On the supposition of Forms such as some assert, this must be the case, and equally on the view that no such entity5 has a separate existence. For in every case in which the essence is in matter it is a fact of observation that the particulars of like form are several or infinite in number. Hence there either are, or may be, more heavens than one. On these grounds, then, it might be inferred either that there are or that there might be several heavens. We must, however, return and ask how much of this argument is correct and how much not.
Now it is quite right to say that the formula of the shape apart from the matter must be different from that of the shape in the matter, and we may allow this to be true. We are not, however, therefore compelled to assert a plurality of worlds. Such a plurality is in fact impossible if this world contains the entirety of matter, as in fact it does. But perhaps our contention6 can be made clearer in this way. Suppose ‘aquilinity’ to be curvature in the nose or flesh, and flesh to be the matter of aquilinity. Suppose further, that all flesh came together into a single whole of flesh endowed with this aquiline7 quality. Then neither would there be, nor could there arise, any other thing that was aquiline. Similarly, suppose flesh and bones to be the matter of man, and suppose a man to be created of all flesh and all bones in indissoluble union. The possibility of another man would be removed. Whatever case you took it would be the same. The general rule is this: a thing whose essence resides in a substratum of matter can never come into being in the absence of all matter. Now the universe is certainly a particular and a material thing: if however, it is composed not of a part but of the whole of matter, then though the being of ‘universe’ and of ‘this universe’ are still distinct, yet there is no other universe, and no possibility of others being made, because all the matter is already included in this. It remains8, then, only to prove that it is composed of all natural perceptible body.
First, however, we must explain what we mean by ‘heaven’ and in how many senses we use the word, in order to make clearer the object of our inquiry9. (a) In one sense, then, we call ‘heaven’ the substance of the extreme circumference10 of the whole, or that natural body whose place is at the extreme circumference. We recognize habitually11 a special right to the name ‘heaven’ in the extremity12 or upper region, which we take to be the seat of all that is divine. (b) In another sense, we use this name for the body continuous with the extreme circumference which contains the moon, the sun, and some of the stars; these we say are ‘in the heaven’. (c) In yet another sense we give the name to all body included within extreme circumference, since we habitually call the whole or totality ‘the heaven’. The word, then, is used in three senses.
Now the whole included within the extreme circumference must be composed of all physical and sensible body, because there neither is, nor can come into being, any body outside the heaven. For if there is a natural body outside the extreme circumference it must be either a simple or a composite body, and its position must be either natural or unnatural13. But it cannot be any of the simple bodies. For, first, it has been shown that that which moves in a circle cannot change its place. And, secondly14, it cannot be that which moves from the centre or that which lies lowest. Naturally they could not be there, since their proper places are elsewhere; and if these are there unnaturally15, the exterior16 place will be natural to some other body, since a place which is unnatural to one body must be natural to another: but we saw that there is no other body besides these. Then it is not possible that any simple body should be outside the heaven. But, if no simple body, neither can any mixed body be there: for the presence of the simple body is involved in the presence of the mixture. Further neither can any body come into that place: for it will do so either naturally or unnaturally, and will be either simple or composite; so that the same argument will apply, since it makes no difference whether the question is ‘does A exist?’ or ‘could A come to exist?’ From our arguments then it is evident not only that there is not, but also that there could never come to be, any bodily mass whatever outside the circumference. The world as a whole, therefore, includes all its appropriate matter, which is, as we saw, natural perceptible body. So that neither are there now, nor have there ever been, nor can there ever be formed more heavens than one, but this heaven of ours is one and unique and complete.
It is therefore evident that there is also no place or void or time outside the heaven. For in every place body can be present; and void is said to be that in which the presence of body, though not actual, is possible; and time is the number of movement. But in the absence of natural body there is no movement, and outside the heaven, as we have shown, body neither exists nor can come to exist. It is clear then that there is neither place, nor void, nor time, outside the heaven. Hence whatever is there, is of such a nature as not to occupy any place, nor does time age it; nor is there any change in any of the things which lie beyond the outermost17 motion; they continue through their entire duration unalterable and unmodified, living the best and most selfsufficient of lives. As a matter of fact, this word ‘duration’ possessed18 a divine significance for the ancients, for the fulfilment which includes the period of life of any creature, outside of which no natural development can fall, has been called its duration. On the same principle the fulfilment of the whole heaven, the fulfilment which includes all time and infinity19, is ‘duration’-a name based upon the fact that it is always-duration immortal20 and divine. From it derive21 the being and life which other things, some more or less articulately but others feebly, enjoy. So, too, in its discussions concerning the divine, popular philosophy often propounds22 the view that whatever is divine, whatever is primary and supreme23, is necessarily unchangeable. This fact confirms what we have said. For there is nothing else stronger than it to move it-since that would mean more divine-and it has no defect and lacks none of its proper excellences24. Its unceasing movement, then, is also reasonable, since everything ceases to move when it comes to its proper place, but the body whose path is the circle has one and the same place for starting-point and goal.
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1
exempt
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| adj.免除的；v.使免除；n.免税者，被免除义务者 | |
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2
copper
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| n.铜；铜币；铜器；adj.铜(制)的；(紫)铜色的 | |
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3
apprehend
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| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
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4
subsists
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| v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的第三人称单数 ) | |
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5
entity
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| n.实体，独立存在体，实际存在物 | |
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6
contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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7
aquiline
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| adj.钩状的，鹰的 | |
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8
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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9
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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10
circumference
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| n.圆周，周长，圆周线 | |
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11
habitually
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| ad.习惯地，通常地 | |
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12
extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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13
unnatural
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| adj.不自然的；反常的 | |
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14
secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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15
unnaturally
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| adv.违反习俗地；不自然地；勉强地；不近人情地 | |
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16
exterior
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| adj.外部的，外在的；表面的 | |
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17
outermost
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| adj.最外面的，远离中心的 | |
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18
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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19
infinity
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| n.无限，无穷，大量 | |
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20
immortal
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| adj.不朽的；永生的，不死的；神的 | |
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21
derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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22
propounds
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| v.提出（问题、计划等）供考虑[讨论]，提议( propound的第三人称单数 ) | |
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23
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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24
excellences
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| n.卓越( excellence的名词复数 )；（只用于所修饰的名词后）杰出的；卓越的；出类拔萃的 | |
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