WE HAVE recognised in representative government the ideal type of the most perfect polity, for which, in consequence, any portion of mankind are better adapted in proportion to their degree of general improvement. As they range lower and lower in development, that form of government will be, generally speaking, less suitable to them; though this is not true universally: for the adaptation of a people to representative government does not depend so much upon the place they occupy in the general scale of humanity as upon the degree in which they possess certain special requisites3; requisites, however, so closely connected with their degree of general advancement4, that any variation between the two is rather the exception than the rule. Let us examine at what point in the descending5 series representative government ceases altogether to be admissible, either through its own unfitness, or the superior fitness of some other regimen.
First, then, representative, like any other government, must be unsuitable in any case in which it cannot permanently6 subsist7 — i.e. in which it does not fulfil the three fundamental conditions enumerated8 in the first chapter. These were — 1. That the people should be willing to receive it. 2. That they should be willing and able to do what is necessary for its preservation9. 3. That they should be willing and able to fulfil the duties and discharge the functions which it imposes on them.
The willingness of the people to accept representative government only becomes a practical question when an enlightened ruler, or a foreign nation or nations who have gained power over the country, are disposed to offer it the boon10. To individual reformers the question is almost irrelevant11, since, if no other objection can be made to their enterprise than that the opinion of the nation is not yet on their side, they have the ready and proper answer, that to bring it over to their side is the very end they aim at. When opinion is really adverse12, its hostility13 is usually to the fact of change, rather than to representative government in itself. The contrary case is not indeed unexampled; there has sometimes been a religious repugnance14 to any limitation of the power of a particular line of rulers; but, in general, the doctrine15 of passive obedience16 meant only submission17 to the will of the powers that be, whether monarchical18 or popular. In any case in which the attempt to introduce representative government is at all likely to be made, indifference20 to it, and inability to understand its processes and requirements, rather than positive opposition21, are the obstacles to be expected. These, however, are as fatal, and may be as hard to be got rid of, as actual aversion; it being easier, in most cases, to change the direction of an active feeling, than to create one in a state previously22 passive. When a people have no sufficient value for, and attachment23 to, a representative constitution, they have next to no chance of retaining it. In every country, the executive is the branch of the government which wields24 the immediate25 power, and is in direct contact with the public; to it, principally, the hopes and fears of individuals are directed, and by it both the benefits, and the terrors and prestige, of government are mainly represented to the public eye. Unless, therefore, the authorities whose office it is to check the executive are backed by an effective opinion and feeling in the country, the executive has always the means of setting them aside, or compelling them to subservience26, and is sure to be well supported in doing so. Representative institutions necessarily depend for permanence upon the readiness of the people to fight for them in case of their being endangered. If too little valued for this, they seldom obtain a footing at all, and if they do, are almost sure to be overthrown27, as soon as the head of the government, or any party leader who can muster28 force for a coup29 de main, is willing to run some small risk for absolute power.
These considerations relate to the first two causes of failure in a representative government. The third is, when the people want either the will or the capacity to fulfil the part which belongs to them in a representative constitution. When nobody, or only some small fraction, feels the degree of interest in the general affairs of the State necessary to the formation of a public opinion, the electors will seldom make any use of the right of suffrage30 but to serve their private interest, or the interest of their locality, or of some one with whom they are connected as adherents31 or dependents. The small class who, in this state of public feeling, gain the command of the representative body, for the most part use it solely32 as a means of seeking their fortune. if the executive is weak, the country is distracted by mere33 struggles for place; if strong, it makes itself despotic, at the cheap price of appeasing34 the representatives, or such of them as are capable of giving trouble, by a share of the spoil; and the only fruit produced by national representation is, that in addition to those who really govern, there is an assembly quartered on the public, and no abuse in which a portion of the assembly are interested is at all likely to be removed. When, however, the evil stops here, the price may be worth paying, for the publicity35 and discussion which, though not an invariable, are a natural accompaniment of any, even nominal36, representation. In the modern Kingdom of Greece, for example,2 it can hardly be doubted, that the placehunters who chiefly compose the representative assembly, though they contribute little or nothing directly to good government, nor even much temper the arbitrary power of the executive, yet keep up the idea of popular rights, and conduce greatly to the real liberty of the press which exists in that country. This benefit, however, is entirely37 dependent on the co-existence with the popular body of an hereditary38 king. If, instead of struggling for the favours of the chief ruler, these selfish and sordid39 factions40 struggled for the chief place itself, they would certainly, as in Spanish America, keep the country in a state of chronic41 revolution and civil war. A despotism, not even legal, but of illegal violence, would be alternately exercised by a succession of political adventurers, and the name and forms of representation would have no effect but to prevent despotism from attaining42 the stability and security by which alone its evils can be mitigated43, or its few advantages realised.
2 Written before the salutary revolution of 1862, which, provoked by popular disgust at the system of governing by corruption44, and the general demoralisation of political men, has opened to that rapidly improving people a new and hopeful chance of real constitutional government.
The preceding are the cases in which representative government cannot permanently exist. There are others in which it possibly might exist, but in which some other form of government would be preferable. These are principally when the people, in order to advance in civilisation45, have some lesson to learn, some habit not yet acquired, to the acquisition of which representative government is likely to be an impediment.
The most obvious of these cases is the one already considered, in which the people have still to learn the first lesson of civilisation, that of obedience. A race who have been trained in energy and courage by struggles with Nature and their neighbours, but who have not yet settled down into permanent obedience to any common superior, would be little likely to acquire this habit under the collective government of their own body. A representative assembly drawn46 from among themselves would simply reflect their own turbulent insubordination. It would refuse its authority to all proceedings47 which would impose, on their savage48 independence, any improving restraint. The mode in which such tribes are usually brought to submit to the primary conditions of civilised society is through the necessities of warfare49, and the despotic authority indispensable to military command. A military leader is the only superior to whom they will submit, except occasionally some prophet supposed to be inspired from above, or conjurer regarded as possessing miraculous50 power. These may exercise a temporary ascendancy51, but as it is merely personal, it rarely effects any change in the general habits of the people, unless the prophet, like Mahomet, is also a military chief, and goes forth52 the armed apostle of a new religion; or unless the military chiefs ally themselves with his influence, and turn it into a prop2 for their own government.
A people are no less unfitted for representative government by the contrary fault to that last specified53; by extreme passiveness, and ready submission to tyranny. If a people thus prostrated54 by character and circumstances could obtain representative institutions, they would inevitably55 choose their tyrants56 as their representatives, and the yoke57 would be made heavier on them by the contrivance which prima facie might be expected to lighten it. On the contrary, many a people has gradually emerged from this condition by the aid of a central authority, whose position has made it the rival, and has ended by making it the master, of the local despots, and which, above all, has been single. French history, from Hugh Capet to Richelieu and Louis XIV., is a continued example of this course of things. Even when the King was scarcely so powerful as many of his chief feudatories, the great advantage which he derived59 from being but one has been recognised by French historians. To him the eyes of all the locally oppressed were turned; he was the object of hope and reliance throughout the kingdom; while each local potentate60 was only powerful within a more or less confined space. At his hands, refuge and protection were sought from every part of the country, against first one, then another, of the immediate oppressors. His progress to ascendancy was slow; but it resulted from successively taking advantage of opportunities which offered themselves only to him. It was, therefore, sure; and, in proportion as it was accomplished61, it abated62, in the oppressed portion of the community, the habit of submitting to oppression. The king's interest lay in encouraging all partial attempts on the part of the serfs to emancipate64 themselves from their masters, and place themselves in immediate subordination to himself. Under his protection numerous communities were formed which knew no one above them but the King. Obedience to a distant monarch19 is liberty itself compared with the dominion65 of the lord of the neighbouring castle: and the monarch was long compelled by necessities of position to exert his authority as the ally, rather than the master, of the classes whom he had aided in affecting their liberation. In this manner a central power, despotic in principle though generally much restricted in practice, was mainly instrumental in carrying the people through a necessary stage of improvement, which representative government, if real, would most likely have prevented them from entering upon. Nothing short of despotic rule, or a general massacre66, could have effected the emancipation67 of the serfs in the Russian Empire.
The same passages of history forcibly illustrate68 another mode in which unlimited69 monarchy70 overcomes obstacles to the progress of civilisation which representative government would have had a decided71 tendency to aggravate72. One of the strongest hindrances73 to improvement, up to a rather advanced stage, is an inveterate74 spirit of locality. Portions of mankind, in many other respects capable of, and prepared for, freedom, may be unqualified for amalgamating75 into even the smallest nation. Not only may jealousies76 and antipathies77 repel78 them from one another, and bar all possibility of voluntary union, but they may not yet have acquired any of the feelings or habits which would make the union real, supposing it to be nominally79 accomplished. They may, like the citizens of an ancient community, or those of an Asiatic village, have had considerable practice in exercising their faculties80 on village or town interests, and have even realised a tolerably effective popular government on that restricted scale, and may yet have but slender sympathies with anything beyond, and no habit or capacity of dealing81 with interests common to many such communities.
I am not aware that history furnishes any example in which a number of these political atoms or corpuscles have coalesced82 into a body, and learnt to feel themselves one people, except through previous subjection to a central authority common to all.3 It is through the habit of deferring83 to that authority, entering into its plans and subserving its purposes, that a people such as we have supposed receive into their minds the conception of large interests, common to a considerable geographical84 extent. Such interests, on the contrary, are necessarily the predominant consideration in the mind of the central ruler; and through the relations, more or less intimate, which he progressively establishes with the localities, they become familiar to the general mind. The most favourable86 concurrence87 of circumstances under which this step in improvement could be made, would be one which should raise up representative institutions without representative government; a representative body, or bodies, drawn from the localities, making itself the auxiliary88 and instrument of the central power, but seldom attempting to thwart89 or control it. The people being thus taken, as it were, into council, though not sharing the supreme90 power, the political education given by the central authority is carried home, much more effectually than it could otherwise be, to the local chiefs and to the population generally; while, at the same time, a tradition is kept up of government by general consent, or at least, the sanction of tradition is not given to government without it, which, when consecrated91 by custom, has so often put a bad end to a good beginning, and is one of the most frequent causes of the sad fatality92 which in most countries has stopped improvement in so early a stage, because the work of some one period has been so done as to bar the needful work of the ages following. Meanwhile, it may be laid down as a political truth, that by irresponsible monarchy rather than by representative government can a multitude of insignificant93 political units be welded into a people, with common feelings of cohesion94, power enough to protect itself against conquest or foreign aggression95, and affairs sufficiently96 various and considerable of its own to occupy worthily97 and expand to fit proportions the social and political intelligence of the population.
3 Italy, which alone can be quoted as an exception, is only so in regard to the final stage of its transformation98. The more difficult previous advance from the city isolation99 of Florence, Pisa, or Milan, to the provincial100 unity63 of Tuscany or Lombardy, took place in the usual manner.
For these several reasons, kingly government, free from the control (though perhaps strengthened by the support) of representative institutions, is the most suitable form of polity for the earliest stages of any community, not excepting a city-community like those of ancient Greece: where, accordingly, the government of kings, under some real but no ostensible101 or constitutional control by public opinion, did historically precede by an unknown and probably great duration all free institutions, and gave place at last, during a considerable lapse102 of time, to oligarchies103 of a few families.
A hundred other infirmities or short-comings in a people might be pointed104 out, which pro1 tanto disqualify them from making the best use of representative government; but in regard to these it is not equally obvious that the government of One or a Few would have any tendency to cure or alleviate105 the evil. Strong prejudices of any kind; obstinate106 adherence107 to old habits; positive defects of national character, or mere ignorance, and deficiency of mental cultivation108, if prevalent in a people, will be in general faithfully reflected in their representative assemblies: and should it happen that the executive administration, the direct management of public affairs, is in the hands of persons comparatively free from these defects, more good would frequently be done by them when not hampered109 by the necessity of carrying with them the voluntary assent110 of such bodies. But the mere position of the rulers does not in these, as it does in the other cases which we have examined, of itself invest them with interests and tendencies operating in the beneficial direction. From the general weaknesses of the people or of the state of civilisation, the One and his counsellors, or the Few, are not likely to be habitually111 exempt112; except in the case of their being foreigners, belonging to a superior people or a more advanced state of society. Then, indeed, the rulers may be, to almost any extent, superior in civilisation to those over whom they rule; and subjection to a foreign government of this description, notwithstanding its inevitable113 evils, is of ten of the greatest advantage to a people, carrying them rapidly through several stages of progress, and clearing away obstacles to improvement which might have lasted indefinitely if the subject population had been left unassisted to its native tendencies and chances. In a country not under the dominion of foreigners, the only cause adequate to producing similar benefits is the rare accident of a monarch of extraordinary genius. There have been in history a few of these, who, happily for humanity, have reigned114 long enough to render some of their improvements permanent, by leaving them under the guardianship115 of a generation which had grown up under their influence. Charlemagne may be cited as one instance; Peter the Great is another. Such examples however are so unfrequent that they can only be classed with the happy accidents which have so often decided at a critical moment whether some leading portion of humanity should make a sudden start, or sink back towards barbarism: chances like the existence of Themistocles at the time of the Persian invasion, or of the first or third William of Orange.
It would be absurd to construct institutions for the mere purpose of taking advantage of such possibilities; especially as men of this calibre, in any distinguished117 position, do not require despotic power to enable them to exert great influence, as is evidenced by the three last mentioned. The case most requiring consideration in reference to institutions is the not very uncommon118 one in which a small but leading portion of the population, from difference of race, more civilised origin, or other peculiarities119 of circumstance, are markedly superior in civilisation and general character to the remainder. Under those conditions, government by the representatives of the mass would stand a chance of depriving them of much of the benefit they might derive58 from the greater civilisation of the superior ranks; while government by the representatives of those ranks would probably rivet120 the degradation121 of the multitude, and leave them no hope of decent treatment except by ridding themselves of one of the most valuable elements of future advancement. The best prospect122 of improvement for a people thus composed lies in the existence of a constitutionally unlimited, or at least a practically preponderant, authority in the chief ruler of the dominant85 class. He alone has by his position an interest in raising and improving the mass of whom he is not jealous, as a counterpoise to his associates of whom he is. And if fortunate circumstances place beside him, not as controllers but as subordinates, a body representative of the superior caste, which by its objections and questionings, and by its occasional outbreaks of spirit, keeps alive habits of collective resistance, and may admit of being, in time and by degrees, expanded into a really national representation (which is in substance the history of the English Parliament), the nation has then the most favourable prospects123 of improvement which can well occur to a community thus circumstanced and constituted.
Among the tendencies which, without absolutely rendering124 a people unfit for representative government, seriously incapacitate them from reaping the full benefit of it, one deserves particular notice. There are two states of the inclinations125, intrinsically very different, but which have something in common, by virtue126 of which they often coincide in the direction they give to the efforts of individuals and of nations: one is, the desire to exercise power over others; the other is disinclination to have power exercised over themselves.
The difference between different portions of mankind in the relative strength of these two dispositions127 is one of the most important elements in their history. There are nations in whom the passion for governing others is so much stronger than the desire of personal independence, that for the mere shadow of the one they are found ready to sacrifice the whole of the other. Each one of their number is willing, like the private soldier in an army, to abdicate128 his personal freedom of action into the hands of his general, provided the army is triumphant129 and victorious130, and he is able to flatter himself that he is one of a conquering host, though the notion that he has himself any share in the domination exercised over the conquered is an illusion. A government strictly131 limited in its powers and attributions, required to hold its hands from over-meddling132, and to let most things go on without its assuming the part of guardian116 or director, is not to the taste of such a people. In their eyes the possessors of authority can hardly take too much upon themselves, provided the authority itself is open to general competition. An average individual among them prefers the chance, however distant or improbable, of wielding133 some share of power over his fellow citizens, above the certainty, to himself and others, of having no unnecessary power exercised over them. These are the elements of a people of place-hunters; in whom the course of politics is mainly determined134 by place-hunting; where equality alone is cared for, but not liberty; where the contests of political parties are but struggles to decide whether the power of meddling in everything shall belong to one class or another, perhaps merely to one knot of public men or another; where the idea entertained of democracy is merely that of opening offices to the competition of all instead of a few; where, the more popular the institutions, the more innumerable are the places created, and the more monstrous135 the over-government exercised by all over each, and by the executive over all. It would be as unjust as it would be ungenerous to offer this, or anything approaching to it, as an unexaggerated picture of the French people; yet the degree in which they do participate in this type of character has caused representative government by a limited class to break down by excess of corruption, and the attempt at representative government by the whole male population to end in giving one man the power of consigning136 any number of the rest, without trial, to Lambessa or Cayenne, provided he allows all of them to think themselves not excluded from the possibility of sharing his favours.
The point of character which, beyond any other, fits the people of this country for representative government is that they have almost universally the contrary characteristic. They are very jealous of any attempt to exercise power over them not sanctioned by long usage and by their own opinion of right; but they in general care very little for the exercise of power over others. Not having the smallest sympathy with the passion for governing, while they are but too well acquainted with the motives137 of private interest from which that office is sought, they prefer that it should be performed by those to whom it comes without seeking, as a consequence of social position. If foreigners understood this, it would account to them for some of the apparent contradictions in the political feelings of Englishmen; their unhesitating readiness to let themselves be governed by the higher classes, coupled with so little personal subservience to them, that no people are so fond of resisting authority when it oversteps certain prescribed limits, or so determined to make their rulers always remember that they will only be governed in the way they themselves like best. Place-hunting, accordingly, is a form of ambition to which the English, considered nationally, are almost strangers. If we except the few families or connections of whom official employment lies directly in the way, Englishmen's views of advancement in life take an altogether different direction — that of success in business, or in a profession. They have the strongest distaste for any mere struggle for office by political parties or individuals: and there are few things to which they have a greater aversion than to the multiplication138 of public employments: a thing, on the contrary, always popular with the bureaucracy-ridden nations of the Continent, who would rather pay higher taxes than diminish by the smallest fraction their individual chances of a place for themselves or their relatives, and among whom a cry for retrenchment139 never means abolition140 of offices, but the reduction of the salaries of those which are too considerable for the ordinary citizen to have any chance of being appointed to them.
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pro
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| n.赞成，赞成的意见，赞成者 | |
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prop
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| vt.支撑；n.支柱，支撑物；支持者，靠山 | |
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requisites
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| n.必要的事物( requisite的名词复数 ) | |
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advancement
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| n.前进，促进，提升 | |
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descending
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| n. 下行 adj. 下降的 | |
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permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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subsist
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| vi.生存，存在，供养 | |
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enumerated
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| v.列举，枚举，数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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boon
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| n.恩赐，恩物，恩惠 | |
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irrelevant
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| adj.不恰当的，无关系的，不相干的 | |
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adverse
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| adj.不利的；有害的；敌对的，不友好的 | |
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hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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repugnance
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| n.嫌恶 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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monarchical
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| adj. 国王的，帝王的，君主的，拥护君主制的 =monarchic | |
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monarch
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| n.帝王，君主，最高统治者 | |
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indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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attachment
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| n.附属物，附件；依恋；依附 | |
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wields
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| 手持着使用（武器、工具等）( wield的第三人称单数 )； 具有； 运用（权力）； 施加（影响） | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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subservience
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| n.有利，有益；从属（地位），附属性；屈从，恭顺；媚态 | |
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overthrown
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muster
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| v.集合，收集，鼓起，激起；n.集合，检阅，集合人员，点名册 | |
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coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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suffrage
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| n.投票，选举权，参政权 | |
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adherents
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| n.支持者，拥护者( adherent的名词复数 )；党羽；徒子徒孙 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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appeasing
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| 安抚，抚慰( appease的现在分词 )； 绥靖（满足另一国的要求以避免战争） | |
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publicity
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| n.众所周知，闻名；宣传，广告 | |
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nominal
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| adj.名义上的；(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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sordid
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| adj.肮脏的，不干净的，卑鄙的，暗淡的 | |
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factions
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| 组织中的小派别，派系( faction的名词复数 ) | |
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chronic
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| adj.(疾病)长期未愈的，慢性的；极坏的 | |
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attaining
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的现在分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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mitigated
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| v.减轻，缓和( mitigate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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civilisation
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| n.文明，文化，开化，教化 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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50
miraculous
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| adj.像奇迹一样的，不可思议的 | |
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51
ascendancy
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| n.统治权，支配力量 | |
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52
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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53
specified
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| adj.特定的 | |
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54
prostrated
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| v.使俯伏，使拜倒( prostrate的过去式和过去分词 )；（指疾病、天气等）使某人无能为力 | |
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55
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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56
tyrants
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| 专制统治者( tyrant的名词复数 )； 暴君似的人； （古希腊的）僭主； 严酷的事物 | |
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57
yoke
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| n.轭；支配；v.给...上轭，连接，使成配偶 | |
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58
derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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59
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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60
potentate
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| n.统治者；君主 | |
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61
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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62
abated
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| 减少( abate的过去式和过去分词 )； 减去； 降价； 撤消（诉讼） | |
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63
unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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64
emancipate
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| v.解放，解除 | |
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65
dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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66
massacre
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| n.残杀，大屠杀；v.残杀，集体屠杀 | |
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67
emancipation
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| n.（从束缚、支配下）解放 | |
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68
illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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69
unlimited
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| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
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70
monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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71
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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72
aggravate
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| vt.加重(剧)，使恶化；激怒，使恼火 | |
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73
hindrances
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| 阻碍者( hindrance的名词复数 )； 障碍物； 受到妨碍的状态 | |
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74
inveterate
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| adj.积习已深的，根深蒂固的 | |
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75
amalgamating
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| v.（使）（金属）汞齐化( amalgamate的现在分词 )；（使）合并；联合；结合 | |
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76
jealousies
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| n.妒忌( jealousy的名词复数 )；妒羡 | |
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77
antipathies
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| 反感( antipathy的名词复数 )； 引起反感的事物； 憎恶的对象； （在本性、倾向等方面的）不相容 | |
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78
repel
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| v.击退，抵制，拒绝，排斥 | |
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79
nominally
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| 在名义上，表面地； 应名儿 | |
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80
faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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81
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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82
coalesced
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| v.联合，合并( coalesce的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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83
deferring
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| v.拖延，延缓，推迟( defer的现在分词 )；服从某人的意愿，遵从 | |
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84
geographical
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| adj.地理的；地区(性)的 | |
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85
dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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86
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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87
concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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88
auxiliary
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| adj.辅助的，备用的 | |
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89
thwart
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| v.阻挠，妨碍，反对；adj.横(断的) | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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91
consecrated
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| adj.神圣的，被视为神圣的v.把…奉为神圣，给…祝圣( consecrate的过去式和过去分词 )；奉献 | |
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92
fatality
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| n.不幸，灾祸，天命 | |
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93
insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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94
cohesion
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| n.团结，凝结力 | |
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95
aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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96
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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97
worthily
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| 重要地，可敬地，正当地 | |
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98
transformation
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| n.变化；改造；转变 | |
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99
isolation
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| n.隔离，孤立，分解，分离 | |
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100
provincial
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| adj.省的，地方的；n．外省人，乡下人 | |
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101
ostensible
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| adj.(指理由)表面的，假装的 | |
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102
lapse
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| n.过失，流逝，失效，抛弃信仰，间隔；vi.堕落，停止，失效，流逝；vt.使失效 | |
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103
oligarchies
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| n.寡头统治的政府( oligarchy的名词复数 )；寡头政治的执政集团；寡头统治的国家 | |
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104
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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105
alleviate
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| v.减轻，缓和，缓解(痛苦等) | |
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106
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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107
adherence
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| n.信奉，依附，坚持，固着 | |
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108
cultivation
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| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
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109
hampered
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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110
assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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111
habitually
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| ad.习惯地，通常地 | |
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112
exempt
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| adj.免除的；v.使免除；n.免税者，被免除义务者 | |
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113
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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114
reigned
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| vi.当政，统治（reign的过去式形式） | |
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115
guardianship
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| n. 监护, 保护, 守护 | |
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116
guardian
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| n.监护人；守卫者，保护者 | |
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117
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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118
uncommon
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| adj.罕见的，非凡的，不平常的 | |
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119
peculiarities
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| n. 特质, 特性, 怪癖, 古怪 | |
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120
rivet
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| n.铆钉；vt.铆接，铆牢；集中(目光或注意力) | |
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121
degradation
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| n.降级；低落；退化；陵削；降解；衰变 | |
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122
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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123
prospects
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| n.希望，前途(恒为复数) | |
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124
rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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125
inclinations
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| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
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126
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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127
dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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128
abdicate
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| v.让位，辞职，放弃 | |
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129
triumphant
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| adj.胜利的，成功的；狂欢的，喜悦的 | |
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130
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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131
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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132
meddling
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| v.干涉，干预（他人事务）( meddle的现在分词 ) | |
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133
wielding
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| 手持着使用（武器、工具等）( wield的现在分词 )； 具有； 运用（权力）； 施加（影响） | |
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134
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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135
monstrous
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| adj.巨大的；恐怖的；可耻的，丢脸的 | |
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136
consigning
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| v.把…置于（令人不快的境地）( consign的现在分词 )；把…托付给；把…托人代售；丟弃 | |
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137
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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138
multiplication
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| n.增加，增多，倍增；增殖，繁殖；乘法 | |
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139
retrenchment
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| n.节省，删除 | |
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140
abolition
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| n.废除，取消 | |
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