To answer this question, we must first take note of the most significant features of our civilisation1 to-day. Some are obvious. One, and that perhaps the most important of all, is easily overlooked. It is obvious that science is transforming the life of the whole race. It is obvious that the East is destined2 to play a far more active part than it has done hitherto. It is obvious to all who are fairly intelligent and informed, and not blinded by some special disability, that Western civilisation is being undermined by vested economic interests and by absolute national sovereignty. It is fairly obvious that the issue of the present world-wide confusion must be either chaos3 and degeneration or a world in which the means of production are in some effective manner communally4 controlled. It is obvious that the forces of reaction are at present relatively5 hopeful and resolute6, while the forces of progress are for the moment disunited, bewildered, and irresolute7.
What is not so obvious is that a sinister8 change of temper is spreading throughout the civilised world and threatening to destroy both the flower and the root of civilisation. As the years pass we are tending more and more to abandon the two principles which constitute at once the goal and the essential means of civilised living. We are losing faith in the free critical intelligence. And we are losing faith in charity.
To understand the importance of this change, let us remember how our species triumphed. Throughout man's career intelligence and charity have been man's distinctive9 and most valuable assets. One of our early pre-human ancestors is said to have been much like the Spectral10 Tarsier, a little mammal about the size of a mouse, with long wiry fingers and huge forward-looking eyes adapted for binocular vision. Not by weapons but by correlation11 of subtle eyes and subtle hands through subtle brain, this creature triumphed. And man himself conquered the world by the same means, by attention, by discrimination, by skilled manipulation, by versatility12; in fact by intelligence and imagination in adapting himself to an ever-changing environment.
But intelligence and imagination have not been his sole outfit13. By means of these he developed a more precise and penetrating14 kind of awareness15 of himself and others than is possible to sub-human animals. At some stage or other men began to be conscious of themselves and their fellows as conscious agents, having distinctive characters and needs. This new power enabled them gradually to attain16, though rarely and precariously18, a new kind of social experience and social behaviour. Sociality, as we have seen, is of two types: the distinctively19 animal and the distinctively human; that which demands only herd-mentality20, and that which demands also the capacity for true community, based on the mutual22 respect of self-conscious and other-conscious individuals.
These then, the critical and imaginative intelligence and the capacity for community, are the powers by which man has risen. Both of them, particularly the latter, are fragmentary and precarious17; but both have until recently been regarded as essential to civilisation. The tragedy of our time lies in the fact that, besides declining in scope, they are actually coming into disrepute.
In the Victorian age it seemed that the future lay with Liberalism, if by that name we may refer not merely to a political policy but to an attitude of mind, a culture, which was accepted by most men, irrespective of party. This attitude of mind had been conceived by, and was appropriate to, the needs of the rising bourgeois23 class in its fight for independence against the feudal24 aristocracy. Along with some distorted ideas that were special to the circumstances of the bourgeois class, Liberalism included two perennially25 important principles, namely, faith in the free intelligence, and respect for human individuality. All other liberal principles, good and bad, were derived26 from these. Economic laissez faire, the freedom of the individual to buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest; political democracy, the freedom of the individual to take a share in the control of public policy by voting; freedom of conscience; freedom from superstition27; freedom of expression; freedom of physical and mental growth through universal comfort and security and universal education — these ideals, which were accepted by very many intelligent citizens, were thought to be capable of speedy realisation throughout the civilised world. Not only so, but the "scientific spirit," the new temper of disinterested28 enquiry which had been so painfully acquired during the preceding three centuries, and had become associated with Liberalism, seemed at last to be coming into its own.
These expectations, as we have already noted30, turned out to be false. Liberalism failed to fulfil its promise. Its failure was due partly to the fact that it stressed individuality at the expense of community, partly to the insincerity with which its principles were applied31 in practice, partly to the general reaction from intellectualism.
The root of the trouble, as we have seen, was that the policy of laissez faire was not implemented32 with equality of bargaining power. It favoured fortunate individuals at the expense of society. It brought not the millennium33 but plutocracy34 and wage-slavery. It brought the rivalry35 of industrial empires competing for the exploitation of backward lands and peoples. It brought also, though against its will, tariff36 walls and neurotic37 patriotism38, arming to the teeth. Indirectly39, and in spite of itself, it brought the European War.
What followed? The war accustomed men to discipline and to conformity41. The exigencies42 of war, abroad and at home, and the exigencies of class-domination, tightened43 discipline in every sphere. Not only the Liberal Party, but the far more widespread Liberal mentality, was torn by an internal conflict, a conflict between democratic ideals and the expediency44 of defending the social order which it, the bourgeois class, controlled. Liberal principles suited a rising but not a dominant45 class.
Meanwhile, among the workers not individualism but collective action against the employers had proved the only remedy against oppression. This fact discredited46 the whole system of Liberal ideas, both the good and the bad. It was from Russia that Liberalism received its death-blow. There the tendency to sink the individual in the militant47 party and class gained immense prestige from the success of the Revolution and the founding of a social order planned in the workers' interests.
In Italy and Germany the same disgust with individualism brought the same tendency to energise and discipline the individual by persuading him to regard himself merely as a member of a group. But here the issue was a very different social order.
In the reaction from Liberalism we must distinguish two opposed but closely entangled48 factors, namely, an advance toward the will for genuine community and a regression toward the herd-mentality. In Russia, Italy, and Germany there has been a revulsion from individualism; and both the herd-mentality and the will for community have played a great part. It seems probable, however, that while in Russia the will for community has, on the whole, been dominant, in Italy and Germany the main factor has been herd-mentality, stimulated50 and used for private ends by individualistic capitalists and social adventurers.
The decline of Liberalism as a social policy brought with it the decline of Liberalism as a cultural ideal. In the more industrialised lands this cultural change was accentuated51 by a growing emotional revulsion from "scientific materialism52," which was closely associated with Liberalism.
This change of feeling had two aspects. In general it was a reaction against the extravagant53 claims of the champions of the abstract intellect, in fact against a narrow intellectualism; and it was a particular protest against the intellectual undermining of morality. The belief that mind was a meaningless accident in the universe, and that moral values were merely subjective54, seemed to be involved in the scientific world-view. This abstraction and hypostatisation of physical qualities was unjustified, but it accorded with the general preoccupation with the commercial aspect of the material world. Materialism, however, doubtless supported by a craving55 to be rid of tiresome56 moral obligations, led to the overthrow57 of the old moral sanctions. This revolution produced, particularly in the "advanced circles" of capitalistic countries, an irresponsible, sordid58, and despair-racked way of life. This, or the reaction which it caused in spectators, gave rise in time to a phase of widespread disgust and horror at the effects of moral nihilism. The emotional tide turned once more toward self-discipline and even toward a "mystical" sanction for morality in some kind of religious devotion.
But devotion to what? The old religion had lost its power. A new one was urgently needed.
In one country alone this need was not seriously felt, or at least not recognised. Soviet59 Russia had not suffered from the disillusionment and degeneracy of Western Europe. In Russia, society itself, in the form of tae proletarian State, became the supreme60 object of veneration61. And dialectical materialism strangely assumed much of the glamour62 of a mystical religion.
But in Italy and Germany materialism was blamed for social degeneracy. The deep need for a mystical sanction for values gave birth to the fantastic mythology63 of the divine race. The racial myth is based on the biologically unsound notion that the cultural differences between peoples are caused mainly by differences of biological stock, and that some races are innately64 nobler than others. This false conception is given an emotional appeal by the vague and wholly unfounded belief that one's own race is the best of all, and moreover has been entrusted65 with a divine mission to rule the world, or is itself an embodiment of the divine principle.
It is perhaps well to say in passing that, though we must emphatically condemn67 the culture which at present dominates Italy and Germany, it would be folly68 on our part to indulge in self-righteous censure69 of these great peoples themselves. The social neurosis which has seized them was bred of agony and dire40 frustration70. And these were caused partly by cruel treatment at the hands of more fortunate neighbours, partly by the tragic71 failure of Liberalism.
The triumph of Liberalism had depended on the free exercise of the critical intelligence. Its downfall brought the free intelligence into contempt. In Russia, no doubt, intelligence is still prized; but it is muzzled72 and only allowed to function in directions approved by the State. Moreover, the discovery that all thought is unwittingly biassed73 has given rise, not only in Russia, to the perverse74 and lethal75 notion that distortion of facts and arguments is praiseworthy so long as it inclines in directions favourable76 to the social ideals of the thinker.
In Italy and Germany the free intelligence has been much more severely77 persecuted78. The finer brains of both countries have been either exiled or destroyed. In the schools the young are brought up to believe that criticism of the official ideology79, is always misleading and wicked. If the present regime continues, these two great peoples may within a generation suffer a very serious all-round reduction of mental capacity. Communists explain the Fascist80 annihilation of culture as a necessary result of the necessary hostility81 of capitalism82 to the free intelligence which tends to expose its weakness. No doubt there is much truth in this view. We must not forget, however, that in Russia also there is ruthless oppression and restriction83 of free criticism. This is officially attributed to the need for unity21 against threatened attack from within and without. It is true that grave danger inevitably84 brings oppression and cultural decline, and that in every country to-day insecurity, frustration, and fear are in fact producing this result. But it is difficult not to be gravely perturbed85 by recurrent shootings in Russia.
Liberalism was associated not only with the free exercise of intelligence but with a morality based on human brotherhood86. This was a legacy87 from Christanity. It did not logically fit into the materialistic88 and ethically89 sceptical metaphysics that science had bred, but it accorded with the Liberal respect for individuality. Even within the sphere of Liberalism, however, it could not have long survived. We have already noticed the widespread "taboo91 on tenderness" that seized Western culture under the influence of science. A much more violent rejection92 of the orthodox tenderness-morality occurred in Italy and Germany as part of the emotional reaction against Liberalism. In fact, combined with a protest against ethical90 scepticism and moral licentiousness93, there was a protest against the particular kind of morality which had for so long inspired Liberalism at its best. As against materialism, Fascism has reinstated morality, but as against Christianity it has dethroned love and set in its place courage and ruthless mastery. Finally, it is perhaps worth while to remark that, just as the racial myth necessitates94 suppression of the free intelligence that ridicules95 it, so this harsh morality demands a gradual blunting of all the finer sensibilities that condemn it.
It must not be supposed that the democratic countries (so-called) have been exempt96 from these tendencies. In Britain; for instance, what do we find? The key to the understanding of the whole process lies in the fact that the capitalistic social order is faced with very grave difficulties. In times of prosperity the owning class, influenced by Liberalism and spurred by the demands of the workers, tended to become comparatively tolerant and paternal97. But recurrent financial crises, the fear of social disorder98, and the necessity to arm extravagantly99 for the maintenance of imperial economic privileges are producing a very different temper. Already there are signs that tolerance100 and paternalism are giving way to a harsher spirit. This is partly the result of the inevitable101 increase of industrial centralisation. The individual firms of each industry tend to collaborate102 to restrict output and maintain prices. Capitalistic private enterprise is voluntarily controlling free competition in order to preserve the system. As yet there is no grand co-ordination of all industries, but it will come. At present, Parliament tries ineffectively to arbitrate between them. In time, presumably, the industries themselves will establish a central co-ordinating body, a sort of Fascist Grand Council.
Meanwhile, the tendency to Fascism is plain in other respects. Democracy is discredited by the supine behaviour of Parliamentary Governments. At the same time we see a steady encroachment103 on civil liberties. Police powers are extended. Attempts are made to discipline the people through gas-drills, and perhaps through the otherwise very desirable physical culture movement. Approval is given to hooligan action against persons whose political opinions are disliked. Conscription is in the air. Increasingly the press, the radio and the cinema become sensitive to Government suggestions for suppression or "interpretation104" of facts. Along with all this we must note a change of moral temper, a slow but steady drift away from the tenderness morality of Liberalism and Christianity. Amongst intellectuals of a certain type we find, for instance, a disposition105 to defend blood-sports, including bull-fighting. There are signs that approval of corporal punishment is increasing, along with morbid106 delight in the infliction107 of it. Everywhere we encounter the first symptoms of the movement from kindliness108 to firmness.
It appears, then, that not only in the Fascist countries, and not only in these and Russia, but also in the "Democracies," there is a steady flight from the principles of Liberalism, both good and bad. I suggest that this cultural change is at bottom a consequence of the economic forces at work in our day. In fact I suggest that economic determinism is thrusting us not toward the Marxian Utopia but toward Fascism; and that, if economic determinism cannot be restrained, we are doomed109.
The Marxian believes that this tendency toward Fascism occurs only in capitalist countries, and that sooner or later capitalism will crack, and the proletariat will seize control. He grossly underestimates the powers of propaganda and coercion110 in the hands of the owning class, and the gullibility111 of the masses. Also he underestimates, or still worse excuses as a temporary expedient112, the tendency toward Fascism in Russia. It is necessary to face the possibility that the Communist party in Russia, in spite of its magnificent record of devotion, may ultimately degenerate113 into an oppressive bureaucracy or a reactionary114 religious hierarchy115. May this fear prove unfounded!
Is there any hope of checking this trend of economic determinism? I believe that there is, though only a forlorn one. But forlorn hopes sometimes kindle116 the best in human nature and carry it to miraculous117 triumph. The only hope, I suggest, is that there may be a widespread and emphatic66 assertion of the will for true community. If, as I have argued, there was something more than economic determinism (in the narrow sense) in Early Christianity, in the French Revolution, and in the Russian Revolution itself, something without which these great events could never have been achieved, then there is after all a hope that the same spirit may yet refashion the whole world.
This spirit, however it has been described in the past, has always manifested two aspects, which in modern idiom consist of faith in the free intelligence and will for true community.
If this is correct, then the practical upshot of our survey of philosophy is obvious. Our main theoretical conclusion has been an increased reliance on the validity of the dispassionate intelligence and on the ideal of personality-in-community. If, as I have argued, philosophy does not end with theory, but is the love and the pursuit of wisdom, this conclusion must not remain purely118 theoretical. We have seen that in the contemporary world the dispassionate intelligence and the spirit of true community are falling into disrepute, and that their decline threatens to bring the human race to grave disaster. Clearly, then, the practical effect of our survey must be to stimulate49 us to do our utmost both in private life and in public life to foster these two essential factors in civilisation.
But though the free intelligence and the spirit of community are, I believe, by far the most important influences for civilising the world, we must not suppose that as abstract principles they constitute by themselves a panacea119 for all our troubles. To say, as some do, that if only we will be constant to these principles all will be well, is not enough. They are all-sufficient only when they are almost universally accepted, and accepted with sincere conviction. In the present world there is no prospect120 that this will soon be the case. On the contrary, even lip-service to them is dwindling121; and at the best of times only a small minority will be capable of practising them constantly and sincerely.
Moreover, public events since the European War have shown all too grimly that a vague inclination122 toward sincere thinking and kindly123 behaviour is utterly124 powerless against a ruthless adventurer or a ruthless class, armed with modern weapons of propaganda and coercion. In our disjointed world there are too many dangerous neurotics125 who cannot be speedily turned from destructiveness by reasonable persuasion126 or by the power of non-violence. In the long run, assuredly, reason and love will prevail. And even to-day they are by far the most important instruments of civilisation. But unaided they cannot deal successfully with every crisis that threatens us with a further incursion of the new barbarism. We must face the fact that, though the free intelligence and the spirit of community are at once the goal and an essential means, they may be not only ineffectual but actually harmful, unless they are combined with a full measure of that hot indignation against tyranny, that devoted127 service in the struggle for the new order, which is characteristic of the best minds of the political Left.
On the other hand, the political Left, if it is to capture the imagination and allegiance of the people of this country and sweep them forward to victory, must, I believe, learn a more liberal spirit. I mean, of course, liberal not in the political but in the cultural sense, namely, loyalty128 to the free critical intelligence and respect for the human individual. For how do things stand? Up and down the country, up and down the world, in every class and every political party, outside the churches and inside them, there are increasing numbers of well-disposed and sensible men and women who are ready to make real sacrifices if thereby129 they can help to create a better social order and a peace that shall be lasting130 and world-wide. Many of those who have social and economic privileges are beginning to realise that such privileges are both unjust and doomed to vanish. Not only so, but many, in all social classes, who are citizens of capitalistic states with imperial privileges, are reluctantly beginning to see that their far-reaching advantages over less-favoured peoples are equally unjust and unmaintainable. Perhaps in time they will become reconciled to surrendering them.
But this growing mass of well-meaning bewildered public opinion is ineffective. One of the main reasons of its futility131 lies in the fact that no political party fully29 deserves its trust. The Conservatives are blinded by the prejudices of capitalism. The Liberals are often equally so. Labour is paralysed by the incubus132 of trade-union leadership. The Communists, unique in devotion and,courage, have gained a reputation for impracticable and doctrinaire133 policies and for political ineptitude134. Moreover, the rank and file of the Communist party, and all but the best of its leaders, are too apt to play into their opponents' hands by indulging in a very excusable but none the less impolitic extravagance and bitterness.
Yet the increasing mass of politically waking people might, I believe, be brought whole-heartedly to support the Left and to make real sacrifices, if they could be sure that the Left was inspired, not only by righteous indignation and the will for a new social order, but also by outstanding intellectual integrity and respect for human individuality. Rightly or wrongly, people are afraid of Communism for the same reasons as they are afraid of Fascism. They are afraid that if it came into power it would prove more tyrannical than the present order, that it would regiment135 people intolerably and suppress criticism with much the same ruthlessness as Fascism. No doubt this impression is partly a result of hostile propaganda, but not entirely136 so.
The most urgent task of the Left to-day is to convince the mass of politically waking members of all classes that it stands not for a new kind of oppression and a new kind of censorship but for human kindliness and for the free intelligence. If the vague and confused forces of good will in this country and in the world are to be brought together to form a really effective movement for radical137 social change and world change, they must not only be taught true theories and sound policies; they must also find both a philosophy and a religion. And for this end the leaders of this great movement, which is so slowly and so tardily138 coming into being, must manifestly appear to be not only astute139 politicians, not only wise statesmen, but moral leaders. They must have the very highest degree of personal integrity. And by personal integrity I mean not merely incorruptibility in the face of personal temptations; for this is, or should be, a commonplace political virtue140. I mean far more than this, namely that these champions of a new world must be relied on to preserve through all the excitements and emergencies of political action their fundamental loyalty to the ideal of personality-in-community and their respect for the free critical intelligence. I mean that they must be manifestly incapable141 of seeking any speedy but superficial triumph for the cause by means which in the long run will frustrate142 the achievement of the true social aim.
Apart from obvious economic ills, what is most wrong with the world to-day is that we have lost faith in the distinctively human attributes of man, namely, the free critical intelligence and the capacity for mutual respect. Leaders who combine sound social policies with unshakable and unmistakable loyalty to these principles will be able to inspire us, not only with a reluctant acceptance of the need to take serious risks, but with the will to follow such leaders constantly, even, if necessary, through the gravest sacrifices, in the faith that they are true builders of the new world.
The End
收听单词发音 |
1
civilisation
|
|
| n.文明，文化，开化，教化 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
destined
|
|
| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
chaos
|
|
| n.混乱，无秩序 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
communally
|
|
| adv.共同地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
relatively
|
|
| adv.比较...地，相对地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
resolute
|
|
| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
irresolute
|
|
| adj.无决断的，优柔寡断的，踌躇不定的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
sinister
|
|
| adj.不吉利的，凶恶的，左边的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
distinctive
|
|
| adj.特别的，有特色的，与众不同的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
spectral
|
|
| adj.幽灵的，鬼魂的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
correlation
|
|
| n.相互关系，相关，关连 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
versatility
|
|
| n.多才多艺，多样性，多功能 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
outfit
|
|
| n.（为特殊用途的）全套装备，全套服装 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
penetrating
|
|
| adj.（声音）响亮的，尖锐的adj.（气味）刺激的adj.（思想）敏锐的，有洞察力的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
awareness
|
|
| n.意识，觉悟，懂事，明智 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
attain
|
|
| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
precarious
|
|
| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
precariously
|
|
| adv.不安全地；危险地；碰机会地；不稳定地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
distinctively
|
|
| adv.特殊地，区别地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
mentality
|
|
| n.心理，思想，脑力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
unity
|
|
| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
mutual
|
|
| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
bourgeois
|
|
| adj./n.追求物质享受的(人)；中产阶级分子 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
feudal
|
|
| adj.封建的，封地的，领地的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
perennially
|
|
| adv.经常出现地；长期地；持久地；永久地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
derived
|
|
| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
superstition
|
|
| n.迷信，迷信行为 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
disinterested
|
|
| adj.不关心的，不感兴趣的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
fully
|
|
| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
noted
|
|
| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
applied
|
|
| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
implemented
|
|
| v.实现( implement的过去式和过去分词 )；执行；贯彻；使生效 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
millennium
|
|
| n.一千年，千禧年；太平盛世 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
plutocracy
|
|
| n.富豪统治 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
rivalry
|
|
| n.竞争，竞赛，对抗 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
tariff
|
|
| n.关税，税率；(旅馆、饭店等)价目表，收费表 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
neurotic
|
|
| adj.神经病的，神经过敏的；n.神经过敏者，神经病患者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
patriotism
|
|
| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
indirectly
|
|
| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
dire
|
|
| adj.可怕的，悲惨的，阴惨的，极端的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
conformity
|
|
| n.一致，遵从，顺从 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
exigencies
|
|
| n.急切需要 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
tightened
|
|
| 收紧( tighten的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）变紧； （使）绷紧； 加紧 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
expediency
|
|
| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
dominant
|
|
| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
discredited
|
|
| 不足信的，不名誉的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
militant
|
|
| adj.激进的，好斗的；n.激进分子，斗士 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
entangled
|
|
| adj.卷入的；陷入的；被缠住的；缠在一起的v.使某人（某物/自己）缠绕，纠缠于（某物中），使某人（自己）陷入（困难或复杂的环境中）( entangle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
stimulate
|
|
| vt.刺激，使兴奋；激励，使…振奋 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
stimulated
|
|
| a.刺激的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
accentuated
|
|
| v.重读( accentuate的过去式和过去分词 )；使突出；使恶化；加重音符号于 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
materialism
|
|
| n.［哲］唯物主义，唯物论；物质至上 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
extravagant
|
|
| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
subjective
|
|
| a.主观(上)的，个人的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
craving
|
|
| n.渴望,热望 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
tiresome
|
|
| adj.令人疲劳的，令人厌倦的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
overthrow
|
|
| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
sordid
|
|
| adj.肮脏的，不干净的，卑鄙的，暗淡的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
Soviet
|
|
| adj.苏联的，苏维埃的；n.苏维埃 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
supreme
|
|
| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
veneration
|
|
| n.尊敬，崇拜 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
glamour
|
|
| n.魔力，魅力；vt.迷住 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
mythology
|
|
| n.神话，神话学，神话集 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
innately
|
|
| adv.天赋地；内在地，固有地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
entrusted
|
|
| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
emphatic
|
|
| adj.强调的，着重的；无可置疑的，明显的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
condemn
|
|
| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
folly
|
|
| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
censure
|
|
| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
frustration
|
|
| n.挫折，失败，失效，落空 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
tragic
|
|
| adj.悲剧的，悲剧性的，悲惨的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
muzzled
|
|
| 给（狗等）戴口套( muzzle的过去式和过去分词 )； 使缄默，钳制…言论 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
biassed
|
|
| （统计试验中）结果偏倚的，有偏的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
74
perverse
|
|
| adj.刚愎的；坚持错误的，行为反常的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
lethal
|
|
| adj.致死的；毁灭性的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
favourable
|
|
| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
severely
|
|
| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
persecuted
|
|
| （尤指宗教或政治信仰的）迫害(~sb. for sth.)( persecute的过去式和过去分词 )； 烦扰，困扰或骚扰某人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
ideology
|
|
| n.意识形态，(政治或社会的)思想意识 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
fascist
|
|
| adj.法西斯主义的；法西斯党的；n.法西斯主义者，法西斯分子 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
hostility
|
|
| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
82
capitalism
|
|
| n.资本主义 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
restriction
|
|
| n.限制，约束 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
inevitably
|
|
| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
85
perturbed
|
|
| adj.烦燥不安的v.使（某人）烦恼，不安( perturb的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
86
brotherhood
|
|
| n.兄弟般的关系，手中情谊 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
87
legacy
|
|
| n.遗产，遗赠；先人(或过去)留下的东西 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
88
materialistic
|
|
| a.唯物主义的，物质享乐主义的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
89
ethically
|
|
| adv.在伦理上，道德上 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
90
ethical
|
|
| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
91
taboo
|
|
| n.禁忌，禁止接近，禁止使用；adj.禁忌的；v.禁忌，禁制，禁止 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
92
rejection
|
|
| n.拒绝，被拒，抛弃，被弃 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
93
licentiousness
|
|
| n.放肆，无法无天 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
94
necessitates
|
|
| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
95
ridicules
|
|
| n.嘲笑( ridicule的名词复数 )；奚落；嘲弄；戏弄v.嘲笑，嘲弄，奚落( ridicule的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
96
exempt
|
|
| adj.免除的；v.使免除；n.免税者，被免除义务者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
97
paternal
|
|
| adj.父亲的，像父亲的，父系的，父方的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
98
disorder
|
|
| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
99
extravagantly
|
|
| adv.挥霍无度地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
100
tolerance
|
|
| n.宽容；容忍，忍受；耐药力；公差 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
101
inevitable
|
|
| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
102
collaborate
|
|
| vi.协作，合作；协调 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
103
encroachment
|
|
| n.侵入，蚕食 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
104
interpretation
|
|
| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
105
disposition
|
|
| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
106
morbid
|
|
| adj.病的；致病的；病态的；可怕的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
107
infliction
|
|
| n.（强加于人身的）痛苦，刑罚 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
108
kindliness
|
|
| n.厚道，亲切，友好的行为 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
109
doomed
|
|
| 命定的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
110
coercion
|
|
| n.强制，高压统治 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
111
gullibility
|
|
| n.易受骗，易上当，轻信 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
112
expedient
|
|
| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
113
degenerate
|
|
| v.退步，堕落；adj.退步的，堕落的；n.堕落者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
114
reactionary
|
|
| n.反动者，反动主义者；adj.反动的，反动主义的，反对改革的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
115
hierarchy
|
|
| n.等级制度；统治集团，领导层 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
116
kindle
|
|
| v.点燃，着火 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
117
miraculous
|
|
| adj.像奇迹一样的，不可思议的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
118
purely
|
|
| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
119
panacea
|
|
| n.万灵药；治百病的灵药 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
120
prospect
|
|
| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
121
dwindling
|
|
| adj.逐渐减少的v.逐渐变少或变小( dwindle的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
122
inclination
|
|
| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
123
kindly
|
|
| adj.和蔼的，温和的，爽快的；adv.温和地，亲切地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
124
utterly
|
|
| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
125
neurotics
|
|
| n.神经官能症的( neurotic的名词复数 )；神经质的；神经过敏的；极为焦虑的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
126
persuasion
|
|
| n.劝说；说服；持有某种信仰的宗派 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
127
devoted
|
|
| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
128
loyalty
|
|
| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
129
thereby
|
|
| adv.因此，从而 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
130
lasting
|
|
| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
131
futility
|
|
| n.无用 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
132
incubus
|
|
| n.负担；恶梦 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
133
doctrinaire
|
|
| adj.空论的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
134
ineptitude
|
|
| n.不适当；愚笨，愚昧的言行 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
135
regiment
|
|
| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
136
entirely
|
|
| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
137
radical
|
|
| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
138
tardily
|
|
| adv.缓慢 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
139
astute
|
|
| adj.机敏的，精明的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
140
virtue
|
|
| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
141
incapable
|
|
| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
142
frustrate
|
|
| v.使失望；使沮丧；使厌烦 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |