of ‘documents;’ more so, at least, than the casual observations of some travellers, or the gossip extracted from natives much in contact with Europeans.
Supposing that the arguments in this essay met with some acceptance, what effect would they have, if any, on our thoughts about religion? What is their practical tendency? The least dubious125 effect would be, I hope, to prevent us from accepting the anthropological theory of religion, or any other theory, as a foregone conclusion, I have tried to show how dim is our knowledge, how weak, often, is our evidence, and that, finding among the lowest savages all the elements of all religions already developed in different degrees, we cannot, historically, say that one is earlier than another. This point of priority we can never historically settle. If we met savages with ghosts and no gods, we could not be sure but that they once possessed a God, and forgot him. If we met savages with a God and no ghosts, we could not be historically certain that a higher had not obliterated126 a lower creed. For these reasons dogmatic decisions about the origin of religion seem unworthy of science. They will appear yet more futile127 to any student who goes so far with me as to doubt whether the highest gods of the lowest races could be developed, or can be shown to have been developed, by way of the ghost-theory. To him who reaches this point the whole animistic doctrine of ghosts as the one germ of religion will appear to be imperilled. The main practical result, then, will be hesitation about accepting the latest scientific opinion, even when backed by great names, and published in little primers.
On the hypothesis here offered to criticism there are two chief sources of Religion, (1) the belief, how attained we know not,10 in a powerful, moral, eternal, omniscient128 Father and Judge of men; (2) the belief (probably developed out of experiences normal and supernormal) in somewhat of man which may survive the grave. This second belief is not, logically, needed as given material for the first, in its apparently earliest form. It may, for all we know, be the later of the two beliefs, chronologically129. But this belief, too, was necessary to religion; first, as finally supplying a formula by which advancing intellects could conceive of the Mighty130 Being involved in the former creed; next, as elevating man’s conception of his own nature. By the second belief he becomes the child of the God in whom, perhaps, he already trusted, and in whom he has his being, a being not destined131 to perish with the death of the body. Man is thus not only the child but the heir of God, a ‘nurseling of immortality,’ capable of entering into eternal life. On the moral influence of this belief it is superfluous132 to dwell.
From the most backward races historically known to us, to those of our own status, all have been more or less washed by the waters of this double stream of religion. The Hebrews, as far as our information goes, were chiefly influenced by the first belief, the faith in the Eternal, and had comparatively slight interest in whatever posthumous133 fortunes might await individual souls. Other civilised peoples, say the Greeks, extended the second, or animistic theory, into forms of beautiful fantasy, the material of art. Yet both in Greece and Rome, as we learn from the ‘Republic’ (Books i. iii.) of Plato, and from the whole scope of the poem of Lucretius, and from the Painted Porch at Delphi, answering to the frescoes134 of the Pisan Campo Santo, there existed, among the people, what was unknown to the Hebrews, an extreme anxiety about the posthumous fortunes and possible punishment of the individual soul. A kind of pardoners and indulgence-sellers made a living out of that anxiety in Greece. For the Greek pardoners, who testify to an interest in the future happiness of the soul not found in Israel, Mr. Jevons may be cited:
‘The agyrtes professed135 by means of his rites to purify men from the sins they had themselves committed . . . and so to secure to those whom he purified an exemption136 from the evil lot in the next world which awaited those who were not initiated137.’ ‘A magic mirror’ (crystal-gazing) ‘was among his properties.’11
In Egypt a moral life did not suffice to secure immortal reward. There was also required knowledge of the spells that baffle the demons who, in Amenti, as in the Red Indian and Polynesian Hades, lie in wait for souls. That knowledge was contained in copies of the Book of the Dead — the gagne-pain of priests and scribes.
Early Israel, having, as far as we know, a singular lack of interest in the future of the soul, was born to give himself up to developing, undisturbed, the theistic conception, the belief in a righteous Eternal.
Polytheism everywhere — in Greece especially — held of the animistic conception, with its freakish, corruptible138 deities. Greek philosophy could hardly restore that Eternal for whom the Prophets battled in Israel; whom some of the lowest savages know and fear; whom the animistic theory or cult7 everywhere obscures with its crowd of hungry, cruel, interested, food-propitiated101 ghost-gods. In the religion of our Lord and the Apostles the two currents of faith in one righteous God and care for the individual soul were purified and combined. ‘God is a Spirit, and they who worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth.’ Man also is a spirit, and, as such, is in the hands of a God not to be propitiated by man’s sacrifice or monk’s ritual. We know how this doctrine was again disturbed by the Animism, in effect, and by the sacrifice and ritual of the Mediaeval Church. Too eager ‘to be all things to all men,’ the august and beneficent Mother of Christendom readmitted the earlier Animism in new forms of saint-worship, pilgrimage, and popular ceremonial — things apart from, but commonly supposed to be substitutes for, righteousness of life and the selflessness enjoined139 in savage mysteries. For the softness, no less than for the hardness of men’s hearts, these things were ordained140: such as masses for the beloved dead.
Modern thought has deanthropomorphised what was left of anthropomorphic in religion, and, in the end, has left us for God, at most, ‘a stream of tendency making for righteousness,’ or an energy unknown and unknowable — the ghost of a ghost. For the soul, by virtue of his belief in which man raised himself in his own esteem141, and, more or less, in ethical142 standing143, is left to us a negation144 or a wistful doubt.
To this part of modern scientific teaching the earlier position of this essay suggests a demurrer. By aid of the tradition of and belief in supernormal phenomena among the low races, by attested phenomena of the same kinds of experience among the higher races, I have ventured to try to suggest that ‘we are not merely brain;’ that man has his part, we know not how, in we know not what — has faculties and vision scarcely conditioned by the limits of his normal purview145. The evidence of all this deals with matters often trivial, like the electric sparks rubbed from the deer’s hide, which yet are cognate146 with an illimitable, essential potency147 of the universe. Not being able to explain away these facts, or, in this place, to offer what would necessarily be a premature148 theory of them, I regard them, though they seem shadowy, as grounds of hope, or, at least, as tokens that men need not yet despair. Not now for the first time have weak things of the earth been chosen to confound things strong. Nor have men of this opinion been always the weakest; not among the feeblest are Socrates, Pascal, Napoleon, Cromwell, Charles Gordon, St. Theresa, and Jeanne d’Arc.
I am perfectly149 aware that the ‘superstitiousness’ of the earlier part of this essay must injure any effect which the argument of the latter part might possibly produce on critical opinion. Yet that argument in no way depends on what we think about the phenomena — normal, supernormal, or illusory — on which the theory of ghost, soul, or spirit may have been based. It exhibits religion as probably beginning in a kind of Theism, which is then superseded, in some degree, or even corrupted151, by Animism in all its varieties. Finally, the exclusive Theism of Israel receives its complement152 in a purified Animism, and emerges as Christianity.
Quite apart, too, from any favourable153 conclusion which may, by some, be drawn from the phenomena, and quite apart from the more general opinion that all modern instances are compact of imposture154, malobservation, mythopoeic memory, and superstitious150 bias155, the systematic156 comparison of civilised and savage beliefs and alleged experiences of this kind cannot wisely be neglected by Anthropology. Humani nihil a se alienum putat.
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solitary
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| adj.孤独的，独立的，荒凉的；n.隐士 | |
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sketch
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| n.草图；梗概；素描；v.素描；概述 | |
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creed
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| n.信条；信念，纲领 | |
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creeds
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| （尤指宗教）信条，教条( creed的名词复数 ) | |
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alluded
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| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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cult
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| n.异教，邪教；时尚，狂热的崇拜 | |
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Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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immortal
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| adj.不朽的；永生的，不死的；神的 | |
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immortals
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| 不朽的人物( immortal的名词复数 )； 永生不朽者 | |
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envisaged
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| 想像，设想( envisage的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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sage
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| n.圣人，哲人；adj.贤明的，明智的 | |
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deity
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| n.神，神性；被奉若神明的人(或物) | |
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philosophic
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| adj.哲学的，贤明的 | |
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speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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savages
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| 未开化的人，野蛮人( savage的名词复数 ) | |
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savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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intelligible
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| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
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specimens
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| n.样品( specimen的名词复数 )；范例；（化验的）抽样；某种类型的人 | |
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inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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21
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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22
maker
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| n.制造者，制造商 | |
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23
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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24
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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25
deities
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| n.神，女神( deity的名词复数 )；神祗；神灵；神明 | |
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26
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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27
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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28
rabble
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| n.乌合之众，暴民；下等人 | |
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29
symbolical
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| a.象征性的 | |
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30
domain
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| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
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31
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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32
treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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33
narratives
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| 记叙文( narrative的名词复数 )； 故事； 叙述； 叙述部分 | |
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34
mythology
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| n.神话，神话学，神话集 | |
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35
aurora
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| n.极光 | |
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36
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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37
alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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38
phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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39
anthropological
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| adj.人类学的 | |
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40
repose
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| v.(使)休息；n.安息 | |
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41
reposes
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| v.将（手臂等）靠在某人（某物）上( repose的第三人称单数 ) | |
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42
eminent
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| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
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43
ken
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| n.视野，知识领域 | |
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44
inquiries
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| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
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45
unfamiliar
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| adj.陌生的，不熟悉的 | |
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46
peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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47
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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48
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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49
subjective
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| a.主观(上)的，个人的 | |
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50
precisely
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|
| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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51
psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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52
nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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53
hack
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| n.劈，砍，出租马车；v.劈，砍，干咳 | |
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54
physiological
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| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
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55
dissection
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|
| n.分析；解剖 | |
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56
sane
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| adj.心智健全的，神志清醒的，明智的，稳健的 | |
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57
faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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58
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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59
faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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60
evoked
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| [医]诱发的 | |
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61
subconscious
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| n./adj.潜意识(的)，下意识(的) | |
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62
demons
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| n.恶人( demon的名词复数 )；恶魔；精力过人的人；邪念 | |
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63
contentedly
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| adv.心满意足地 | |
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64
testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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65
rumour
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| n.谣言，谣传，传闻 | |
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66
procuring
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的现在分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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67
monstrous
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|
| adj.巨大的；恐怖的；可耻的，丢脸的 | |
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68
subconsciously
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| ad.下意识地，潜意识地 | |
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69
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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70
casually
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| adv.漠不关心地，无动于衷地，不负责任地 | |
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71
illustrates
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| 给…加插图( illustrate的第三人称单数 )； 说明； 表明； （用示例、图画等）说明 | |
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72
accredited
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|
| adj.可接受的；可信任的；公认的；质量合格的v.相信( accredit的过去式和过去分词 )；委托；委任；把…归结于 | |
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73
analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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74
mythical
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| adj.神话的；虚构的；想像的 | |
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75
rote
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| n.死记硬背，生搬硬套 | |
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76
delirious
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|
| adj.不省人事的，神智昏迷的 | |
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77
anecdote
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| n.轶事，趣闻，短故事 | |
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78
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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79
unaware
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| a.不知道的，未意识到的 | |
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80
follower
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| n.跟随者；随员；门徒；信徒 | |
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81
attested
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|
| adj.经检验证明无病的，经检验证明无菌的v.证明( attest的过去式和过去分词 )；证实；声称…属实；使宣誓 | |
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82
honourable
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|
| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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83
dilemma
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|
| n.困境，进退两难的局面 | |
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84
reiterate
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| v.重申，反复地说 | |
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85
expounded
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| 论述，详细讲解( expound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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86
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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87
materialism
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| n.［哲］唯物主义，唯物论；物质至上 | |
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88
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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89
postulated
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|
| v.假定，假设( postulate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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90
potent
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| adj.强有力的，有权势的；有效力的 | |
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91
ridiculed
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| v.嘲笑，嘲弄，奚落( ridicule的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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92
vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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93
anthropology
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| n.人类学 | |
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94
ethics
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|
| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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95
reveres
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| v.崇敬，尊崇，敬畏( revere的第三人称单数 ) | |
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96
motive
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|
| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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97
derived
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|
| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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98
tribal
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|
| adj.部族的，种族的 | |
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99
hymns
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| n.赞美诗，圣歌，颂歌( hymn的名词复数 ) | |
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100
relatively
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| adv.比较...地，相对地 | |
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101
propitiated
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| v.劝解，抚慰，使息怒( propitiate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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102
dread
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| vt.担忧，忧虑；惧怕，不敢；n.担忧，畏惧 | |
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103
detrimental
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|
| adj.损害的，造成伤害的 | |
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104
ravenous
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| adj.极饿的，贪婪的 | |
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105
bloody
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|
| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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106
rites
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| 仪式，典礼( rite的名词复数 ) | |
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107
superseded
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| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
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108
archaic
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| adj.(语言、词汇等)古代的，已不通用的 | |
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109
degenerate
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| v.退步，堕落；adj.退步的，堕落的；n.堕落者 | |
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110
civilisation
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| n.文明，文化，开化，教化 | |
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111
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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112
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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113
propounded
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| v.提出（问题、计划等）供考虑[讨论]，提议( propound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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114
philosophically
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| adv.哲学上；富有哲理性地；贤明地；冷静地 | |
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115
ascending
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| adj.上升的，向上的 | |
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116
descending
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| n. 下行 adj. 下降的 | |
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117
suspense
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| n.（对可能发生的事）紧张感，担心，挂虑 | |
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118
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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119
hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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120
makers
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| n.制造者，制造商（maker的复数形式） | |
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121
speculations
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| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
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122
incarnate
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| adj.化身的，人体化的，肉色的 | |
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123
contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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124
neatly
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| adv.整洁地，干净地，灵巧地，熟练地 | |
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125
dubious
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| adj.怀疑的，无把握的；有问题的，靠不住的 | |
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126
obliterated
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| v.除去( obliterate的过去式和过去分词 )；涂去；擦掉；彻底破坏或毁灭 | |
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127
futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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128
omniscient
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| adj.无所不知的；博识的 | |
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129
chronologically
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| ad. 按年代的 | |
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130
mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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131
destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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132
superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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133
posthumous
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| adj.遗腹的；父亡后出生的；死后的，身后的 | |
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134
frescoes
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| n.壁画( fresco的名词复数 )；温壁画技法，湿壁画 | |
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135
professed
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| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
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136
exemption
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| n.豁免，免税额，免除 | |
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137
initiated
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| n. 创始人 adj. 新加入的 vt. 开始，创始，启蒙，介绍加入 | |
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138
corruptible
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| 易腐败的，可以贿赂的 | |
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139
enjoined
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| v.命令( enjoin的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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140
ordained
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|
| v.任命（某人）为牧师( ordain的过去式和过去分词 )；授予（某人）圣职；（上帝、法律等）命令；判定 | |
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141
esteem
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| n.尊敬，尊重；vt.尊重，敬重；把…看作 | |
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142
ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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143
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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144
negation
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| n.否定；否认 | |
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145
purview
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| n.范围；眼界 | |
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146
cognate
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| adj.同类的，同源的，同族的；n.同家族的人，同源词 | |
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147
potency
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| n. 效力，潜能 | |
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148
premature
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| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
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149
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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150
superstitious
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| adj.迷信的 | |
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151
corrupted
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|
| （使）败坏( corrupt的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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152
complement
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| n.补足物，船上的定员；补语；vt.补充，补足 | |
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153
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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154
imposture
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| n.冒名顶替，欺骗 | |
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155
bias
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| n.偏见，偏心，偏袒；vt.使有偏见 | |
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156
systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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